"Tackling Disinformation: A Learning Guide is aimed at helping those already working in the field, or directly impacted by the issues, such as media professionals, civil society actors, DW Akademie partners and experts. It offers insights for evaluating media development activities and rethinking ap
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proaches to disinformation, alongside practical solutions and expert advice, with a focus on the Global South and Eastern Europe." (https://akademie.dw.com)
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"The book includes an extensive section on the echoes of Rwanda, which looks at the cases of Darfur, the Central African Republic, Myanmar, and South Sudan, while the impact of social media as a new actor is examined through chapters on social media use by the Islamic State and in Syria and in other
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contexts across the developing world. It also looks at the aftermath of the genocide: the shifting narrative of the genocide itself, the evolving debate over the role and impact of hate media in Rwanda, the challenge of digitizing archival records of the genocide, and the fostering of free and independent media in atrocity's wake. The volume also probes how journalists themselves confront mass atrocity and examines the preventive function of media through the use of advanced digital technology as well as radio programming in the Lake Chad Basin and the Democratic Republic of Congo." (Publisher description)
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"This chapter presents the findings of a research project undertaken with the objective of understanding the radio-listening habits of Rwandan rebels in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC). The intent was also to understand the impact and appreciation of an educational soap op
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era called 'Musekeweya', which dramatizes messages on conflict prevention and reconciliation. This radio theatre play is broadcast by Radio Rwanda, the Rwandan state broadcaster. In total, 101 ex-rebels of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) were consulted during several weeks of fieldwork in 2009." The conclusion (page 607) states: "Although there is no clear evidence that radio or a radio soap such as 'Musekeweya' played a decisive role in the final decision of ex-rebels to return home, it is clear that the radio soap has been somehow at work in a dynamic of competing ideologies and mindsets. Scott Straus is convinced that, in the context of mass violence, ideology and ideas shape decision making in "subtle but profound ways." Ideology played a decisive role in the dynamics that led to genocide against Tutsi and remains important in understanding the post-genocide situation … Since the end of the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is promoting a radically different interpretation of Rwandan history and aims to reconfigure the political and societal narrative. Central is the notion of "Rwandanicity," or "Rwandanness," which asserts that before the arrival of colonialism, Rwandans were one unified people. According to this narrative, the colonial powers divided what had been a harmonious and egalitarian society. This ultimately culminated in the 1994 mass slaughter of Tutsi. This narrative praises the activities of the RPF, stopping the genocide in 1994 and divisionism altogether, and warns for the persistence of this "genocide ideology." But there is a thin line between re-education and political indoctrination, also on this side of the Rwandan border. The attempt to change mindsets can be seen as a strategy to achieve hegemonic control." (Introduction, page 597)
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"The evidence amounts to a persuasive refutation of the commonly held beliefs that radio had widespread, direct effects and that hate radio was the primary driver of the genocide and participation in it. That said, the evidence suggests radio had some marginal and conditional effects. RTLM broadcast
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s instigated certain attacks, particularly in and around the capital. The survey research shows statistically significant correlations between radio incitement and higher levels of violence among perpetrators. From that, it might be deduced that RTLM catalyzed some key agents of violence in some locations. Qualitative analysis additionally shows that a minority of the survey genocide perpetrators believed radio coordinated elites and signaled that authorities wanted the population to fight "the Tutsi enemy." In sum, then, the positive evidence of radio media effects is that radio instigated a limited number of acts of violence, catalyzed some key actors, coordinated elites, and bolstered local messages of violence. Based on these findings, it is plausible to hypothesize that radio had conditional and marginal effects. Radio did not cause the genocide or have direct, massive effects. Rather, radio emboldened hard-liners and reinforced face-to-face mobilization, which helped those who advocated violence assert dominance and carry out the genocide." (Page 123)
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"This chapter demonstrates the critical importance of stringers and local journalists to international news production, and how much harder we need to work to understand the motivations and perspectives of these excluded groups of journalistic actors. News bureaus should restructure to cater to the
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needs of these vital subaltern journalists to create higher quality journalism, while according these journalists proper credit and compensation. Post-Colonial theory finds several applications in current news structures. It is my belief that this analogy, which I introduce in some detail, can be further developed to better understand how modern news production systems function and can diminish their appropriation from the margins and subalterns. Chronicles about stringers and local journalists serve to humanize and illuminate these journalists, in particular for readers generally unaware of the invisible actors behind their daily international news. With greater empathy and understanding, the gap between news producers and consumers narrows, and consumers, in seeing the inner workings of news production, come to understand just how much to trust what they read on the page or hear on television." (Conclusion)
