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Relational Futures: Indigenous Sovereignty and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Bronwyn Carlson, Tamika Worrell

Macquarie University (2026), 30 pp.

"Artificial intelligence must be governed as a relational and institutional force, not simply a technical system. Effective policy requires Indigenous leadership, enforceable standards, and a commitment to sovereignty, accountability, and community wellbeing. Failure to act risks embedding inequalit ... more

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Weaponising the law: Threats to media freedom in Kenya

Lawrence Mute, Andrew Songa

Thomson Reuters Foundation (2026), 55 pp.

"This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the legal threats to media freedom in Kenya today. For the purposes of this report, weaponisation of the law is defined as the deliberate use or misuse of legal provisions and processes to intimidate, silence, or economically weaken media actors. Des ... pite robust constitutional safeguards for freedom of expression and of the media, as well as a vibrant media sector, Kenya continues to experience setbacks in the realisation of these rights, alongside improvements in some areas. This report follows the global Weaponizing the Law: Attacks on Media Freedom report, published in 2023, by providing a country-specific analysis of the Kenyan context. Informed by an initial desktop review of relevant laws, regulations and court decisions, the research included an industry survey and focus group discussions, which identified six primary categories of legal threats: the abuse of court processes; regressive and disabling legislation; weak implementation of media laws; technology-facilitated harms; impunity and safety of journalists; the sustainability of the media industry. This report presents these threats thematically rather than in order of severity, reflecting the fact that they do not occur in isolation, but intersect with broader patterns of political influence, intimidation, and pressure from certain private actors. Together, they undermine independent journalism and weaken the long-term sustainability of the media sector. Our survey found that 42% of media actors in Kenya have faced legal threats in response to their work, including litigation, arrest, and the shutting down of online platforms. A summary of these key threats is outlined below. Moreover, 65% of media professionals who responded to our survey highlighted legal protections as their top support need to ensure the sustainability of journalism in Kenya. Throughout the research and across the six categories of threats documented in this report, three cross-cutting themes have emerged: 1. Legal tools are increasingly used to punish, deter, or delegitimise critical journalism. 2. Institutional weaknesses, such as inconsistent implementation and limited enforcement, undermine the effectiveness of legal protections already on the books. 3. Rapid technological change is outpacing the law, leaving journalists exposed to new risks ranging from AI-driven market disruptions to technology-facilitated gender-based violence. These issues are not unique to the Kenyan context; the solutions will lie in collaborative action that harnesses the expertise of a breadth of stakeholders across the media freedom ecosystem within the country and region." (Executive summary) more

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Reinventing Humanitarian Aid Procurement for the Age of AI

Giulio Coppi

Access Now (2026), 59 pp.

"Our research reveals that the organisational use of AI and algorithmic systems often happens through a process of unstructured integration rather than formal adoption. More precisely, cloud-based, algorithmic-enhanced functionalities and processes are making their way into humanitarian entitiesʼ t ... ech stack through updates and add-ons to preexisting products, slowly but inexorably seeping into most internal systems. A price-based procurement process designed around the static idea of digital asset purchase is inadequate to ensure adequate protection from hyperdynamic tech product development. This is especially evident looking at the growing power imbalances between private actors and nonprofits, and among nonprofits themselves. Digital technology is often heralded as key to democratise and equalise the playing field between humanitarian actors, by finally unlocking local actorsʼ access to resources traditionally reserved for international entities. But emerging trends seem to disprove such claims. The lack of adequate legal frameworks and safeguards, lagging investments in humanitarian funding for information and communication technology (ICT) resources and connectivity, and inadequate dedicated funding for digital programmes are thwarting these opportunities. More broadly, virtuous and responsible procurement practices are proving inadequate for protecting human rights alone, as tech companiesʼ commitments to human rights are replaced by defence-oriented pitches and the size of their human rights teams keeps shrinking. Preexisting digital divides are enhanced by several deep and subtle changes in traditional tech business models, resulting from the gradual cloudification of most common digital systems and the fast-paced, distributed nature of modern digital development. Even more worryingly, we are seeing new forms of digital divide well beyond the traditional gaps in digital capacity between local and small non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) or UN entities. Cloud-based companiesʼ takeover of generic coordination platforms creates a constantly broadening chasm between the few organisations that are digitally mature, those who are barely retrofitting their processes to fit the new reality, and the broad majority forced to access the promised land of digital humanitarianism through the predatory gates of algorithmic and cloud servicesʼ free tech licensing. Our findings highlight how organisation-led digital development, building on open-source systems (despite some “openwashing” practices) and trusted external providers, remains the best option for risk reduction when it comes to algorithmic systems. However, in the short to medium term, this might not be financially and technically feasible for the majority of humanitarian actors, especially considering the catastrophic funding environment. To fill this gap, we propose a toolkit in an appendix to this report. This is a foundational governance model for transforming digital procurement from a transactional into a strategic business function, integrated across key organisational departments. By doing so, protection-mandated aid groups could move from running purchase-centred processes, to adopting a dynamic, proactive, and rights-based approach to tech management. This report also contains a set of recommendations for states and donors, the humanitarian community, tech companies, local aid actors and communities, research centres, and cyber experts." (Executive summary, pages 2-3) more

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Meeting the Revenue Challenge: Philanthropy's Role in Local News Growth

Mark Fuerst, Caroline Porter, Feather Houstoun

Philadelphia, PA: Wyncote Foundation (2026), 32 pp.

