"Der Beitrag analysiert die Berichterstattung über den Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine in den russischen Teilrepubliken Tatarstan und Baschkortostan, welche sich beide durch die starke Präsenz von turksprachigen Bevölkerungsgruppen auszeichnen. Die Medienanalyse ergab, dass die Berichterstattung
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Propagandafunktionen erfüllt. Die militärischen Freiwilligenverbände nehmen dabei eine zentrale Rolle ein." (Zusammenfassung, Seite 13)
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"This report highlights adaptations and innovations by Ukrainians in their struggle against Moscow’s disinformation machine. As part of the project, the International Forum on Democratic Studies conducted more than fifty expert interviews and hosted a series of convenings with experts from Ukraine
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and across Europe which inform the analysis. Companion essays—one from Ukraine, the other from Central Europe—provide more context and details on the ways in which locally based organizations are learning to meet the challenge. The research identified three advantages—deep preparation, open networks of cooperation, and active utilization of new technology—that have allowed civil society organizations and governments in Ukraine and Central and Eastern Europe to build trust and tell Ukraine’s story, unite Ukrainians and their allies, and ensure resilience in the face of authoritarian disinformation campaigns." (Executive summary, page 1)
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"Can residents of Ukraine discern between pro-Kremlin disinformation and true statements? Moreover, which pro-Kremlin disinformation claims are more likely to be believed, and by which audiences? We present the results from two surveys carried out in 2019—one online and the other face-to-face—th
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at address these questions in Ukraine, where the Russian government and its supporters have heavily targeted disinformation campaigns. We find that, on average, respondents can distinguish between true stories and disinformation. However, many Ukrainians remain uncertain about a variety of disinformation claims’ truthfulness. We show that the topic of the disinformation claim matters. Disinformation about the economy is more likely to be believed than disinformation about politics, historical experience, or the military. Additionally, Ukrainians with partisan and ethnolinguistic ties to Russia are more likely to believe pro-Kremlin disinformation across topics. Our findings underscore the importance of evaluating multiple types of disinformation claims present in a country and examining these claims’ target audiences." (Abstract)
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"Neun Illustratorinnen und ein Illustrator der ukrainischen Organisation Pictoric zeigen in diesem Band politische Karikaturen und Illustrationen, in denen sie ihre Kriegseindrücke verarbeiten. Dabei überführen sie mit der Stärke ihres Berufsstandes anspruchsvolle Themen und Gefühle in eine lei
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cht verständliche Bildsprache und machen sie auf diese Weise zugänglich. Die Arbeiten sollen sowohl die Schrecken des Krieges festhalten als auch die Vielfalt der ukrainischen Gesellschaft abbilden, Hoffnung wecken und durch ironische Verzerrungen den Mut zum Durchhalten stärken." (Klappentext)
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"In order to spread Russian narratives about Ukraine that create a false impression of the country among external and internal audiences, the Russian Federation uses a whole complex of information and communication channels. Their main task is to replace the target audience's existing ideas about th
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e real, factual state of affairs with ideas that are considered to be more beneficial to the aggressor country. Russia rejects democratic principles and Ukraine's desire for a European future. Depending on the tasks and results (successes/failures) of operations to influence the internal politics of Ukraine and the formation of its image among the Western audience, Russian narratives changed from a presentation of Ukrainians and Russians as “brotherly” peoples or even one people to the importance of the complete extermination of "Ukrainian nationalists and Nazis," denial of the very existence of Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic group (thereby “justifying” genocide), returning supposed "historical territories of Russia," and promoting the idea that Ukraine has never really been a proper state or is a historic mistake. The narratives of Russian propaganda intertwine, sometimes reinforcing and sometimes contradicting each other. But whatever the Russian narrative may be, its main goal is to undermine Ukraine’s democratic development and its integration into the Western world, to weaken the desire of Ukrainians to determine their future outside Russian influence, within the European family, as well as to weaken international support for Ukraine. The Kremlin's disinformation campaign led to the emergence of a number of stereotypes that influenced the decision-making of Ukraine's partners at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, which led to numerous human casualties, the destruction of Ukrainian economy and infrastructure, and a real threat to the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Fortunately, Ukraine has persevered. Unbreakable people of an unbreakable country continues its fight not only for itself but the whole democratic world." (Summary)
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"Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a
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theoretical framework based on media structure, showing how and why decentralized and centralized media offer distinct opportunities and challenges for conducting influence operations. This framework indicates a relative advantage for television in both dissemination and persuasiveness. We test this framework against the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (before the 2022 escalation), contributing new data from a national survey and a new dataset of Telegram activity. We identify fifteen disinformation narratives, and, using statistical analysis, examine correlations between media consumption, audience exposure to, and agreement with, narratives, and foreign policy preferences. To explore causal mechanisms, we follow up with content analysis. Findings strongly support our theoretical framework. While consuming some partisan social media channels is correlated with narrative exposure, there is no correlation with narrative agreement. Meanwhile, consumption of partisan television channels shows clear and consistent correlation. Finally, agreement with narratives also correlates with foreign policy preferences. However, and importantly, findings indicate the overall limitations of influence operations." (Abstract)