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"The cases discussed in this chapter have demonstrated how disinformation and rhetoric that is spread through social media in the developing world often meets the Benesch criteria for dangerous speech. It comes from influential sources, which can include family and friends who share it. It plays on
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audience fears by persuading them that members of their group are being attacked by a rival group. It sometimes dehumanizes other groups and issues direct calls for violence against them. It happens where there are longstanding ethnic tensions and grievances. And where the media landscape is weak or suppressed, social media becomes a primary source of information, making it an especially influential means of transmission. There are several characteristics shared by developing countries, particularly those with a recent history of conflict and/or government repression, that make them more vulnerable to dangerous speech spread by social media. This includes low media or digital literacy, a lack of available alternative media and the prevalence of untraceable messaging platforms such as WhatsApp." (Conclusion)
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"The trend in international newsgathering is to greater reliance on local journalists and fixers to provide crucial information to a global audience. At the same time, these local journalists are themselves becoming targets of violence. Increasingly, local journalists are being killed in the line of
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fire. Their deaths create stress for their colleagues, families and communities. It remains a challenge to discern areas in which the global community can provide support to journalists in these circumstances. As long as we continue to rely on fixers and local journalists for news and information from hot spots around the world, we must also provide them with adequate support to mitigate risk, including to their mental health. Local journalists, such as those in the Central African Republic, are one of the most likely groups of journalists to experience psychological trauma, thanks to the implicit risks of their work, combined with public pressure to provide news from these situations. What support can be provided to these journalists and how can it best meet the specific needs of such a community? Can we promote resiliency? The first step is to acknowledge the dearth of relevant research on mental health and psychosocial support for local journalists in conflict or emergency settings. There is a need for research on the kinds of trauma (and resilience) that journalists experience and their causes, including impacts on the individual and colleagues and impacts on the work […] Second, "little has been done to develop treatments based on local coping styles, culture-specific idioms of distress, and culturally appropriate helping methods" (de Jong 2017, 209) […] Third, any training efforts of journalists should be accompanied with mental health and psychosocial support […] Finally, the United Nations has adopted the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity This may at least give some wider symbolic support to journalists who are victims of traumatic attacks. Ultimately, there must be a recognition that the mental health of the journalist can have an impact on their reporting - something that is particularly critical in conflict environments." (Conclusion)
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"The most extreme damage inflicted by social media can be seen in South Sudan. As documented in the chapter by Theo Dolan, social media in South Sudan has contributed to hatred and conflict among ethnic groups. Many investigators, including UN investigators, have warned that South Sudan's social med
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ia are triggering violence against ethnic groups. Since the beginning of the civil war in late 2013, social media has fuelled waves of hate speech that have provoked deadly violence and ethnic conflict in South Sudan, including massacres and other atrocities. In that sense, social media has become a new variation of the "hate radio" phenomenon that flourished in Rwanda before and during the 1994 genocide … Social media is also emerging as a powerful way to harass and intimidate the opponents of a regime or a political party. In this sense, it adds another weapon to the arsenal of a powerful regime that already has multiple weapons at its disposal. A regime can mobilize its supporters to use social media in a targeted way against its foes, or it can use its financial resources to create a fake army of fictional users on social media. In either case, it is tilting the playing field against its enemies. A targeted attack through social media can be more effective than the telephone threats or messages often deployed in the past. The use of social media can be more intimidating because it belittles the targeted person in front of a much bigger audience. The presence of this audience means that the attack is more damaging, more difficult to ignore and has the potential to mobilize large numbers of people against the victim … While social media is often used for anti-democratic purposes in Africa's authoritarian states, it has also been used as a force for reform, accountability and justice. It has helped to safeguard the fairness of elections. It has allowed greater scrutiny of potential threats, such as vote-rigging or violence, allowing citizens to be alerted when there is still a chance to prevent the worst abuses. It has put a spotlight on corruption and political wrongdoing, allowing activists to mobilize pressure on governments to resolve these long-neglected problems. In some cases, as it did in the Arab Spring, social media has played a role in toppling an authoritarian state. When an election was called in the small West African state of Gambia, where the dictator Yahya Jammeh had ruled for 22 years, opposition candidates had little access to state-controlled media. So the main opposition party created more than a dozen WhatsApp groups, allowing it to communicate with voters. Other forms of social media also proliferated. A leading independent group, the Gambia Youth and Women's Forum, discussed election issues on a public Facebook group with 55,000 members. The government blocked access to WhatsApp and eventually extended the shutdown to the entire internet, but Gambians used virtual private network (VPN) technology to bypass the shutdown. The opposition won the election and Jammeh was forced to flee the country." (Pages 419-423)