"Starting in February 2025, we set out to identify and examine success stories among local news groups, where success was sustainability in business operations, even if that term has a range of interpretations. We reasoned that the experiences of these successful organizations might carry predictive ... more

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From Crisis to Renewal: Addressing AI’s Impact on Our Information Ecosystem
New

Lena-Maria Böswald, Roa Powell, Tyreese Calnan

Berlin: Interface – Tech Analysis and Policy Ideas for Europe (2026), 18 pp.

"As AI summaries summarise information directly within search results, they can significantly reduce traffic to news publishers. Evidence suggests users are less likely to click through to original sources when AIOs are present on Google, threatening the financial viability of journalism. These impa ... cts from AI summaries and AIOs in particular are unlikely to be evenly distributed and will play out in different ways across the news sector across Europe, with smaller and ad-funded outlets particularly vulnerable, raising concerns about declining media plurality. At the same time, AI-generated summaries often fail to provide accurate and diverse information. Research shows that AI tools disproportionately rely on a narrow set of sources, marginalising smaller publishers. In addition, persistent issues with accuracy – including misleading or incorrect outputs – risk distorting public understanding and weakening trust in information systems. Current regulatory frameworks in both the EU and UK are struggling to address these challenges effectively. While multiple legal instruments are relevant and already in place – including competition law, platform regulation, copyright, and AI governance – none are fully equipped to respond quickly and comprehensively to the harms of monopolisation and the lack of remuneration for media outlets posed by AI summaries. We argue that competition policy offers the most effective and immediate route to intervention, with digital regulation serving as a secondary lever. The UK’s approach, based on flexible, case-specific competition rules, enables faster action through tailored conduct requirements for dominant firms like Google. In contrast, the EU’s framework is broader but slower, relying more heavily on traditional, time-intensive antitrust investigations and ongoing debates around copyright and remuneration for publishers. Both systems offer complementary strengths, and policymakers should learn from each other’s approaches. We therefore recommend a “competition-first” policy package to ensure fairer outcomes. Key measures include enforcing fair ranking and attribution practices, preventing unauthorised use of publisher content, and potentially requiring platforms to compensate news organisations. However, competition policy alone is not the key. We therefore propose additional long-term interventions, including greater transparency through “nutrition labels” for AI-generated content and increased public or democratic funding for journalism. These measures aim to strengthen the resilience and independence of the news sector, ensuring that trustworthy information remains accessible in an information ecosystem shaped by AI. more

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Environmental Cost of AI's Energy Use: Carbon, Water and Land Footprints

Miriam Aczel, Sanaz Chamanara, Mir Matin, Aria Farsi, Tshilidzi Marwala, Kaveh Madani

Richmond Hill, Ontario (CA): United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH) (2026), 55 pp.

"[...] The study reveals some striking numbers. In 2025, data centers—the physical backbone of AI—consumed an estimated 448 TWh of electricity. If data centers were a country, that level of electricity use would rank it 11th globally. On current trajectories, data center electricity demand could ... roughly double to 945 TWh by 2030, nearly triple the combined annual electricity use of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nigeria, together home to more than 650 million people. Producing that much electricity would have a carbon footprint of 399 million tonnes CO2e, requiring 6.7 billion trees grown over 10 years to offset—roughly twice the number of trees in the United Kingdom. The associated water footprint of 9.3 trillion liters would be equivalent to the annual domestic water needs of all 1.3 billion residents of Sub-Saharan Africa. The land footprint associated with this electricity would exceed 14,500 km², nearly 10 times the size of Mexico City. AI is now one of the most significant drivers of that data center growth. In 2025, AI workloads alone accounted for around 20% of total data center electricity use, and if that share rises to 40% by 2030 as projected, its electricity demand could reach roughly 378 TWh—enough to meet the residential electricity needs of the entire population of Sub-Saharan Africa for over 2 years. AI’s environmental impacts are shaped not only by data center growth and electricity supply mixes, but also by the escalating cost of building ever-larger models. For example, GPT-3 training consumed an estimated 1.3 GWh of electricity over 34 days, while GPT-4 is estimated to have consumed 50 to 70 GWh over 100 days, roughly 40 to 55 times GPT-3. Yet training is only part of the picture as AI’s operational footprint is increasingly driven by inference. Once models are deployed, billions of everyday interactions account for the bulk of energy use, with inference estimated at roughly 80–90% of total energy consumption. [...] The report identifies priority implications for key stakeholders. Governments must integrate AI infrastructure into energy system planning, carbon accounting, water governance and land use permitting. This requires standardized environmental footprint reporting so impacts can be verified and compared across providers and jurisdictions. Industry and AI developers should treat model selection, default outputs, and routing decisions as footprint determinants, while also improving efficiency-by-design. Users and deploying organizations also shape impacts through volume, frequency, and modality choices. They should adopt “fit-for-purpose” use: selecting the lightest model and lowestenergy format that meets the task and limiting high-cost features when not needed. Data center operators and utilities should recognize siting and procurement as environmental footprint decisions, apply environmental impact screening and cumulative impact assessment. They should implement transparent mitigation and community safeguards where expansion occurs. Investors and financiers should treat electricity, carbon, water, and land footprints as material risks for AI infrastructure portfolios and use comparable footprint metrics in due diligence." (Executive summary, pages 12-13) more

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No Signal, no Voice: How Internet Shutdowns Undermined Uganda’s 2026 Elections

Kampala: Unwanted Witness; Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET) (2026), 55 pp.

