"Based on ethnographic research on Islamist buzzers – social media political operators tasked with making particular online conversation subjects trend – in Indonesia, this article details the process of how the proliferation of insensitive message in both the online and offline realms plays a r
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ole in mobilizing those sympathetic to religious fundamental-ism. As this research shows, the interviewed buzzers were one of the driving forces behind the massive success of the fundamentalist Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) as they mobilized people to participate in the organization’s political rallies between 2016 and 2017. Driven by altruistic volunteerism and sense of community, these actors go beyond their duty as click-farmers. They maintain regular contact with sympathizers and convincing them to revive broken weblinks, hang banners on streets as part of astroturfing campaigns and gather masses to attend offline events. Detailing the activity and spatiality of buzzers in crafting new online and offline spaces as part of their innovative bottom-up propaganda management, this research concludes that right-wing political mobilization and radicalization are not simply the product of ideology but are catalyzed by technically and socially tedious, mediated messaging campaigns." (Abstract)
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"The primary questions driving this assessment are: What are the principal drivers of extremism in Mauritania? What are the principal social fractures that have been, or could be, exploited by extremists? The table below displays the overall main drivers of VE in Mauritania, as well as the five subn
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ational assessment sites (Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, Trarza, Hodh el-Gharbi, and Assaba). Poor governance and relative deprivation are among the most pervasive push factors identified in this assessment, while ideology and social media are the main pull factors [...] The second main assessment question is: What is the role of the Mauritania media landscape within the context of VE? Section 4 addresses this question through a thorough assessment of the overall media landscape in Mauritania. We found that the Mauritanian media has the potential to be a key actor in efforts to counter VE in Mauritania. However, it needs a lot of capacity building and professionalization in order to be effective." (Pages 8-10)
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"This review presents the existing research on the role of the Internet in radicalization processes. Using a systematic literature search strategy, our paper yields 88 studies on the role of the Internet in a) right-wing extremism and b) radical jihadism. Available studies display a predominant inte
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rest in the characteristics of radical websites and a remarkable absence of a user-centred perspective. They show that extremist groups make use of the Internet to spread right wing or jihadist ideologies, connect like-minded others in echo chambers and cloaked websites, and address particularly marginalized individuals of a society, with specific strategies for recruitment. Existing studies have thus far not sufficiently examined the users of available sites, nor have they studied the causal mechanisms that unfold at the intersection between the Internet and its users. The present review suggests avenues for future research, drawing on media and violence research and research on social identity and deindividuation effects in computer-mediated communication." (Abstract)
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"Recent studies suggest that empathy induced by narrative messages can effectively facilitate persuasion and reduce psychological reactance. Although limited, emerging research on the etiology of radical political behavior has begun to explore the role of narratives in shaping an individual’s beli
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efs, attitudes, and intentions that culminate in radicalization. The existing studies focus exclusively on the influence of narrative persuasion on an individual, but they overlook the necessity of empathy and that in the absence of empathy, persuasion is not salient. We argue that terrorist organizations are strategic in cultivating empathetic-persuasive messages using audiovisual materials, and disseminating their message within the digital medium. Therefore, in this paper we propose a theoretical model and analytical framework capable of helping us better understand the neurocognitive process of digital radicalization." (Abstract)
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"Digitale Kommunikation spielt in unserem Alltag eine immer größere Rolle. Vor allem Jugendliche nutzen insbesondere das Internet zum Austausch mit Freund*innen als Informationsquelle und zur Unterhaltung. Extremistische Akteure wissen das und nutzen Internet-Plattformen und -Dienste zur Kommunika
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tion, zur Rekrutierung neuer Mitglieder, zur Verbreitung von propagandistischem Material, zur Agitation und zur Vernetzung untereinander. Sie profitieren dabei von einer (größtenteils) unkontrollierten, schnellen und kostengünstigen Informationsvermittlung nahezu in Echtzeit und über Ländergrenzen hinweg sowie einer (vermeintlichen) Anonymität. Laut Verfassungsschutz nutzen extremistische Akteure das Internet um zu mobilisieren und potentielle Anhänger*innen hinzuzugewinnen." (Einführung)
