"Democratic backsliding in recent years has been characterised by gradual, often legalistic shifts, rather than overt actions like coups. Europe is seeing worrying declines in electoral integrity, civil liberties and rule of law. There are several factors driving democratic backsliding in Europe, bu
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t we often focus on the most obvious ones. The Philea team has developed the Democracy Iceberg to help philanthropy tackle root causes instead of just symptoms of democratic decline. Foundations have countless opportunities to address the root causes of democratic backsliding. For inspiration, we have compiled a short list of possible actions." (Executive Summary)
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"For decades, Georgia has been one of the largest per capita recipients of U.S. assistance. In 2012-2023, the years in which the Georgian Dream has been in power, total U.S. overseas development assistance (ODA) stands at USD 1 billion 920 mil lion, according to official data. Of course, the lion’
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s share of that assistance went to the government and public administration. In 2023, the U.S. government disbursed USD 143.8 million in aid to Georgia, with USD 84.5 million flowing through USAID as the primary administra tive channel. USD 77 million of that was allocated to governance-related programs, but where did all that money go? Once again, most of the assistance went to the government and public administration. To give a representative example in 2023, the last fiscal year when complete data is available, the largest share, at USD 42 million, was spent under “conflict, peace, and security” umbrella, while USD 34 million fell under “government and civil society.” Of this amount, USD 15 million support ed democratic participation and civil society, USD 6.5 million went toward legal and judicial develop ment, and USD 3.5 million was directed at media and freedom of information. Human rights programs received USD 2.1 million, while decentralization efforts got USD 600,000. Meanwhile, USD 470,000 was allocated to domestic revenue mo bilization and USD 450,000 was used to combat transnational organized crime [...] Our considered estimate is that over 2,000 Georgians are likely to lose jobs due to culling USAID, given the average number of programs, grants, and sub-grants, and the average number of people required to implement them. Most of them are qualified (first and medium-level) project and program managers with foreign language skills as well as administrative personnel (e.g., financial officers), and other support professions (e.g., media managers)." (Pages 1-3)
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"Since August 2017, USAID/Tanzania’s five-year Data-Driven Advocacy (DDA) Activity has sought to improve and sustain Tanzanian civil society’s ability to advocate for and influence policy on key national human rights issues using higher-quality data and information to drive results. Implemented
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by Freedom House in collaboration with Pact, DDA is funded at a total estimated cost of $8,700,000. The Activity provides mentorship and technical assistance to rights-focused civil society organizations (CSOs) in data collection, evidence-based advocacy, and digital and physical protection. DDA helps CSOs build or strengthen platforms for coordination with stakeholders and strengthen institutional capacity. It also provides CSOs with resources and mentorship to engage the GoT and encourage a more inclusive, data-driven, human rights–focused policymaking process [...] USAID asked the Data for Development Project to conduct this evaluation to assess how DDA has performed in relation to its specific objectives and performance targets. The evaluation gathered data to assess progress, challenges, and constraints to implementation and performance. It identified potential needs for adaptation or course correction in the remaining activity period. This utilization-focused evaluation also leveraged lessons learned to inform future USAID projects in Tanzania. Specifically, USAID and its Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) Office plan to apply evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations to thinking and planning for future design." (Executive Summary, page vii)
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"US democracy support should follow a triage approach, providing assistance to countries on the precipice of democratic backsliding, while investing in civil societies that hold promise for advancing democratic values. The United States should leverage its assets while working with partners and alli
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es to fight disinformation and support equitable economic growth and entrepreneurship, while exercising caution about relying too heavily on supporting elections and empowering foreign militaries. The United States should focus its efforts and resources on the health of its own democracy in order to receive buy-in domestically and from foreign publics for democratization efforts." (Summary)
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"Late in the twentieth century, the United States embraced democracy promotion as a foreign policy priority, a central component of which involved allocating democracy aid to governments, political parties, and nongovernmental organizations around the world to support and encourage democratization.