"This report finds that significant, deliberate, and centrally coordinated internet disruptions occurred before, during, and after Uganda’s January 2026 general elections. Contrary to public assurances issued by government officials in the weeks preceding polling, access to the internet was progre ... more

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Targeted: How cuts to US foreign aid threaten freedom of expression and its defenders worldwide

London: Article 19 (2026), 112 pp.

"Between January and April 2025, the United States government implemented massive and immediate cuts to foreign aid spending. Our new report Targeted explores the global impact of those cuts on freedom of expression and the people working to defend it. The cuts have weakened civil society’s capac ... more

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How Russia Is Reshaping Command and Control for AI-Enabled Warfare

Kateryna Bondar

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2026), 20 pp.

"This paper examines how Russia is transforming its command and control (C2) architecture under wartime pressure, how these changes shape the country’s incremental move toward battlefield-required software solutions, and what lessons U.S. policymakers can learn from Russia’s experiences. Focusin ... g on both strategic ambitions and battlefield practice, the takeaways below summarize how automated C2 systems, unmanned platform management software, and emerging AI applications are being developed, adapted, and scaled within Russia’s military ecosystem. 1. Russia is no longer prioritizing the construction of a single, comprehensive automated C2 architecture comparable to Western joint concepts; instead, it is reallocating effort toward tactical, task-specific software, driven by battlefield necessity. Prolonged, high-intensity combat in Ukraine exposed the limits of centralized, system-wide C2 modernization and elevated the importance of accelerating the tactical kill chain. The emergence of systems such as the “Svod” Tactical Situational Awareness Complex and other integrated reconnaissance-strike tools reflects a pragmatic shift in which operational control of unmanned systems and real-time battlefield management now deliver greater military value than achieving end-to-end C2 integration. 2. Because unmanned systems now conduct up to 80 percent of Russian fire missions, the center of gravity in C2 innovation has shifted toward software that manages drones and integrates them with artillery and other fire units. Civilian engineers and volunteer developers have focused on closing this gap by building tools that provide situational awareness, automate fire correction, and link unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operators directly to firing units. Russia’s “Glaz/Groza” software complex demonstrates this trend, functioning as a unified reconnaissance-strike workflow that converts drone footage into targeting data and compresses the time from detection to impact from hours to minutes. 3. The Russian military assesses its AI capabilities for visual and audio data processing as relatively mature, placing computer vision, sensor fusion, and signal analysis at technology readiness level (TRL) 6–9, while natural-language processing remains at an early, experimental stage, TRL 1–3. This disparity reflects a deliberate prioritization of AI applications that deliver immediate battlefield utility—such as target recognition, guidance, and autonomous terminal functions for unmanned systems—and where abundant data and combat validation are available. By contrast, text analysis AI, which underpins document processing and higher-level C2 decision support, remains constrained by immature architectures, limited certified software, and organizational barriers, slowing progress toward fully AI-enabled command workflows. 4. Within Russian C2 systems, AI is primarily envisioned as a support function rather than a replacement for human decisionmaking. Russian military doctrine assigns AI two core roles: enhancing the processing and interpretation of sensor data and providing predictive decision support through forecasting, scenario generation, and recommendations for commanders. Across strategic and tactical levels, AI is intended to augment situational awareness and analytical capacity, while formal authority and responsibility for decisions remain firmly with human commanders. 5. Russia began its C2 digitalization effort by building a dense layer of standards governing terminology, system architecture, hardware-software integration, and information management. This standardization drive, coupled with the transition to the domestically controlled Astra Linux operating system, reflects an attempt to create a unified technical foundation capable of supporting data integration, interoperability, and future AI insertion across the command hierarchy. While this framework provides structural coherence, it has not, on its own, resolved deeper institutional and methodological constraints that continue to limit system-wide C2 integration. 6. To enable AI-driven tactical software, the Russian military launched a systematic data collection effort in 2025 focused on unmanned operations and strike outcomes. The emerging data infrastructure aggregates UAS video feeds, operator telemetry, strike effects, and individual pilot performance metrics, each linked to unique personal identifiers. These datasets serve multiple functions simultaneously: operational analysis, training evaluation, and the creation of labeled data for AI model development, establishing a feedback loop that ties battlefield performance directly to software refinement. 7. Despite efforts to reduce dependence on foreign commercial technologies, Russia’s military AI development remains heavily reliant on open-weight models and civilian software ecosystems. The transition from tools such as AlpineQuest and Discord toward domestic alternatives like ZOV Maps and Astra-based platforms reflects a push for security and sovereignty at the application layer. At the same time, Russian developers actively adapt open-weight and commercially available AI models, including Mistral, Qwen, LLaMA, YOLO, and related architectures, for military use, embedding them into on-premise, tightly controlled environments. This hybrid approach allows Russia to mitigate sanctions and accelerate AI adoption without building foundational models from scratch." (Executive summary) more

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Promoting and advancing human rights in global AI ecosystems: The need for a comprehensive framework under international law

Alexander Kriebitz, Caitlin C. Corrigan (eds.)