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"This book investigates ways in which global media coverage of conflicts affects the worldviews of the social and cultural values of nationals from the war regions. It identifies the cultural patterns in remote communities that have been 'diluted' by IT and the extent to which the changes impacted t
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he values of the indigenes. It also describes the role that IT especially social media and broadcast media play in the understanding of war among residents in highly wired and remote communities, respectively." (Publisher description)
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"The most extreme damage inflicted by social media can be seen in South Sudan. As documented in the chapter by Theo Dolan, social media in South Sudan has contributed to hatred and conflict among ethnic groups. Many investigators, including UN investigators, have warned that South Sudan's social med
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ia are triggering violence against ethnic groups. Since the beginning of the civil war in late 2013, social media has fuelled waves of hate speech that have provoked deadly violence and ethnic conflict in South Sudan, including massacres and other atrocities. In that sense, social media has become a new variation of the "hate radio" phenomenon that flourished in Rwanda before and during the 1994 genocide … Social media is also emerging as a powerful way to harass and intimidate the opponents of a regime or a political party. In this sense, it adds another weapon to the arsenal of a powerful regime that already has multiple weapons at its disposal. A regime can mobilize its supporters to use social media in a targeted way against its foes, or it can use its financial resources to create a fake army of fictional users on social media. In either case, it is tilting the playing field against its enemies. A targeted attack through social media can be more effective than the telephone threats or messages often deployed in the past. The use of social media can be more intimidating because it belittles the targeted person in front of a much bigger audience. The presence of this audience means that the attack is more damaging, more difficult to ignore and has the potential to mobilize large numbers of people against the victim … While social media is often used for anti-democratic purposes in Africa's authoritarian states, it has also been used as a force for reform, accountability and justice. It has helped to safeguard the fairness of elections. It has allowed greater scrutiny of potential threats, such as vote-rigging or violence, allowing citizens to be alerted when there is still a chance to prevent the worst abuses. It has put a spotlight on corruption and political wrongdoing, allowing activists to mobilize pressure on governments to resolve these long-neglected problems. In some cases, as it did in the Arab Spring, social media has played a role in toppling an authoritarian state. When an election was called in the small West African state of Gambia, where the dictator Yahya Jammeh had ruled for 22 years, opposition candidates had little access to state-controlled media. So the main opposition party created more than a dozen WhatsApp groups, allowing it to communicate with voters. Other forms of social media also proliferated. A leading independent group, the Gambia Youth and Women's Forum, discussed election issues on a public Facebook group with 55,000 members. The government blocked access to WhatsApp and eventually extended the shutdown to the entire internet, but Gambians used virtual private network (VPN) technology to bypass the shutdown. The opposition won the election and Jammeh was forced to flee the country." (Pages 419-423)
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"This policy brief analyses the use of social media by different groups affected by Boko Haram’s terrorist insurgence, including the group itself. The rate, speed, spread and belief which information from social media commands has changed theatres of war and amplified terrorist threats. The Nigeri
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an youth who are the forerunners of social media use in the country have further employed Hashtag (#) Activism for varied causes regarding Boko Haram. This study examines the interlinkages between the use of social media in ‘orchestrated data circulation’ (for the dissemination of information and propaganda) by both the insurgents and the Nigerian government, and the populace’s growing awareness of the power they wield by simply having internet data and a phone which enables them to challenge, counter and refute claims made by the government or security agencies. The populace does all of these by providing verifiable eye-witness accounts shared and made viral on social media. This brief further highlights the hidden enablers of the above interlinkages – Telecommunication Companies (TELCOs) whose role as Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) continues to oscillate between being government collaborators, targets for Boko Haram’s terrorist attacks and simply profit-driven enterprises competing for subscribers. As a base for contextual analysis, this study premises that while all parties involved attempt to appropriate social media for their benefits, specific parties such as social media tech companies, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the populace have impactful roles to play. One of such is ensuring the benefits accrued from the continuous boom of social media are properly harnessed for peace processes and the safeguarding of individual rights to freedom of expression." (Abstract)