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Nonetheless, as a scarce resource, democracy assistance is allocated selectively: some states receive substantial commitments while others receive none. As previous studies have concluded, democracy aid allocations are, in part, strategic bets placed on the likelihood of progress toward and consolidation of democracy, as donors consider cues that identify situations where democracy aid is likely to be most successful. We introduce the role of media coverage as a key factor in democracy aid allocations and argue that a shift toward democracy within a potential recipient state interacts with media attention to that state to generate cues for aid allocators. To gauge the agenda-setting and cueing effects of media coverage on democracy aid allocations, we examine US democracy assistance from 1975 to 2010, weighing the impact of media attention, democratic openings, and other factors related to recipient characteristics and US political, strategic, economic, and ideational interests on democracy assistance. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings." (Abstract)
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"Proposal 1: Bring democracy support and protection to the core of EU external action and implement this strategic priority in EU foreign relations with Africa (and worldwide). Proposal 2: Develop a new narrative and more strategic approach to democracy support in a geopolitical context where democr
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acy is increasingly being undermined from within in (former) democratic countries and challenged from the outside by powerful authoritarian regimes. Proposal 3: Address the impacts of demographic change, urbanisation, digitalisation and climate change on political regimes through EU democracy support. Proposal 4: Invest more in intermediary organisations (media, parties, CSOs, trade unions, business councils) and in the democratic accountability of sectoral policies. Proposal 5: Intensify support for civic education and launch new initiatives to strengthen transnational relations between African and European societies. Proposal 6: Engage more strategically in contexts where authoritarian regimes suddenly open up or where electoral autocracies gradually close political spaces. Proposal 7: Continue and deepen cooperation with African regional organisations and put more emphasis on joint learning and practices for defending democracy. Proposal 8: Create a different institutional set-up that allows the EU to engage more strategically in democratic reforms. Proposal 9: Increase the capacities of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) to work on democracy support. Proposal 10: Develop a joint European approach towards democracy support that is sustained by all European countries." (Executive summary)
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"European support for democracy is at a crossroads. The next decade will have a major bearing on what democracy means for the European Union (EU) at a time of increasing awareness of fundamental technological change, climate risks, demographic adjustment and power shifts between and within continent
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s. Democratic governance should no longer be taken for granted within Europe or in European foreign policy. Political choices will need to be made that determine how important democracy is for European states and what to do as a consequence. It is with these choices in mind that we embarked, 18 months ago, on a review of European support for democracy. This has included several stand-alone papers on democracy support and numerous multi-stakeholder meetings with academics, activists, civil society, donors, experts, policy-makers and think-tanks. The review looked at what European democracy support has achieved (the past), what can be improved today (the present) and where democracy support should be headed (the future). There were some things we expected to find in this review and there were also some surprises. Democracy offers us the greatest potential for achieving sustainable development, respect for human rights and long-term stability. But democracy is not a perfect political system and can be dominated by powerful interest groups, short-termism, identity politics and the translation of healthy competition into conflict or violence. Today, these challenges are more real than ever." (Executive summary)
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"Three key cross-cutting priority areas for the civil society and media sectors emerge from this analysis: Civic Education: Without wide public understanding of and support for democracy, it is possible for public opinion to be manipulated, or frustrations exploited, and for public support for Armen
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ia’s nascent democracy to be diminished or reversed. Enabling Environment: In the context of the fragile political environment, it is critical that laws, regulations, and processes that provide protections to the civil society and media sectors, and that define relationships between government and sector actors, are developed and established. Advocacy: Support for sector advocacy initiatives and for follow up monitoring of implementation constitutes a priority focus for donor efforts." (Executive summary, page 2)
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"Most of Japan's civil society assistance targets media. JICA's policy guideline on peace-building assistance regards media assistance as one of the target categories of Japan's democracy assistance (Japanese International Cooperation Agency JICA, 2009). The International Peace Cooperation Council (
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Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Kondankai), which was established within the Cabinet Office. recommended boosting Japan's media assistance in its report published in December 2002 (Council on International Peace Cooperation 2002, 42). Japan has assisted media through grants, technical assistance, expert dispatch, expert training, and the provision of materials related to broadcasting (JICA 20046, 50). Japan has provided media assistance mainly to TV and radio stations. According to Masakazu Sakashita (2006, 122), 127 TV media assistance projects and 56 radio assistance projects had been conducted by September 2005, while Japan has never provided media assistance to print media such as newspapers and magazines. This is because Japan regards telecommunication and broadcasting technology as its comparative advantage and thus focuses on those projects that require it. Indeed, the chief characteristic of Japan's media assistance is that it focuses on facilities such as information and telecommunication networks instead of media content. Project contents include the improvement of production capacity and broadcasting skills, repair of ground communication systems, and provision of studio equipment. Seminars are provided to teach how to use and maintain the equipment provided through such projects as well (JICA 20046, 50). Expert training has been conducted for countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka in addition to broadcasting infrastructure assistance, which provided training for program production. However, this training tends to be a mere supplement to broadcasting in frastructure assistance projects (Sakashita 2006, 122). Within JICA, while it is the former Public Policy Department and the current Industrial Development and Public Policy Division that is in charge of democrac y assistance, the Information and Telecommunication Technology Division is in charge of media assistance. This shows that Japan's media assistance is conducted mainly as broadcasting technical assistance rather than democracy assistance, as Sakashita (2006, 122) notes.