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"Zwischen dem 19.09.2022 und 18.09.2023 wurde das Projekt „Narrative über den Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine“ (NUK, im Folgenden NUK) vom Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD Germany) im Auftrag der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/bpb umgesetzt. Ziel des Projekts war es, Desinformati
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on gegenüber ukrainischen Geflüchteten innerhalb russisch- und arabischsprachiger Communities in Deutschland mithilfe von vier online verbreiteten Erklärvideos zu beleuchten. Dieser Abschlussbericht stellt die zentralen Ergebnisse der Analysen zu Desinformationsnarrativen dar, skizziert den Entstehungsprozess sowie die Inhalte der Videos und führt eine Evaluation der Verbreitung der Videos durch." (Seite 3)
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"This volume aims to deepen understanding of the dynamic intersections of war and media in the rapidly transforming media ecology and the reordered geopolitical context. The volume examines the ways in which the digital media and communication environment is involved in and shape the war in Ukraine.
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The chapters in the volume analyse expanding mesh of media-from mainstream broadcasting and press to social media platforms, and the latest digital technologies and addresses four key themes: media infrastructures and the interplay between platforms, technologies, institutions and civic actors; open-source intelligence contributing to (dis)information about the war; the everyday life of war performed and documented on social media; and different interplays between the local and the global in the news coverage of the war." (Publisher description)
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"Before launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia had maintained a low-scale war with Ukraine since early 2014. That conflict, which culminated in the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the ongoing Donbas war, received less international attention than the 2022 ful
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l-scale invasion. Due to the Kremlin’s propaganda channels, troll armies, and “useful idiots” in the West and beyond, Russia was able to control the narrative on the situation in Donbas and Crimea and significantly diminish both support and interest toward Ukraine throughout 2014–2022. Yet, things changed after the start of the full-scale war in 2022. In 2022, Ukraine shifted international views on the Russian invasion. Ukraine’s efforts significantly contributed to Russia’s digital isolation and mainstreamed Ukraine’s counter-narratives using open-source data, digital allies, and successful communication campaigns." (Abstract)
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"Online media is a blessing and a curse for academic research on war. On the one hand, the internet provides unprecedented access to information from conflict zones. On the other hand, the prevalence of disinformation can make it difficult to use this information in a transparent way. This article p
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roposes digital forensic process tracing as a methodological innovation to tackle this challenge and make case study research on the causes of war fit for the social media age. It argues that two important features of process-tracing methodology – source criticism and Bayesian updating – are well developed in theory but are rarely applied to the study of armed conflict. Digital forensic process tracing applies these features to online media sources by drawing on the journalistic practice of open source intelligence (OSINT) analysis. This article uses the case of the war in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed methodology." (Abstract)
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"Propaganda has been an age-old part of warmongering. It is thus no surprise that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was preceded by, and continues to be fuelled by, propaganda transmitted by state-controlled Russian media. What is more unusual about the Russian (dis)information campaigns is the sheer
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volume of distorted narratives or complete fictional accounts about the conflict. This article explores the content and technologies of Russian information manipulation of domestic audiences in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. We also examine the bases for the sustained robust public support for the war within Russia during the first 12 months of the conflict, despite being based on mostly fabricated (dis)information. Relying on political psychology and communication theory we explain how emotions and associative memories have played an important role in the Russian public's sustained approval to the war. Our findings point to that in the absence of contrasted and independently-verified information, the volume, frequency, emotional intensity of slick, plug-and-play media packages on Ukraine have acted to displace and distort the average Russian's associative social monitoring processes." (Abstract)
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"Most scholars working on Russia’s use of strategic narratives recognize the importance of the Russian state. Nevertheless, the authors argue that much of the attention on strategic narratives has given insufficient appreciation for how Russia has developed its military and media policies in a coo