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"Julia Ebner verfolgt hauptberuflich Extremisten. Undercover mischt sie sich unter Hacker, Terroristen, Trolle, Fundamentalisten und Verschwörer, sie kennt die Szenen von innen, von der Alt-Right-Bewegung bis zum Islamischen Staat, online wie offline. Ihr Buch macht Radikalisierung fassbar, es ist
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Erfahrungsbericht, Analyse, unmissverständlicher Weckruf. Als Extremismusforscherin stellen sich ihr folgende Fragen: Wie rekrutieren, wie mobilisieren Extremisten ihre Anhänger? Was ist ihre Vision der Zukunft? Mit welchen Mitteln wollen sie diese Vision erreichen? Um Antworten zu finden, schleust sich Julia Ebner ein in zwölf radikale Gruppierungen quer durch das ideologische Spektrum. Sozusagen von der anderen Seite beobachtet sie Planungen terroristischer Anschläge, Desinformationskampagnen, Einschüchterungsaktionen, Wahlmanipulationen. Sie erkennt, Radikalisierung folgt einem klaren Skript: Rekrutierung, Sozialisierung, Kommunikation, Mobilisierung, Angriff." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"Die Medien und die breite Öffentlichkeit zeigen sich oftmals verwundert über die Perfektion der IS-Propaganda. Dabei wird übersehen, dass der Medienkrieg des Pseudo-Islamischen Staats auf einer ‚Großen Erzählung', einer ‚Meistererzählung' basiert, an der dschihadistische Organisationen se
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it beinahe 40 Jahren arbeiten. Die Entwicklung der dschihadistischen Propaganda lässt sich in fünf Phasen unterteilen. Die erste fällt mit dem 1979 bis 1989 gegen die Sowjetunion geführten Afghanistankrieg zusammen. Mehrere in dieser Zeit erschienene Filme setzen den von Abdallah Azzam, dem ‚Vater des modernen Dschihad', theoretisch begründeten Märtyrerkult ins Bild. Die zweite Phase umfasst den Bürgerkrieg in Bosnien von 1992 bis 1995: die Videopropaganda wird professionalisiert und erstmals werden Muslime außerhalb dschihadistischer Kreise erreicht. Die dritte Phase, 1996 bis 2002, fällt in die Jahre des zweiten Aufenthalts Bin Ladens in Afghanistan und Pakistan und kulminiert in den Anschlägen des 11. September 2001. Al-Qaida versucht vorzugeben, die einzig wahre muslimische Glaubensgemeinschaft zu sein. Die vierte Phase nimmt ihren Anfang mit der US-Invasion im Irak 2003 und dauert bis etwa 2007 an. Sie zeichnet sich durch eine Globalisierung der Propaganda, eine starke Präsenz im Web und das Auf treten des sogenannten ‚Pop-Dschihad' aus. Die fünfte und bis heute andauernde Phase beginnt 2010 und fällt mit zwei entscheidenden Entwicklungen zusammen: der durch die Entstehung des Web 2.0 bedingten massenhaften Nutzung der sozialen Netzwerke und dem wachsenden Einfluss des Dschihadismus im Zuge der Umwälzungen in der arabischen Welt." (Seite 147)
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"La propagande de guerre de l'EI adopte les codes des genres cinématographiques afin de fictionnaliser le fait guerrier et dissimuler l'fenvers du décors. Cette fantasmagorie surréaliste fonctionne selon un double regime de fascination et de stimulation des pulsions de mort qui ont pour effet de
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susciter des vocations djihadistes. Le pan institutionnel de la propagande de l'EI se presente plutot comme un discours rationnel en adoptant le reportage comme régime d'fecriture de la vérité. Cette caution de transparence d'fun Etat-providence, équitable et qui offre toutes les bonnes conditions de vie masque l'entreprise totalitaire et les exactions institutionnalisees de l'EI et le présente comme un espace citoyen et familial. Ces deux genres de mises en scene sont sous-tendues par des protocoles de desinformation singuliers qui confortent leur efficacité. D'abord, le jeux avec l'énonciation qui ne permet pas de déceler un message clair et principal dans les vidéos de l'EI participe de l'ambigüité foncière de son discours et permet de l'interpréter de plusieurs manières possibles. Ensuite, l'estompage des temporalités et la confusion géographique décontextualisent le propos et rendent possible la désinformation des recepteurs. En outre, la production de normes différenciées du djhad classique presente l'EI comme une nouvelle utopie et rend son idéologie extensible a de nouveaux publics. Enfin, l'association inextricable de registres disparates : le religieux et le politique, le transcendant et l'immanent, le réel et le discours sur le rél, le personnel et le collectif, etc. favorise l'identification d'un nombre plus grand de récepteurs au discours de l'EI. Tous ces procédés permettent à l'organisation de proposer des réponses adaptées à des publics dissemblables et ainsi recruter massivement. La désinformation est constitutive de tout discours de propagande mais la caractéristique inédite de celui de l'EI c'est cette hybridation des niveaux de significations hétérogènes qui rend son efficacité redoutable et qui nécessite, de ce fait, de l'examiner dans une recherche plus approfondie." (Conclusion)
