"[...] in recent years – particularly since the 2014 Ukraine conflict – Russia’s use of media to leverage broader influence campaigns has gained notoriety, both domestically and internationally. Russia’s state-owned media outlets are central to the Kremlin’s strategy and are drivers of its
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soft power in Africa. Services like Sputnik and RT (formerly Russia Today) find resonance among African editors. Building on anti-imperialist credentials and positioning itself as an alternative news source, state-owned media is able to provide a more balanced image of Russia in Africa, while combatting Western narratives. The Kremlin has successfully adapted to the digital age, broadening its operations to include online news sites in several languages. African news websites are, in turn, republishing content from Kremlin-sponsored media on a large scale. The narratives are amplified far beyond their original source, the main message being that Moscow is ready to engage with Africa on mutually beneficial terms. Influence-building using social media is another key aspect of Russia’s media strategy in Africa. It is used to sow doubt and build trust in alternative news sources. And, Russian networks are increasingly working with local actors in African countries to better disguise their activities. Interestingly, much of the content being shared on social media by Russian networks is not ‘fake news’, but in most cases is hyper-partisan and polarising." (Abstract)
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"The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today) has attracted much attention as a purveyor of Russian propaganda. To date, most studies of RT have focused on its broadcast, website, and social media content, with little research on its audiences. Through a data-driven
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application of network science and other computational methods, we address this gap to provide insight into the demographics and interests of RT’s Twitter followers, as well as how they engage with RT. Building upon recent studies of Russian state-sponsored media, we report three main results. First, we find that most of RT’s Twitter followers only very rarely engage with its content and tend to be exposed to RT’s content alongside other mainstream news channels. This indicates that RT is not a central part of their online news media environment. Second, using probabilistic computational methods, we show that followers of RT are slightly more likely to be older and male than average Twitter users, and they are far more likely to be bots. Third, we identify thirty-five distinct audience segments, which vary in terms of their nationality, languages, and interests. This audience segmentation reveals the considerable heterogeneity of RT’s Twitter followers. Accordingly, we conclude that generalizations about RT’s audience based on analyses of RT’s media content, or on vocal minorities among its wider audiences, are unhelpful and limit our understanding of RT and its appeal to international audiences." (Abstract)
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"En tanto ideología presente en medios, intelectuales y élites políticas de Rusia y Latinoamérica, las narrativas iliberales -proyectadas por medios y academias afines- gozan de apreciable presencia e impacto en el panorama regional. A raíz del conflicto entre Rusia y Occidente por la invasión
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a Ucrania, el rol de los medios rusos como fuente de desinformación de la población latinoamericana ha sido objeto de atención. La presencia de estos medios masivos permite al Kremlin cuestionar el modelo democrático vigente en la mayor parte de América Latina y defender las posturas oficiales del gobierno ruso, al tiempo que se alinean con las perspectivas de las fuerzas iliberales - en especial de la izquierda radical - del espectro político regional." (Resumen)
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"During the monitoring period (February 24 – April 24) the following tendencies have been identified: Out of the 160 false information and manipulative content, mainly disseminated in Russian and Georgian sources, the largest share (49.4%) was directed against Ukraine, followed by disinformation a
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gainst the West (28.1%). Part of the false and manipulative content was aimed at justifying Russia’s actions (16.3%). In order to evade Russia’s responsibility for human casualties, the Kremlin’s propaganda has resorted to the tactic of “whataboutism” – in response to accusations, the Russian side has been arguing that the Ukrainian side was the one killing the civilian population and that the population was endangered not by Russian troops but by the actions of the Azov Battalion and other so-called ‘Nazi groups.’ The denial of Russian responsibility for the military intervention in Ukraine was also bolstered by deliberate disinformation, reinforcing the idea that Ukraine was fabricating information about the victims (Mariupol blogger story, Bucha Massacre). Visual manipulations, including those related to the pandemic, were often used for this purpose [...]" (Key findings)
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"Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Beiträge in russischen staatlichen Medien über Impfkampagnen im Westen haben eine negative Konnotation. Die Übertreibung der negativen Folgen einer Impfung mit Präparaten von BionTech/Pfizer und Moderna sowie die Überzeichnung der angeblich massenhaften Unzufried
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enheit sind dabei die wichtigsten Narrative der russischen regierungsfreundlichen Medien. Die russische Medienpolitik hinsichtlich der Berichterstattung über westliche Impfstoffe entspricht der allgemeinen staatlichen Linie des Kreml, Russlands herausragende Stellung in der Welt und die Unzulänglichkeiten des Westens hervorzuheben." (Schlussfolgerungen, Seite 4)
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"Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, policymakers worldwide have taken measures to curb the reach of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik. Mapping the audiences of these outlets in 21 countries, we show that in the quarter before the invasion, at least via their official we
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bsites and mobile apps, neither outlet reached more than 5% of the digital populations of any of these countries each month. Averaged across all countries, both outlets’ website and mobile app reach remained approximately constant between 2019 and 2021, was higher for men, and increased with audiences’ age." (Abstract)