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rdinated manner: learning from its mistakes and failures as it went along, and becoming more efficient each time. In making their case, they examine three theatres of Russian military activity and their accompanying media coverage: the wars in Chechnya in 1994–1995 and 1999– 2000; war with Georgia in 2008 over the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and Ukraine, especially Crimea, since 2014. The Russian leadership addressed the shortcomings on each occasion, with the news media being increasingly weaponized as time went on. The authors argue that scholars should see Russia’s evolving uses of those military and media power resources as part of a single strategic process. How the Russian state goes about its media policy can accentuate the military intervention for better or for worse as far as its image is concerned." (Abstract)
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"Ukraine has been building its capacity to use humour as a strategic communications tool since Russian first invasion in 2014. After Russia launched the full-scale war in February 2022, this often grassroots effort was multiplied by many new actors joining it. Foreign supporters of Ukraine stepped i
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n to expose lies of Russian officials in social media, resulting in a creation of NAFO movement. The use of humour by the Ukrainian government officials also pushed the boundaries of what is considered acceptable in digital diplomacy. Numerous jokes and memes have been created that will remain in the historical record of this war, such as the “Russian warship” meme, “sunflower seeds in a pocket”, “bavovna”( cotton), and others. However, humour should not overshadow the terrible reality of war Ukrainians have to face daily until this day. It should not distract attention from the need for Ukraine to win and Russia to be held accountable for its war crimes. Humour helped Ukrainians cope with the trauma of war and preserve mental health. For foreign audiences, especially in the West, it helped to introduce Ukraine as a country that is a part of the same cultural space, has similar values, and is worthy of support. Witty jokes and creative memes opened a window for many to discover Ukrainian history and culture. Satire helped to expose the absurdity of Russian imperialist ideology and propaganda narratives the Kremlin used to launch its invasion of Ukraine." (Conclusion)
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"Hate speech is more complex and diverse on social media. It spreads at high speed and can impact behaviors beyond the borders where it originates. Hate is ubiquitous, interactive, and multimedia. It is available 24/7, reaching a much larger audience. On social media, haters can be anonymous and fin
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d support from individuals with the same aggressive mindset. This is just a brief characterization and certainly presents many theoretical gaps that need improvement. This book explores the nature of hate speech on social media. Readers will find chapters written by 21 authors from 18 universities or research centers. It includes researchers from 11 countries, prioritizing a diversity of approaches from the Global North and Global South – Brazil, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Germany, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA. The analyses herein involve the realities in an even larger number of countries, given the transnational approach of some of these studies." (Preface, page 13)
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"This article offers a qualitative analysis of how, by adopting identity-related discourses whose meanings resonate within a given culture, Russian state propaganda strives to bolster “the truth status” of its Ukraine war claims. These discourses, we argue, have long historical lineages and thus
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are expected to be familiar to audiences. We identify three such discourses common in many contexts but with specific resonances in Russia, those of colonialism/decolonization, imperialism, and the imaginary West. The article demonstrates that these same discourses also inform war-related coverage in Russophone oppositional media. Russian state-affiliated and oppositional actors further share “floating signifiers,” particularly “the Russian people,” “historical Russia,” “the Russian world,” “Ukraine,” “fascism/Nazism,” and “genocide,” while according them radically different meanings. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of studying how state propaganda works at the level of discourses, and the acutely dialogical processes by which disinformation and counter-disinformation efforts are produced and consumed." (Abstract)
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"The topic of the war in Ukraine dominated the media during the first three months of the war and completely marginalized all other topics. The most foreign actor reported on most in the media was Russia, while the countries of the West, the US, the EU, and NATO were far less noticeable. Although th
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e initial open support for Russia has softened since the beginning of the war, the media continue to report in favour of Russia, and against the West. Television stations with national coverage (especially their morning news programmes), as well as parts of the daily press, are at the forefront of supporting Russia. Internet portals have a more balanced approach. Among state officials, President Vucic has monopolized the discussions of the war in Ukraine, and he is the person most credited in the media for establishing Serbia's neutral stance on this issue. Disinformation in the media is placed in such a way as to present Russia in a positive light, and the West negatively. Disinformation was most prevalent on internet portals and the printed edition of Vecernje novosti, the daily Informer, and television stations Pink and Happy." (Key findings)
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"Eight months into the Russia-Ukraine war, Roma refugees in Moldova, continue to face significant barriers to accessing the information necessary to make decisions for themselves and their families and to access humanitarian services. This assessment shows that some barriers are well documented and
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have impacted their access to timely, verified, and actionable information long before their arrival in Moldova. These include a deeply ingrained distrust of authority figures (in particular, the government), poor access to education, and lower literacy skills than other refugee groups. Other barriers are more recent, resulting from the new structural inequities they are facing in Moldova." (Executive summary)
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