"Disinformation is an endemic and ubiquitous part of politics throughout the Western Balkans, without exception. A mapping of the disinformation and counter-dis in for mation landscapes in the region in the period from 2018 through 2020 reveals three key disinformation challenges: external challenge
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s to EU credibility; disinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic; and the impact of disinformation on elections and referenda. While foreign actors feature prominently – chiefly Russia, but also China, Turkey, and other countries in and near the region – the bulk of disinformation in the Western Balkans is produced and disseminated by domestic actors for domestic purposes. Further, disinformation (and information disorder more broadly) is a symptom of social and political disorder, rather than the cause. As a result, the European Union should focus on the role that it can play in bolstering the quality of democracy and governance in the Western Balkans, as the most powerful potential bulwark against disinformation." (Abstract)
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"In its 2020 presidential and legislative elections, Taiwan combatted and defeated Chinese propaganda and disinformation through a whole-of-society approach, one in which the government became better at debunking fake news and raising awareness of these attacks; civil society became more alert and c
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reated non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to detect, debunk, and block fake news online; and companies such as Facebook and LINE (similar to WhatsApp) became faster at finding and removing fake accounts and disinformation. Using Taiwan’s most recent elections as an example to elucidate the nature of Chinese propaganda and disinformation, this report identifies China’s motives, tactics, and actors in its foreign information warfare. Similar to Russia’s, China’s motives are to destabilize democracy and weaken governance in a target country by sowing doubts and chaos in its society, undermining its self-confidence, and increasing polarization and disunity. Its tactics include the following: 1) worsen existing social, political, economic, and generational divides; 2) exploit weaknesses in the informational system; 3) financially control and absorb traditional media; 4) employ its cyber army; 5) obfuscate the attack source through technological, commercial, and legal means; and 6) make the attacks partisan so that one side will at worst not condemn it and at best magnify the effects of its attacks. Its actors are the Chinese Cyberspace Administration, Central Propaganda Department, United Front Department, People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, 50-Cent Party (cyber army) and its content farms, and provinces, as well as agents from the target country employed by the Chinese government." (Executive summary, page 5)
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"Given the size and scope of the Russian propaganda campaign that targeted the U.S. electorate in 2016, it is critical to understand both the impact of that campaign and the mechanisms that can reduce the impact of future campaigns. This report, the third in a four-part series, describes a study con
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ducted by RAND researchers to assess how people react to and engage with Russia’s online propaganda and to determine whether the negative effects of that engagement can be mitigated by brief media literacy advisories or by labeling the source of the propaganda. Russia targets the extremes on both sides of the political divide, and a short media literacy video and labeling intervention were both shown to reduce willingness among particular categories of participants (defined by news consumption habits) to “like” the propaganda. This is one of the first studies to show that Russian propaganda content works, at least partially, as it is intended to—that is, it successfully elicits strong partisan responses that may help it exacerbate divisions in American society. For certain audiences, the content is also likeable and sharable. This study is among the first to use actual Russian propaganda in a randomized controlled trial." (Back cover)
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"RT (formerly, Russia Today) is one of the most important organizations in the global political economy of disinformation. It is the most richly funded, well-staffed, formal organization in the world producing, disseminating, and marketing news in the service of the Kremlin. It is an agency accused
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of many things, but little is known about all the creative work involved in financing, governing, training, and motivating RT’s activities. To understand more about the production of political news and information by RT, we investigate its organizational behavior through in-depth interviews of current and former staff. Our data show that RT is an opportunist channel that is used as an instrument of state defense policy to meddle in the politics of other states. The channel has been established in the shadows of the Soviet media system and its organizational behavior is characterized by Soviet-style controls." (Abstract)
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"In Deutschland wollen RT Deutsch, Sputnik mit SNARadio, Ruptly und die neuen Internet-Firmen Maffick Media und Redfish eine Gegenöffentlichkeit zu den aus ihrer Sicht manipulierten deutschen Medien schaffen. Dabei präsentieren sie sich als unabhängige Alternative. Dies entspricht aber nicht den
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Tatsachen: Diese Medien werden aus dem russischen Staatshaushalt finanziert und sind organisatorisch in das vom Kreml kontrollierte Mediennetzwerk eingebunden. Diese Sprachrohre des Kremls verbreiten seine Positionen und Narrative [...] Die Bundesregierung spricht das Problem der hybriden Kriegsführung kaum öffentlich an, obwohl der Bundestag 2015 und Bundesministerien 2018 „mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit“184 Opfer von Cyberabgriffen des russischen Geheimdienstes GRU wurden. Im Mai 2020 wurde ein Haftbefehl gegen einen russischen Hacker erlassen, der im Auftrag des GRU das IT-System des Bundestags angegriffen haben soll [...] Die Nutzerzahlen von RT Deutsch und der Social Media Plattform In the Now zeigen, dass sich das Auditorium dynamisch entwickelt und einige etablierte Online-Medien überholt wurden. Auch für die „Trollfabrik“ genannte Agentur Internet Analyse ist Deutschland eines der wichtigsten Ziele. Russische Narrative werden täglich von tausenden Nutzern in Deutschland konsumiert. Die genannten Beispiele zur tendenziösen und teils falschen Berichterstattung belegen: Die russischen Medien sind eine Waffe im Informationskrieg." (Resümee, Seite 21)
