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Digital occupation: Pro-Russian bot networks target Ukraine’s occupied territories on Telegram

Yuliia Dukach, Iryna Adam, Meredith Furbish

Atlantic Council, July 16 (2025)

"This joint report from OpenMinds and the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) analyzes the activity of a network of 3,634 automated accounts that posted pro-Russian comments on Telegram channels between January 2024 and April 2025 targeting Ukrainian populations inside Russian-occupied territorie ... more

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Have people ‘had enough of experts’? The impact of populism and pandemic misinformation on institutional trust in comparative perspective

Vaclav Stetka, Francisco Brandao, Sabina Mihelj, Fanni Toth, Daniel Hallin, Danilo Rothberg, Paulo Ferracioli, Beata Klimkiewicz

Information, Communication & Society, volume 28, issue 6 (2025), pp. 1039-1060

"Public trust in institutions is a key prerequisite for effective crisis management. However, the rise of populism and misinformation in recent years made it increasingly difficult to maintain institutional trust. Despite this recognition, we still lack a systematic understanding of how exposure to ... more

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Psychological Defence and Information Influence: A Textbook on Theory and Practice

Jesper Falkheimer, James Pamment (eds.)

Karlstad: Psychological Defence Agency (2025), 257 pp.

"In an age defined by rapid information flows and shifting security landscapes, the resilience of societies rests not only on military strength or technological capacity, but equally on the ability of individuals and institutions to withstand psychological influence and manipulation. Psychological d ... more

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Recommendations for strengthening Mauritania´s resilience against disinformation. White paper

Bonn: Deutsche Welle DW Akademie (2025), 18 pp.

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Emerging Media Structures, Media Policy and the Challenge of Disinformation in Post-Assad Syria

Asiem El Difraoui, Carola Richter, Anja Wollenberg

Berlin: Media in Cooperation and Transition (MiCT) (2025), 54 pp.

"This study analyses the media ecosystem in post-Assad Syria, focusing on the proliferation of disinformation, ethno-sectarian hate speech and Foreign Interference (FIMI). It covers the period from December 2024 to December 2025, one year after the collapse of the Assad regime. Besides disinformati ... on, the research examines emerging media structures, media policies of the transitional government, and the professional conditions of journalists across different regions of Syria. The study is based on field research conducted in Damascus in September and November 2025, semi-structured interviews with approximately 60 stakeholders —including government officials, journalists, and media experts from eight Syrian cities— in-depth desk research, social media analysis and a focus group discussion with Syrian media professionals held during a workshop in Amman [...] Within this broader context, the Syrian media landscape is undergoing significant transformation. State media institutions, such as the television channel Al-Ikhbariya, the news agency SANA, and the newspaper Al-Thawra, have adjusted their editorial lines and now largely support the new government, with limited critical coverage. The state media sector employs an estimated 7,000–8,000 staff, but displays pronounced salary inequalities between long-standing employees and newly appointed executives from Idlib. Media outlets funded by Qatar, including Syria Now and Syria TV, have gained prominence due to their close alignment with the new authorities. While some exile media outlets have begun to return to Syria, local and independent media organisations continue to operate under precarious financial conditions. In the Kurdish-controlled northeast of Syria (AANES), an autonomous media system persists, though it has been severely affected by the withdrawal of U.S. funding. Disinformation represents a central challenge in the Syrian media and information environment, particularly given the dominance of social media and messaging platforms as primary news sources. The study identifies multiple actors involved in coordinated disinformation campaigns. These include remnants of the former regime (Foloul), who seek to destabilise the transitional authorities as well as foreign actors—for example Russia, Iran, Israel and Turkey—that pursue their own geopolitical interests partly through coordinated campaigns; and ISIS propaganda, which routinely calls for attacks on Alawites, Shias, Christians, Druze, Kurds, and other groups it casts as enemies. Most of the various ethno-religious communities are both targets and producers of disinformation. Competing narratives centred on victimhood, revenge, and revisionism have contributed to cycles of mistrust and fear. Disinformation, hate speech, and propaganda are primarily disseminated via Facebook, WhatsApp, and Telegram. Based on these findings, the study proposes five policy recommendations: (1) the establishment of a Syria Media and Disinformation Observatory to monitor and analyse disinformation trends; (2) the development of a context-sensitive media literacy toolkit; (3) sustained international funding for public interest media; (4) cross-regional professional networking and training programmes for Syrian journalists; and (5) youth-focused initiatives aimed at promoting social cohesion. The study concludes that the future development of a pluralistic media system in Syria will depend largely on internal power dynamics within the ruling elites, particularly the balance between ideological hardliners and more pragmatic actors." (Executive summary) more

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Why do people spread fake news? Modelling the factors that influence social media users’ fake news sharing behaviour

Yan An, Yinan Huang, Ndonima Uhwe Danjuma, Oberiri Destiny Apuke, Elif Asude Tunca

Information Development, volume 41, issue 1 (2025), pp. 48-60

"This study modelled the factors that influence fake news spreading behaviour among social media users. To gather our data, we used an online survey to sample 385 social media users in Nigeria, using a chain referral approach. Smart PLS structural equation modelling was used to analyse the data (SEM ... more

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Climate Disinformation in Pakistan: Silencing Indigenous Peoples’ Voice

Humera Qasim Khan, Waqas Naeem

Islamabad: International Media Support (IMS); Institute for Research, Advocacy and Development (IRADA); Mediastan (2025), vii, 39 pp.

