"By learning about both the repression and resistance sides of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, it is evident that digital technology is playing a critical role in this revolution. The military is using every possible technology to repress people, inject fear into society and manipulate it. The revolu
...
tionists are also employing digital technology to circumvent the restrictions of the military and to employ innovative ways to build the state. The digital resilience of its society will be one of the determining factors of the revolution of Myanmar. This scenario of digital repression is one of the many manifestations that indicate that cyberspace has become a new sovereign territory different from land, sea and air. Information freedom, internet freedom, digital literacy, and media literacy cannot be taken for granted anymore as they now have an impact on people’s physical and digital survival. Therefore, Myanmar’s ongoing revolution to fight against the military’s dictatorship is not just physical anymore — the fact is that whoever harnesses the power of technology in the right way will become the game changer of the revolution." (Conclusion, page 14)
more
"This report focuses on the main trends in digital authoritarian technologies used in Kazakhstan from 2017 to 2022. It contextualises the repressive online mechanisms within the changing political landscape. The January 2022 protests tested the grounds of social and political liberties — the seemi
...
ng political stability failed. The Tokayev government closely monitored attempts to delegitimise his governance and the right to rule. The regime is sending mixed signals of future transition: promising liberal reforms and imposing further restrictions on political liberties. Post-January Kazakhstan fails on the experience of repression and increased securitisation, including in cyberspace. Two case studies — the arrest of opposition leader Zhanbolat Mamay for disinformation and coordinated inauthentic behaviour in social media during the presidential campaign — illustrate the culture of digital authoritarianism in Kazakhstan" (Analysis and conclusion, page 19)
more
"Like any authoritarian regime, the Philippine government uses various forms of digital authoritarianism to its advantage. The aim is to win the propaganda war against its perceived enemies so that it can continue implementing policies that are often detrimental to the ordinary folk. While the two i
...
ncidents analysed in this research took place during the Duterte administration, the narrative frames asserted by state actors have persisted under the new administration of Marcos Jr. Marcos Jr. did not reverse Duterte’s actions. In fact, the same justifications have been peddled by the new officials in government, and even by online trolls with regard to the blocking of 27 websites and the practice of red-tagging. The same online vitriol against journalists and critics is being spread and amplified online under the new administration. The same pattern of attacks on the media has also been noted. According to human rights group Karapatan, the current Marcos Jr. administration seems intent on perpetuating different forms of authoritarianism to quell all forms of dissent." (Analysis and conclusion, page 21)
more
"[...] The research has revealed that the incumbent Kyrgyz government is actively suppressing dissent by engaging in information manipulation, passing restrictive laws and attacking free media and investigative journalism. The Kyrgyz government has introduced new laws to regulate online activity, an
...
d is proposing additional legislation on foreign agents to control and to limit the activity of NGOs and foreign media, and on mass media to gain greater control over bloggers and social media accounts with more than 5,000 followers. The government has been using the “Law on Protection from False Information,” also known as the fake news law, to silence its critics. This has included shutting down the website of Azattyk, a foreign-funded media outlet critical of the state, and detaining and censoring individuals who share or repost information critical of the government on social media. Similarly, investigative reporters in Kyrgyzstan have had to deal with multiple accusations, various attacks, or legal action taken against them. One of them, Temirov Bolot, was forced to leave Kyrgyzstan and move to Russia in November 2022.
Furthermore, the research has examined how the Kyrgyz leadership is exploiting social media platforms to launch influence campaigns and boost the president’s popularity. Pages and groups supportive of Zhaparov on various social media platforms, including Instagram, Telegram, Facebook, YouTube, and WhatsApp, have emerged with the aim of garnering backing for the president during critical moments, and are run by individuals associated with his informal network, while receiving funding from unknown pro-president groups or individuals. The support pages promote the current regime’s decisions and policies by creating pro-regime content (usually videos) that is disseminated through multiple social media platforms, while also commenting on contentious news items published by critical media channels. These videos are directed towards under-educated Kyrgyz-speaking people who tend to trust unverified sources, conveying unconfirmed and intentionally exaggerated information. Overall, the situation with media freedom and freedom of opinion in Kyrgyzstan is worsening and these developments are worrying because the country has been a champion of democratic reforms in the region since 1991." (Analysis and conclusion, page 21)
more
"This report provides an overview of the most prolific instances of digital authoritarianism in Kenya. The report will debrief the most relevant actions and decisions taken by the Kenyan government in recent years that leverage the internet and technology in order to achieve certain political goals.