Japan's media assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 helped broadcast the country's Loya Jirga, or national assembly, on TV via satellite. Its aim was to show the discussion at the national assembly and the process of choosing the interim president of the country to increase the legitimacy of the new administration (JICA 2004a). The political character of this assistance project was distinct compared with Japan's media assistance until then. However, the project assisted only a state hroadcasting station and did not intend to Increase the capacity of primate media's watchdog functions. In this sense, the actual content of this assistance project was state, not civil society assistance. In addition, the contents of this assistance were to upgrade broadcasting in frastructure and provide equipment and training on how to use the equipment. No assistance was provided in terms of the content of the broadcasting. No expert on free and fair broadcasting was included in its preliminary study group, and all the experts were broadcasting technical specialists, which shows the weakness of Japan's interest in supporting the role of media in democracy (JICA 2002). The project document did not set contribution to democracy as an evaluation criterion of the project, either (Sakashita 2006, 124)." (Pages 51-53)
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"Media democracy promotion is a hidden form of international development aid (IDA). However, the dynamics underlying democracy promotion and their adaptation in local contexts is hardly considered when evaluating or theorizing international media development aid (IMDA). Multi-lateral organizations (
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MLOs) are important carriers of democratic ideals and different interpretations. In this paper, I unravel the dynamics between multi-lateral organizations and local actors during the media reform debates in three MERCOSUR countries; Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay." (Abstract)
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"This article intends to provide responses to some of the many unanswered questions about the making and the transformation of the uprising in Syria by exploring a new avenue of research: media development aid. Most academic interest has been oriented towards the role that the new media played at th
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e time of the uprising; insufficient interest, by contrast, has been directed to the development of the sector in the years predating it. What emerges from this article is that the Syrian media landscape was strongly supported by international development aid during the years prior to the outbreak of the uprising of 2011. By looking at the complex structure of media aid architecture and investigating the practices and programmes implemented by some representative organisations, this article reflects on the field of media development as a new modus operandi of the West (the EU and US especially), to promote democracy through alternative and non-collateral, bottom-up support." (Abstract)
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"1) This paper provides a conceptual framework for counting and categorising peacebuilding activities as well as a hard working-definition of the actions that count as peacebuilding. One of the primary inhibiting factors for assessing peacebuilding cost-effectiveness has been the lack of commonly ag
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reed definitions and confusion about what activities constitute peacebuilding. Without this, it is simply not possible to measure and compare the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding activities. 2) A comprehensive accounting of global peacebuilding expenditures from 2002 to 2013, using the working definition that was developed in partnership with the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and Peacebuilding Support Group. This is the first known attempt at comprehensively accounting for peacebuilding activities — without this data it is not possible to empirically assess different peacebuilding strategies and assess the cost-effectiveness of them or individual peacebuilding actions. This data shows that peacebuilding activities are unevenly distributed geographically and thematically and are prioritised to differing extents by international donors. 3) A detailed case study of peacebuilding expenditures is presented to analyse an example of peacebuilding success — Rwanda from the wake of genocide to 2014. This analysis shows US$18.35 billion was committed to peacebuilding expenditures in Rwanda from 1995 to 2014. That means peacebuilding commitments in Rwanda from the international community were at least $27 per capita each year for the past 15 years. This demonstrates that the assistance associated with peacebuilding is not exhausted in the five or even ten years following a conflict, meaning that the success of peacebuilding cannot be judged on whether there has been a relapse into a conflict after such a short period of time has elapsed. If some moderate level of peacebuilding expenditure indeed leads to a reduction in violence, and if Rwanda is illustrative of the levels of peacebuilding required to reduce violent conflict, then the current levels of global peacebuilding expenditure are insufficient to build global peace. 