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Understanding Mis- and Disinformation in Nepal

BBC Media Action (2025), 10 pp.

"Social media dominates daily internet use, while use of traditional media is declining: overall, 7 in 10 Nepalis use the internet daily, with Facebook and YouTube being the most used platforms (63% daily usage for both). Among those with internet access, 80% are heavy users of social media, i.e., ... they go on social media platforms at least once a day. Only 40% use the internet for purposes beyond social media, such as online search and emails. Internet users are using TV and radio less. Only 24% watch TV daily and 19% listen to the radio daily. Sharing information is an emotionally driven and socially performative behaviour: content is often shared not for its accuracy, but for its emotional impact, shock value, or social appeal. People are motivated by a desire to entertain, impress, provoke, or find hope, making them less likely to question the credibility of what they share. Drawing on qualitative data, we identified segments of the Nepali population who differ by how they share information: • Exaggeration Sharers: This group will often amplify exaggerated claims in order to gain visibility. They will often share contents that may elicit emotional responses, such as crime and violence. When sharing it, they may add their own take on the issue to exaggerate it further. • Show-off Enthusiasts: Similar to Exaggeration Sharers, they choose to share content that makes them look important, ‘wanting to impress others’ and ‘seek praise’. This is particularly true when sharing may reach people they respect. • Controversy Seekers: This group seeks out explicit content such as the commonly highlighted Bhojpuri songs (typically mentioned in Madhesh), as well as celebrity scandals. Contents often shared by this group tend to have a negative tonality, including topics like ethnic and religious scuffles. • Bystanders: This group tends to use social media by watching and listening without interacting or sharing. However, they enjoy novel content (particularly religious and political content) that may become a topic of discussion within their social network. • Naïve Consumers: This group focuses their attention on content that seeks to give hope in the face of challenges such as unemployment and economic difficulties. However, they tend to be less aware of, or concerned with, implications of online sharing and privacy issues, indicating lower digital and media literacy." (Pages 3-4) more

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AI-Generated Disinformation in Europe and Africa: Use Cases, Solutions and Transnational Learning

Karen Allen, Christopher Nehring

Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Media Programme Sub-Sahara Africa (2025), xii, 158 pp.

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Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections
Deep Insights

Dani Madrid-Morales, Herman Wasserman, Nicola Davies-Laubscher, Fatoumata Sow

Mapping Electoral Disinformation inAfrica (MEDiA); Centre for Information Integrity in Africa (CIIA); Stellenbosch University (2025), 58 pp.

"In recent years, electoral disinformation has followed several recurring patterns globally, many of which were observed in the case studies analysed in this report. One prominent tactic is attacks on electoral integrity, where political actors spread false claims about voter registration, election ... rigging, or external interference to delegitimise outcomes. As we show in this report, in the DRC, for example, rumours circulated that biometric voter registration was designed to expose individuals’ HIV status, discouraging participation. In South Africa, disinformation networks falsely claimed that the Electoral Commission (IEC) was manipulating results to favour the ruling party, fueling distrust in the electoral process. Another trend is the weaponisation of ethnic and gendered disinformation. In Kenya, misleading narratives framed certain candidates as “foreign-sponsored outsiders” to undermine their legitimacy, while in Senegal, false claims about morality were used to discredit opposition figures. Meanwhile, gendered disinformation—targeting women candidates with sexist tropes and false accusations—was a recurring feature in all four countries, reflecting a broader global pattern in which women in politics are disproportionately subjected to online abuse and misinformation. Social media platforms have been central to the spread of electoral disinformation. Across Africa, as in much of the world, platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter) have served as primary vehicles for the rapid dissemination of falsehoods, often facilitated by coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Data that we present in the report shows that, in South Africa, paid “nano-influencers”—individuals with small but loyal online followings—were mobilised to amplify misleading narratives in favour of specific political actors, demonstrating how disinformation strategies are evolving in response to changing digital landscapes. [...] In response to these findings, the report makes several key recommendations. First, it calls for greater cross-platform coordination among CSOs, fact-checking groups, and election monitors to ensure realtime responses to emerging disinformation threats. Second, it highlights the importance of media and digital literacy programmes among all age groups, including young voters, some of whom are often the most active on social media but may lack the skills to critically assess the credibility of information they encounter. Third, it urges greater transparency and accountability from technology platforms, which remain the primary distribution channels for electoral disinformation but have done little to curb its spread in African electoral contexts. Ultimately, electoral disinformation is not simply a digital challenge—it is a fundamental governance issue that shapes public perceptions of legitimacy and democratic participation. Evidence from the four elections in Africa that we examine in this report demonstrates that countering disinformation requires a multi-stakeholder approach that includes journalists, civil society actors, election commissions, and policymakers working collaboratively to strengthen information integrity and electoral transparency. The findings in this report offer both a diagnosis of the current disinformation landscape and a framework for more effective, evidence-based responses that can help safeguard future elections from manipulation." (Pages 9-10) more