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"This book presents a new perspective on how Russia projects itself to the world. Distancing itself from familiar, agency-driven International Relations accounts that focus on what 'the Kremlin' is up to and why, it argues for the need to pay attention to deeper, trans-state processes over which the
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Kremlin exerts much less control. Especially important in this context is mediatization, defined as the process by which contemporary social and political practices adopt a media form and follow media-driven logics. In particular, the book emphasizes the logic of the feedback loop or 'recursion', showing how it drives multiple Russian performances of national belonging and nation projection in the digital era. It applies this theory to recent issues, events and scandals that have played out in international arenas ranging from television, through theatre, film, and performance art, to warfare." (Publisher description)
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"The spread of disinformation around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects wider challenges related to the shift in how information is produced and distributed. Platform and algorithm designs can amplify the spread of disinformation by facilitating the creation of echo chambers and confirmation bi
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as mechanisms that segregate the news and information people see and interact with online; information overload, confusion and cognitive biases play into these trends. A particular challenge is that people tend to spread falsehoods “farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth”; this is particularly the case for false political news. For example, one study found that tweets containing false information were 70% more likely to be retweeted than accurate tweets. Another study found that false information on Facebook attracts six times more engagement than factual posts. In addition, feedback loops between the platforms and traditional media can serve to further amplify disinformation, magnifying the risk that disinformation can be used to deliberately influence public conversations, as well as confuse and discourage the public. The flow of – and disruption caused by – Russian disinformation has significantly increased since Russia's invasion in February 2022. In turn, Ukraine’s response to the Russian disinformation threat has built upon progress made in strengthening the information and media environment since 2014 and in establishing mechanisms to respond directly to information threats. These include efforts to provide accurate information, ensure that media organisations can continue operations, and policy efforts to combat the threats posed by Russian state-linked media." (Page 2)
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"We sought to better understand Russia's disinformation on social media and generate recommendations to better meet and counter this evolving threat. We relied on an analysis of Russian military literature, investigative efforts, official reports, academic and policy literature, media reporting, and
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expert interviews. We also conducted a case study in Ukraine, interviewing a variety of key experts in the Ukrainian government and in the nongovernmental sector who are involved in confronting Russian information warfare." (Summary)
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"Over the past decade, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has employed unorthodox foreign policy tools with increasing frequency, intensity, and success. Perhaps the most effective of these tactics has been the use of information warfare designed to affect decision-making in countries Russia considers to be
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its adversaries. In the target countries, these measures aim to destabilize civil society, erode trust in democratic institutions, and foster uncertainty among allies. If the United States and Europe hope to defend their economies, institutions, and identities, an immediate and effective policy response is required. To date, however, the United States and many of its European partners have struggled to develop policies that combat and counter Russian information warfare. The articles gathered here examine the tools that Russia has used against Ukraine, Poland, the United States, and the European Union, as well as the strategies that these countries have employed to combat Russian information warfare. The joint article by the four authors concisely summarizes the findings and proposes policy options by means of which the democratic countries of the West can address the challenges information warfare poses. The final article looks at Russia, examining controversies around the political role of the aggregator Yandex.news in prioritizing media news." (Introduction, page 2)
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"The publication analyzes the emerging trends of foreign authoritarian-state disinformation in the context of the war in Ukraine in a comparative manner focusing on 7 states of Southeast Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania). It examines
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the continuities and evolution in Russia’s strategies, channels and narratives for disseminating disinformation since the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine and the extent to which other foreign authoritarian states -Turkey, the Gulf states, Iran, have amplified Russian propaganda. The research further traces the personal and institutional pathways through which China has been able to establish its media foothold in Southeast European countries. The report offers policy recommendations for safeguarding democracy and media freedom in the Balkans against the ever-increasing pressures from authoritarianism." (Publisher description)
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"The purpose of this study is to assess the threats and supporting mechanisms present in the Georgian media environment in 2022. Observation of the media environment, similar to the previous year’s research, was based on the evaluation of the participants involved in the research and further compa
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rative analysis." (Abstract)
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"The growth of Russia’s presence across Africa over the last decade has generated significant international concern, further exacerbated after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s engagement can affect the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states (MS) in Africa
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. How should European policymakers understand these developments and respond to them? To answer this question, this report looks at Russia’s engagement in Africa, reaching three main conclusions.