4) A global model of the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding, based on the case study findings and the data generated from them. Using 20 years of peacebuilding expenditure, Rwanda’s experience as a baseline, and combining this with IEP’s research on the global cost of conflict, the paper presents scenario analysis and a model of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness. It finds that using conservative assumptions, the cost-effectiveness ratio of peacebuilding is 1:16, showing that increased funding for peacebuilding would be hugely beneficial not only to peacebuilding outcomes but in terms of the potential economic returns to the global economy. This means that if countries currently in conflict increased or received levels of peacebuilding funding to appropriate levels estimated by this model, then for every dollar invested now, the cost of conflict would be reduced by $16 over the long run. Projected forward ten years from 2016 this would save US$2.94 trillion in direct and indirect losses from conflict. However, achieving this outcome would require an approximate doubling of peacebuilding toward the 31 most fragile and conflict affected nations of the world. Of course, this does not preclude other important factors for peacebuilding success such as the external influence of other states or the role of political elites, but rather establishes a working framework for resources required for programmatic peacebuilding activities. 5) In order to take this research forward, this paper also provides detailed approaches for a future research agenda to look deeper into the ultimate aim of assessing the cost-effectiveness of particular peacebuilding interventions. Through drawing upon existing impact evaluations on peacebuilding interventions in Liberia, it demonstrates a basic approach to how the cost-effectiveness of specific peacebuilding interventions could be compared within a specific context. However, this approach demonstrates the long-term needs for a fully-fledged research agenda in this area. Impact evaluations are resource intensive and require a very significant upscaling of research. Currently, it is estimated that there are only 61 impact evaluations globally on programmes with peacebuilding outcomes. In other domains such as health or education there are hundreds and thousands of such impact evaluations, which highlights the clear need for more impact evaluations in peacebuilding." (Executive summary)
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"[...] This thesis contributes to the emerging academic literature on media development and its role in statebuilding. It does so by investigating media development in the new state of South Sudan. Ethnographic observations, a social survey, and unstructured interviews have been applied during a fie
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ldwork spell in Juba, which lasted from November 2014 to August 2015. The application of three methods allowed for an in-depth investigation of the South Sudanese understanding of media, which differed significantly from the aims of western media experts implementing media development projects. Furthermore, the thesis compares the strengths and weaknesses, and the results delivered, by each utilised research method, and thus investigates how these methods perform in a country of the global South. I argue that the various understandings of media in South Sudan differ significantly from the thinking and practices of western media practitioners. In South Sudan, this resulted in a deteriorating relationship between the country’s government and its international donors and led to problems for the newly trained journalists. Furthermore, my results show the limitations of using just one method in a country of the global South; and they provide an argument for bricolage, a research approach that combines perspectives, theories, and methods, when researching policy-relevant questions in environments where the researcher is not a cultural native." (Abstract)
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"Many resource-strapped developing country governments seek international aid, but when that assistance is channeled through domestic civil society, it can threaten their political control. As a result, in the last two decades, 39 of the world’s 153 low- and middle-income countries have adopted la
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ws restricting the inflow of foreign aid to domestically operating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Governments recognize that such laws harm their international reputations for supporting democracy and may invite donor punishment in terms of aid reductions. Yet, they perceive foreign aid to NGOs as supporting political opponents and threatening their grip on power. In the aftermath of competitive electoral victories, governments often take new legal steps to limit these groups’ funding. We test this argument on an original dataset of laws detailing the regulation of foreign aid inflows to domestically operating NGOs in 153 low- and middle-income countries for the period 1993–2012. Using an event history approach, we find that foreign aid flows are associated with an increased risk of restrictive law adoption; a log unit increase in foreign aid raises the probability of adoption by 6.7%. This risk is exacerbated after the holding of competitive elections: the interaction of foreign aid and competitive elections increases the probability of adoption by 11%." (Abstract)
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"A comprehensive, practical guide to the on-the-ground tasks of evaluating and monitoring democracy assistance programs, from planning and implementation to preparing and presenting evaluation reports." (Publisher description)