"The study identifies five distinct forms of climate disinformation in Pakistan: alarmist and sensationalised content, which exaggerates climate impact to provoke fear, confusion and emotional reactions rather than informed understanding; conspiracy-driven narratives that suggest hidden agendas or e ... xternal actors manipulating climate event, undermining trust in institutions and science; denial and delay narratives where scientific consensus is rejected or inaction is promoted by downplaying risks and questioning the urgency of climate response; oversimplified or false solutions that promote misleading or ineffective fixes to distract from evidence-based mitigation and adaptation strategies; religious fatalism, which frames climate change effects as predetermined or divinely inevitable, reducing perceived human responsibility and discouraging action.hich frames climate change effects as predetermined or divinely inevitable, reducing perceived human responsibility and discouraging action. The study also confirms findings from literature about structural weaknesses within Pakistan’s news media environment, which include a lack of consistent news coverage of climate issues, limited scientific literacy among journalists, editorial incentives favouring sensationalism over accuracy and the absence of systematic fact-checking protocols. These gaps, exacerbated by platform algorithms that reward virality over veracity, create a situation where climate-related disinformation may spread unchecked. The report shows that the climate disinformation impacts IPs in five ways: first, it affects community safety and Indigenous livelihoods by creating a false sense of security or conversely unnecessary panic among IP communities that may lead to damage, displacement and poor adaptation and mitigation practices; second, disinformation related to natural disasters generates fear, uncertainty, confusion and psychological distress among vulnerable IP communities, creating emotional trauma and diminishing their self-confidence in their ability to respond to climate risks; third, climate-related disinformation erodes trust of IPs in scientific forecasts, institutional information and the official responses of state authorities, as viral disinformation messages and rumours fill the information vacuum created by the absence of clear, timely and accessible climate communication; fourth, it discourages Indigenous ecological knowledge and diminishes the credibility of local adaptation methods by painting these methods as primitive, unscientific or outdated; fifth, climate disinformation intensifies the existing exclusion, marginalisation and invisibility of IPs in climate policy frameworks and climate governance mechanisms, silencing their voices and forcibly transforming them from custodians of community resilience to subjects of pity or blame within the policy and media discourses. The study underscores that climate disinformation is not an isolated digital problem but a systemic governance challenge. It undermines trust in science and institutions, weakens public engagement and delays adaptation efforts. This crisis of information integrity demands coordinated action across sectors. The report offers the following recommendations for key stakeholders to address climate disinformation and its impact on Indigenous peoples and communities in Pakistan. UN bodies should support the government in integrating climate information integrity in national climate and digital governance frameworks and ensure Pakistan’s compliance with relevant international conventions and declarations on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. The relevant ministries of the federal and provincial governments should embed information integrity into Pakistan’s climate governance frameworks, including the National Action Plan and Nationally Determined Contributions, to ensure coordinated and accountable action on climate misinformation. iNGOs should facilitate the creation of a National Climate Fact-Checking Alliance linking journalists, researchers, media organisations and civil society for real-time verification and rapid debunking of false climate narratives. CSOs should establish community-based verification networks, conduct grassroots awareness campaigns, promote digital safety and information verification capacity building for IPs and document and amplify local climate knowledge. Media should set up climate news beats within newsrooms, ensure the presence of trained journalists for environmental reporting, institutionalise fact-checking protocols, provide training for journalists on climate science and disaster reporting and adopt ethical editorial standards for coverage of climate emergencies. Technology companies should implement algorithmic accountability measures to curb the viral spread of climate disinformation, promote verified climate information through priority ranking and contextual labels, collaborate with fact-checkers to monitor regional-language climate content for falsehoods and support rapid-response climate information alerts for Pakistan during climate-induced extreme weather events. Indigenous communities should engage in peer-led digital literacy programmes that build capacity to recognise and counter climate disinformation and collaborate with independent media to document." (Executive summary, pages vi-vii) more

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Russian information operations outside of the Western information environment

Jonathan Morley-Davies, Jem Thomas, Graham Baines

Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Rev. version (2025), 184 pp.