Globethics Foundation; Responsible AI Network – Africa (RAIN-Africa) (2026), 33 pp.

"In response to far-reaching societal impacts of AI, policymakers are increasingly adopting a human rights lens for AI governance. However, the regulatory landscape remains fragmented and characterized by Western led initiatives as well as inconsistent enforcement. To address these limitations, a un ... ified and binding international framework is urgently needed. The proposed Convention on AI, Data, and Human Rights (drafted as the “Munich Convention on AI, Data, and Human Rights”) is an initiative toward such a framework. Developed with contributions from over 50 global experts, it proposes an international convention to align AI governance with human rights principles. This whitepaper explores the underlying rationale behind the convention, emphasizing its alignment with the norms and principles articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter. It examines the relevance of safeguards against AI’s misuse in facilitating human rights violations, with particular focus on protecting underrepresented or marginalized groups, including indigenous peoples, and addressing collective rights. It furthermore points to the necessity to codify rights that empower individuals to opt out, be forgotten, seek explanations, and access remedies to maintain adequate human rights standards in the context of AI. The urgency to act arises from the escalating impact of AI and the rapid pace of political and technological advancements. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is particularly well poised to play a leading role in initiating global discussions on a binding convention for AI governance, grounded in human rights principles. Drawing on its established mandate to uphold human rights globally, the UNHRC has a record of successfully embedding human rights principles into international frameworks, as demonstrated by its endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the recognition of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. Through dedicated action around promoting a convention on AI and human rights, the UNHRC can foster international consensus and proactively shape the future of AI in a manner that prioritizes the values and principles enshrined in the key documents of international human rights law." (Executive summary) more

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Toward AI Governance Alignment in Africa, Middle East, and Türkiye (AMET) Region

Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem, Fola Adeleke, Jake Effoduh, Kebene Wodajo, Nagla Rizk, Olubayo Adekanmbi, Rachel Adams, Rami Alkarmi, Seani Rananga, Seydina Ndiaye, Shikoh Gitau, Tami Koroye

Global Center on AI Governance (GCG) (2026), 54 pp.

"The analysis begins by identifying the core “centric approaches” that guide Artificial Intelligence (AI) national strategies. These include security-anchored models driven by state control, innovation-led frameworks that prioritise competitiveness, rights-based regimes centred on fundamental pr ... otections, and developmental approaches focused on public service delivery and technological catch-up. Each approach expresses incentives, risk perceptions and administrative capacities. Out of these foundational choices, there are different groupings. Various regions within AMET are adopting recognisable patterns of regulation that reflect their political economies, institutional structures and geopolitical positions. These groupings are not static categories, but evolving alignments shaped by domestic pressures, supply-chain dependencies and shifting global power dynamics. Across all regions, a set of cross-cutting issues consistently shapes the regulatory landscape. Data protection and interoperability remain central, alongside growing demands for accountability, explainability and robust auditing. Standards and certification are emerging as tools for both trustbuilding and geopolitical influence. Sector-specific rules in finance, health, education and public administration are increasingly decisive. Capacity constraints, fiscal limits and uneven institutional strength continue to define what is realistically possible for many governments. Geopolitical tensions and cloud concentration reinforce questions around sovereignty, infrastructure control and long-term strategic autonomy. This report translates these insights into practical implications for states, regional bodies and technology firms. It highlights workable pathways for reconciling innovation with safety, managing cross-border data flows, and building resilient digital infrastructure. It also identifies areas where architecture choices such as regional cloud centres, culturally calibrated testing layers and tiered sovereignty models can support both regulatory goals and developmental priorities. The recommendations emphasise flexible alignment, cooperation through standards, and the need for shared mechanisms that accommodate political diversity while reducing fragmentation. Taken together, the framework provides a stable and operational way of understanding global AI regulation. It clarifies the interests driving different jurisdictions, the pressures that shape convergence or divergence, and the strategic considerations that technology firms and policymakers must navigate as the regulatory environment continues to evolve." (Executive summary) more

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The State of Media Development 2026: Funding, local ownership and adaptation in international media development

Ines Drefs, Rose Kimani, Dennis Reineck, Martin Scott

Bonn: Deutsche Welle DW Akademie (2026), 85 pp.

"With resources drying up, not least because the U.S. administration has pulled the plug on international development funding, a rise in authoritarianism and another large-scale tech reset looming with AI, media development organizations are struggling to meet the challenges. According to data colle ... more

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Principled caution: How AI is used in public-interest media in Asia

James Gomez

Bonn: Deutsche Welle DW Akademie (2026), 52 pp.

