"More than nine months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the online methods for tracking this war are many and proliferating, including the most obvious source of all — social media networks. A 2019 law designed to keep its military from posting on social media has not deterred Russian service
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men from sharing images and updates from the frontline, not least on Telegram and the Russian social network VKontakte, potentially allowing anyone with an Internet connection to pinpoint the place, time, and sometimes individuals seen in footage of military movements. Open-source investigations (OSI), popularly and misleadingly known as open-source intelligence, is not synonymous with social media, however. OSI is any information that can be publicly accessed by others, including but not limited to online sources. That includes everything from local newspapers to satellite imagery and images shared on TripAdvisor. What it doesn’t include are two mainstays of traditional investigative journalism — non-public document leaks or closed-source reporting, otherwise known as shoe-leather reporting and interviews. Over the past few years, newsrooms have started integrating open-source methods into their coverage and building their own OSI teams. That’s in part to verify social media posts, and in part to report on places where it is simply too dangerous for journalists to venture — areas on or behind the frontlines — where open-source imagery allows a glimpse into military movements and potential war crimes. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, open-source investigations have surged in prominence and the genre as a whole has attracted scrutiny, not least from state actors themselves." (Introduction)
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"In posts by Chinese diplomats, the US, NATO and the West were almost exclusively blamed or criticised for Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Russia was not specifically blamed. The most common posts shared news relating to the conflict (including readouts of Xi Jinping’s calls with world
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leaders), primarily from Chinese state media. Those articles usually presented China’s and, where they aligned, Russia’s views of the conflict. They frequently reported on the actions of Chinese officials reiterating China’s position. Chinese diplomats repeated Russian conspiracy theories about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine with gusto and linked the alleged activities to conspiracy theories about the origin of Covid-19. Posts about Ukraine on Facebook mostly underperformed compared to regular posts, except in Europe. On Twitter, Ukraine material appeared to broadly perform better than non-Ukraine material, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. Chinese diplomats did not appear to specifically target the Chinese diaspora (by posting in Chinese) in posts about Ukraine to any significant extent on Facebook or Twitter. A selection of CGTN content on YouTube largely mirrored the narratives of the Chinese officials on Twitter and Facebook." (Executive summary)
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"En tanto ideología presente en medios, intelectuales y élites políticas de Rusia y Latinoamérica, las narrativas iliberales -proyectadas por medios y academias afines- gozan de apreciable presencia e impacto en el panorama regional. A raíz del conflicto entre Rusia y Occidente por la invasión
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a Ucrania, el rol de los medios rusos como fuente de desinformación de la población latinoamericana ha sido objeto de atención. La presencia de estos medios masivos permite al Kremlin cuestionar el modelo democrático vigente en la mayor parte de América Latina y defender las posturas oficiales del gobierno ruso, al tiempo que se alinean con las perspectivas de las fuerzas iliberales - en especial de la izquierda radical - del espectro político regional." (Resumen)
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"During the monitoring period (February 24 – April 24) the following tendencies have been identified: Out of the 160 false information and manipulative content, mainly disseminated in Russian and Georgian sources, the largest share (49.4%) was directed against Ukraine, followed by disinformation a
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gainst the West (28.1%). Part of the false and manipulative content was aimed at justifying Russia’s actions (16.3%). In order to evade Russia’s responsibility for human casualties, the Kremlin’s propaganda has resorted to the tactic of “whataboutism” – in response to accusations, the Russian side has been arguing that the Ukrainian side was the one killing the civilian population and that the population was endangered not by Russian troops but by the actions of the Azov Battalion and other so-called ‘Nazi groups.’ The denial of Russian responsibility for the military intervention in Ukraine was also bolstered by deliberate disinformation, reinforcing the idea that Ukraine was fabricating information about the victims (Mariupol blogger story, Bucha Massacre). Visual manipulations, including those related to the pandemic, were often used for this purpose [...]" (Key findings)