First, Moscow’s engagement with Africa has so far remained limited as compared to that of other global players, particularly in the economic domain. The current level of (media) attention devoted to Russia’s role in Africa is thus not supported by sufficient evidence of its actual engagement in the continent. At the same time, however, the growth of Russia’s presence is a real trend.
Second, Russian actors are guided by a rather loose strategy when it comes to Africa. The Russian state has some interests that act as a broad framework. However, the actual engagement is carried out not only by state actors, but also by state-backed conglomerates and politically connected private businesses. These latter actors have their own specific interests, which are not always fully aligned with those of the Russian state. While state actors are often driven by geopolitical considerations, Russian companies are more interested in economic opportunities.
Third, Russia’s engagement in African countries is significantly shaped by the different national contexts and by the interests of African governments. For instance, in a strong state like Ethiopia, Russia’s engagement takes place exclusively at the governmental level. By contrast, in Sudan and Mali (contexts with weaker state structures), other Russian actors like private military companies (PMCs) and private businesses are involved. Yet, in all three cases, Moscow’s presence tends to grow when relations between African governments and their international partners (especially in the West) deteriorate, often in the wake of authoritarian turns. This shows the opportunistic nature of Russia’s engagement, as well as the complex trade-offs faced by EU/MS governments when engaging with African governments." (Executive summary)
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"Looking at media involvement in Africa, one can only state that the continent is more important than ever. Next to traditional actors like the BBC or Radio France International, and to a smaller extent of Deutsche Welle or Radio Swiss International, there are new players. They do not seem to have t
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he same agendas as the older ones, but they bring about new versions of journalism, of attempted influence and propaganda. What differentiates them is, in the case of China, that funds do not seem to matter much. In the case of Turkey, that more and more scholarships are being offered and when it comes to Russia, that old alliances of the USSR in the Cold War are being reactivated. What separates them even further from the old players are the values that they stand for and try to propagate. They are offering a journalism that praises their own autocratic models of rule and, in the case of China in particular, they promote a positive journalism, that does not ask uneasy questions, a journalism that does not offend or hurt, but that usually pleases the powers-that-be." (Foreword)
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"The current report illuminates the scope, means, and reach of Russia’s sharp power influence through the phenomenon of media capture. It traces the regime’s malign impact on good governance and democratic development in eight Southeast European countries (EU members: Bulgaria and Croatia, as we
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ll as EU aspirants: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo). An understanding of the Kremlin’s media influence has been developed based on the assessment of: (1) the instruments that Russia deploys to expand its influence over public discourses; (2) the channels and narratives of Russian disinformation utilized to sway views of the West and its key institutions, the EU and NATO; (3) the impact of Kremlin narratives on societal perceptions; (4) the amplification of Russian media influence through a convergence with the disinformation activities of other authoritarian states, particularly China. The cross-country regional comparison reveals several key similarities in Russia’s media capture tactics. The Kremlin typically deploys informal instruments of influence. These are manifested in the cultivation of opaque local oligarchic networks, rather than through traceable ownership of SEE media companies. To amplify the impact of these informal tools, Russia has also leveraged the dependence of media outlets in the region on advertising revenue from Russian-owned or dependent companies to exert pressure on their editorial policy. In addition, Russian state-owned propaganda outlets make their content freely available for republishing in local languages, which facilitates the uptake of pro-Russian media content." (Executive summary)
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"This analysis examines the methods of disinformation being used to prove Russia's scientific lead, while portraying Western compet-itors in a very negative light. Sputnik V is an instrument of "soft power" through which Russia is trying to gain influence worldwide. In order to evaluate how successf
