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Tackling Kremlin's Media Capture in Southeast Europe: Shared Patterns, Specific Vulnerabilities and Responses to Russian Disinformation
Deep Insights

Rumena Filipova, Alexander Gerganov, Martin Vladimirov

Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) (2021), 124 pp.

"The current report illuminates the scope, means, and reach of Russia’s sharp power influence through the phenomenon of media capture. It traces the regime’s malign impact on good governance and democratic development in eight Southeast European countries (EU members: Bulgaria and Croatia, as we ... more

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Combating Foreign Disinformation on Social Media: Study Overview and Conclusions

Raphael Cohen, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Joe Cheravitch et al.

Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation (2021), xvi, 119 pp.

"Drawing on a host of different primary and secondary sources and more than 150 original interviews from across the U.S. government, the joint force, industry, civil society, and subject-matter experts from nine countries around the world, researchers examined how China, Russia, and North Korea have ... more

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Information Bedlam: Russian and Chinese Information Operations During Covid-19

Edward Lucas, Jake Morris, Corina Rebegea

Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) (2021), 20 pp.

"Based on a literature review through January 2021, evaluated at an expert seminar, this policy brief provides a baseline analysis of changing tactics, narratives, and distribution strategies in Russian and Chinese information operations (IOs) relating to the covid-19 pandemic. Key findings: China c ... more

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Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation: A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 Elections

Aaron Huang

Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (2020), 63 pp.

"In its 2020 presidential and legislative elections, Taiwan combatted and defeated Chinese propaganda and disinformation through a whole-of-society approach, one in which the government became better at debunking fake news and raising awareness of these attacks; civil society became more alert and c ... more

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Russische Medien in Deutschland: Wie der russische Informationskrieg und Desinformation Einfluss auf Deutschland ausüben

Susanne Spahn

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2020), 27 pp.

"In Deutschland wollen RT Deutsch, Sputnik mit SNARadio, Ruptly und die neuen Internet-Firmen Maffick Media und Redfish eine Gegenöffentlichkeit zu den aus ihrer Sicht manipulierten deutschen Medien schaffen. Dabei präsentieren sie sich als unabhängige Alternative. Dies entspricht aber nicht den ... more

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Russian Propaganda Hits its Mark: Experimentally Testing the Impact of Russian Propaganda and Counter-Interventions

Todd C. Helmus, James V. Marrone et al.

Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (2020), xv, 86 pp.

"Given the size and scope of the Russian propaganda campaign that targeted the U.S. electorate in 2016, it is critical to understand both the impact of that campaign and the mechanisms that can reduce the impact of future campaigns. This report, the third in a four-part series, describes a study con ... more

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Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter Them

Samuel Greene, Gregory Asmolov, Adam Fagan, Ofer Fridman, Borjan Gjuzelov

European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union (2020), 101 pp.

"Disinformation is an endemic and ubiquitous part of politics throughout the Western Balkans, without exception. A mapping of the disinformation and counter-dis in for mation landscapes in the region in the period from 2018 through 2020 reveals three key disinformation challenges: external challenge ... more

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More-Troll Kombat: French and Russian Influence Operations Go Head to Head Targeting Audiences in Africa

Graphika (2020), 83 pp.

"On December 15, Facebook announced that it had taken down three separate networks that it had discovered for “coordinated inauthentic behavior” that targeted communities across Africa. One, centered on the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, was linked to individuals associated with the Fr ... more

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Das ist keine Propaganda: Wie unsere Wirklichkeit zertrümmert wird

Peter Pomerantsev

Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), Sonderausg. (2020), 295 pp.

"Auf der ganzen Welt nutzen unterschiedlichste Akteure die Wirkungsmechanismen der digitalen Medien aus, um durch gezielte Desinformationskampagnen die öffentliche Meinung zu beeinflussen. Dies, so lautet die zentrale These von Peter Pomerantsev, bedrohe Demokratien und Demokratisierungsprozesse. W ... more

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“Anything That Causes Chaos”: The Organizational Behavior of Russia Today (RT)

Mona Elswah, Philip N. Howard

Journal of Communication, volume 70, issue 5 (2020), pp. 623-645

"RT (formerly, Russia Today) is one of the most important organizations in the global political economy of disinformation. It is the most richly funded, well-staffed, formal organization in the world producing, disseminating, and marketing news in the service of the Kremlin. It is an agency accused ... more

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How to lose the information war: Russia, fake news, and the future of conflict

Nina Jankowicz

London: Tauris (2020), xxvii, 259 pp.

"Since the start of the Trump era, the United States and the Western world has finally begun to wake up to the threat of online warfare and the attacks from Russia. The question no one seems to be able to answer is: what can the West do about it? Central and Eastern European states, however, have be ... more

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Propaganda by Proxy: Ukrainian Oligarchs, TV and Russia's Influence

Jakob Hedenskog, Mattias Hjelm

Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency (2020), 4 pp.

"The issues of media ownership and Russian propaganda messaging remain an ongoing concern in Ukraine. Of the top 20 most-viewed TV channels in the country, almost all belong to the same people who top the list of Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarchs – Rinat Akhmetov, Viktor Pinchuk, Dmytro Firtash, Se ... more

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Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State (2020), 76 pp.