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"Part One, 'In Their Own Words: Trolling, Meme Culture, and Journalists’ Reflections on the 2016 US Presidential Election,' provides a historical overview of the relationship between the news media and far-right manipulators during the 2016 US presidential election. Part Two, 'At a Certain Point Y
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ou Have to Realize That You’re Promoting Them’: The Ambivalence of Journalistic Amplification,' identifies the intended and unintended consequences of reporting on bigoted, damaging, or otherwise problematic information and the structural limitations of journalism (economic, labor, and cultural) that exacerbate these tensions. And Part Three, 'The Forest and the Trees: Proposed Editorial Strategies,' recommends practices on establishing newsworthiness; handling objectively false information; covering specific harassment campaigns or manipulators, bigots, and abusers; and reporting on the internet that are particularly critical in an era of disinformation." (Executive summary, page 3)
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"Over the past decade, radicalisation to violent extremism (VE) has become a matter of pressing public and political concern in Central Asia. Between 2000 and 5000 Central Asians responded to calls to join jihad in Syria and Afghanistan, most of them radicalised while foreign workers in the labour c
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amps of Russia’s cities. While rates are low by global standards, the phenomenon has nonetheless spurred the governments of the region to respond. The legal response taken up by Central Asian countries borrows heavily from Russia’s anti-terrorism measures. Laws are unclear and overbroad in their definitions of extremism, leading to legal uncertainty and repressive application. They set out legal penalties for those creating or disseminating VE and mandate restrictions on the dissemination of VE material, including online. A lack of clarity about what is and is not extremism has resulted in uneven and harsh application of these laws, with lengthy prison sentences for those convicted of no more than liking an extremist Facebook post [...] This report is written in three parts: Part A sets out legislative definitions of extremism and extremist content in Central Asian states, and outlines how they have been applied through criminal prosecution. Part B gives the results of analysis of VE content on Central Asian open social media, blogs and online forums from late 2018, detailing the actors, their use of social media, and the narratives they promulgate; and, Part C examines how content blocking, education and engagement have been used to counter VE content online, and assesses their success." (Executive summary)
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"Social media is used by al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and ISIL in Africa. The importance of cross-media communications to the strategies of all three groups is underlined by the existence of dedicated branches for media planning, namely al-Shabaab’s al-Kata’ib, Boko Haram’s Media Office of West Afri
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ca Province and ISIL’s Al Hayat Media Center. In part driven by growing Internet access in Africa and on-going technological advancement, it is clear that the use of social media by all three groups has increased in recent years – although this inevitably varies by geographical area depending on the level of ICT penetration. There appears to be a spectrum of sophistication across the three groups in relation to their social media strategies: ISIL’s strategy is more advanced than those of its two counterparts, which may be linked to its more far-reaching and international support base. While still less sophisticated overall than those of ISIL and al-Shabaab, Boko Haram’s social media strategy has become more professionalised since its declaration of allegiance to ISIL in 2015, whether due to the direct or indirect influence of ISIL’s concerted online activities." (Summary of key findings, page 65-66)
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"Though it’s well-known that extremist groups like al-Shabaab use social media to spread fear and recruit susceptible youth, there’s very little evidence-based research that details how at-risk youth use social media and how language is weaponized online by extremists to radicalize and recruit t
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hese youth. By better understanding language related to violent extremism and utilizing innovative social media monitoring technologies to track radical online narratives, PeaceTech Lab has developed a solid analytical foundation that informs and supports local P/CVE efforts in Mombasa. In partnership with Wasafiri Consulting and with funding from DAI, PeaceTech Lab identified, monitored and analyzed online content and the sources of influence used by extremist groups to radicalize youth in specific communities in Mombasa, Kenya." (Publisher description)
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"This report summarizes the findings from a research study conducted by Love Frankie to inform Search for Common Ground (Search) in developing an implementation strategy for a 24-month project to reduce the influence of violent extremist narratives online, particularly targeted at youth and ex-juven
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ile offenders in Indonesia via social media." (Page 5)
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