"In conclusion, this research has provided a systematic understanding of AI adoption within public-interest media across Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Uzbekistan. By identifying concrete areas for strategic intervention, this research seeks to strengthen ... journalistic quality and prepare the sector for an AI-integrated future. The findings reveal that the AI adoption is currently taking place within public-interest media, but it is one of “principled caution” where adoption is careful, selective and highly varied. This evolution unfolds within a structurally precarious media environment where AI regulation is often absent or actively restrictive. While adoption remains cautious to protect journalistic credibility from risks such as hallucinations and biases, newsrooms are increasingly embracing AI as a powerful toolset to alleviate severe capacity and resource constraints. Currently, organizations primarily utilize AI for assistive, routine tasks such as translation, transcription, summarization, and early-stage content ideation and the final language editing stage rather than for broader organizational transformation. The research highlights deep capacity deficits in the governance framework, institutional training, and leadership. These gaps often prevent individual AI literacy from translating into consistent, organization-wide policy formulation and enforcement. This challenge is further exacerbated by the funding instability and resource constraints that characterize the region’s independent media, restricting the long-term investment necessary for ethical and responsible AI adoption. Despite these legal, political, technical, capacity, and operational constraints, localized and innovative AI workflows are emerging. While AI has not yet generated entirely new, revenue-generating business models, strategic investments in customized AI infrastructures, such as in-house dashboards and media monitoring systems, present a critical pathway toward long-term operational resilience. To support this trajectory, the report recommends coordinated action among media organizations, governments, technology companies, donors and media development funders to invest in long-term AI capacity, governance frameworks, and secure technological infrastructure." (Conclusion, page 39) more

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Advancing Open Source AI in India: Recommendations for Governments & Technology Developers

Aarushi Gupta, Anushka Jain, Urvashi Aneja, Shreeja Sen

Bonn; Delhi; Noida (IN): Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); FAIR Forward – Artificial Intelligence for All; NASSCOM (2026), 80 pp.

"[...] this brief positions open source AI as a strategic policy option within India’s evolving AI ecosystem. It unpacks the critical importance of openness for India’s digital future, crystallising the key opportunities it offers to governments and developers alike. In doing so, it also explore ... more

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Societies at an AI Crossroads: Choices and Value Conflicts

Ignas Kalpokas, Julija Kalpokienė

London; New York: Routledge (2026), 116 pp.

"As contemporary societies undergo profound transformations driven by artificial intelligence and related technologies, a unilinear vision of inevitable ‘progress’ and development increasingly dominates public discourse. This book offers a counterpoint, challenging such deterministic narratives ... more

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SAFE AI: A Governance Framework for Humanitarians using AI. How to turn SAFE AI principles into practical action

Helen McElhinney, Anjali Mazumder, Michael Tjalve, Suzy Madigan, Sarah Spencer

CDAC Network; Alan Turing Institute; Humanitarian AI Advisory (2026), 93 pp.

"The SAFE AI Framework is designed to support humanitarian organisations on their AI journey, and navigate the risks raised. Organisations procuring AI systems or designing AI projects will benefit from each tool within this framework, which is intended as a practical approach to using, designing, p ... more

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World Disasters Report 2026: Truth, Trust and Humanitarian Action in the Age of Harmful Information
Deep Insights

Charlotte Lindsey Curtet (ed.)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC) (2026), 372 pp.

"The World Disasters Report 2026 calls on governments, humanitarian actors, media, technology companies and communities, to recognise that the trustworthiness of information is a matter of life and death. Just as we plan for logistics, shelter and health care in emergencies, we must also plan for th ... e information environment. This requires investing in community engagement, prioritizing listening over speaking, building resilience against harmful narratives and consistently upholding humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in every interaction and message. In 2024, 32 Red Cross and Red Crescent volunteers and staff were killed while on duty; in 2025, a further 27 lives were lost. This is a painful reminder of the risks borne by those who put humanity first, often in the most dangerous circumstances. Their deaths underscore the urgent need to protect humanitarian staff and volunteers, and to safeguard the space they need to save lives. Anything that deepens mistrust, fuels hostility or turns the emblem of protection into a target must be confronted with urgency. Honouring their memory compels us to meet this crisis with urgency and resolve. Hope must also be part of our response. Harmful information thrives on fear and confusion, but hope – rooted in trust, solidarity and human dignity – can be just as contagious. Balancing threats with hope and fostering narratives of agency and possibility offers a vital counterforce. Around the world, communities respond to crises not only with resilience but also with creativity and compassion, often leading the way in finding solutions. By amplifying authentic stories and voices, we do more than counter falsehoods: we inspire action, strengthen trust and remind people that even in the darkest moments, there are paths forward. The IFRC and its member Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies have always worked at the heart of communities, earning trust through presence, transparency and respect. In today’s information crisis, this role matters more than ever. Our commitment is clear and unwavering: act with humanity and based on evidence, uphold trust and put people in need first – so that in moments of fear and uncertainty, the voices that carry furthest are those that heal, aid and protect. Each of us has a role to play. By staying informed, questioning, verifying and amplifying only what is trustworthy and constructive, we strengthen the information environment and ensure that hope speaks louder than harm." (Foreword) more

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The “Authoritarian Utopia”: The impact of funding cuts on independent media

Jos Midas Bartman, Evelien Wijkstra

Free Press Unlimited (2026), 23 pp.