"This report, drawing from research, qualitative and quantitative data, Key Insight Interviews (KIIs), digital tools, and Russian information and deception doctrine, explores the Kremlin’s IIOs in non-Western environments using five selected countries as case studies: Egypt, Mali, Kenya, South Afr ... more

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Climate Disinformation in Thailand: Negating Indigenous Peoples’ Identity

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2025), viii, 60 pp.

"This report examines how climate disinformation reinforces the systemic negation of Indigenous People's (IP) identity, undermining traditional practices, weakening advocacy for rights and obstructing inclusive climate and forest governance by making three key contributions. First, it identifies fou ... r distinct forms of climate disinformation in Thailand: one-sided reporting, where the media spotlights government and corporate initiatives while omitting their social and environmental harms, whether due to political pressure or economic incentives; greenwashing, where corporations exaggerate or misrepresent their sustainability practices to obscure their ongoing environmentally destructive activities; false climate solutions promoted as climate action which fails to address the root causes of climate change while leaving IP communities socially and economically disadvantaged; scapegoating of IPs where Indigenous communities are falsely portrayed as primary drivers of deforestation, legitimising displacement and marginalisation. Second, it demonstrates four ways in which climate disinformation harms IPs, each reinforcing the negation of their identities: exclusion from decision-making: by either barring their participation outright or dismissing their inputs in decision-making processes, IPs’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is removed thereby negating their identities as owners and stewards of their land; criminalisation: the strategic misuse of “climate change” laws to negate IP identity and erase the legitimacy of IPs’ traditions and practices in environmental stewardship; and the use of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) intimidate advocates for challenging climate disinformation; forced evictions: conservation and development narratives justify deterritorialisation that severs spiritual, cultural and economic ties to ancestral lands which forms the core of IPs’ identities; intimidation and violence: harassment, threats and attacks undermining the capacity of IPs to resist projects and actions that harm them, their environment and their way of life. Third, to address climate disinformation and safeguard Indigenous Peoples’ (IPs) rights and identities in Thailand, this report outlines a list of multi-stakeholder recommendations: UN bodies should integrate climate disinformation into their human rights monitoring and climate action frameworks and provide guidance to Thailand on implementing its international obligations; the Thai government should embed safeguards against climate disinformation into national climate and environmental policies, strengthen legal protections for IPs, ensure meaningful participation of IP communities in decision-making and improve transparency and accountability in environmental governance; international NGOs (INGOs) should collaborate with IP organisations to map, document and respond to climate disinformation, provide sustained technical capacity-building and funding, and support advocacy and litigation to defend IP rights; civil society organisations (CSOs) should monitor disinformation targeting IPs, co-develop counter-narratives with IP communities and educational content to empower both IPs and the broader public and expand legal aid support; the media sector should prioritise constructive and investigative journalism on climate, environmental, and IP issues; expand coverage in Indigenous languages and culturally appropriate formats; collaborate with IP organisations on fact-checking and monitoring disinformation; and amplify Indigenous perspectives through both national and international outlets; technology companies should strengthen content moderation against climate disinformation, flag misleading project information and invest in digital literacy and connectivity initiatives for rural and Indigenous communities; indigenous communities and organisations should build monitoring networks to identify and counter disinformation, strengthen alliances with independent and Indigenous media, conduct and participate in capacity-building workshops and use digital tools to amplify their voices and safeguard knowledge." (Executive summary, pages vi-vii) more

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When Fact-Checking Is Not WEIRD: Negotiating Consensus Outside Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic Countries

Otavio Vinhas, Marco Bastos

International Journal of Press/Politics, volume 30, issue 1 (2025), pp. 256-276

"This study unpacks the emerging framework of detection, verification, and correction of falsehoods developed by fact-checkers outside Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic countries. We explore a series of semistructured interviews carried out in several languages with thirty-seve ... more

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Google Scholar (132)

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Checking the Fact-Checkers: A Global Perspective

Celine Yunya Song, Daya Kishan Thussu, Drew Margolin (eds.)

Oxford: Routledge (2025), xviii, 319 pp.

"Scholars from different regions, fields, and disciplines provide a unique global and multi-disciplinary perspective for understanding the landscape of fact-checking initiatives and formulating effective and context-dependent strategies. Drawing on diverse international case studies, the authors exp ... more

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‘Living in a post-truth era’? Online misinformation in everyday life in rural and urban China

Pu Yan, Ralph Schroeder

Information, Communication & Society, volume 28, issue 7 (2025), pp. 1195–1215

"This paper investigates everyday information seeking and misinformation among Internet users in rural and urban China. The research employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to identify user demographics and categories of misinformation encountered on mobile devices online. The paper makes ... more

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The Role of Trust and Attitudes toward Democracy in the Dissemination of Disinformation: A Comparative Analysis of Six Democracies