Climate Disinformation in Pakistan: Silencing Indigenous Peoples’ Voice

Humera Qasim Khan, Waqas Naeem

Islamabad: International Media Support (IMS); Institute for Research, Advocacy and Development (IRADA); Mediastan (2025), vii, 39 pp.

"The study identifies five distinct forms of climate disinformation in Pakistan: alarmist and sensationalised content, which exaggerates climate impact to provoke fear, confusion and emotional reactions rather than informed understanding; conspiracy-driven narratives that suggest hidden agendas or e ... xternal actors manipulating climate event, undermining trust in institutions and science; denial and delay narratives where scientific consensus is rejected or inaction is promoted by downplaying risks and questioning the urgency of climate response; oversimplified or false solutions that promote misleading or ineffective fixes to distract from evidence-based mitigation and adaptation strategies; religious fatalism, which frames climate change effects as predetermined or divinely inevitable, reducing perceived human responsibility and discouraging action.hich frames climate change effects as predetermined or divinely inevitable, reducing perceived human responsibility and discouraging action. The study also confirms findings from literature about structural weaknesses within Pakistan’s news media environment, which include a lack of consistent news coverage of climate issues, limited scientific literacy among journalists, editorial incentives favouring sensationalism over accuracy and the absence of systematic fact-checking protocols. These gaps, exacerbated by platform algorithms that reward virality over veracity, create a situation where climate-related disinformation may spread unchecked. The report shows that the climate disinformation impacts IPs in five ways: first, it affects community safety and Indigenous livelihoods by creating a false sense of security or conversely unnecessary panic among IP communities that may lead to damage, displacement and poor adaptation and mitigation practices; second, disinformation related to natural disasters generates fear, uncertainty, confusion and psychological distress among vulnerable IP communities, creating emotional trauma and diminishing their self-confidence in their ability to respond to climate risks; third, climate-related disinformation erodes trust of IPs in scientific forecasts, institutional information and the official responses of state authorities, as viral disinformation messages and rumours fill the information vacuum created by the absence of clear, timely and accessible climate communication; fourth, it discourages Indigenous ecological knowledge and diminishes the credibility of local adaptation methods by painting these methods as primitive, unscientific or outdated; fifth, climate disinformation intensifies the existing exclusion, marginalisation and invisibility of IPs in climate policy frameworks and climate governance mechanisms, silencing their voices and forcibly transforming them from custodians of community resilience to subjects of pity or blame within the policy and media discourses. The study underscores that climate disinformation is not an isolated digital problem but a systemic governance challenge. It undermines trust in science and institutions, weakens public engagement and delays adaptation efforts. This crisis of information integrity demands coordinated action across sectors. The report offers the following recommendations for key stakeholders to address climate disinformation and its impact on Indigenous peoples and communities in Pakistan. UN bodies should support the government in integrating climate information integrity in national climate and digital governance frameworks and ensure Pakistan’s compliance with relevant international conventions and declarations on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. The relevant ministries of the federal and provincial governments should embed information integrity into Pakistan’s climate governance frameworks, including the National Action Plan and Nationally Determined Contributions, to ensure coordinated and accountable action on climate misinformation. iNGOs should facilitate the creation of a National Climate Fact-Checking Alliance linking journalists, researchers, media organisations and civil society for real-time verification and rapid debunking of false climate narratives. CSOs should establish community-based verification networks, conduct grassroots awareness campaigns, promote digital safety and information verification capacity building for IPs and document and amplify local climate knowledge. Media should set up climate news beats within newsrooms, ensure the presence of trained journalists for environmental reporting, institutionalise fact-checking protocols, provide training for journalists on climate science and disaster reporting and adopt ethical editorial standards for coverage of climate emergencies. Technology companies should implement algorithmic accountability measures to curb the viral spread of climate disinformation, promote verified climate information through priority ranking and contextual labels, collaborate with fact-checkers to monitor regional-language climate content for falsehoods and support rapid-response climate information alerts for Pakistan during climate-induced extreme weather events. Indigenous communities should engage in peer-led digital literacy programmes that build capacity to recognise and counter climate disinformation and collaborate with independent media to document." (Executive summary, pages vi-vii) more