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"This paper will outline the technologies and mechanisms of Putin's information machine, how it operates during the war and the obstacles to anti-war propaganda among Russians. At the very end, we will offer some recommendations for confronting Putin's information machine at war, both of a general n
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ature and relating to specific groups of Russian society." (Page 3)
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"Although China's official position on the war has been that of neutrality-not aligning with the West against Russia and not directly supporting Russia's war in Ukraine-its communications about the war, in particular its propaganda via state media and Foreign Ministry spokespeople have carried a mor
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e pro-Russia stance. During the past two months of the Russia-Ukraine war, Chinese official messaging has echoed and reinforced Russia's position: 1.) by promoting shared narratives about the origins and culprits of the war, namely blaming NATO and the United States; 2.) by drawing disproportionally on Russian sources and footage of the war; and 3.) by under-reporting on Ukraine's perspectives. This pro-Russia leaning during the Ukraine crisis can be understood as part of a larger propaganda trajectory vis-à-vis Russia and the United States. Domestically, China's propaganda messaging in large part appears to resonate with public opinion. Internationally, however, Chinese propaganda about the war, especially communications by Foreign Ministry spokespeople, delude China's neutrality position and antagonize the West, while more integrating China into the Global South." (Page 1)
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"Der Journalist und Verleger Sergej Parkhomenko ist ein international gefeierter Menschenrechtsverteidiger, Oppositionsaktivist und unter den russischen Medienschaffenden einer der wichtigsten Partner für das Internationale Journalisten- und Mediendialogprogramm (IJMD) der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftun
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g für die Freiheit . Als entschiedener Gegner der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine setzt er von Europa aus seine Arbeit gegen den russischen Eroberungskrieg und wider die Putin-Diktatur fort. Im Impulspapier berichtet Parkhomenko über den Überlebenskampf des unabhängigen Journalismus unter den totalitären Repressionsmaßnahmen in Russland." (https://shop.freiheit.org)
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"Die Zustimmungswerte zu pro-russischen Verschwörungserzählungen in der deutschen Gesamtbevölkerung steigen. Im Vergleich zu den Umfrageergebnissen einer CeMAS-Analyse aus April 2022 stiegen sowohl alle Zustimmungswerte als auch alle Werte der teils-teils-Antworten im Hinblick auf die Haltung zu
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pro-russischen Verschwörungserzählungen in der deutschen Bevölkerung signifikant an. Mit 19 % stimmte fast jede:r Fünfte der Aussage zu, dass der russische Angriffskrieg eine alternativlose Reaktion Russlands auf die Provokation der NATO wäre. 21 % stimmten dieser Aussage teilweise zu. Im April lag die Zustimmung hier bei 12 % und die teils-teils-Antwort bei 17 %. Den zweithöchsten Zustimmungswert der abgefragten Items erreichte die Aussage, Putin würde gegen eine globale Elite vorgehen, die im Hintergrund die Fäden zöge. Mit 18 % im Vergleich zu 12 % im April nahm diese Aussage um 6 Prozentpunkte zu. Die teils-teils-Antworten stiegen mit 26 % im Vergleich zu 20 % im April um 6 Prozentpunkte an." (Seite 1)
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"The war in Ukraine is just the latest instance where attention-grabbing events have fuelled the rapid spread of false or misleading news about refugees and migrants. This Issue Paper examines the challenges posed by disinformation about refugees from Ukraine, as well as the responses taken so far t
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o address it. It inspects which disinformation actors spread false claims about Ukrainian refugees, and how. It sheds light on why migration-related disinformation is so pervasive and how disinformation narratives change over time and space. It also examines which audiences are more susceptible to online disinformation. The paper also identifies positive developments and shortcomings in the EU's responses." (Executive Summary, page 5)
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"Wie denken gewöhnliche Russ:innen wirklich über die Entscheidung von Präsident Putin, in die Ukraine einzumarschieren? Obwohl einiges dafürspricht, dass frühere Umfragen, die Zustimmungswerte um 60 % für den Krieg zeigen, als genuine Signale der russischen öffentlichen Meinung gewertet werde
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n können, untersucht dieser Beitrag eine Reihe von Gründen, warum diese Umfrageergebnisse mit großer Vorsicht behandelt oder gar ignoriert werden sollten. Gründe dafür sind u. a. die staatliche Zensur, die Selbstzensur der Bevölkerung und eine verzerrte Beantwortung der Fragen, das Vorhandensein von Protesten sogar in einem autoritären Umfeld in Russland, als auch die Tatsache, dass einige der früheren Umfragen nach einem hypothetischen Einmarsch fragten, über den viele Russ:innen wohl nicht ausreichend nachgedacht haben könnten. Allerdings führt der Beitrag an, dass die plausibelste Erklärung für den offensichtlichen anfänglichen Rückhalt für den Krieg in der Manipulation der öffentlichen Meinung durch staatliche Kontrolle der Kommunikationskanäle und der weitverbreitete Einsatz von Zensur, Propaganda und Desinformation im eigenen Land als auch im Ausland liegt." (Seite 6)