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"While we might blame news audiences for their short-lived engagement with foreign crises, their reactions are far less surprising when we look carefully at what news stories truly communicate to readers. As illustrated above, the subtle lessons the news media teach audiences about foreign crises wo
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rk together to suggest that there are few, if any, solutions to foreign suffering and the solutions that have been implemented do not work very well. By way of comparison, the media suggest that national crises, such as Hurricane Katrina, can and will be effectively addressed by responsible governments and engaged publics. Given these patterns in news discourse, it is no surprise that Americans engage superficially with the topic of distant suffering.… Journalists could begin to change the way foreign crises are covered and present better coverage of solutions by actually asking victims on the ground what they think rather than relying on political leaders and charitable groups for facts and quotes. For instance, despite many stories on al-Shabaab, none included any comments by Somalis themselves on what could be done to stop the group, and only a very small number of victim comments explicitly addressed causes or solutions. While several pieces stated that the famine was caused by drought, no Somalis were ever quoted regarding what government policies or international interventions might have lessened the severity of future droughts." (Conclusion)
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"In presenting some of the findings from an analysis of 3,387 media reports and from interviews with Africa correspondents and other journalists from eight countries, this chapter provides several insights on patterns of media representations of the conflict in Darfur. After initial neglect, peaks i
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n reporting followed political initiatives, especially Kofi Annan's analogical bridging from the Rwandan genocide to Darfur, and the ICC interventions. Judicial interventions increased reporting and citations of the crime frame. While the humanitarian emergency frame featured prominently in early stages, its use declined quickly as continued suffering was no longer news and as the government of Sudan cut off sources of information. Diplomatic representations also declined over time. Patterns of reporting follow similar paths in all countries, but they do so at different levels of intensity. In addition, receptivity to the crime frame and use of the genocide label vary across countries. The causal factors of such variation are country-specific policy preferences and cultural sensitivities, distinct characteristics of media fields and varying strengths, that is, resources, power and prestige, of social fields that surround journalism." (Conclusions, page 270)
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"The Islamic State's media strategy allows for a message that has been crafted by a handful of IS propaganda agents to be disseminated by a few primary distributors, who in turn can reach thousands of unaffiliated sympathizers, and therefore millions of Twitter users. By means of a conclusion, this
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chapter offers four short considerations on countering some of the different actors involved in the process. First, given the highly centralized nature of IS media production, which is most likely spearheaded by a handful of well-trained, technologically savvy and talented individuals, IS media production efforts would be very sensitive to the removal of these individuals [...] Second, although there is some anecdotal evidence that banning social media accounts is an effective way to curtail the activities of unaffiliated sympathizers, relying solely on social media companies to combat the spread of extremist material on their platforms not only raises questions regarding free speech, but would also give these companies the power to control public knowledge and discourse [...] Third, and on a related note, none of the so-called "lone wolf" attacks in Western countries were perpetrated by individuals who were actively involved in disseminating IS propaganda. In fact, it may well be that distributing jihadist material is an alternate mode of participation for individuals who are unwilling to engage in actual violence [...] Finally, although the Islamic State's military defeat appears imminent, one of the greatest mistakes of the "War on Terror" was the belief that the destruction of al-Qaeda's training camps and leadership would lead to the demise of the group, its affiliated movements and its ideology." (Conclusion)
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"This ethnic conflict frame performs three functions when used by African journalists. The first is that it works to domesticate the conflict [in Darfur] by relying on already sedimented knowledge among African audiences about identity formation … The second function of this frame is based on know
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ing that the national media subfields in the three countries [i.e., Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa] have a nuanced understanding of ethnic identities. When asked about the role of ethnicity in Darfur, a Nigerian journalist responded, "It's a factor, religion is a factor as well. Religion shapes ethnicity" (interview with a journalist, Nigeria 2015). This approach alerts us that, as far as African journalists are concerned, ethnicity does not always have a path-deterministic relationship with violence, as some journalists in the Global North have sometimes suggested (Wahutu 2017b, 16-17). The third point is that this ethnic conflict frame works to create a sense of shared affinity between the victims and the audience in Kenya, South Africa and Rwanda while othering those framed as Arab/Muslim as being radically different. This explanation is one that was more present during my interviews with journalists. In both Kenya and South Africa, journalists often viewed as Sudan as not "real Africa." (Page 246)