Edda Humprecht

Digital Journalism, volume 13, issue 5 (2025), pp. 931-948

"Trust lies at the heart of the disinformation crisis, as citizens must decide which narratives to follow and whether to accept “alternative truths.” Therefore, trust in institutions that publish reliable information can act as a shield against disinformation. This comparative study investigates ... more

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Deciphering authenticity in the age of AI: how AI-generated disinformation images and AI detection tools influence judgements of authenticity
Deep Insights

Key Guides

Aqsa Farooq, Claes de Vreese

AI & SOCIETY, volume 41 (2025), pp. 493–504

"An ongoing surge of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled false content has been spreading its way through the information ecosystem, including AI-generated images, which have been used as part of political disinformation campaigns. Thus, there remains a pressing need to understand which factors ind ... more

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Governing Misinformation in Everyday Knowledge Commons

Madelyn Sanfilippo, Melissa G. Ocepek (eds.)

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2025), xiv, 278 pp.

"Governing Misinformation in Everyday Knowledge Commons delves into the complex issue of misinformation in our daily lives. The book synthesizes three scholarly traditions - everyday life, misinformation, and governing knowledge commons - to present 10 case studies of online and offline communities ... more

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State-Sponsored Disinformation Around the Globe: How Politicians Deceive their Citizens

Martin Echeverría Victoria, Sara Garcia Santamaria, Daniel C. Hallin (eds.)

Oxford: Routledge (2025), xiii, 336 pp.

"This book explores the pervasive and globalised trajectory of domestic disinformation. It describes specific operations and general apparatuses of disinformation that are sponsored by the State institutions in several countries around the world, such as governments, political parties, and politicia ... more

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Understanding Mis- and Disinformation in Nepal

BBC Media Action (2025), 10 pp.

"Social media dominates daily internet use, while use of traditional media is declining: overall, 7 in 10 Nepalis use the internet daily, with Facebook and YouTube being the most used platforms (63% daily usage for both). Among those with internet access, 80% are heavy users of social media, i.e., ... they go on social media platforms at least once a day. Only 40% use the internet for purposes beyond social media, such as online search and emails. Internet users are using TV and radio less. Only 24% watch TV daily and 19% listen to the radio daily. Sharing information is an emotionally driven and socially performative behaviour: content is often shared not for its accuracy, but for its emotional impact, shock value, or social appeal. People are motivated by a desire to entertain, impress, provoke, or find hope, making them less likely to question the credibility of what they share. Drawing on qualitative data, we identified segments of the Nepali population who differ by how they share information: • Exaggeration Sharers: This group will often amplify exaggerated claims in order to gain visibility. They will often share contents that may elicit emotional responses, such as crime and violence. When sharing it, they may add their own take on the issue to exaggerate it further. • Show-off Enthusiasts: Similar to Exaggeration Sharers, they choose to share content that makes them look important, ‘wanting to impress others’ and ‘seek praise’. This is particularly true when sharing may reach people they respect. • Controversy Seekers: This group seeks out explicit content such as the commonly highlighted Bhojpuri songs (typically mentioned in Madhesh), as well as celebrity scandals. Contents often shared by this group tend to have a negative tonality, including topics like ethnic and religious scuffles. • Bystanders: This group tends to use social media by watching and listening without interacting or sharing. However, they enjoy novel content (particularly religious and political content) that may become a topic of discussion within their social network. • Naïve Consumers: This group focuses their attention on content that seeks to give hope in the face of challenges such as unemployment and economic difficulties. However, they tend to be less aware of, or concerned with, implications of online sharing and privacy issues, indicating lower digital and media literacy." (Pages 3-4) more

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Defending the Truth

D+C: Development and Cooperation, issue 6 (2025), pp. 22-50

"People of all ages and from all societies must be empowered to understand the information they are dealing with. Autocratic regimes around the world owe their rise in part to the deliberate use of all kinds of misinformation. They have an interest in ensuring that truths are distorted or remain unr ... more

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Misinformation Trends and Fact-Checking Practices on Safaricom Kenya’s Twitter: An Online Content Review

Josephine Kalekye Mule

American Journal of Communication, volume 8, issue 1 (2025), 1-15 pp.

This study examines how Safaricom Kenya handled misinformation on its official Twitter account, focusing on posts and audience engagement from January to June 2025. It considers rumors about service outages, prices, and security breaches, and describes the company’s use of multimedia fact-checking ... more

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Desinformación, periodismo y democracia

Omar Rincon, Esther Borges

La Paz: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2025), 31 pp.

Deciphering authenticity in the age of AI: how AI-generated disinformation images and AI detection tools influence judgements of authenticity Deep Insights Key Guides

Deciphering authenticity in the age of AI: how AI-generated disinformation images and AI detection tools influence judgements of authenticity
Deep Insights

Key Guides