"This report investigates the political economy of covert influence in the 2022 Philippine Elections, with a focus on social media influencers involved in covert political campaigning. This interdisciplinary research (1) examines political influencers and peripheral actors in the field engaged in po
...
litical campaigning using qualitative field research methods, (2) maps and evaluates evidence of their participation in covert influence operations through computational social science methods, and (3) estimates political spending on the presumed commissioned influencers through economic modeling. Our research is the first empirical work to produce an assembly of data-informed approximations of the scope and scale of the political economy of covert influence operations. Specifically, it is the first to estimate the economic ‘cost’ of commissioned influencers for electoral influence operations in the Philippines. It also provides a complex but nuanced account of influencers as ‘gray’ political actors who exercise agency in their complicity to covert political campaigning given commensurate economic and political incentives. Amidst undocumented transactions and opaque operations, our research establishes multiple, cross-platform proxy measures of malicious political influencing, beyond established detection mechanisms. We find that thousands of political influencers are presumed to be commissioned to perform covert political campaigning in the 2022 Philippine Elections for top national positions, funded by massive financing by political intermediaries in a largely unstructured and unregulated economic market characterized by asymmetrical political relations." (Executive summary, page 11)
more
"Increasingly, social media has become a major source of fake news, with disinformation used as a tool in manipulating public opinion and delegitimizing opposing voices. This study explores the influence of the content of social media on traditional media, and the proliferation of disinformation in
...
the context of elections and accountability in Nigeria. Data were collected from 60 interviews and 18 focus group discussions with key stakeholders across Nigeria’s geo-political zones. The result shows the content of social media as shaping traditional media in addition to exacerbating pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions. The study recommends strengthening the positive elements of social media to weaken the threat posed by digital disinformation." (Abstract)
more
"Trust is the foundation on which democracy is built. Not coincidentally, it is the main victim of attacks by disinformation merchants bent on undermining the electoral process and the democratic environment. This article outlines the efforts of the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE) to tackle
...
the effects of ‘information disorder’ on its democratic process, discussing its partnerships with digitalplatforms and civil society to guarantee transparency and to build trust and integrity in electoral processes in Brazil. The TSE aims to increase the electorate’s access to information and its resilience to disinformation, as well as build official mechanisms to respond to these threats. Related decisions issued by the court will also be analysed. The article demonstrates how these initiatives have helped the TSE to reduce disinformation in the electoral information ecosystem and enabled a more informed exercise of the right to vote." (Abstract)
more
"Disinformation represents a danger to the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process. From our research based on the 2021 Czech parliamentary elections, we introduce a model for measuring the resilience of citizens to disinformation. This model is then used to draw conclusions about the impa
...
ct of disinformation on their voting behaviour. We argue that it is important to understand this impact in the context of pre-existing beliefs and opinions, and therefore in terms of disinformation reinforcing rather than changing existing views. In particular, we demonstrate how feeling disappointed with one political party can make people more inclined to endorse disinformation that targets it." (Abstract)
more
"With contributions from scholars across the continent, Digital Citizenship in Africa illustrates how citizens have been using VPNs, encryption, and privacy-protecting browsers to resist limits on their rights to privacy and political speech. This book dramatically expands our understanding of the v
...
ast and growing arsenal of tech tools, tactics, and techniques now being deployed by repressive governments to limit the ability of citizens to safely and openly express opposition to government and corporate actions. AI-enabled surveillance, covertly deployed disinformation, and internet shutdowns are documented in ten countries, concluding with recommendations on how to curb government and corporate power, and how to re-invigorate digital citizenship across Africa." (Publisher description)
more
"This report examines the characteristics and consequences of influence operations in the 2022 presidential election in the Philippines. The report makes three main claims: a) the term "influence operations" provides a broader frame to identify personalities, platforms, and practices that hack publi
...
