"This study modelled the factors that influence fake news spreading behaviour among social media users. To gather our data, we used an online survey to sample 385 social media users in Nigeria, using a chain referral approach. Smart PLS structural equation modelling was used to analyse the data (SEM
...
). We discovered that lack of mindfulness, religiosity, instant news sharing, self-expression all predicted fake news sharing behaviour of social media users. The impacts of lack of mindfulness and religiosity were found to have a greater effect on fake news sharing behaviour. Exploration was found to have a negative effect on fake news sharing. We concluded this study with some theoretical and practical implications." (Abstract)
more
"Misinformation is one of the twenty-first century’s greatest challenges, a peril to democracy, peace, science, and public health. Yet we lack a clear understanding of what makes misinformation so potent and why it can spread so rapidly. In Falsehoods Fly, a leading cognitive scientist and philoso
...
pher offers a new framework for recognizing and countering misleading claims by exploring the ways that information works—and breaks down. Paul Thagard examines the dangers of misinformation on COVID-19, climate change, conspiracy theories, inequality, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He argues that effective responses to these problems require understanding how information is generated and spread. Bringing together empirical findings about the psychological and social mechanisms that drive cognitive errors with philosophical accounts of critical thinking, Thagard develops an innovative theory of how we gain information. Grasping how the generation and transmission of knowledge can fail helps us find ways to repair it and provides tools for converting misinformation into facts. Offering a deep and rich account of the nature and workings of information, Falsehoods Fly provides practical, concrete strategies to stop the creation and spread of misinformation." (Publisher description)
more
"Online personal messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger are now hugely popular around the world. Yet their role in the spread and social correction of misinformation remains under-researched. We carried out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with the UK public (N = 102) to exp
...
lore how social relationships and technological design interact and foster norms regulating how people respond when their everyday social ties share misinformation on these platforms. Conceptualizing messaging as hybrid public-interpersonal communication, we develop a framework that situates online political talk in the context of everyday social interaction. We show that, among our participants, a norm of conflict avoidance is particularly powerful on these platforms and makes people reluctant to speak out. Conflict avoidance should therefore be taken seriously as a contributor to the diffusion of misinformation in everyday life. Policymakers and other stakeholders, including news organizations, should explore new, tailored ways to empower citizens to challenge misinformation in these important online spaces, where automated and algorithmic interventions are impossible." (Abstract)
more
"Does the news media exacerbate or reduce misinformation problems? Although some news media deliberately try to counter misinformation, it has been suggested that they might also inadvertently, and sometimes purposefully, amplify it. We conducted a two-wave panel survey in Brazil, India, and the UK
...
(N=4732) to investigate the effect of news and digital platform use on awareness of and belief in COVID-19 misinformation over time (January to February 2022). We find little support for the idea that the news exacerbates misinformation problems. News use broadened people’s awareness of false claims but did not increase belief in false claims—in some cases, news use actually weakened false belief acquisition, depending on access mode (online or offline) and outlet type. In line with previous research, we also find that news use strengthens political knowledge gain over time, again depending on outlets used. The effect of digital platforms was inconsistent across countries, and in most cases not significant—though some, like Twitter, were associated with positive outcomes while others were associated with negative outcomes. Overall, our findings challenge the notion that news media, by reporting on false and misleading claims, ultimately leave the public more misinformed, and support the idea that news helps people become more informed and, in some cases, more resilient to misinformation." (Abstract)
more
"Taking a person-centered approach – we explored different constellations of social-psychological characteristics associated with (dis)information belief in order to identify distinct subgroups whose (dis)information belief stems from different social or political motives. Hungarian participants (
...