...
The major incidents highlighted include communications and online surveillance, misuse of personal data and data breaches during elections, and misinformation and sponsored disinformation campaigns. Analysing how these actions are sanitised and justified by the government and how this is often permissible under Kenyan law. Further, looking into the harms and human rights abuses that arise from such incidents, this report concludes by analysing the general impact such actions have on democracy and civil liberties, and makes recommendations arising from the aforementioned analysis." (Executive summary)
more
"Under the government of Rafael Correa, punitive measures were used systematically against the privately-owned press, and there were even emblematic prosecution cases that were later dealt with by international courts such as the El Universo case. However, Fundamedios and Fundación Periodistas Sin
...
Cadenas continue to report that, even with Correa out of power, the Ecuadorian State continues to be journalists’ main aggressor. Therefore, it is vital to keep asking questions and not let the debate die with Correa out of power. Correa’s Communication Law, which went through profound modifications, showcases Ecuador’s political black-or-white thinking. The law was indeed used against journalists and the media, but when it was dismantled, it led to a problematic dichotomy between having more state or more self-regulated media. The latter eventually gained ground in the first year of Guillermo Lasso’s government. Also, other issues such as affirmative measures for community-led media, the role of public media, the distribution of frequencies of the radio electric spectrum, the broadcasting of intercultural content, all of which are needed to address communications as a whole, have been overshadowed." (Analysis and conclusion, page 19)
more
"This report analyses two major incidents: the disclosure that Pegasus spyware has been used against journalists from independent media outlets and representa tives of civil society, and Bukele’s legal advisor’s threats against two women journalists for not revealing anonymous sources included i
...
n a news story. The second event represents a trend of online harassment and threats against women journalists promoted by President Bukele and public officials and replicated by Bukele’s supporters, troll centres, and pro-government influencers on social media. Through the analysis of these two main events, this report attempts to respond to the key research question: What are the main motives for, methods of, and responses to digital authoritarianism in El Salvador? Thus, this research identifies the major characteristics, strategies, and narratives interplaying in the configuration of digital authoritarianism in El Salvador. In conclusion, there is substantive evidence that Bukele and Bukelism are constructing a political project based on populism and authoritarian practices, and within this process, one key objective is to discredit the role of independent journalism, and, using spyware technologies such as Pegasus, to legally establish a monitoring system of critical voices and political opponents." (Executive summary)
more
"With the crackdown on radio, TV, and newspapers since 2007, the Venezuelan population is largely dependent on digital spaces: social media is generally the main source of information across the country, and digital media has taken over other types of press and completely changed the media ecosystem
...
in Venezuela. However, digital authoritarianism has rapidly advanced in the country since 2014, with Maduro’s arrival in power. Within Venezuela’s political and economic crisis, complex humanitarian emergency, and polarised context, digital authoritarianism is used to crack down on dissident voices and control freedom of expression, press, and opinion. Strategies behind digital authoritarianism in Venezuela range from internet blocking against digital media, censorship, the detention of people who use social media to express themselves against Maduro’s government, electrical outages that hinder internet access, surveillance of private communications without legal justification, electoral manipulation through technology, and misinformation and disinformation campaigns, to inorganic promotion through paid social media users. Venezuela’s opposition parties also take part in misinformation and export digital propaganda to countries like El Salvador." (Analysis and conclusion)
more
"La Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (FLIP), el Círculo de Periodistas de Bogotá y Cifras & Conceptos presentan los resultados de la "Encuesta de Libertad de Expresión y Acceso a la Información". En la encuesta participaron 585 periodistas y columnistas en 6 regiones del país y 9 de ellos
...