"Recent reports by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2026) and Article 19 (2026) on the impact of U.S. funding cuts, laid bare some of the most direct consequences of the U.S. funding cuts. They reported that the median grantee of their survey respondents lost about 35 to 40 percent of ... annual revenue for the year 2025. That number makes sense in light of the fact that the U.S. government cut at least $1.7 billion worth of freedom of expression programmes. This number was reported when some of the terminations were still unfolding. This is largely in line with our own findings, more than a year after the cuts. Out of the 57 surveyed partners, 37 percent reported budget cuts of 26-50 percent and 26 percent reported budget cuts of more than 50 percent Unfortunately, the abrupt and devastating level of the cuts have also led to media outlets and media support organisations ceasing operations. For this research we have not collected data on this but we are aware of several examples such as the closing of our Ukrainian partner, media outlet Zaborona, caused by the cessation of support of both the US and UK governments. Zaborona was an independent media outlet specialized in long-form, analytical reporting. The long-term political and geopolitical consequences of the U.S. governement funding cuts are still unfolding, but some of the medium-term effects are already visible. In the Philippines for example, disinformation has been able to flow more uncontrolled and narratives that support Chinese claims to the South China Sea have been diffusing more rapidly. Partners in Venezuela reported on how RT Academy provides training in several African countries, Argentina, Mexico and Cuba as an indirect way to approach people who can help amplify pro-Russian narratives in each of those countries, make friends and improve RT’s credibility. This report lays bare similar worrying but expected developments. Our survey shows unequivocally that where independent media decline, authoritarian interests fill the vacuum. Partners have reported on this dynamic across different continents. The boundary between domestic politics and international relations shows to be thin as well in this regard. In Pakistan for example, our partners report that China’s ability and assertiveness in trying to export its governance model have increased. Pakistani media organizations have been open about their recent collaboration with the Chinese embassy and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Authoritarian governments, such as Pakistan’s military elite, are unlikely to push back against these dynamics. [...] The same political actors who increasingly argue that international cooperation must be more interest driven should recognise that independent media serve precisely those interests. Where independent journalism collapses, corruption becomes harder to expose, authoritarian influence becomes easier to project, disinformation spreads with fewer constraints, and democratic allies become weaker. The vacuum is not neutral: it is filled by actors whose interests often run directly counter to those of the European Union. For Europe, the question is therefore not whether it can afford to support independent media globally. The question is whether it can afford not to. If the EU wants to remain a credible geopolitical actor, preserve its normative influence, strengthen democratic partners, and counter authoritarian interference, then support for independent media must be treated as strategic infrastructure: as essential to democratic resilience as election support, rule-of-law programming, anti-corruption work or cyber defence." (Executive summary, pages 4-5) more

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Encyclical Letter Magnifica Humanitas of His Holiness Pope Leo XIV on Safeguarding the Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence

Leo XIV (Pope)

Vatican City: Holy See (2026)