c attention, mobilize publics, and influence electoral out; b) influence operations build on cumulative impacts of longitudinal disinformation; c) The main consequence of influence operations in 2022 is the creation of parallel public spheres or two separate information ecosystems aligned with hardened political identities. The document concludes with pathways forward as the nation seeks to rebuild today's distorted public sphere." (Executive summary, page 7)
more
"Analisamos uma amostra do conteúdo denunciado ao TSE, a fim de verificar se, de fato, a Meta removeu ou indicou a presença de desinformação nestas publicações. Os resultados apontam que parcelas expressivas das publicações denunciadas e já diagnosticadas como nocivas por checadores de fato
...
s não foram removidas das redes da Meta e/ou não receberam o rótulo de desinformação. A Meta está permitindo a circulação de conteúdo nocivo à democracia brasileira no Facebook e Instagram, sem cumprir de forma efetiva com as suas políticas e a parceria com o TSE." (Apresentação)
more
"Die Coronapandemie hat schonungslos die Schwachstellen der digitalen Gesellschaft aufgedeckt: die Digitalisierungsdefizite der öffentlichen Verwaltung, die schlechte digitale Ausstattung der Schulen und Universitäten, die Monopolstellung internationaler Digitalkonzerne, die Polarisierung in den s
...
ozialen Medien, die digitale Spaltung der Gesellschaft in Stadt und Land und Arm und Reich. Auch die Demokratie und ihre Institutionen scheinen nur zum Teil auf die Herausforderungen der Digitalisierung vorbereitet zu sein. Gleichzeitig hat die Pandemie gesellschaftliche Digitalisierungspotenziale aufgezeigt und entsprechende Prozesse angestoßen oder beschleunigt, etwa hinsichtlich neuer digitaler Formen der Kommunikation und des Arbeitens, der Verwaltungsmodernisierung oder im Bereich demokratischer Partizipation. Die größte gesellschaftliche Aufgabe dürfte künftig sein, alte digitale Spaltungen und Ungleichheiten abzubauen und neuen vorzubeugen." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
more
"This handbook offers a comprehensive overview of international and regional standards and commitments related to the rights to freedom of expression, access to information, political participation, and privacy in the area of the internet, social media and Artificial Intelligence in elections. It al
...
so maps a series of good practices implemented by diverse stakeholders worldwide during electoral processes. It is organized in eight sections: six sections dedicated to the analysis of the challenges and the general situation of elections in digital times, a section dedicated to conclusions and a section with suggestions for possible action. Each of the first six sections has a guide of suggested questions at the end in case the publication is used for trainings and workshops." (Methodological note, page 14)
more
"The Moroccan elections of September 2021 were unusual for various reasons. As electoral campaigning took place under pandemic circumstances, social media played a role previously unseen and contributed significantly to the unexpected victory of the National Rally of Independents (RNI), a liberal pa
...
rty, against the Justice and Development Party (PJD), an Islamist party. The use of social media for campaigning purposes is not a completely new phenomenon in Morocco, given its prominent use by numerous social movements in the past. However, social media became a game-changer during the last elections. Considering the COVID-19 measures imposed, political parties shifted much of their campaigning online. Today, online spaces are no longer exclusively used by grassroots activists but have become increasingly popular among Moroccan political parties. While political parties converged in resorting to online spaces to compensate for the restrictions on offline campaigns, they diverged in their approaches; additionally, not all parties have the same financial capacity to exploit the full potential of social media. The huge disproportion in resources invested in online platforms was a main contributor to the victory of the RNI and the unexpected electoral wipeout of the PJD." (Abstract)
more
"Social media have led to profound transformations in the media ecosystem and new communication dynamics. Such platforms have become a competitive source of information and played a decisive role in facilitating the dissemination of false or misleading content, with a particular impact on recent ele
...
ctions. This study analyses the formats and the spread of disinformation during Brazil’s 2018 election on social media, considering the countermeasures adopted that year by the platforms to reduce its circulation. Disinformation occupies a central space in the public debate in Brazil, where there is massive use of social media. Based on a content analysis of the 153 false or misleading narratives most shared during the campaign period, the results show that contents changed formats to overcome platforms’ countermeasures. Results also highlight a majority of images and a blend of false and accurate information that reshape the phenomenon definition and suggests the inefficacy of current regulations." (Abstract)
more
"Through this research we gained insight into tactics employed by state-backed social media disinformation. With that goal, we explored user interactions with inauthentic Twitter accounts. We used multiple procedures to measure the ways in which users talked with and about the accounts employed by t
...
