Document details

Japan's International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis

London; New York: Routledge (2018), xiii, 149 pp.

Contains bibliogr. pp. 116-143

Series: Politics in Asia

ISBN 9780367272845 (pbk); 9781317351887 (online)

"Most of Japan's civil society assistance targets media. JICA's policy guideline on peace-building assistance regards media assistance as one of the target categories of Japan's democracy assistance (Japanese International Cooperation Agency JICA, 2009). The International Peace Cooperation Council (Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Kondankai), which was established within the Cabinet Office. recommended boosting Japan's media assistance in its report published in December 2002 (Council on International Peace Cooperation 2002, 42). Japan has assisted media through grants, technical assistance, expert dispatch, expert training, and the provision of materials related to broadcasting (JICA 20046, 50). Japan has provided media assistance mainly to TV and radio stations. According to Masakazu Sakashita (2006, 122), 127 TV media assistance projects and 56 radio assistance projects had been conducted by September 2005, while Japan has never provided media assistance to print media such as newspapers and magazines. This is because Japan regards telecommunication and broadcasting technology as its comparative advantage and thus focuses on those projects that require it. Indeed, the chief characteristic of Japan's media assistance is that it focuses on facilities such as information and telecommunication networks instead of media content. Project contents include the improvement of production capacity and broadcasting skills, repair of ground communication systems, and provision of studio equipment. Seminars are provided to teach how to use and maintain the equipment provided through such projects as well (JICA 20046, 50). Expert training has been conducted for countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka in addition to broadcasting infrastructure assistance, which provided training for program production. However, this training tends to be a mere supplement to broadcasting in frastructure assistance projects (Sakashita 2006, 122). Within JICA, while it is the former Public Policy Department and the current Industrial Development and Public Policy Division that is in charge of democrac y assistance, the Information and Telecommunication Technology Division is in charge of media assistance. This shows that Japan's media assistance is conducted mainly as broadcasting technical assistance rather than democracy assistance, as Sakashita (2006, 122) notes.
Japan's media assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 helped broadcast the country's Loya Jirga, or national assembly, on TV via satellite. Its aim was to show the discussion at the national assembly and the process of choosing the interim president of the country to increase the legitimacy of the new administration (JICA 2004a). The political character of this assistance project was distinct compared with Japan's media assistance until then. However, the project assisted only a state hroadcasting station and did not intend to Increase the capacity of primate media's watchdog functions. In this sense, the actual content of this assistance project was state, not civil society assistance. In addition, the contents of this assistance were to upgrade broadcasting in frastructure and provide equipment and training on how to use the equipment. No assistance was provided in terms of the content of the broadcasting. No expert on free and fair broadcasting was included in its preliminary study group, and all the experts were broadcasting technical specialists, which shows the weakness of Japan's interest in supporting the role of media in democracy (JICA 2002). The project document did not set contribution to democracy as an evaluation criterion of the project, either (Sakashita 2006, 124)." (Pages 51-53)
1 Introduction, 1
2 What is democracy assistance? 21
3 Japan's democracy assistance policies and practice, 33
4 International system-level factors, 65
5 Domestic-level factors, 88
Conclusion, 109