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Digital Disinformation Trends in Latin America: Organisation, Goals, and Policy Pushback

Jesus A. Renzullo N.

Hamburg: GIGA (2025), 31 pp.

"The topic of digital disinformation in Latin America has gained significant traction in recent decades as polarisation increases in the region, trust in institutions erodes, and the arrival of digital propaganda to countries including Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Mexico threatens the democrat ... more

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Defending the Truth

D+C: Development and Cooperation, issue 6 (2025), pp. 22-50

"People of all ages and from all societies must be empowered to understand the information they are dealing with. Autocratic regimes around the world owe their rise in part to the deliberate use of all kinds of misinformation. They have an interest in ensuring that truths are distorted or remain unr ... more

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How effective are fact-checks in Pakistan and who engages with them?

Waqas Ejaz, Sacha Altay, Itlefaq Muhammad

Information, Communication & Society (2025), 23 pp.

"For fact-checks to be effective, they must first and foremost reach their intended audience. Yet, little is known about what determines engagement with fact-checks and how to enhance their reach. We conducted a pre-registered online survey experiment in Pakistan (N participants = 302, N observation ... more

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Empowering Youth to Combat Malicious Deepfakes and Disinformation: An Experiential and Reflective Learning Experience Informed by Personal Construct Theory

Nadia Naffi, Mélodie Charest, Sarah Danis et al.

Journal of Constructivist Psychology, volume 38, issue 1 (2025), 22 pp.

"The potential to weaponize deepfakes is growing at an alarming rate. The study aimed to explore how education can help youth develop resilience to malicious deepfakes and the ability to counter disinformation, regardless of context. Sixteen youth between the ages of 18 and 24 participated in a 9-h, ... more

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Climate Disinformation in Thailand: Negating Indigenous Peoples’ Identity

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2025), viii, 60 pp.

