"Social media have led to profound transformations in the media ecosystem and new communication dynamics. Such platforms have become a competitive source of information and played a decisive role in facilitating the dissemination of false or misleading content, with a particular impact on recent ele
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ctions. This study analyses the formats and the spread of disinformation during Brazil’s 2018 election on social media, considering the countermeasures adopted that year by the platforms to reduce its circulation. Disinformation occupies a central space in the public debate in Brazil, where there is massive use of social media. Based on a content analysis of the 153 false or misleading narratives most shared during the campaign period, the results show that contents changed formats to overcome platforms’ countermeasures. Results also highlight a majority of images and a blend of false and accurate information that reshape the phenomenon definition and suggests the inefficacy of current regulations." (Abstract)
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"Through this research we gained insight into tactics employed by state-backed social media disinformation. With that goal, we explored user interactions with inauthentic Twitter accounts. We used multiple procedures to measure the ways in which users talked with and about the accounts employed by t
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he Russian-affiliated Internet Research Agency in the month before the 2016 U.S. Election. We found that users were overwhelming supportive of the IRA accounts, a fact that calls into question the standard representation of these accounts as “trolls.” Users were particularly supportive of the accounts that pretended to be part of a particular ideological group (on both the left and right), supporting arguments that a strategy of building connections with like-minded people was central to the IRA campaign. This strategy seems to work—on days that the Russian accounts received more support they also received more engagement." (Lay summary)
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"In 2022, internet penetration and social platform usage reached an all-time high – 43.4% of the total population who use the internet are youth aged between 15-24 years. Youth voters have explicitly become a major target of political parties and their campaign messages. We can expect social media
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and online campaigns to be deployed by political parties, sometimes at an expense of authenticity, to reach out to these young voters. However, legal and non-legal measures implemented to date have yet to effectively address disinformation. Hence, youth and other voters remain potentially exposed to the risk of online manipulation during the election. This baseline study identifies the risks from 5 recurring patterns of disinformation related to: sexual orientation and promiscuity; corruption; electoral integrity; women politicians and foreign interference. The 2022 Johor Bahru State Election confirms this trend. To mitigate disinformation and build trust in the electoral system and process, Asia Centre has complied some recommendations for key stakeholders in educational institutions, the election commission, government, media, NGOs, political parties, technology companies and youth groups who can implement them as practical safeguards to ensure that first-time and other voters are not subjected to manipulation through disinformation campaigns." (Conclusion, page 34)
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"The actions to be developed are distributed in three axes: (i) Inform, aimed at the dissemination of official, reliable and quality information; (ii) Empower, aimed at media literacy and training the whole of society to understand the phenomenon of disinformation and the functioning of the electora
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l process; and (iii) Respond, related to the identification of cases of disinformation and the adoption of strategies, both preventive and repressive, to contain its negative effects. For the 2022 electoral cycle, the first axis has five projects with their own purposes and goals. They are: (i) mass dissemination network of truthful and official information about elections and the Electoral Justice; (ii) chatbot – electoral queries on WhatsApp; (iii) access, dissemination and enhancement of the scope of fact checking on the electoral process; (iv) deepening electoral transparency; (v) development and improvement of other technological tools and digital channels to disseminate true and quality information. In this strategic point, the Court’s action is guided by the preferential position of freedom of expression, in the legal system, by encouraging plurality of information. Likewise, information actions meet the recommendations for “prophylactic” prebunking actions (that is, strategies to reduce citizens’ susceptibility to disinformation by exposing examples of how disinformation operates). The second axis, in turn, includes seven initiatives: (i) training for internal and external audiences on disinformation, on the integrity of Brazilian elections and on the fundamentality of the Electoral Justice as an institution that guarantees democracy; (ii) prevention of the mental health of members, agents and collaborators of the Electoral Justice who deal directly with actions to contain disinformation; (iii) training the internal and external public on the