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"Auf der ganzen Welt nutzen unterschiedlichste Akteure die Wirkungsmechanismen der digitalen Medien aus, um durch gezielte Desinformationskampagnen die öffentliche Meinung zu beeinflussen. Dies, so lautet die zentrale These von Peter Pomerantsev, bedrohe Demokratien und Demokratisierungsprozesse. W
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o früher Informationen durch die Zensur kontrolliert wurden, gebe es heute ein Überangebot an Informationen, deren Wahrheitsgehalt immer schwerer feststellbar ist. Dadurch ginge das Vertrauen in eine gemeinsam gelebte und objektiv überprüfbare Wirklichkeit als Voraussetzung öffentlicher Meinungs- und Willensbildung zunehmend verloren. Autokratische Regime hätten es so leichter, Narrative zu verbreiten, die das Ziel haben, politische Gegner zu schwächen, missliebige Journalistinnen und Journalisten zu diskreditieren oder zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen zu delegitimieren. Kriege wie der in der Ostukraine würden heutzutage nicht durch Schusswaffen, sondern durch Troll-Armeen, Cybermilizen und Facebook-Posts entschieden. Auf seinen Reisen taucht Pomerantsev in die grenzenlose Welt der Internetaktivistinnen und -aktivisten ein und zeigt die lokalen Folgen davon auf, wenn sie Kategorien wie Wahrheit und Lüge ins Wanken bringen." (Klappentext)
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"On December 15, Facebook announced that it had taken down three separate networks that it had discovered for “coordinated inauthentic behavior” that targeted communities across Africa. One, centered on the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, was linked to individuals associated with the Fr
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ench military. The other two, centered respectively on CAR and Libya, were connected to the business and influence operations of Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, founder of the mercenary organization Wagner Group and the Internet Research Agency “troll farm.” The French and Russian operations in the CAR tried to expose each other, and repeatedly clashed in groups, comments, and cartoon wars. We have documented the first of the Russian operations in a joint report with Stanford University entitled “Stoking Conflict by Keystroke”; this report focuses on the French and Russian operations that targeted CAR. For the sake of brevity, the operation linked to individuals with ties to the French military will be referred to as the “French operation” in this report, while the Russian operation attributed to individuals associated with past activity by the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and previous operations attributed to entities associated with Russian financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin is referred to as the “Russian operation” in this report. It is worth highlighting that Facebook did not attribute the operation directly to the French Government or the French military, and that this report similarly does not offer evidence of institutional involvement from French governmental and military entities." (Executive summary)
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"Policy discourse about disinformation focuses heavily on the technological dimensions of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Unfortunately, this myopic focus on technology has led to insufficient attention being paid to the underlying human factors driving the success of state-sponsored disin
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formation campaigns. Academic research on disinformation strongly suggests that belief in false or misleading information is driven more by individual emotional and cognitive responses — amplified by macro social, political and cultural trends — than specific information technologies. Thus, attention given to countering the distribution and promulgation of disinformation through specific technological platforms, at the expense of understanding the human factors at play, hampers the ability of public diplomacy efforts countering it. This article addresses this lacuna by reviewing the underlying psychology of three common types of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns and identifying lessons for designing effective public diplomacy counter-strategies in the future." (Abstract)
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"As many as 1,967 anti-Western comments were detected in the 17 monitored media outlets in 2017. In contrast to 2016 and 2015, when negative messages targeted human identity and rights, in 2017, a dominant topic was the foreign policy with the messages aimed at increasing the polarization on the for
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eign policy orientation of the country. This change in the strategic communication of pro-Kremlin actors shows that “loss of identity” was a rather tactical message that prepared the ground, while the messaging aimed at demonizing Georgia’s strategic partners (USA, NATO, EU) is of strategic nature. The United States of America accounted for the highest share of negative comments (25.9%), up by almost three times as compared to the previous year, followed by NATO (18,4%) and the West (14,1%). Compared to 2016, messages against the European Union have almost doubled (13.4%) whereas the comments about the loss of identity and human rights in anti-Western context have almost halved (12.9%). Comments against nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the US philanthropist George Soros have trebled, as compared to 2016, and comprised 7.3%; this increase can be explained by a stepped up activity of far-right groups and their campaign to smear Open Society Georgia Foundation. Yet another change as compared to the previous years were clearer messages showcasing Russia as an alternative to the West and idealizing the Soviet system (7.2%). Comments against Great Britain (0,8%) have been mainly detected in two pro-Kremlin online media outlets – Georgia and the World, and Sakinformi. Alike previous years, the main source of anti-Western messages was media (827), followed by politicians (463), society (411), civil organizations (230) and the clergy (37). The structure of the Kremlin narrative in the Georgian discourse consists of three stages and aims at: 1. Creating threats; 2. Sowing distrust towards partners and Western institutions; 3. Ingraining a belief that Russia is the only option in fighting against the threats and that authoritative/Soviet-style governance is necessary. Four major threats were emphasized by pro-Kremlin actors: threat of war; threat of loss of territories; threat of bio subversion; threat of loss of identity." (Key findings, page 7)
