"The Islamic State's media strategy allows for a message that has been crafted by a handful of IS propaganda agents to be disseminated by a few primary distributors, who in turn can reach thousands of unaffiliated sympathizers, and therefore millions of Twitter users. By means of a conclusion, this chapter offers four short considerations on countering some of the different actors involved in the process. First, given the highly centralized nature of IS media production, which is most likely spearheaded by a handful of well-trained, technologically savvy and talented individuals, IS media production efforts would be very sensitive to the removal of these individuals [...] Second, although there is some anecdotal evidence that banning social media accounts is an effective way to curtail the activities of unaffiliated sympathizers, relying solely on social media companies to combat the spread of extremist material on their platforms not only raises questions regarding free speech, but would also give these companies the power to control public knowledge and discourse [...] Third, and on a related note, none of the so-called "lone wolf" attacks in Western countries were perpetrated by individuals who were actively involved in disseminating IS propaganda. In fact, it may well be that distributing jihadist material is an alternate mode of participation for individuals who are unwilling to engage in actual violence [...] Finally, although the Islamic State's military defeat appears imminent, one of the greatest mistakes of the "War on Terror" was the belief that the destruction of al-Qaeda's training camps and leadership would lead to the demise of the group, its affiliated movements and its ideology." (Conclusion)