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"The research – based on programmatic text-mining supported analyses of several millions of war-related comments scraped by Sentione and further examined with CrowdTangle - found traces of inauthentic, repetitive pro-Kremlin activity on Facebook in all countries under review, which can be consider
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ed attempts to influence public opinion in the affected states and, in some cases, beyond them. Our main conclusions are: Crises help the Kremlin. Even if public opinion in the EU is currently unfavorable to the Kremlin, the onset of high, permanent inflation, soaring energy prices and the looming danger of an EU-wide recession could create a more favorable environment for the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts. Most (covertly) Kremlin-friendly forces will adopt a rhetoric blasting sanctions for harming Europe more than Russia. Importing disinformation narratives. Three out of the four narratives found in Hungary were imported into the country from abroad. One doubting Ukraine’s existence as a country started from an organization connected to Ukrainian pro-Putin oligarch Viktor Medvechuk, taken over by the so-called “news agency” of separatists. Another narrative detailing a new, dictatorial world order based on, among others, COVID-19 restrictions, and led by NATO was aimed at developing countries where Russia can hope to hold more sway. The third essentially took over a trend in the Russian media space: users tried to discredit anti-war voices by asking them “where they were in the past eight years” when Ukraine committed atrocities against minorities. Strategies in Germany: Divide and Rule. The six relevant narratives we found in Germany employed three different strategies. The first was anti-Westernism, where the US and NATO are to blame for Russia’s attack. The second aimed clearly at generating debates by spreading a Kremlin-critical narrative. Some profiles involved in this were caught disseminating both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin narratives, which indicates it is not intended to counter the Kremlin’s information operation but to be a part of it. The third strategy was about exploiting contemporary events - such as heightened discussions on sanctions and rising inflation." (Executive summary)
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"The spread of disinformation around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects wider challenges related to the shift in how information is produced and distributed. Platform and algorithm designs can amplify the spread of disinformation by facilitating the creation of echo chambers and confirmation bi
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as mechanisms that segregate the news and information people see and interact with online; information overload, confusion and cognitive biases play into these trends. A particular challenge is that people tend to spread falsehoods “farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth”; this is particularly the case for false political news. For example, one study found that tweets containing false information were 70% more likely to be retweeted than accurate tweets. Another study found that false information on Facebook attracts six times more engagement than factual posts. In addition, feedback loops between the platforms and traditional media can serve to further amplify disinformation, magnifying the risk that disinformation can be used to deliberately influence public conversations, as well as confuse and discourage the public. The flow of – and disruption caused by – Russian disinformation has significantly increased since Russia's invasion in February 2022. In turn, Ukraine’s response to the Russian disinformation threat has built upon progress made in strengthening the information and media environment since 2014 and in establishing mechanisms to respond directly to information threats. These include efforts to provide accurate information, ensure that media organisations can continue operations, and policy efforts to combat the threats posed by Russian state-linked media." (Page 2)
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"We sought to better understand Russia's disinformation on social media and generate recommendations to better meet and counter this evolving threat. We relied on an analysis of Russian military literature, investigative efforts, official reports, academic and policy literature, media reporting, and
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expert interviews. We also conducted a case study in Ukraine, interviewing a variety of key experts in the Ukrainian government and in the nongovernmental sector who are involved in confronting Russian information warfare." (Summary)
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"The rise of social media has revolutionized information-sharing and the way in which people learn about important events. As evidenced by the use of TikTok in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, social media has the ability to connect people from conflict zones to individuals around the world.
