"Without a doubt, the combined power of the public arena and broadcast media is a very efective social tool for collective action in Afghanistan. Yet there are serious limits to both the media’s self-advocacy and the public’s strong and unwavering support. Te media-related crimes and murders mentioned in this chapter are a few of the many. Yet no arrests are made and no one is prosecuted in most of these cases. Zoorawarah can continue to censor media makers with impunity and without fears of retribution. Broadcasting the incidents of violence and censorship against media personnel and the media writ large, as well as the subsequent protests and production of investigative and expository programs is indeed generative in creating dialogue and raising awareness about media rights and the important role of a free media in a society, but it is clearly not enough. Tus far, we have seen examples of two types of potential cultural imperialism. By aggressively promoting and offering their own media products, programs, and formats, at little or no cost, the argument can be made that foreign countries are impeding the development of Afghanistan’s own media industry, artistry, and media crafts. Additionally, we have seen examples of censorship, both from endogenous and exogenous forces, ranging from pressuring the government to ban programming or directly pressuring producers to do so. In extreme cases, we have seen an egregious third form of censorship becoming prevalent in Afghanistan. High-level media personnel and wealthy media owners who are ofen prominent public fgures, such as politicians, warlords, drug lords, religious leaders, and businessmen, hire body guards and live behind gated fortress mansions, while low-level television personalities and reporters are subjected to threats, physical attacks, and death for providing people with programming they want to watch and which gives them a platform to raise their voices. Hence, it is the mid- and low-level media professionals, not the owners of the television stations they work for nor the foreign governments that are the patrons of the stations, who bear the ultimate burden of media freedom and reform in Afghanistan. Caught between warring ideologies that range from Islamist to commercial to “developmentalist,” as brave as these Afghan media personalities and journalists are, and despite their high media a profile, their low socioeconomic status leaves them vulnerable to abuse and possible death." (Conclusion, page 168-169)