"Welchen Einfluss haben Gesinnungen der Gewalt auf die gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen in Afghanistan? Die internationalen Beiträger*innen richten ihren Blick auf linke, dschihadistische sowie talibanistische Ideologien und Praktiken in der jüngeren afghanischen Geschichte. Multiperspektivisch ze
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ichnen sie den Verlauf der letzten 20 Jahre nach und fokussieren dabei vor allem auf den dramatischen Wandel, den die afghanische Bevölkerung in Bezug auf Kultur, Frauenrechte und Medien durchlebt: Einstige Sehnsüchte und die Hoffnung auf eine offene Gesellschaft verwandeln sich durch ein Wiedererstarken der Taliban in Alpträume." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"Der »Wegweiser zur Geschichte: Afghanistan« erschien erstmals 2006. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt kämpften die US-Streitkräfte und ihre Verbündeten im Rahmen der Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) bereits mehrere Jahre auch auf afghanischem Boden gegen den internationalen Terroris mus. Die Kräfte der Int
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ernational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) konnten berechtigt hoffen, einen Beitrag zur Stabilität im Lande zu leisten. Die Bundeswehr war an der OEF von Anfang an beteiligt. Ende 2014 wurde der ISAF-Einsatz beendet und den Afghanen die Verantwortung für die Sicherheit ihrer Heimat übertragen. Gleichwohl war klar, dass das Land am Hindukusch auch weiterhin des Beistands der internationalen Gemeinschaft bedurfte. Folgerichtig wirkt die Bundeswehr seit 2015 im Auftrag des Deutschen Bundestages mit Einsatzkontingenten an der Mission Resolute Support (RS) mit. Ein Ende der Unterstützungsleistungen ist derzeit nicht absehbar. Der »Wegweiser zur Geschichte: Afghanistan« bietet auch in seiner vierten, aktualisierten Auflage einen raschen Überblick über Geschichte und Kultur des Landes. Die aktuellen Konfliktlinien und Herausforderungen werden in bewährter Weise aufgezeigt." (Buchrückseite)
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"Overall, one finding stands out: the international community has repeatedly overestimated its own capacity and the capacity of its Afghan partners to bring about rapid social change. What has worked best are modest, locally embedded projects with immediate, tangible benefits. What has rarely worked
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are complex projects aimed at building capacity and changing behaviour. More specifically, interventions in basic health and education, and in improving basic livelihoods, led to results. Interventions in building capacity for the administration, or in sectors such as the rule of law or gender, rarely worked. In reading these 148 reports, one also realizes that the international aid community is often not good at learning. Monitoring and evaluation systems are weak, and have hardly improved since 2002. Back in the early 2000s, many donors pointed out that, in order to achieve meaningful and sustainable development, more time was necessary. Fifteen years later, few sustainable results have been achieved, but many donors continue to suggest that better results will still require more time. Few donors appear to have changed their fundamental strategic approach, despite the fact that their own evaluations strongly suggest that many aid programs are neither e cient nor e ective in the Afghan context. In all fairness, the Afghan context is an incredibly challenging one, as these 148 reports vividly remind us on almost every page. The situation on the ground was and still is characterized by a lack of basic security; Afghan partners in government and in civil society lack basic capacities; many entrenched political actors have little interest in real reforms. Despite these challenging conditions, there was since the early days of the international engagement in Afghanistan tremendous political pressure on development actors to rush in and to provide quick results. An additional layer of complexity was added by the fact that the international engagement was from the beginning both a civilian and a military intervention, and planners in headquarters as well as practitioners on the ground had to learn how to cope with the task of civil-military cooperation. Under such circumstances, designing e ective aid programs is a herculean task." (Introduction, page 8)
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"Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US
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’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions." (Publisher description)
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