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"The Middle East media landscape provides Russian state with unique opportunities. A region with strong state-controlled media, weak independent outlets, and a burgeoning reliance on social media—along with a historical suspicion of Western news sources—has created useful openings that the Kreml
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in exploits to advance its agenda. Russia presents its own media as a better alternative to other Arabic-language networks, and it has a more receptive audience in the region than in the West. Today, the RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic websites are the two most visible outlets of Moscow’s propaganda influence. Analysis of these sites shows both continuity with the Kremlin’s traditional propaganda goals and adaptation of tried-and-true methods to advance them. These outlets cultivate an image of Moscow as a great power in the Middle East and focus heavily on social media. Unsurprisingly, they also advance a divisive, conspiratorial, anti-Western ideology. Deeper investigation, however, reveals a more nuanced approach aimed at building credibility with Arab audiences through coverage of human interest and domestic issues—especially in Egypt—and through efforts to develop relationships with other local and regional media. As this Kremlin-funded information operation gains local traction and viewers, it increasingly poses a challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East." (Page 2)
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"In this issue we discuss some of the arguments and debates related to the highly charged and topical issue of Russia’s strategic narrative and how it is disseminated. Propaganda, in numerous forms, creates a barrier to more constructive engagement and dialogue. This issue’s contributors find th
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at Russia’s narrative is based on notions of encirclement by the West as part of a deliberate containment strategy that Russia feels duty bound to resist if it is to remain a great power. The West, for its part, acknowledges Russia’s power status and its legitimate right to seek such status, but questions the means it uses to that end. Propaganda constructs an artificial information reality and sows doubt by questioning the very existence of objective, reliable and credible facts. It can mobilize popular support against an external threat, as well as toward a positive goal. Propaganda thrives when notions of journalistic objectivity are sacrificed. The notion that there must be two sides to any given issue or event can undermine rational conclusions when one side relies on the power of implausible denials and direct lies. “You have your truth, and I have mine” is the mantra and motto of contemporary Russian information warfare." (Director's letter, page 4)
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"With well-organised and far-reaching weapons of information Russia has succeeded in sowing doubt about the need for democratic values and is therefore also undermining faith in democratic countries, weakening it. Russia government uses lies, concealment, and the manipulation of anything that can se
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rve their purpose—to turn citizens toward the ‘preferred’ direction. We are now faced with new and cunning forms of propaganda; a go-to source of information may turn out to be a false news outlet or a false Facebook ‘friend’. In the new information age, where borders between media fact and fiction are blurred, agents of propaganda seek to access citizens with messages presented in formats that discourage critical thinking. The main objectives of such attacks are to undermine democratic values—tolerance, minority rights, freedom of expression, the rule of law, and also loyalty to one’s country. In this war, democratic states are faced with unprecedented difficulties; in order to protect themselves they cannot fight the enemy using the same weapons the enemy uses, because then democracy would be no different than authoritarian rule. Democracies must choose mechanisms to counter hostile propaganda that comply with the rule of law and our fundamental values. This is difficult, but not impossible. In this publication, we have collected a number of expert opinions on what national governments, the EU, relevant institutions, and the media can do to win this war for the hearts and minds of the people." (Foreword)
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"Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime has taken control of the traditional media in Russia: TV, radio and newspapers. As Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated, the Kremlin sees the mass media as a ‘weapon’. Now Russia’s leadership is trying to take control of social media to
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o, and for this massive operation a new information warfare tool has been mobilised—an army of fake social media Putin-fans, known as ‘trolls’. My investigation has discovered that coordinated social media propaganda writers are twisting and manipulating the public debate in Finland, too. Trolls and bots distribute vast amounts of false information in various languages, and target individual citizens for aggressive operations. Aggressive trolls have created a feeling of fear among some of my interviewees, causing them to stop making Russia-related comments online. Trolling has had a serious impact on freedom of speech, even outside Russia. Thus, it should be viewed as a national security threat that needs to be addressed accordingly. The question is: how should the Kremlin’s trolls and disinformation be countered?" (Abstract)
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"The Kremlin exploits the idea of freedom of information to inject disinformation into society. The effect is not to persuade (as in classic public diplomacy) or earn credibility but to sow confusion via conspiracy theories and proliferate falsehoods. The Kremlin is increasing its “information war
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” budget. RT, which includes multilingual rolling news, a wire service and radio channels, has an estimated budget of over $300 million, set to increase by 41% to include German- and French language channels. There is increasing use of social media to spread disinformation and trolls to attack publications and personalities. Unlike in the Cold War, when Soviets largely supported leftist groups, a fluid approach to ideology now allows the Kremlin to simultaneously back far-left and far-right movements, greens, anti-globalists and financial elites. The aim is to exacerbate divides and create an echo chamber of Kremlin support. The Kremlin exploits the openness of liberal democracies to use the Orthodox Church and expatriate NGOs to further aggressive foreign policy goals." (Executive summary)
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