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Although dramatic video clips can be critical for our understanding of real-time developments and for pressuring policymakers to act, they also open the door to misinformation that creates confusion and division." (Abstract)
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"In this essay, I explore the nature of propaganda in a hybrid media environment through the example of Russian propaganda during the ongoing war in Ukraine. I start by briefly overviewing the Russian media system’s development, focusing on the roots of cynical attitude toward journalism in the so
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ciety. After analyzing propaganda strategies, I suggest the propaganda on demand concept, which describes the manipulation of public opinion by targeting different social milieus with specif-ically tailored narratives. In Russia’s case, this approach is based on inconsistency and eclecticism. However, it seems well suited to the very logic of the digital realm, which helps the state deliver often-contradicting narratives to different target groups." (Abstract)
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"The purpose of this research is two-fold: first, to assess the effectiveness of the restrictions placed on Russian state-affiliated media by the European Union after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine; second, to unearth potential circumvention methods and their success in enabling pro-Kr
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emlin content to reach European audiences. This report breaks down into two parts: firstly, an analysis of traffic from global and European audiences to all RT websites, as well as websites associated with Rossiya Segodnya, a media group affiliated with the Kremlin that operates various outlets, including Sputnik. For this, analysts conducted website forensics and collected website traffic data to identify all RT and Rossiya Segodnya domains and to understand who is still accessing their content and how. The second study explored how RT articles that negatively depict Ukrainians seeking refuge in Europe and elsewhere were made available through various means across the EU." (About this publication)
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"This report is published quarterly and gives an overview of key communication, community engagement and accountability (CCEA) barriers and gaps across the Ukraine response, as well as recommendations for practitioners and responders to improve the use of CCEA for those affected by the crisis. Despi
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te the many CCEA-related activities happening on the ground, there are still critical gaps related to: information provision on priority topics; addressing language and translation concerns; two-way digital outreach; and CCE for marginalised groups and host communities. Many of these gaps could be addressed, and CCEA activities more effectively scaled, through a collaborative approach among international aid organisations and local media, CSOs, and diaspora- and refugee-led organisations, formal and informal." (Introduction, page 5 & Conclusion, page 21)
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"The purpose of this study is to assess the threats and supporting mechanisms present in the Georgian media environment in 2022. Observation of the media environment, similar to the previous year’s research, was based on the evaluation of the participants involved in the research and further compa
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rative analysis." (Abstract)
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"The aim of this research was to study media consumption habits among different age groups and geographical areas, as well as the public's vulnerability to various disinformation and manipulative narratives disseminated in Georgia. The first part of the research concerns media literacy competencies,
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namely media consumption habits, the ability to identify and verify false information, while the second part deals with perceptions of disinformation in relation to 3 thematic areas (Russian intervention in Ukraine, current events/ identity-related issues in Georgia and health). The research was conducted in 7 Georgian cities throughout the month of September, namely Akhalkalaki, Batumi, Gardabani, Zugdidi, Tbilisi, Telavi, and Kutaisi, conducting face-to-face interviews with 140 respondents." (Introduction, page 3)
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