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Russia-Ukraine War <2014-
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Der regionale Blick. Medien in Tatarstan und Baschkortostan und Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine
Russland-Analysen, issue 441 (2023), pp. 13-18
"Der Beitrag analysiert die Berichterstattung über den Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine in den russischen Teilrepubliken Tatarstan und Baschkortostan, welche sich beide durch die starke Präsenz von turksprachigen Bevölkerungsgruppen auszeichnen. Die Medienanalyse ergab, dass die Berichterstattung
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Media and the war in Ukraine
New York: Peter Lang (2023), xii, 238 pp.
"This volume aims to deepen understanding of the dynamic intersections of war and media in the rapidly transforming media ecology and the reordered geopolitical context. The volume examines the ways in which the digital media and communication environment is involved in and shape the war in Ukraine.
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Narrative über den Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine (NUK)
Bonn; Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb); Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2023), 30 pp.
"Zwischen dem 19.09.2022 und 18.09.2023 wurde das Projekt „Narrative über den Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine“ (NUK, im Folgenden NUK) vom Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD Germany) im Auftrag der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/bpb umgesetzt. Ziel des Projekts war es, Desinformati
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Hate Speech on Social Media: A Global Approach
Covilhã (PO); Qutio (EC): LabCom; University of Beira Interior; PUCE Publications Centre (2023), 302 pp.
"Hate speech is more complex and diverse on social media. It spreads at high speed and can impact behaviors beyond the borders where it originates. Hate is ubiquitous, interactive, and multimedia. It is available 24/7, reaching a much larger audience. On social media, haters can be anonymous and fin
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Media Environment 2022: Threats and Supportive Instruments in Georgia
Tbilisi: Media and Communication Educational and Research Center "Media Voice" (2022), 76 pp.
"The purpose of this study is to assess the threats and supporting mechanisms present in the Georgian media environment in 2022. Observation of the media environment, similar to the previous year’s research, was based on the evaluation of the participants involved in the research and further compa
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Media Literacy and Disinformation Perception Survey
Tbilisi: Media Development Foundation (MDF) (2022), 37 pp.
"The aim of this research was to study media consumption habits among different age groups and geographical areas, as well as the public's vulnerability to various disinformation and manipulative narratives disseminated in Georgia. The first part of the research concerns media literacy competencies,
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Limitations of Anti-War Messaging Oriented at Russians
Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2022), 11 pp.
"This paper offers a critical overview of anti-war propaganda in the Russian language during the first six months of the war and identifies the reasons for its limited success. After a review of the challenges to current forms of propaganda, the paper offers practical recommendations to improve the
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Ukrainekrieg auf Telegram: Rechtsextremer Knotenpunkt für Desinformationen und Verschwörungserzählungen
Mainz: jugendschutz.net (2022), 9 pp.
"Seit Beginn des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine im Februar 2022 nutzen Rechtsextreme die Ereignisse und Entwicklungen für ihre Propaganda. Dabei lassen sich sowohl pro-ukrainische als auch prorussische Positionierungen beobachten. Insbesondere werden gezielt Desinformationen und Versch
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Belastungsprobe für die Demokratie: Pro-russische Verschwörungserzählungen und Glaube an Desinformation in der Gesellschaft
Berlin: Center für Monitoring, Analyse und Strategie (CeMAS) (2022), 9 pp.
"Die Zustimmungswerte zu pro-russischen Verschwörungserzählungen in der deutschen Gesamtbevölkerung steigen. Im Vergleich zu den Umfrageergebnissen einer CeMAS-Analyse aus April 2022 stiegen sowohl alle Zustimmungswerte als auch alle Werte der teils-teils-Antworten im Hinblick auf die Haltung zu
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Dispatches from Ukraine: Tactical media reflections and responses
Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures (2022), 119 pp.
Así nos habla el Kremlin: Narrativa política y medios de comunicación rusos en América Latina
Montevideo: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) (2022), 20 pp.
"En tanto ideología presente en medios, intelectuales y élites políticas de Rusia y Latinoamérica, las narrativas iliberales -proyectadas por medios y academias afines- gozan de apreciable presencia e impacto en el panorama regional. A raíz del conflicto entre Rusia y Occidente por la invasión
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Why Does the Kremlin's Propaganda Remain Effective in Wartime?
Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2022), 10 pp.
"This paper will outline the technologies and mechanisms of Putin's information machine, how it operates during the war and the obstacles to anti-war propaganda among Russians. At the very end, we will offer some recommendations for confronting Putin's information machine at war, both of a general n
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The State of Communication, Community Engagement and Accountability Across the Ukraine Response. Second Edition. 30 September 2022
London: CDAC Network, 2nd ed. (2022), 22 pp.
"This report is published quarterly and gives an overview of key communication, community engagement and accountability (CCEA) barriers and gaps across the Ukraine response, as well as recommendations for practitioners and responders to improve the use of CCEA for those affected by the crisis. Despi
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How Russian Television Prepared the Public for War
PONARS Eurasia (2022), 12 pp.
"Reported here are findings from a study of the frequency and content of messaging on various themes on Russian television. The goal of this approach is not necessarily to re-create Russians' viewing habits, though one might reasonably assume that more frequently mentioned topics are more likely to
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Open-Source Journalism in a Wired World: Spurred by Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, Open-Source Investigations Are Being Integrated Into Standard Newsroom Practice
Nieman Reports, December 7 (2022)
"More than nine months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the online methods for tracking this war are many and proliferating, including the most obvious source of all — social media networks. A 2019 law designed to keep its military from posting on social media has not deterred Russian service
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Steuerung der öffentlichen Meinung
Russland-Analysen, issue 418 (2022), pp. 1-14
"Wie denken gewöhnliche Russ:innen wirklich über die Entscheidung von Präsident Putin, in die Ukraine einzumarschieren? Obwohl einiges dafürspricht, dass frühere Umfragen, die Zustimmungswerte um 60 % für den Krieg zeigen, als genuine Signale der russischen öffentlichen Meinung gewertet werde
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Tracking the Propaganda and Disinformation About Foreign Influence in Serbia. Case Study: Serbian Media on the Ukraine War
Beograd: CRTA (2022), 15 pp.
"The topic of the war in Ukraine dominated the media during the first three months of the war and completely marginalized all other topics. The most foreign actor reported on most in the media was Russia, while the countries of the West, the US, the EU, and NATO were far less noticeable. Although th
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Disinformation on Refugees from Ukraine: Boosting Europe’s Resilience After Russia’s Invasion
Brussels: European Policy Centre (2022), 35 pp.
"The war in Ukraine is just the latest instance where attention-grabbing events have fuelled the rapid spread of false or misleading news about refugees and migrants. This Issue Paper examines the challenges posed by disinformation about refugees from Ukraine, as well as the responses taken so far t
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Russian Disinformation Efforts on Social Media
Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (2022), xviii, 202 pp.
"We sought to better understand Russia's disinformation on social media and generate recommendations to better meet and counter this evolving threat. We relied on an analysis of Russian military literature, investigative efforts, official reports, academic and policy literature, media reporting, and
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