"Apart from the geographical differences, another distinction has to be made between established media (pro-government) and emerging media (post 2011). The development of the media field is the product of the authoritarian pre 2011 context and the ongoing conflict, which has resulted so far in the d ... eath of hundreds of thousands of people and the displacement of an estimated 11 million Syrians. The popular uprising that broke up in March 2011, cracked down by the government and the subsequent escalation of violence by all the actors involved in the conflict, has led to a gradual descent into regional war, which has transformed the country - according to the New York-based organisation Reporters Without Borders - into one of the world’s most dangerous country for journalists, with extremely high risk of arrest, abduction or death. In fact, as the figures released by the Syrian Network for Human Rights state, 707 citizen journalists were killed in the country from March 2011 until April 2020 and 422 are still detained, mostly by the Syrian government. Nevertheless, there has been a true explosion of “independent media” after 2011, many of which, after reaching the peak in 2013, have since closed. The proliferation of media institutions has been quite chaotic and only recently people working in the field have become more aware of the importance of stronger institutionalisation. Also the Kurdish context has been affected by this break-with-the-past attitude. The repression and oppression by the government went further than in any other region: Kurdish language was banned until 2011 and any cultural expression of Kurdish identity was prohibited. With the autonomy self-proclaimed in 2016, for the first time in recent years a high number of local outlets in Kurdish were launched. The de facto neutrality of Rojava during clashes between the Syrian regime and the opposition forces has created a favourable environment for media institutions, with fewer restrictions than in the rest of Syria. However, local media are highly politicised and, being most of them affiliated with political parties, all too often biased. Political and sectarian fragmentation and polarisation in the different areas of Syria have an immediate effect on the structure of the media landscape, not only at a local, but also national level. Politics through its partisan and armed structures has a direct influence over media production. In government-held areas the Syrian media scene remains largely dominated by pro-government news sources. In this rapidly changing environment, though, the government has not remained behind. It has tried to update its media system, not by establishing new outlets, but by developing those already existing. Moreover, in recent years, especially local media (devoted for example to a specific city or region, or available only on Facebook) have gained relatively more independence. In such areas as Tartus, Latakia, Hama, local media running only on Facebook pages have managed to exert some kind of pressure on both local and central authorities and at this level, journalists have learnt whether and how to cross certain red lines. They have been able to denounce episodes of corruption in a frame of distorted governance dynamics, succeeding in circumventing censorship by not calling into question the status quo and not explicitly taking political stances.In opposition-held areas, the only real independent media are those funded by foreign INGOs, which for structural and economic reasons cannot invest as much and play the same role as the regional and local actors directly or indirectly involved in the conflict do. However, very local and grass-roots independent media initiatives in the years have proved resilient to openly denounce the socio-economic injustices of despotic local, central or foreign authorities. In Kurdish areas, the main division is between the PYD and its supporters on the one hand and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) - the largest party in Iraqi Kurdistan - and its affiliates on the other. A high number of journalists have reported being subjected to pressures on the side of the PYD and its supporters. Thanks to these connections with Kurdish parties, media outlets in Rojava have comparably more funds. It is the only area, for example, where TV stations have been established: Ronahi (linked to PYD) and Zagros TV (affiliated to KDP). It is not by coincidence that Ronahi newspaper has a circulation of 10,000 copies in Rojava, much more than what any independent media can afford." (Overview) more

"The Lebanese media sector is facing a profound crisis and there are many journalists and media staff, working in the local and pan-Arab media outlets based in Beirut, who have not been paid for long time or have lost their jobs. As-Safir, a historic newspaper, was forced to close, and An-Nahar has ... weakened and had to restructure. Even Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera offices in Beirut and in the region have reduced the number of their staff members. The only media outlets that resist are those financed by large investors, linked to political-sectarian actors in the region. In the 1970s, Lebanon offered a unique cultural openness and freedom of expression. Beirut was the region’s media hub and the target of important funding for its publications. Investors included Iraq’s former president Saddam Hussein, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, deposed Tunisian president Ben Ali, as well as Saudi royals. Lebanese newspapers were read throughout the Arab world and used to feature articles and op-eds by personalities from all over the region. Gulf countries, but also Iraq and Libya, used to finance Lebanese newsrooms to carry out and support their political battles. As a result, the injection of foreign funding was abundant and steady. Nowadays, with the global economic crises and the new channels of the Gulf, that money has been inexorably vanishing. From the second half of the 19th century, decades before the creation of independent Lebanon in 1946, Beirut boasted pre-eminence in the surrounding Arab regions for the freedom of expression enjoyed by its several newspapers. These are indeed the oldest and most important in the area. Even today, the smallest country in the Middle East is an exception compared to its Arab neighbours in terms of pluralism of the press and broad range of readers. Despite a history of turmoil, Lebanon’s well-educated and critical population has led to one of the most diverse and sophisticated press and media landscapes in the Arab Levant. With newspapers and media outlets in four different languages (Arabic, French, English and Armenian), Beirut has a vibrant media community with relatively high professional standards and free from State control. The Lebanese press does, however, reflect the limitations of the sectarian system that dominates the country, where a newspaper or a TV station is more often than not identified with one of the main religious and political groups. With the media being entangled to the national politics and international influence peddling, journalists are often required to act like political activists. On the one hand the Lebanese State does not control media outlets, contrary to what happens in many other Arab countries; however, on the other hand, political parties have the power to influence and direct the majority of Lebanese media institutions, which therefore reflect the country’s sectarian politics and all too often serve as the mouthpiece for political propaganda. Since media outlets do not rely on readership, but rather on investors as a source of revenue, there is little – if any – interest in producing quality journalism. Moreover, the deep and long-lasting economic crisis did not spare the media and in particular the newspapers. The media sector started to suffer heavily from 2016, when shortage of funding hit several companies and outlets, with the consequent inability of producing quality content and paying wages. Regardless of the political affiliation, the whole sector has reported negative trends and suffered from financial problems, reducing the number, the quality and the circulation of newspapers. The situation faced by Lebanese media reached a critical dimension, as it was defined “free falling” (The Guardian) and “dying” (Middle East Eye). It is unfortunately a common practice to bribe journalists to publish a certain piece of information, or – on the contrary – to avoid any further analysis on specific matters. With the financial crisis newsrooms have been facing, it is even harder for journalists to resist such offers. Lebanese syndicates have asked the government to support the country’s media. Former minister of information Ramzi Joreige announced in 2016 the creation of a $10m fund to back Lebanese newspapers, but the plan was never voted on in parliament. With the creation of a new cabinet in late January 2020, the newly appointed minister of Information is Manal Abdul Samad, an expert on taxation and fiscal policies, with experience in university teaching. In the first months of her mandate, she showed commitment in proposing reform plans for the information and media sector in Lebanon. Considering the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemics, the minister expressed concern on the accuracy of news broadcasted and the intention of drafting a plan to overview and regulate the spread of fake news regarding the virus. In May 2020, she presented a plan for the complete restructuring of the Ministry of Information and the public media sector, which is still under the government’s consideration." (Overview) more