"Divided into five chapters, Magnifica humanitas has an underlying premise: technology is not “a force antagonistic to humanity” (paragraph 4), nor is it “inherently evil” (9). However, “technology is never neutral, because it takes on the characteristics of those who devise, finance, regu ... late, and use it. Therefore, Pope Leo XIV appeals for people to build “for the common good” and to “remain human,” following a courageous mentality of shared responsibility and communion, so that the world “will come to recognize the human heart as the place where God desires to dwell” (16). [...] An ethical code for AI: The third chapter—Technology and Dominance. The Grandeur of Humanity in Light of the Promises of AI stresses the need to approach artificial intelligence with vigilance. Pope Leo warns about the “technocratic paradigm” already denounced by Pope Francis and how it can require that every choice be dictated exclusively by measuring efficiency and profits (92). On the contrary, the most powerful technology is not necessarily the best. AI can imitate and simulate the person, but it does not possess a moral conscience, empathy, or affective, relational or spiritual capabilities. The Pope urges clarity about responsibilities and accountability at every stage of the development process, focusing on adequate AI policies and legal frameworks, independent oversight, and user education. Above all, Pope Leo calls for an ethical code subject to shared standards of social justice, because “a more moral AI is not enough if that morality is determined by a few” (107). Nor, he adds, should the environmental impact of new technologies be overlooked, since they require large quantities of energy and water, affecting Creation (101). Disarming AI: AI must be “disarmed,” Pope Leo XIV continues, in order to free it from the mentality of military, economic, and cognitive competition. “To disarm means discrediting the assumption that technical power automatically confers the right to govern,” he says. “To disarm does not mean rejecting technology, but preventing it from dominating humanity” (110). He devotes ample space to a critique of transhumanism and posthumanism, which interpret progress as the overcoming of human limits. Instead, limitations are not defects to be eliminated, but a constitutive dimension of the human person, because it is in fragility and finitude that relationship and openness to God and to others mature. He says we must remember that “humanity flourishes not despite limitations, but often through them” (118). Technological progress without regression of the heart: Pursuing technological innovation at the expense of eliminating human limitations, he says, would cause an anthropological regression. “Humanity—in all its grandeur and woundedness—must never be replaced or surpassed,” he says. Technology can alleviate humanity’s sufferings and open new possibilities, but it must not deny the essence of humanity, which is our “capacity for relationship and love” (126). In the face of AI, says the Pope, “the true alternative is not between enthusiasm and fear, but between two paths of development: a progress that serves individuals and peoples, or a progress that subjects them to the mentality of power” (129). An ecology of communication and the centrality of schools: In the fourth chapter—Safeguarding Humanity at a Time of Transformation. Truth, Work, Freedom—the Pope calls for an “ecology of communication” based on truth. He urges transparency in how content is selected, protection of personal data, serious journalism founded on argumentation and verification, a new awareness in the “proper and critical” use of digital tools, and the integration of different forms of knowledge. The Church must also embody transparent and honest communication, especially in cases of injustice and abuse. The Pope also appeals for a renewed educational alliance, so that the “desire to ask questions” may not be extinguished in young people by perfect machines that make human thought seem useless (140). Pope Leo XIV, therefore, calls for renewed attention to schools as places where people learn to “seek and love the truth” (147). The dignity of work: In the “fourth industrial revolution” represented by the digital transition, the Pope emphasizes the importance of protecting the dignity of work by designing systems centered on the person and not only on performance. “The ‘new ways’ of working are not necessarily better,” he writes, “while AI promises to boost productivity by taking over mundane tasks, it frequently forces workers to adapt to the speed and demands of machines, rather than machines being designed to support those who work” (150). Technology can certainly free human beings from burdensome or repetitive tasks, but it must not lead to unemployment in the name of reducing costs and increasing profit. In this regard, the Pope expresses his hopes for a renewal of labor organizations (155). Peace and development: Pope Leo then notes the need to move beyond GDP as the measure of a country’s level of development, focusing instead on the dignity of work, shared prosperity, the reduction of inequalities, and environmental protection. Finance, he says, must focus on the development, creation, and evolution of work (159-160). Following in the footsteps of Pope St. Paul VI, the encyclical underscores the interdependence between peace and development. It calls for international cooperation capable of defining shared strategies, especially in favor of the most vulnerable countries and groups, because prosperity contributes to peace “only if it is widespread, inclusive, and sustainable” (163). The family, “primary social good”: The Pope upholds the role of the family, saying it is founded on the stable union between a man and a woman. The family is a “primary social good” and the “fundamental and irreplaceable cell of every community organization” (165), which must be supported, including through labor policies that favor stability and humane rhythms, so as to protect society’s ability to “build the future.” ‘Architecture of visibility’ and risks for freedom: Pope Leo XIV then discusses the theme of human freedom in an age when digital platforms are designed to capture users’ time and exploit their vulnerabilities. He reiterates the need to strengthen each person’s interior freedom, while also confronting the risk of social control arising from the mass collection of data and the use of algorithmic systems. Profiling, predicting, and directing behavior, he says, is “a new form of power” (171) that risks discriminating against the weakest. The Pope particularly criticizes the “architecture of visibility,” which amplifies only what is visible and shapes opinions. New forms of slavery and colonialism: AI also generates new forms of slavery, such as that of the “scarred, injured, and worn down” bodies (173) of those who work in the extraction of the “rare earth elements” needed for technology. Therefore, the Pope upholds the importance of combating new forms of slavery as another “decisive test for ethical discernment” in the digital transformation. Pope Leo XIV stresses that “the Church renews her firm condemnation of every form of slavery, trafficking, and commodification of persons” and he underscores that to not react or to tolerate grave violations of human dignity means becoming accomplices to them. At the same time, the Pope “sincerely asks forgiveness” for the delay with which the Church in the past condemned “the scourge of slavery” (174-176). The encyclical also refers to the vital information—for example, on health and demographics—used to guide economic strategies. He calls this a new face of colonialism that turns personal lives into exploitable information, making the digital environment a “space of exploitation” (178-179). Overcoming ‘just war’ theory: In the fifth chapter—The Culture of Power and the Civilization of Love—Pope Leo XIV turns his gaze to war, saying “the digital revolution is changing the nature of conflict.” The Pope calls for an ethical approach, without which decisions about the life and death of persons will become increasingly impersonal due to a use of force regarded as an “immediate and viable option” (182-183). At the root of all this is a “culture of power” that normalizes war and rehabilitates it as an “instrument of international politics,” favoring rearmament. Today, he says, public opinion is burdened by polarizing media narratives, as well as by “a disconcerting loss of historical memory,” which leaves people without a long-term vision (191). Consequently, he says, peace today is no longer understood as a task to be undertaken, but as an interval between conflicts. For this reason, Pope Leo XIV reiterates that—while preserving the right to legitimate defense in the strictest sense—the theory of “just war” must be overcome, and dialogue, diplomacy, and forgiveness must instead be promoted (192). Algorithms do not make war morally acceptable: Pope Leo expresses criticism of the growth in the arms industry, the nuclear arms race, and the emergence of new armed actors—including jihadist groups—who aim to perpetuate conflicts as a source of power and profit. He also warns against the use of weapons linked to AI, because “there is no algorithm that can make war morally acceptable.” The Pope writes, “AI does not remove the intrinsic inhumanity of conflict; indeed, it can only bring about conflict more quickly and render it more impersonal, lowering the threshold for resorting to violence, transforming defense into threat prediction and thus reducing victims to data. In this way, it will accustom us to the idea that violence is inevitable and needs only to be optimized.” The Pope urges strict ethical limits, which are shared at the international level and based on personal responsibility and the protection of civilians. “Any technology that facilitates attacks without seeing the face of human beings lowers the moral threshold of conflict” (199). Crisis of multilateralism: The culture of power also emerges from the crisis of multilateralism and the emergence of “a disorderly and conflict-ridden multipolarism” with a prevailing sense of mistrust (201). The Pope laments that the rule of law has been replaced by the law of the strongest, while the logic of power prevails over peace building and institutions established to safeguard the common destiny of peoples have now been weakened. In this regard, the Pope hopes for “profound reforms” of the UN that can overcome the current crisis of values in favor of the common good (226). An irresponsible Realpolitik: The encyclical notes that today “hybrid” wars are fought “also on the economic, financial and cyber fronts, where disinformation and campaigns that feed people’s fears are used to manipulate public opinion” so that increases in military expenditures are seen as the “only response” to an uncertain future. But all of this is only a “false realism”, an irresponsible Realpolitik that sows in people’s consciences and cultures a resignation to an unavoidable war and describes peace as a utopia (204-205). He notes that there is the possibility that some “may consider armed conflict as an effective way of diverting attention from domestic problems and a cynical tool for managing difficulties (208). The civilization of love: Christians, says Pope Leo, are called to respond to the culture of power by building “the civilization of love” and by choosing whether to feed the logic of force or safeguard peace. He recalls the memory of the saints, “righteous people and the oft-forgotten peacemakers, show us that grace does not magically eliminate conflict, but instead it inspires active resistance to evil and an astonishing creativity in doing good” (211). The Pope indicates five paths of responsibility, which include disarming words by speaking the truth; building peace in justice; adopting the perspective of victims by taking a stand, because there are conflicts in which “it is unjust to remain neutral”; cultivating “a healthy realism” that seeks practicable paths of peace through deeds, not only words. Importance of interreligious dialogue: Finally, relaunching dialogue by moving from a culture of power to a culture of negotiation is highlighted. And of decisive importance is “interreligious dialogue”, being bearers of a message of peace. He writes that “those who use the name of God to legitimize terrorism, violence or war betray his true nature, for to fight in the name of religion means attacking religion itself” (223). The diplomacy of the Holy See, he notes, “adopts the Gospel’s principle of mercy as a concrete criterion for political action.” And from this, the exhortation to prayer, since peace comes above all from God (227-228)." (https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2026-05/pope-leo-xiv-encyclical-magnifica-humanitas-ai.html) more

