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Online Content Regulation in the Asia-Pacific: Limiting Civil Society’s Capacity to Hold Governments Accountable

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2024), v, 37 pp.

"Governments have updated penal codes and national security laws, enacted fake news and cybersecurity laws as well as laws that govern internet service providers and technology companies. These laws have widely been used to block and remove online content that call out blind spots in government poli ... cies and to intimidate and prosecute these content creators through hefty fines and jail time. Efforts to hold political office holders and government officials accountable for their policies are increasingly penalised. These government actions have significantly impacted civil society actors in numerous ways. First, individuals and organisations utilising the online sphere to hold government officials and policies accountable have come under intense scrutiny, resulting in the criminalisation of critics and the blocking and removal of online content deemed sensitive by state authorities. Second, the effectiveness of civil society in holding governments accountable is compromised, as state authorities routinely direct internet service providers and technology companies to block or remove online content considered sensitive or illegal. Consequently, individuals and organisations increasingly find their digital content at risk of being blocked or removed, succumbing to government directives to internet service providers and technology companies. This diminishes civil society’s calls for accountability. Third, on several instances, governments have imposed internet shutdowns - particularly during elections and politically sensitive periods - to disrupt the information flow. Ultimately, this has limited civil society’s ability to send and receive communications effectively to mobilise people to hold governments publicly accountable during politically important instances. Fourth, troll ng has surfaced as a mainstream strategy to harass and intimidate individuals and organisations who seek to hold governments accountable. Typically orchestrated by organised groups or cybertroopers, these digital attacks increasingly involve online hate speech directed at women who call out blindspots in government policies. Fifth, the ways of working of INGOs and CSOs have changed, leading many organisations to restrict the scope and assertiveness of their communications to shield themselves from government retribution and trolling. Some entities have opted to remove the visibility of their organisations, incorporating measures such as disallowing the use of their logos or the publishing of videos, photos and text by local partners in order to distance themselves from particular activities and contents of knowledge products. Given these developments, the principal recommendation is that key stakeholders, including international organisations, governments, ISPs and technology companies, and civil society actors, should recognise that criticism of government policies and officials is a legitimate activity and a vital form of expression for civil society. Hence, any measures, whether legal or non-legal, that interfere with or criminalise this legitimate activity should be rescinded or disallowed. Instead, measures should be put in place to ensure that civil society is empowered to call out the blind spots in government policies." (Executive summary) more

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Political Hate Sites in Singapore: Flourishing Without Repercussions

Ekmongkhon Puridej

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), 60 pp.

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State-Sponsored Online Disinformation: Impact on Electoral Integrity in Thailand

Korbkusol Neelapaichit, Ekmongkhon Puridej (eds.)

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), vii, 42 pp.

"[This publication] outlines how organised disinformation campaigns or Information Operations have become the latest variable to impact the quality of elections in the kingdom [...] Drawn from past evidence, the report identifies four forms of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns that are likely ... more

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Digital Security and Human Rights Defenders Landscape: Recommendations for NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), 22 pp.

"Governments in the Asia-Pacific region have responded to human rights defenders' (HRD’s) new online advocacy strategies, affecting their online advocacy through the use of legal and non-legal measures to harass them and impede their work. Against this backdrop, National Human Rights Institutions ... more

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Digital Security and Human Rights Defenders in the Asia-Pacific

James Gomez, Marc Piñol Rovira et al.

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), 47 pp.

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Internet Freedoms in Malaysia: Regulating Online Discourse on Race, Religion, and Royalty

Bangkok: Asia Centre (2023), 49 pp.

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Restrictions on Internet Freedoms: Recommendations for Thai Policy-Makers and Civil Society

Bangkok: Asia Centre (2023), 16 pp.

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Media Freedom in Southeast Asia: Repeal Restrictive Laws, Strengthen Quality Journalism

Bangkok: Asia Centre; Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2022), 41 pp.

"This report proposes solutions on how best to equip journalists and other key actors to fulfil their vital role in a changing landscape. While censorship is an alluring option in the face of disinformation over the internet, it is important to find avenues to facilitate the responsible and ethical ... more

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Internet Freedoms in Thailand

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2022), iv, 29 pp.

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Youth and Disinformation in Malaysia: Strengthening Electoral Integrity

Korbkusol Neelapaichit, Ekmongkhon Puridej, Pemtat Chanhom (ed.)

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2022), vii, 44 pp.

"In 2022, internet penetration and social platform usage reached an all-time high – 43.4% of the total population who use the internet are youth aged between 15-24 years. Youth voters have explicitly become a major target of political parties and their campaign messages. We can expect social media ... more

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Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns

Asia Centre (2021), 8 pp.

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Myanmar: Dismantling Dissent. Crackdowns on Internet Freedoms

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2021), 27 pp.

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Timor Leste: Internet Freedoms under Threat

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2021), 26 pp.

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"Infodemic" and SDGs: Internet Freedoms in Southeast Asia

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2021), 46 pp.

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Internet Freedoms in Cambodia: A Gateway to Control

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2021), 32 pp.

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Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns

Asia Centre (2021), 15 pp.

"Asia Centre’s Briefing Note, Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns, tracks the period 1 February to 31 March 2021. The Note provides a timeline of the shutdowns, reactions from protestors, technology companies and the international community, legal analysis of key laws and Myanmar’s international ... more

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Harmony Laws in Southeast Asia: Majority Dominance, Minority Repression

Bangkok: Asia Centre; Association for Progressive Communications (APC) (2021), 63 pp.

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Defending freedom of expression: Fake news laws in East and Southeast Asia
Deep Insights

Bangkog; Manila: Asia Centre; Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD). (2020), 61 pp.

"This report compares the impact of legislation in countries with multiparty legislatures and independent government institutions, and countries with one dominant political force and an absence of independent national institutions. It finds that in the former countries, provisions are included to sa ... more

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Hate Speech in Southeast Asia: New Forms, Old Rules

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2020), 40 pp.

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International Conference on Fake News and Elections in Asia. Conference Proceedings

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2019), 22 pp.

Defending freedom of expression: Fake news laws in East and Southeast Asia Deep Insights

Defending freedom of expression: Fake news laws in East and Southeast Asia
Deep Insights