electoral process, including the functions performed by it in the context of the democratic rule of Law; (iv) awareness campaigns on disinformation and media and information education actions for the external public; (v) cooperation and actions to enhance reaching partners’ media and information literacy initiatives; (vi) dialog with political parties and party federations to make them aware of their responsibility in the context of fighting against disinformation; (vii) support to other public institutions to implement actions to confronting disinformation. Finally, the response axis encompasses eight projects: (i) permanent coalition for verification; (ii) engagement of digital platforms and their technological resources in confronting structured networks of disinformation and inauthentic behavior; (iii) reporting channel for mass shooting of content in partnership with WhatsApp; (iv) creating a network to monitor disinformation practices against the electoral process; (v) containment of disinformation on Telegram; (vi) partnership and dialog with the Federal Police and the Electoral Prosecutor Office; (vii) Strategic Cyberintelligence Committee and (viii) review and elaboration of norms that acts against the practice of disinformation in the Electoral Justice, as a way of preventing the phenomenon in question. Concerning to this point, the planning met the parameters of timely response, appreciation of fact checking, importance of engagement and transparency of platforms, as well as the expansion and improvement of channels for complaints." (Presentation, page 5-6)
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"Le présent livre blanc passe au peigne fin le parcours trépidant de la HAAC pendant cette campagne inédite au Bénin et dans le monde. Il retrace et analyse les activités menées par la HAAC dans le cadre des communales de 2020, en pointant singulièrement la période de campagne électorale qu
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i fut exclusivement médiatique. C’est un ouvrage de référence qui vise à faire la promotion des expériences de la HAAC en matière de gestion de campagne médiatique des élections, et notamment de cet aspect nouveau de campagne électorale exclusivement médiatique. Cet ouvrage pourrait inspirer plus tard la HAAC ellemême et les instances de régulation des médias qui seraient amenées à faire face à des expériences similaires." (Preface, page 7)
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"Internet shutdowns in Africa are becoming increasingly widespread, particularly when governments face competitive or contentious elections. They have also come to symbolise a widening fracture between competing conceptions of the global Internet and its regulation. Governments in Africa are justify
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ing shutdowns as able address misinformation and disinformation, protect the election process, and ensure national security. International organisations, NGOs, and social networking platforms condemn these as an inadmissible form of censorship and information control, an abuse by political actors seeking to silence critics or manipulate elections. This article offers an alternative reading on internet shutdowns by placing them in the historical context of the wide range of information controls around elections, many of which are widely regarded as being acceptable and legitimate mechanisms to support competitive elections. By offering this context, we can ask what is new about shutdowns and whether they can ever be regarded as a proportionate response to real concerns of social media and election manipulation. We conclude by highlighting the inequalities of online content moderation as an often-overlooked factor in driving the use of shutdowns, and the failure of social media companies to effectively address misinformation and disinformation in Africa, particularly around elections." (Abstract)
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"This article examines the roles of social media on youth’s political participation in the 2019 General Elections in Nigeria. It interrogates the roles played by these communication tools in the emancipation and agency of youths while revealing the double-edged implications the devices may have on
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the democratic processes and aspirants. The article employs both primary and secondary methods of data sourcing. Primary data were obtained from in-depth interviews with social media ‘influencers’ who played vital roles during the 2019 General Election in Nigeria. Further data were obtained from selected social media accounts of prominent politicians and analysed using content analysis. Secondary data were extracted from books, articles, newspapers and magazines. Also, the study was contextualised using use and gratification theory. The study concluded that social media played a vital role in the 2019 General Election in Nigeria. It revealed how social media contributed to citizens’ power and agency through debates and narratives which were instrumental in agenda-setting for the ruling class and citizens’ democratic expectations." (Abstract)
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"Narrativas de desinformação - principais achados: 1. Entre alegações de fraude e apelos moralistas, a Integridade Eleitoral e os Valores Cristãos despontam como as principais pautas do segundo turno. 2. Parte da relevância dos valores cristãos se dá pelo reenquadramento de outras pautas ger
