"1) Any definition of disinformation in legislation or other regulation, such as regulatory guidance, must take into account the serious implications for freedom of expression and media freedom. Particularly to the extent that provisions on disinformation have been adopted in criminal law, a precise definition is paramount. This is even more important following the basic principle of criminal law, which prescribes that penalties only may be imposed when the criminal behaviour and the applicable penal sanctions within the upper and lower limits are precisely formulated in the law. Scholars and fundamental rights experts have warned that disinformation is an “extraordinarily elusive concept to define in law”, and is “susceptible to providing executive authorities with excessive discretion to determine what is disinformation, what is a mistake, what is truth”. Further, measures to combat disinformation “must never prevent journalists and media actors from carrying out their work or lead to content being unduly blocked on the Internet.” Indeed, the European Commission has warned that laws on disinformation which are “too broad” raise particular concerns as regards freedom of expression, and can lead to self-censorship. Given the dangers associated with defining disinformation in legislation, great caution should be exercised in enacting a definition. 2) Current national approaches are very divergent, which from a Digital Single Market and market freedom perspective can create problems for the freedom of the media to disseminate information across borders. This clearly demonstrates a further need for considering all options of handling more unified concepts. 3) Where disinformation is sought to be defined, common elements of a more unified approach to defining disinformation should be: (a) false or misleading information, (b) disseminated with a specific intention (malicious or bad faith) (c) and has the ability to cause certain public harms." (Recommendations, page 85)