"This study analyses the media ecosystem in post-Assad Syria, focusing on the proliferation of disinformation, ethno-sectarian hate speech and Foreign Interference (FIMI). It covers the period from December 2024 to December 2025, one year after the collapse of the Assad regime. Besides disinformation, the research examines emerging media structures, media policies of the transitional government, and the professional conditions of journalists across different regions of Syria. The study is based on field research conducted in Damascus in September and November 2025, semi-structured interviews with approximately 60 stakeholders —including government officials, journalists, and media experts from eight Syrian cities— in-depth desk research, social media analysis and a focus group discussion with Syrian media professionals held during a workshop in Amman [...]
Within this broader context, the Syrian media landscape is undergoing significant transformation. State media institutions, such as the television channel Al-Ikhbariya, the news agency SANA, and the newspaper Al-Thawra, have adjusted their editorial lines and now largely support the new government, with limited critical coverage. The state media sector employs an estimated 7,000–8,000 staff, but displays pronounced salary inequalities between long-standing employees and newly appointed executives from Idlib. Media outlets funded by Qatar, including Syria Now and Syria TV, have gained prominence due to their close alignment with the new authorities. While some exile media outlets have begun to return to Syria, local and independent media organisations continue to operate under precarious financial conditions. In the Kurdish-controlled northeast of Syria (AANES), an autonomous media system persists, though it has been severely affected by the withdrawal of U.S. funding.
Disinformation represents a central challenge in the Syrian media and information environment, particularly given the dominance of social media and messaging platforms as primary news sources. The study identifies multiple actors involved in coordinated disinformation campaigns. These include remnants of the former regime (Foloul), who seek to destabilise the transitional authorities as well as foreign actors—for example Russia, Iran, Israel and Turkey—that pursue their own geopolitical interests partly through coordinated campaigns; and ISIS propaganda, which routinely calls for attacks on Alawites, Shias, Christians, Druze, Kurds, and other groups it casts as enemies. Most of the various ethno-religious communities are both targets and producers of disinformation. Competing narratives centred on victimhood, revenge, and revisionism have contributed to cycles of mistrust and fear. Disinformation, hate speech, and propaganda are primarily disseminated via Facebook, WhatsApp, and Telegram.
Based on these findings, the study proposes five policy recommendations: (1) the establishment of a Syria Media and Disinformation Observatory to monitor and analyse disinformation trends; (2) the development of a context-sensitive media literacy toolkit; (3) sustained international funding for public interest media; (4) cross-regional professional networking and training programmes for Syrian journalists; and (5) youth-focused initiatives aimed at promoting social cohesion. The study concludes that the future development of a pluralistic media system in Syria will depend largely on internal power dynamics within the ruling elites, particularly the balance between ideological hardliners and more pragmatic actors." (Executive summary)