residentes en el exterior. La encuesta refleja las características del medio en que trabajan, una autocrítica al ejercicio profesional, el ambiente para la libertad de expresión en Colombia y la identificación de agresiones en el ejercicio de su profesión, datos que permitirán trabajar en pro del ejercicio periodístico en el país. Entre los hallazgos, resaltamos que las y los periodistas consideran que los mandatarios y funcionarios públicos dificultan el acceso a la información y que las estigmatizaciones por parte de estos actores son más comunes. Así mismo, incluimos un análisis sobre el manejo de pauta publicitaria ya que casi la mitad de las y los encuestados conoce algún medio de comunicación de su departamento que haya dejado de publicar por miedo a perder pauta publicitaria. En el documento también incluimos algunos resultados divididos en seis regiones: Bogotá, Oriente, Centro sur, Pacífico, el Eje Cafetero y Caribe." (https://flip.org.co/publicaciones)
more
"¿Cómo proteger a la prensa en un país violento? Desde el 2020, cada año se impone un nuevo récord de amenazas contra periodistas. La cifra del 2022 fue de 218, la más alta de los últimos quince años. Además, dos periodistas fueron asesinados, para un total de cinco en los últimos tres añ
...
os. Con estas violencias ocurren múltiples heridas que fracturan la confianza de la gente, que instalan el miedo en los poros de la comunidad y que van trazando un país con puntos ciegos y verdades ahogadas. Estos ataques frustran la posibilidad de compartir información, de hacer seguimiento a los problemas que afectan a la comunidad y poner freno a las arbitrariedades, esas que con frecuencia ocurren en las zonas más conflictivas del país. Ahí, quienes hacen periodismo son blanco de grupos criminales, ya sea porque el Estado no les protege o porque es cómplice. ¿Cómo pedirle a los gobiernos y a las figuras políticas que protejan al periodismo cuando son ellos quienes estigmatizan y desacreditan? Entre abril y julio del año pasado, la campaña electoral para elegir presidente se convirtió en otro campo de batalla. La discusión política transcurrió en medio de altísimos niveles de violencia y se caracterizó por constantes y hostiles mensajes contra la prensa. ¿Quiénes son los nuevos guardianes del territorio? Se trata de periodistas ciudadanos, cuyas figuras emergen especialmente en aquellos municipios, pueblos y veredas donde prácticamente no existen empresas de comunicación. No tienen un guión y la mayoría han aprendido su oficio de manera empírica. Su trabajo es cuestionado por figuras públicas quienes les tildan de activistas, militantes e incluso opositores, buscando agredir a esas voces que vigilan y controvierten al poder local. Es necesario responder a estas tres preguntas para poder entender mejor la radiografía de la violencia que, como en décadas pasadas, vuelve a enfilarse contra la prensa en todo el país. Hacer ese repaso por quiénes son, por qué los amenazan y cuáles son las consecuencias de esos ataques, también supone anticipar que esta situación podría empeorar." (https://flip.org.co)
more
"This research indicates that the government criminalises free speech by using a vague and broad definition of fake news, and clamps down on dissent and criticism, and that journalists who criticise the government are seen as enemies of the state — as in the case of the jailing of Kingsley Fomunyu
...
y Njoka. This was evident during the conflict in the Anglophone regions in 2017. Internet throttling was also used during the 2018 elections. Online surveillance has been used to track down and arrest Cameroonians who criticise the president and state authority, citing the cybersecurity and cyber criminality law. Journalists have been arrested and jailed for social media posts. The lucky ones have been freed, some fled the country but many more are still in jail in connection with issues related to freedom of expression, information, and opinion on and offline." (Analysis and conclusion, page 19)
more
"Authoritarian practices are not strictly limited to authoritarian states; they are employed by regimes that span the political spectrum. The research approach argues for expanding the understanding of key authoritarian strategies to include persuasion alongside coercion and cooptation, which are id
...
entified in academic literature as key approaches to consolidating power and building stability in authoritarian states. States are not only restricting access to information technologies, but are also actively investing in technologies of control, as well as shaping media ecosystems. States employ a range of strategies that often work in combination, such as: restricting information access, targeting expression, and pushing narratives. State opacity about the extent of their repressive capacities is a feature, not a bug. This allows states to make claims about their capabilities that create fear and distrust even if inaccurate or untrue. The combined use of information technologies to surveil, censor, and shape information ecosystems aid in “preventative repression,” making resistance and opposition more difficult and costly. Policy recommendations to help resist authoritarian practices face the complicated challenge of how to regulate dual-use and surveillance technologies that were developed for security and commercial applications, but that also facilitate authoritarian practices. There is an active debate about whether surveillance for commercial or consumer purposes, border controls and policing is mostly or inherently authoritarian in practice." (Summary of observations, page 6-7)
more