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ais da campanha permanente pela ótica e moral religiosas. 3. A pauta de Gênero e Família cresce nas plataformas durante o período do 2º turno, graças à discussão sobre aborto, comumente associada à moral religiosa. 4. A discussão sobre integridade eleitoral aumenta em momentos estratégicos, como o 7 de setembro e a votação do primeiro turno. Cresce o risco associado à pauta, com “previsões” de fraude que abrem espaço à contestação no segundo turno. 5. No Facebook e Instagram, predomina a atividade regular e institucionalizada de organizações e lideranças que trabalham com gênero e meio ambiente." (Página 2)
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"Neste relatório, o NetLab UFRJ reúne os principais resultados do monitoramento de redes de desinformação multiplataforma a partir dos aplicativos de mensageria. Analisando 115,3 mil mensagens veiculadas em grupos públicos do Whatsapp e 180,9 mil em grupos e canais públicos do Telegram, identi
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ficamos o compartilhamento de links externos, narrativas segmentadas, e tendências que podem contribuir para compreender e mitigar os efeitos da desinformação no segundo turno das eleições." (Netlab Blog)
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"The Multistakeholder Dialogue on Electoral Disinformation (MDED) project sought the perspectives of pro-democracy actors and key agents in the electoral process to map out election integrity initiatives, assess organizational capacities for disinformation mitigation, and identify influence operatio
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ns trends for 2022. Phase 1 of the project cast a wide net in sampling diverse participants both old and new players to fair elections projects. This report summarizes common themes from the focus groups and individual interviews with my own critical assessment of important gaps in coalition work and donor programming that MDED aims to enhance." (Page 8)
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"This article contributes to the scholarship on Latin American campaigning by presenting data on the use of social media by presidential candidates in Guatemala’s 2019 election, including a content analysis of more than 2,000 Facebook posts along fifteen variables. The data show that Facebook use
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by presidential campaigns is ubiquitous and allows campaigns to disseminate messages in non-traditional formats. Candidates use their Facebook accounts to mention issues of concern to voters and to make promises to fix the country’s problems, but offer far more slogans and vague promises than detailed policy proposals. They also rarely attack other candidates or tout their own qualifications for the presidency. The data also reveal systematic differences in campaign messaging between frontrunner and long-shot candidates." (Abstract)
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"This handbook explains how internet shutdowns undermine democractic elections and provides tips and recommendations for key actors to navigate shutdowns and understand and assess the extent to which an election taking place under a shutdown is free and fair. It is aimed at election observers, peopl
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e on diplomatic missions, journalists, and human rights activists in particular." (Introduction)
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"For analysing populist and dis- and minformation-driven campaigning, three sub-groupings of South African Twitter deserve particular attention. A) A community of radical populists made of black consciousness voices emphasising the struggle against 'white monopoly capital,' using this phrase as a di
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sinformation strategy initially run by Bell Pottinger back in 2017, which had the effect of polarising white and black South Africans. This community was the audience the EFF and RET audience appealed to. B) A community galvanised around the #PutSouthAfricansFirst hashtag and movement and its über-nationalism and xenophobia - disdain for primarily African foreign nationals. Influencers used this hashtag to demonise foreign nationals for crime, unemployment, homelessness and other disinformation. Political parties such as ATM and ActionSA used the same hashtag to campaign for votes under the guise of calling for the integrity of South Africa's borders and jobs. Their nationalist calls continued to form a crucial part of these parties' messaging, even as they benefited from the negative sentiment generated towards foreigners by the more strident anonymous accounts. C) A community of minority ideologies and groups predominantly made up of South Africa's white body politic polarised from the rest of South African Twitter influenced by overlapping harmful iterations of Libertarianism and Conservatism. Conspiracy theorists, Covid-19 denialists, anti-institution, anti-vaxxers reside within this community with imported overt MAGA-style Trumpian Alt-Right. The DA, Cape Party, ACDP appealed to this community. An analysis of tweets generated in the lead up to the election showed that one in four tweets were generated by the EFF community, underscoring the extent to which that party dominated the platform. However, it also highlights the disconnect between Twitter and the 'real world'. The EFF was only the third-largest party with roughly 10% votes." (Lessons learned and conclusion, page 99)
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