"Radio B92 was an iconic independent media institution in Serbia. Founded in 1989, B92 provided Belgrade listeners with subversive rock music, high-quality journalism, and independent perspectives on politics in the former Yugoslavia. An early adapter to the internet, B92 has been credited with spar
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king the many demonstrations that took place in Belgrade during the 1990s. While the role of Radio B92 during the turbulent days of the Yugoslav Wars is well known, less known is the role of its first CEO and news director in the creation of what would become the Media Development Investment Fund (MDIF). Drawing on semi-structured interviews with journalists, scholars, funders, diplomats, and media observers conducted in Belgrade in 2022, this study argues that much can be learned from the case of Radio B92 and the short history of independent media in Serbia. Although B92 ultimately met a tragic death at the hands of privatization and “market censorship,” the “impact investment” model of media development it sparked lives on. Combining affordable loan and equity financing with technical assistance and advisory services, MDIF’s model helps struggling news organizations avoid dependency on grants. Although the 2022 reelection of President Aleksandar Vucic demonstrates his party’s successful state capture of Serbian news media, a look back at the case of Radio B92 has implications for the broader question of what works in international media assistance and why." (Abstract)
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"As many as 1,967 anti-Western comments were detected in the 17 monitored media outlets in 2017. In contrast to 2016 and 2015, when negative messages targeted human identity and rights, in 2017, a dominant topic was the foreign policy with the messages aimed at increasing the polarization on the for
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eign policy orientation of the country. This change in the strategic communication of pro-Kremlin actors shows that “loss of identity” was a rather tactical message that prepared the ground, while the messaging aimed at demonizing Georgia’s strategic partners (USA, NATO, EU) is of strategic nature. The United States of America accounted for the highest share of negative comments (25.9%), up by almost three times as compared to the previous year, followed by NATO (18,4%) and the West (14,1%). Compared to 2016, messages against the European Union have almost doubled (13.4%) whereas the comments about the loss of identity and human rights in anti-Western context have almost halved (12.9%). Comments against nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the US philanthropist George Soros have trebled, as compared to 2016, and comprised 7.3%; this increase can be explained by a stepped up activity of far-right groups and their campaign to smear Open Society Georgia Foundation. Yet another change as compared to the previous years were clearer messages showcasing Russia as an alternative to the West and idealizing the Soviet system (7.2%). Comments against Great Britain (0,8%) have been mainly detected in two pro-Kremlin online media outlets – Georgia and the World, and Sakinformi. Alike previous years, the main source of anti-Western messages was media (827), followed by politicians (463), society (411), civil organizations (230) and the clergy (37). The structure of the Kremlin narrative in the Georgian discourse consists of three stages and aims at: 1. Creating threats; 2. Sowing distrust towards partners and Western institutions; 3. Ingraining a belief that Russia is the only option in fighting against the threats and that authoritative/Soviet-style governance is necessary. Four major threats were emphasized by pro-Kremlin actors: threat of war; threat of loss of territories; threat of bio subversion; threat of loss of identity." (Key findings, page 7)
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