"This report examines how climate disinformation reinforces the systemic negation of Indigenous People's (IP) identity, undermining traditional practices, weakening advocacy for rights and obstructing inclusive climate and forest governance by making three key contributions. First, it identifies fou ... r distinct forms of climate disinformation in Thailand: one-sided reporting, where the media spotlights government and corporate initiatives while omitting their social and environmental harms, whether due to political pressure or economic incentives; greenwashing, where corporations exaggerate or misrepresent their sustainability practices to obscure their ongoing environmentally destructive activities; false climate solutions promoted as climate action which fails to address the root causes of climate change while leaving IP communities socially and economically disadvantaged; scapegoating of IPs where Indigenous communities are falsely portrayed as primary drivers of deforestation, legitimising displacement and marginalisation. Second, it demonstrates four ways in which climate disinformation harms IPs, each reinforcing the negation of their identities: exclusion from decision-making: by either barring their participation outright or dismissing their inputs in decision-making processes, IPs’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is removed thereby negating their identities as owners and stewards of their land; criminalisation: the strategic misuse of “climate change” laws to negate IP identity and erase the legitimacy of IPs’ traditions and practices in environmental stewardship; and the use of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) intimidate advocates for challenging climate disinformation; forced evictions: conservation and development narratives justify deterritorialisation that severs spiritual, cultural and economic ties to ancestral lands which forms the core of IPs’ identities; intimidation and violence: harassment, threats and attacks undermining the capacity of IPs to resist projects and actions that harm them, their environment and their way of life. Third, to address climate disinformation and safeguard Indigenous Peoples’ (IPs) rights and identities in Thailand, this report outlines a list of multi-stakeholder recommendations: UN bodies should integrate climate disinformation into their human rights monitoring and climate action frameworks and provide guidance to Thailand on implementing its international obligations; the Thai government should embed safeguards against climate disinformation into national climate and environmental policies, strengthen legal protections for IPs, ensure meaningful participation of IP communities in decision-making and improve transparency and accountability in environmental governance; international NGOs (INGOs) should collaborate with IP organisations to map, document and respond to climate disinformation, provide sustained technical capacity-building and funding, and support advocacy and litigation to defend IP rights; civil society organisations (CSOs) should monitor disinformation targeting IPs, co-develop counter-narratives with IP communities and educational content to empower both IPs and the broader public and expand legal aid support; the media sector should prioritise constructive and investigative journalism on climate, environmental, and IP issues; expand coverage in Indigenous languages and culturally appropriate formats; collaborate with IP organisations on fact-checking and monitoring disinformation; and amplify Indigenous perspectives through both national and international outlets; technology companies should strengthen content moderation against climate disinformation, flag misleading project information and invest in digital literacy and connectivity initiatives for rural and Indigenous communities; indigenous communities and organisations should build monitoring networks to identify and counter disinformation, strengthen alliances with independent and Indigenous media, conduct and participate in capacity-building workshops and use digital tools to amplify their voices and safeguard knowledge." (Executive summary, pages vi-vii) more

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Disarming disinformation in the media: What works, what doesn't and why

Cambridge: Thomson Foundation (2025), 4 pp.

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Desinformación, periodismo y democracia

Omar Rincon, Esther Borges

La Paz: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2025), 31 pp.

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How Strategic Information Operations Affect Peacekeeping: Two Case Studies from the Central African Republic

Naomi Miyashita, Zarine Kharazian, Laura De Backer, Kate Starbird

International Peacekeeping, volume 32, issue 3 (2025), pp. 414-456

"Strategic information operations – efforts by individuals or groups to shape public opinion using propaganda, rumors and facts – pose significant challenges to peacekeeping missions. These operations undermine trust, hinder communication with the public and complicate the implementation of peac ... more

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WhatsApp in the World: Disinformation, Encryption, and Extreme Speech
Deep Insights

Sahana Udupa, Herman Wasserman (eds.)

New York: New York University Press (2025), vii, 375 pp.

"Known by the popular nickname “ZapZap” in Brazil and synonymous with the Internet across Africa and South Asia, WhatsApp has emerged as a major means of communication for millions of people around the world. Unlike social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, WhatsApp offers a closed, e ... more

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Donetsk Don’t Tell: ‘Hybrid War’ in Ukraine and the Limits of Social Media Influence Operations

Lennart Maschmeyer, Alexei Abrahams, Peter Pomerantsev, Volodymyr Yermolenko

Journal of Information Technology & Politics, volume 22, issue 1 (2025), pp. 49-64

"Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a ... more

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Studying visual disinformation: A computational literature review of current issues, trends and research methods of a growing field

Xénia Farkas, Moa Eriksson Krutrök

Journal of Visual Political Communication, volume 12, issue 2 (2025), pp. 167-191

"The rise of visual mis/disinformation presents a significant challenge to democratic societies, as misleading visual content increasingly influences public opinion and decision-making. This study aims to comprehensively map the current state of research on visual mis/disinformation, providing insig ... more

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Recommendations for strengthening Mauritania´s resilience against disinformation. White paper

Bonn: Deutsche Welle DW Akademie (2025), 18 pp.