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ul the Russian infor-mation policy was, this analysis examines the perception of the benefits of Sputnik V in six different countries. In early 2021, Kazakhstan’s and Serbia’s relations to Russia were positively affected. Similar opportunities would have existed for Germany and Slovakia, since both governments were very willing to cooperate with Russia. In the case of Germany, however, this opportunity was lost due to a lack of cooperation and transparency on Russia’s part. In Slovakia, the government crisis over the use of Sputnik V has had a detrimental effect. For France and Great Britain, neither an improvement of the epidemiological situation through the Russian vaccine nor a success of the overall Sputnik V campaign are expected. This analysis is based on 130 news reports from the Russian state-owned media RT and Sputnik, the international press and the Russian independent press." (Summary)
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"The study revealed the macro and micro media threats that come to light in the digital and physical media environments prior to and following elections. The media environment observed during the 2021 self-government elections was representative of the reality seen through the eyes of media workers,
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and it was revealed that, compared to previous years, the media environment has changed for the worse. The study confirmed that political polarization and public crises have a negative impact on the media environment and the safety of journalists in Georgia, while changes in the political landscape can have a positive impact on the media environment. It has also been demonstrated that the media themselves can reduce or enhance the effects of polarization.
The study confirmed that media threats in Georgia increase self-censorship and fear, reduce media credibility and weaken the viability of the media institution. The study revealed an additional effect of political polarization, a new tactic to combat critical media: “Use the media themselves against the journalists”, which leads to media polarization in itself, inciting conflict between journalists and exposing this macro-threat across the media field. In this regard, polarization in Georgia is an obstacle to solidarity. On the other hand, polarization has a so-called demonizing effect that can be manifested through the stigmatization of journalists by politicians, political labelling, and demolition of credibility, which ultimately harms the media.
The research confirmed that the ruling political force in Georgia uses all the components and mechanisms required to create and strengthen self-censorship of journalists. These mechanisms are: fear, impunity for crime, ridicule, discrediting, insecurity, dissemination of misinformation, etc. Enhancing journalists' self-censorship creates an invisible field of censorship in newsrooms when, for security reasons, the journalist is forced to avoid covering specific topics, sources, or facts. Critical questions are replaced by silence." (Conclusion, pages 51-52)
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"Based on a literature review through January 2021, evaluated at an expert seminar, this policy brief provides a baseline analysis of changing tactics, narratives, and distribution strategies in Russian and Chinese information operations (IOs) relating to the covid-19 pandemic. Key findings: China c
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opied Russia’s tactics, spreading disinformation globally for the first time, particularly on the virus’s origins. But it lacks Russia’s skillset. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) turned to destructive and conspiratorial narratives in an attempt to blunt criticism of its initial failure to contain Covid-19. China’s previous approach built economic ties and influence with political elites, whereas Russia’s lies and disruption targeted broader public opinion. Russia’s approach evolved little; it recycled previous narratives, spreading a broad range of covid-19 disinformation. Evidence supports the theory that Russia seeks to strengthen itself in relative terms by weakening the West, while China seeks to strengthen itself in absolute terms. Collaboration agreements between state media and circular amplification of narratives during the pandemic do not (yet) amount to evidence of strategic Sino-Russian coordination." (Executive summary)
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"Due to its Soviet past, the Russian influence in the Republic of Moldova is still very significant. The country is divided between European integration and Russian convergence. After the government of the pro-European coalition ACUM leaded by Maia Sandu and the pro-Russian Party of Socialists (PSRM
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) of President Igor Dodon fell apart in November 2019, pro-Russian powers under the leadership of Dodon are expanding its power progressively. This affects the media market, which already has experienced an enormous state concentration under the long-time government of the Democratic Party and its leader Vladimir Plahotniuc." (Page 1)
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