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Russlands unabhängiger Journalismus: Der harte Überlebenskampf unter totalitären Repressionsmaßnahmen

Sergej Parkhomenko

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (2022), 39 pp.

"Der Journalist und Verleger Sergej Parkhomenko ist ein international gefeierter Menschenrechtsverteidiger, Oppositionsaktivist und unter den russischen Medienschaffenden einer der wichtigsten Partner für das Internationale Journalisten- und Mediendialogprogramm (IJMD) der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftun ... more

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Winning the Web: How Beijing Exploits Search Results to Shape Views of Xinjiang and COVID-19

Jessica Brandt, Bret Schafer, Elen Aghekyan, Valerie Wirtschafter, Adya Danaditya

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution (2022), 47 pp.

"For months, our team has been tracking how China has exploited search engine results on Xinjiang and COVID-19, two subjects that are geopolitically salient to Beijing — Xinjiang, because the Chinese government seeks to push back on condemnation of its rights record; COVID-19, because it seeks to ... more

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Russian Disinformation Efforts on Social Media

Elina Treyger, Joe Cheravitch, Raphael S. Cohen

Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (2022), xviii, 202 pp.

"We sought to better understand Russia's disinformation on social media and generate recommendations to better meet and counter this evolving threat. We relied on an analysis of Russian military literature, investigative efforts, official reports, academic and policy literature, media reporting, and ... more

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The Evolution in the Taliban’s Media Strategy

Weeda Mehran

George Washington University, Program on Extremism (2022), 8 pp.

"In the mid-1990s, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan for the first time. They banned photography, TV, music, and all forms of entertainment. Soon after, the Taliban banned the internet in early 2001, and then-Foreign Minister Mawlavi Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil famously stated, “We want to establ ... more

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How Big Data Can Bolster Autocratic Legitimacy (Via the Rhetoric of Safety and Convenience)

Prithvi Subramani Iyer

Tokyo: Toda Peace Institute (2022), 14 pp.

"This Policy Brief examines the different ways in which big data collection serves autocratic agendas by hiding the oppressive potential of heightened surveillance through promises of enhanced safety, convenience, and modernisation. Political actors with autocratic agendas can package their governan ... more

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Content Moderation in autoritären Staaten: Wie soziale Medien zu Komplizen autoritärer Herrscher zu werden drohen

Paula Köhler, Daniel Voelsen

Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) (2022), 8 pp.

"Täglich gibt es Berichte darüber, wie private Betreiber sozialer Medien sich problematischen Vorgaben autoritärer Herrscher beugen. Ob in Thailand, Kasachstan oder Russland, immer wieder werden als Teil von Content Moderation (CM) gezielt Inhalte entfernt oder Konten gelöscht, weil Regierungen ... more

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Turkey’s Communicative Authoritarianism

Burçe Çelik

Global Media and Communication, volume 16, issue 1 (2022), pp. 102-120

"The majority of current political communication studies focus on discursive dimensions of communications and disregard how communications partake in the governing of populations through economic, material and institutional practices. By focusing on Turkey’s case, here I move beyond this approach ... more

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Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Deception, Disinformation and Social Media

Marc Owen Jones

London: Hurst & Company (2022), 303 pp.

"By the time readers arrive at the end of Jones’s astonishing examination of social media in the Middle East, they will be completely persuaded that it is now impossible to tell whether anything they read online is true. Replete with bots and sock puppets, trolls and dupes, this online world is bo ... more

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Choosing Propaganda: Media Selection and Politics in Putin's Russia

Ashley Katrine Blum

Los Angeles: University of California, Doctoral Thesis (2022), xiv, 160 pp.

"The results of this dissertation suggest that most Russians are aware, at least to some degree, of the biases of state media. Nonetheless, they still consider these sources to provide valuable information. This, in part, stems from beliefs about the access these news outlets have to information and ... more

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Trapped in a Web: The Exploitation of Personal Data in Hungary’s 2022 Elections

Human Rights Watch (2022), 94 pp.

"On April 3, 2022, Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party won a fourth term in national elections, cementing its dominance with a two-thirds majority that will allow it to continue traveling what critics of the party and many others would describe as the path of centralizing power and rolling back democrat ... more

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Russian Social Network VK Gains Carte Blanche Following the Closure of Instagram and Facebook in the Country

Daria Zakharova

Russia Analytical Digest, issue 280 (2022), pp. 20-21

"As the Russian invasion of Ukraine erupted, the country’s authorities declared a war on Western social media as well. In March, such social media giants as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram were blocked in Russia, giving their local competitor—named VK—a virtual monopoly in the country. Millio ... more

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The Great Firewall of China: How to Build and Control an Alternative Version of the Internet

James Griffiths

London: Zed Books (2021), xv, 423 pp.

"China's 'Great Firewall' has evolved into the most sophisticated system of online censorship in the world. As the Chinese internet grows and online businesses thrive, speech is controlled, dissent quashed, and attempts to organise outside the official Communist Party are quickly stamped out. Update ... more

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Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment

London et al.: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2021), 174 pp.

"This report sets out a new methodology for assessing cyber power, and then applies it to 15 states: Four members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance – the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia; Three cyber-capable allies of the Five Eyes states – France, Israel and Japan; F ... more

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Information Bedlam: Russian and Chinese Information Operations During Covid-19

Edward Lucas, Jake Morris, Corina Rebegea

Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) (2021), 20 pp.