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When Fact-Checking Is Not WEIRD: Negotiating Consensus Outside Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic Countries

Otavio Vinhas, Marco Bastos

International Journal of Press/Politics, volume 30, issue 1 (2025), pp. 256-276

"This study unpacks the emerging framework of detection, verification, and correction of falsehoods developed by fact-checkers outside Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic countries. We explore a series of semistructured interviews carried out in several languages with thirty-seve ... more

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Media and Propaganda in an Age of Disinformation

Nelson Ribeiro, Barbie Zelizer (eds.)

New York; London: Routledge (2025), viii, 205 pp.

"First, the book looks at media and propaganda through the lens of different disciplines, ranging across communication and media studies, journalism studies, psychology, neuroscience, sociology, history, gender studies, information and library science, literature, and platform studies. Recognizing t ... more

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Digital occupation: Pro-Russian bot networks target Ukraine’s occupied territories on Telegram

Yuliia Dukach, Iryna Adam, Meredith Furbish

Atlantic Council, July 16 (2025)

"This joint report from OpenMinds and the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) analyzes the activity of a network of 3,634 automated accounts that posted pro-Russian comments on Telegram channels between January 2024 and April 2025 targeting Ukrainian populations inside Russian-occupied territorie ... more

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Digital Shadows: Deepfakes Used As Violence Against Women in Journalism and Politics During African Elections

Risper Akinyi, Josephine Miliza, Mwara Gichanga, Sarah Kiden et al.

Kibera: Tanda Community Network (2025), 77 pp.

"This report delves into the growing threat of deepfakes as a tool for technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TfGBV) against women in politics and journalism during elections across Africa. With increasing reliance on digital tools and artificial intelligence (AI), deepfakes pose a serious ri ... sk to democratic processes and the personal security of women in leadership roles. The report investigated how deepfakes and other forms of manipulated media contribute to TfGBV against women journalists and politicians in the context of elections in Ghana, Namibia, and Senegal. Both interviews and focus group discussions elicited responses from policymakers, journalists, technologists, and researchers. Deepfakes, which use AI to manipulate videos, audio, and images, are being weaponized to tarnish reputations, spread falsehoods, and harass women, often in the most public and vulnerable moments of their careers. Women in politics and journalism are particularly susceptible, as their visibility makes them prime targets for digital harassment and character assassination. This misuse of AI-generated content not only impacts their personal and professional lives but also threatens to silence women’s voices in public discourse, deterring other women from engaging in leadership roles. The report emphasizes the urgent need for comprehensive measures to address this issue. Key recommendations include: the enactment of specific deepfake legislation; public awareness campaigns to educate women in leadership about online safety and investment in AI detection technologies; strengthening support systems for victims of TfGBV and promoting responsible AI use are also critical to creating a safer, more inclusive digital environment for women; Collaborative efforts with international organizations and the expansion of media and digital literacy programs are suggested to bolster the nation's resilience against this evolving threat. By addressing the challenges posed by deepfakes and TfGBV, Ghana, Namibia, and Senegal can safeguard its democratic processes and promote gender equality in the political and media landscapes. The report calls for immediate action to protect women in leadership, ensuring that they can participate fully and fearlessly in the country's democratic development." (Executive summary) more

Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections Deep Insights

WhatsApp in the World: Disinformation, Encryption, and Extreme Speech Deep Insights

Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections
Deep Insights

WhatsApp in the World: Disinformation, Encryption, and Extreme Speech
Deep Insights