he Russian-affiliated Internet Research Agency in the month before the 2016 U.S. Election. We found that users were overwhelming supportive of the IRA accounts, a fact that calls into question the standard representation of these accounts as “trolls.” Users were particularly supportive of the accounts that pretended to be part of a particular ideological group (on both the left and right), supporting arguments that a strategy of building connections with like-minded people was central to the IRA campaign. This strategy seems to work—on days that the Russian accounts received more support they also received more engagement." (Lay summary)
more
"In 2022, internet penetration and social platform usage reached an all-time high – 43.4% of the total population who use the internet are youth aged between 15-24 years. Youth voters have explicitly become a major target of political parties and their campaign messages. We can expect social media
...
and online campaigns to be deployed by political parties, sometimes at an expense of authenticity, to reach out to these young voters. However, legal and non-legal measures implemented to date have yet to effectively address disinformation. Hence, youth and other voters remain potentially exposed to the risk of online manipulation during the election. This baseline study identifies the risks from 5 recurring patterns of disinformation related to: sexual orientation and promiscuity; corruption; electoral integrity; women politicians and foreign interference. The 2022 Johor Bahru State Election confirms this trend. To mitigate disinformation and build trust in the electoral system and process, Asia Centre has complied some recommendations for key stakeholders in educational institutions, the election commission, government, media, NGOs, political parties, technology companies and youth groups who can implement them as practical safeguards to ensure that first-time and other voters are not subjected to manipulation through disinformation campaigns." (Conclusion, page 34)
more
"The actions to be developed are distributed in three axes: (i) Inform, aimed at the dissemination of official, reliable and quality information; (ii) Empower, aimed at media literacy and training the whole of society to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the functioning of the electora
...
l process; and (iii) Respond, related to the identification of cases of disinformation and the adoption of strategies, both preventive and repressive, to contain its negative effects. For the 2022 electoral cycle, the first axis has five projects with their own purposes and goals. They are: (i) mass dissemination network of truthful and official information about elections and the Electoral Justice; (ii) chatbot – electoral queries on WhatsApp; (iii) access, dissemination and enhancement of the scope of fact checking on the electoral process; (iv) deepening electoral transparency; (v) development and improvement of other technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information. In this strategic point, the Court’s action is guided by the preferential position of freedom of expression, in the legal system, by encouraging plurality of information. Likewise, information actions meet the recommendations for “prophylactic” prebunking actions (that is, strategies to reduce citizens’ susceptibility to disinformation by exposing examples of how disinformation operates). The second axis, in turn, includes seven initiatives: (i) training for internal and external audiences on disinformation, on the integrity of Brazilian elections and on the fundamentality of the Electoral Justice as an institution that guarantees democracy; (ii) prevention of the mental health of members, agents and collaborators of the Electoral Justice who deal directly with actions to contain disinformation; (iii) training the internal and external public on the electoral process, including the functions performed by it in the context of the democratic rule of Law; (iv) awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public; (v) cooperation and actions to enhance reaching partners’ media and information literacy initiatives; (vi) dialog with political parties and party federations to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of fighting against disinformation; (vii) support to other public institutions to implement actions to confronting disinformation. Finally, the response axis encompasses eight projects: (i) permanent coalition for verification; (ii) engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in confronting structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior; (iii) reporting channel for mass shooting of content in partnership with WhatsApp; (iv) creating a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process; (v) containment of disinformation on Telegram; (vi) partnership and dialog with the Federal Police and the Electoral Prosecutor Office; (vii) Strategic Cyberintelligence Committee and (viii) review and elaboration of norms that acts against the practice of disinformation in the Electoral Justice, as a way of preventing the phenomenon in question. Concerning to this point, the planning met the parameters of timely response, appreciation of fact checking, importance of engagement and transparency of platforms, as well as the expansion and improvement of channels for complaints." (Presentation, page 5-6)
more