"Russia has operationalized the concept of perpetual adversarial competition in the information environment by encouraging the development of a disinformation and propaganda ecosystem that allows for varied and overlapping approaches that reinforce each other even when individual messages within the ... system appear contradictory. This ecosystem reflects both the sources of disinformation and propaganda—official government statements, state-funded media outlets, proxy websites, bots, false social media personas, cyber-enabled disinformation operations, etc.—and the different tactics that these channels use. Russia’s willingness to employ this approach provides it with three perceived advantages. First, it allows for the introduction of numerous variations of the same false narratives. This allows for the different pillars of the ecosystem to fine tune their disinformation narratives to suit different target audiences because there is no need for consistency, as there would be with attributed government communications. Second, it provides plausible deniability for Kremlin officials when proxy sites peddle blatant and dangerous disinformation, allowing them to deflect criticism while still introducing pernicious information. Third, it creates a media multiplier effect among the different pillars of the ecosystem that boost their reach and resonance. The media multiplier effect can, at times, create disinformation storms with potentially dangerous effects for those Russia perceives as adversaries at the international, national, and local level. In the past, Russia has leveraged this dynamic to shield itself from criticism for its involvement in malign activity. This approach also allows Russia to be opportunistic, such as with COVID-19, where it has used the global pandemic as a hook to push longstanding disinformation and propaganda narratives [...] This report provides a visual representation of the ecosystem described above, as well as an example of the media multiplier effect it enables. This serves to demonstrate how the different pillars of the ecosystem play distinct roles and feed off of and bolster each other. The report also includes brief profiles of select proxy sites and organizations that occupy an intermediate role between the pillars of the ecosystem with clear links to Russia and those that are meant to be fully deniable." (Pages 5-7) more

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Weapons of Mass Distraction: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in the Digital Age

Christina Nemr, William Gangware

Park Advisors (2019), 44 pp.

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The Psychology of State-Sponsored Disinformation Campaigns and Implications for Public Diplomacy

Erik C. Nisbet, Olga Kamenchuk

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, volume 14, issue 1/2 (2019), pp. 65-82

"Policy discourse about disinformation focuses heavily on the technological dimensions of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Unfortunately, this myopic focus on technology has led to insufficient attention being paid to the underlying human factors driving the success of state-sponsored disin ... more

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Russia's Arabic Propaganda: What it is, Why it Matters

Anna Borshchevskaya, Catherine Cleveland

Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2018), 17 pp.

"The Middle East media landscape provides Russian state with unique opportunities. A region with strong state-controlled media, weak independent outlets, and a burgeoning reliance on social media—along with a historical suspicion of Western news sources—has created useful openings that the Kreml ... more

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Anti-Western Propaganda

Tamar Kintsurashvili

Tblisi: Media Development Foundation (MDF); UN Association of Georgia; USAID (2018), 38 pp.

"As many as 1,967 anti-Western comments were detected in the 17 monitored media outlets in 2017. In contrast to 2016 and 2015, when negative messages targeted human identity and rights, in 2017, a dominant topic was the foreign policy with the messages aimed at increasing the polarization on the for ... eign policy orientation of the country. This change in the strategic communication of pro-Kremlin actors shows that “loss of identity” was a rather tactical message that prepared the ground, while the messaging aimed at demonizing Georgia’s strategic partners (USA, NATO, EU) is of strategic nature. The United States of America accounted for the highest share of negative comments (25.9%), up by almost three times as compared to the previous year, followed by NATO (18,4%) and the West (14,1%). Compared to 2016, messages against the European Union have almost doubled (13.4%) whereas the comments about the loss of identity and human rights in anti-Western context have almost halved (12.9%). Comments against nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the US philanthropist George Soros have trebled, as compared to 2016, and comprised 7.3%; this increase can be explained by a stepped up activity of far-right groups and their campaign to smear Open Society Georgia Foundation. Yet another change as compared to the previous years were clearer messages showcasing Russia as an alternative to the West and idealizing the Soviet system (7.2%). Comments against Great Britain (0,8%) have been mainly detected in two pro-Kremlin online media outlets – Georgia and the World, and Sakinformi. Alike previous years, the main source of anti-Western messages was media (827), followed by politicians (463), society (411), civil organizations (230) and the clergy (37). The structure of the Kremlin narrative in the Georgian discourse consists of three stages and aims at: 1. Creating threats; 2. Sowing distrust towards partners and Western institutions; 3. Ingraining a belief that Russia is the only option in fighting against the threats and that authoritative/Soviet-style governance is necessary. Four major threats were emphasized by pro-Kremlin actors: threat of war; threat of loss of territories; threat of bio subversion; threat of loss of identity." (Key findings, page 7) more

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Countering Russian Propaganda

Per Concordiam: Journal of European Security and Defense Issues, issue special issue (2016), 38 pp.

"In this issue we discuss some of the arguments and debates related to the highly charged and topical issue of Russia’s strategic narrative and how it is disseminated. Propaganda, in numerous forms, creates a barrier to more constructive engagement and dialogue. This issue’s contributors find th ... more

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Resisting Foreign State Propaganda in the New Information Environment: The Case of the EU, Russia, and the Eastern Partnership Countries

Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) (2016), 293 pp.

"With well-organised and far-reaching weapons of information Russia has succeeded in sowing doubt about the need for democratic values and is therefore also undermining faith in democratic countries, weakening it. Russia government uses lies, concealment, and the manipulation of anything that can se ... more

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The Cyberspace War: Propaganda and Trolling as Warfare Tools

Jessika Aro

European View, volume 15, issue 1 (2015), pp. 121-132

"Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime has taken control of the traditional media in Russia: TV, radio and newspapers. As Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated, the Kremlin sees the mass media as a ‘weapon’. Now Russia’s leadership is trying to take control of social media to ... more

Tackling Kremlin's Media Capture in Southeast Europe: Shared Patterns, Specific Vulnerabilities and Responses to Russian Disinformation Deep Insights

Tackling Kremlin's Media Capture in Southeast Europe: Shared Patterns, Specific Vulnerabilities and Responses to Russian Disinformation
Deep Insights