"Based on a literature review through January 2021, evaluated at an expert seminar, this policy brief provides a baseline analysis of changing tactics, narratives, and distribution strategies in Russian and Chinese information operations (IOs) relating to the covid-19 pandemic. Key findings: China c ... more

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Cyber Capabilities as a New Resource of Power Conflicts in the Digital Sphere

Jason Chumtong, Christina Stolte

International Reports (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), issue 1 (2021), pp. 95-105

"Interestingly, traditional sources of power, such as military and economic strength, are not a prerequisite for success in cyberspace. It is true that the premier league of cyber powers also includes many traditional major powers in its ranks. But states need very few resources to build their cyber ... capabilities and exploit them to project influence, as the examples of international outsiders like Iran and Venezuela demonstrate. In some ways, cyber capabilities even seem ideally suited to allowing small and medium-sized countries to increase their influence because they represent an effective tool of asymmetric warfare. Even though they require relatively few resources and low-threshold technology, they have the potential to inflict considerable damage when deployed against other countries Attacks on poorly protected public authorities, businesses, or even infrastructure can cause serious damage to other countries. The risks for the attacker are reasonably low because attribution of the attacks is usually difficult and time-consuming. On top of this, the evidence is seldom clear, and consistent denial of any involvement is part and parcel of cyber warfare. This is also one of the key differences from previous power struggles at the international level. While the global battle for power and influence has always been accompanied by visible demonstrations of power and the accumulation of status symbols, the struggle in cyberspace takes place under the radar. This makes it especially difficult to identify shifts of power occurring today. Particularly in the field of information warfare, an area of growing importance in both national and international conflicts, states that were never previously on the radar as global players are now increasing their international influence. Yet, these countries recognised the potential of digital technologies at an early stage and are exploiting them with great success. Many of them have a wealth of experience in this respect due to having deployed the tools of information warfare against their own citizens and political opponents for many years. They can now direct this expertise towards other countries to wield global influence." (Conclusion, page 103) more

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Democracy and Fake News

Serena Giusti, Elisa Piras (eds.)

London; New York: Routledge (2021), xiv, 232 pp.

"This book explores the challenges that disinformation, fake news, and post-truth politics pose to democracy from a multidisciplinary perspective. The authors analyse and interpret how the use of technology and social media as well as the emergence of new political narratives has been progressively ... more

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Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State (2020), 76 pp.

"Russia has operationalized the concept of perpetual adversarial competition in the information environment by encouraging the development of a disinformation and propaganda ecosystem that allows for varied and overlapping approaches that reinforce each other even when individual messages within the ... system appear contradictory. This ecosystem reflects both the sources of disinformation and propaganda—official government statements, state-funded media outlets, proxy websites, bots, false social media personas, cyber-enabled disinformation operations, etc.—and the different tactics that these channels use. Russia’s willingness to employ this approach provides it with three perceived advantages. First, it allows for the introduction of numerous variations of the same false narratives. This allows for the different pillars of the ecosystem to fine tune their disinformation narratives to suit different target audiences because there is no need for consistency, as there would be with attributed government communications. Second, it provides plausible deniability for Kremlin officials when proxy sites peddle blatant and dangerous disinformation, allowing them to deflect criticism while still introducing pernicious information. Third, it creates a media multiplier effect among the different pillars of the ecosystem that boost their reach and resonance. The media multiplier effect can, at times, create disinformation storms with potentially dangerous effects for those Russia perceives as adversaries at the international, national, and local level. In the past, Russia has leveraged this dynamic to shield itself from criticism for its involvement in malign activity. This approach also allows Russia to be opportunistic, such as with COVID-19, where it has used the global pandemic as a hook to push longstanding disinformation and propaganda narratives [...] This report provides a visual representation of the ecosystem described above, as well as an example of the media multiplier effect it enables. This serves to demonstrate how the different pillars of the ecosystem play distinct roles and feed off of and bolster each other. The report also includes brief profiles of select proxy sites and organizations that occupy an intermediate role between the pillars of the ecosystem with clear links to Russia and those that are meant to be fully deniable." (Pages 5-7) more

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I Know What You Mean: Information Compensation in an Authoritarian Country

Jiangnan Zhu, Chengli Wang

International Journal of Press/Politics, volume 26, issue 3 (2020), pp. 587-608

"How do people address information deficiency caused by rigid control of information in authoritarian regimes? We argue that there exists an internally oriented information compensation approach through which people can glean extra information from official messages domestically. This approach does ... more

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Das ist keine Propaganda: Wie unsere Wirklichkeit zertrümmert wird

Peter Pomerantsev

Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), Sonderausg. (2020), 295 pp.

"Auf der ganzen Welt nutzen unterschiedlichste Akteure die Wirkungsmechanismen der digitalen Medien aus, um durch gezielte Desinformationskampagnen die öffentliche Meinung zu beeinflussen. Dies, so lautet die zentrale These von Peter Pomerantsev, bedrohe Demokratien und Demokratisierungsprozesse. W ... more

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Subversion im Cyberraum: Sicherheit, Freiheit und Resilienz gegen Angriffe im Netz

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Johannes Wiggen

Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa) (2020), 59 pp.

"Die technischen Möglichkeiten der Cyberwelt haben gänzlich neue Potenziale zur Beeinflussung von politischen Präferenzen in anderen Staaten eröffnet. Die Meinungsbildung in offenen Gesellschaften wird zunehmend durch subversive Maßnahmen autoritärer Regime im Internet beeinflusst, wodurch der ... more