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Generative AI and democracy: Study on advantages and risks of the use of generative artificial intelligence in public debate and democratic processes

Natali Helberger, Claes de Vreese, Gionata Bouche, Agustin Ferrari Braun, Max van Drunen, Simon Kruschinski, Nicolas Mattis, Sophie Morosoli, Laurens Naudts, Charis Papaevangelou, Theresa Seipp, Fabio Votta, Teresa Weikmann

Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Steering Committee on Democracy (CDDM) (2026), 77 pp.

"The key finding of this report is that it is not enough to make sure that the technology is safe and no risk to human rights and public values. GenAI’s impact and potential for the realisation of fundamental rights depends on the societal, organisation and regulatory context in which it operates, ... the possibility for institutions to make value-driven choices and regulators that actively promote public innovation where the interests of society as a whole outweigh purely economic interests of a concentrated handful of technology companies. This report has made the argument that GenAI and its implications for human rights and democracy must be seen in the context of the configurations of infrastructural and political power, and who is able and entitled to decide the course and character of innovation. [...] The report makes a number of recommendations to the Council of Europe: 1. Provide substantive guidance and standardisation: As a human rights organisation, the Council of Europe is particularly well prepared to develop more substantive guidance and identify, concretise and monitor risks to democracy, human rights and political equality, be that in the way GenAI is used in democratic practices like elections, the more structural implications for democratic institutions (such as the free press) as well as the democratic governance of AI. Next to a focus on risks, the Council of Europe can also usefully develop guidance how AI can advance democracy and human rights and develop a value-driven interpretation of “public interest innovation” to inform States, companies and standardisation processes. 2. Incentivise and enable public interest innovation: Next to the risked-based approach to AI that is also enshrined in the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention, the Council of Europe could develop guidance on policies and governance approaches that enable and incentivise public interest innovation. It could help identify the democratic and human rights implications of procurement choices, and develop narratives to prioritize value-oriented innovation, open-source datasets, decentralisation and interoperability above the promotion of scale and innovation driven by a concentrated number of technology companies. 3. Strengthen democratic resilience and ability to govern: The Council of Europe, and the CDDEM specifically, could have an important role in exploring mechanisms and regulatory solutions to map and remedy existing dependencies and identify mission-critical elements of a European digital ecosystem, for example through monitoring the use of GenAI in elections, stimulating the development of public interest information infrastructures and strengthening the ability of states to develop democratic and inclusive ways of governing GenAI. Next to digital autonomy, empowering public accountability actors like civil society, equality bodies, academics or investigative reporters to participate in the governance of the digital transformation are critical conditions for strengthening democratic resilience. Finally, democratic resilience also means enabling more meaningful citizen engagement, including of otherwise often marginalised groups, for example through transparency, literacy and meaningful participation in decision making." (Executive summary) more

From Crisis to Renewal: Addressing AI’s Impact on Our Information Ecosystem New

World Disasters Report 2026: Truth, Trust and Humanitarian Action in the Age of Harmful Information Deep Insights

From Crisis to Renewal: Addressing AI’s Impact on Our Information Ecosystem
New

World Disasters Report 2026: Truth, Trust and Humanitarian Action in the Age of Harmful Information
Deep Insights