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"There is no doubt that technology has improved the ability to document war crimes and human rights abuses, even in otherwise inaccessible locations. The world now sees, often in close to real-time, atrocities that would have been lost to the world only a handful of years ago. But does knowing neces
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sarily translate into doing? Whether such access can be directly linked to changes in international policy-making processes remains undecided. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that changes in the technical capacity to gather evidence have had negligible effect on states' willingness to intervene in mass atrocity events. Syria, for example, has been mapped, photographed and crowdsourced in detail for (as of this writing) seven years, yet the war there is expected to continue for years more. Reported war crimes have so far had no clear, unequivocal effect on policy. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian military underscores the point." (Pages 569-570)
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"In this chapter we begin by surveying the digital political landscape, which has provided a fertile breeding ground for trolling as a state tool for suppression of dissenting ideas. We observe the tactical move by states from an ideology of information scarcity to one of information abundance, whic
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h sees "speech itself as a censorial weapon" (Wu 2017). This era of information abundance has enabled states to sponsor and execute trolling attacks using ordinary internet users as well as volunteer, amateur and professional trolling institutions. Under the heading "The Anatomy of Patriotic Trolling," we outline salient patterns from more than 15 case studies across seven countries illustrating the common tools and tactics in state-sponsored trolling attacks. Drawing on campaigns across Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Ecuador, the Philippines, Turkey, Venezuela and the United States, we are able to establish the existence of a broader trend within which national variations occur. We then offer a framework for conceptualizing the responsibility of states for such attacks. We argue attribution is critical to elucidating remedies to state-sponsored trolling. As long as the role of governments in instigating or leveraging such campaigns is obscured, it will be impossible to advance effective technological or regulatory solutions. We conclude by offering some preliminary policy proposals, hoping this chapter will prompt a further debate about effective and necessary interventions." (Pages 503-504)
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"A brief recap of the examples discussed here suggests, among other things, the following considerations: When information circulation is limited due to censorship or security concerns, it may be necessary to restrict information to what is essential for survival. In the case of BBTT in South Sudan,
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humanitarian information is produced and transmitted by residents of the UN protected sites, in local languages and for local residents only; Likewise, in post-genocide Rwanda, where broadcasting news about atrocities would have been very challenging, the newsreel project provided information and space for discussion for different groups, while creating a conversation that extended beyond each screening and location; BBTT and the newsreels project also demonstrate that closed environments may be the best option to provide information safely and allow for open discussions among individuals affected by violence. By employing the use of listening and discussion groups, the program furthers its goal of engaging residents and extending their participation in the local form of public sphere. These controlled environments are particularly important to encourage the participation of victims, women and other marginalized groups in dialogue; Training and engaging citizens to gather, curate and disseminate content, as BBTT does with community correspondents, is an effective way to provide information that matters to people's lives and to foster a culture of critical engagement. These processes potentially help communities rebuild media structures once the political situation stabilizes; Media outlets that create avenues for interaction and feedback tend to be most successful in providing content that is relevant and engaging to audiences, as in the case of Sawa Shabab in South Sudan; Drama, games, storytelling and other forms of engagement with narratives provide opportunities for individuals to work together, regain social trust, learn about alternate forms of participation and reconstruct symbolic narratives, as demonstrated by the examples in Colombia; Recognition of the suffering of the victims as well as of their agency in resisting violence is also crucial in a post-atrocities context. This may come in the form of interactive media-making by citizens or in initiatives supported by media or research organizations such as the National Center for Historical Memory." (Pages 226-227)
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"This book examines the crucial role the media played in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, bringing together local reporters and commentators from Rwanda, Western journalists, and media theorists. Part One (eight articles) describes and analyzes "Hate Media in Rwanda", mainly, but not exclusively, focusing
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on Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). Part Two (thirteen articles) presents a critique of international media coverage of the genocide, including not only the United States and Western Europe, but also Kenya and Nigeria. Part three (five articles) covers the deliberations by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the role of the media in the genocide, identifying various missed opportunities. Part Four, "After the Genocide and the Way Forward" (six articles), goes beyond the Rwanda experiences, tackling issues like the use and abuse of media in vulnerable societies. The authors outline how censorship and propaganda can be avoided, argue for a new responsibility in media reporting, and give recommendations for media intervention in the prevention of genocidal violence." (CAMECO Update 1-2008)
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