N = 296) judged the accuracy of fake and real news items with a political (pro/anti-government) and nonpolitical narrative. Two profiles of ‘fake news believers’ and two of ‘fake news non-believers’ emerged, with a high conspiracy mentality being the main marker of the former two. These two ‘fake news believers’ profiles were distinguishable: one exhibited extreme trust in the media and in politicians, and the other deep distrust. Our results suggest that not only political distrust, but also excessive trust can be associated with disinformation belief in less democratic social contexts." (Abstract)
more
"As Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, social media was rife with pro-Kremlin disinformation. To effectively tackle the issue of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, this study examines the underlying reasons why some individuals are susceptible to false claims
...
and explores ways to reduce their susceptibility. It uses linear regression analysis on data from a national survey of 1,500 adults (18+) to examine the factors that predict belief in pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives regarding the Russia–Ukraine war. Our research finds that belief in Pro-Kremlin disinformation is politically motivated and linked to users who: (1) hold conservative views, (2) trust partisan media, and (3) frequently share political opinions on social media. Our findings also show that exposure to disinformation is positively associated with belief in disinformation. Conversely, trust in mainstream media is negatively associated with belief in disinformation, offering a potential way to mitigate its impact." (Abstract)
more
"This report examines why the precarious middle class in the Philippines has been particularly susceptible to digital disinformation. It focuses on two key imaginaries that disinformation producers weaponized in the year leading up to the 2022 national elections. The first was a long-simmering anti-
...
Chinese resentment, which racist social media campaigns about Philippines-China relations targeted. The other was a yearning for a “strong leader”, which history-distorting campaigns about the country’s Martial Law era amplified. Ironically, some practices adopted by members of the public to protect themselves from the toxicity and vitriol of online spaces increased their vulnerability to digital disinformation. The cumulative impact of these was for people to dig deeper into their existing imaginaries, something that disinformation producers targeted and exploited. We offer two suggestions for future counter-disinformation initiatives. The first has to do with addressing people’s vulnerability to the weaponization of their shared imaginaries. Counter-disinformation initiatives can move past divisive imaginaries by infusing creativity in imparting information. Collaborating with well-intentioned professionals in the media and creative industries would be key to these kinds of initiatives. The second has to do with addressing people’s media consumption practices. These practices tend to open them up to sustained and long-term digital disinformation campaigns, which provide them with problematic imaginaries to dig into. To establish a similarly robust common ground of reality, counter-disinformation initiatives should themselves be programmatic, not ad hoc." (Executive summary)
more
"On average in the 16 countries surveyed, 56% of internet users frequently use social media to stay informed about current events, far ahead of television (44%). However, it is worth noting that differences exist among population groups: television is the primary source in the most developed countri
...
es (55% compared to 37% for social media), while it lags significantly in countries with high (42% vs 63%) or medium/low levels of Human Development Index (HDI) (37% vs 68%) [...] The significance of social media as a source of information, especially during election campaigns, is even more crucial given that citizens believe disinformation is highly prevalent there. Across all 16 countries, 68% of internet users told us that social media is the place where disinformation is most widespread, far ahead of groups on online messaging apps (38%) and media websites/apps (20%). This sentiment is overwhelmingly prevalent in all countries, age groups, social backgrounds, and political preferences. This is even more important and citizens feel that the issue of disinformation is a real threat: 85% express concern about the impact and influence of disinformation on their fellow citizens." (Analysis of key results)
more
"Participants in the study take a snapshot of a variety of news channels and social media platforms to get their news, evaluating their truthfulness and attempting to “figure out the truth.” Across different focus groups, there is a shared lack of trust in news channels, and no media outlet is p
...
articularly credited with credibility or objectivity. Even if the media is affiliated with their own religious community or political party, all participants confirm consuming media messages with great caution and limited belief. This mistrust is the result of the political and partisan ownership of news channels. Participants insist that every media outlet provides the news according to its particular interests and those of the politician who finances it. Participants are fully aware that mainstream media outlets are promoting the political agendas of their financiers and sponsors. Moreover, they are merely tools in the hands of their owners (religious factions, political parties, business persons…) who use them as part of their larger panoply to conduct their battles and achieve their political and economic aims." (Major findings, page 4-5)
more
"In the midst of heated debates surrounding the veracity and honesty of communication, scholarly attention has turned to the conceptualization of mis- and disinformation on the supply-side of (political) communication. Yet, we lack systematic research on the conceptualization of perceived mis- and d
...
isinformation on the demand-side. Original survey data collected in ten European countries (N = 6,643) shows that news consumers distinguish general misinformation from disinformation. Yet, the high correlation between the two dimensions indicates that disinformation perceptions may be regarded as a sub-type of misinformation perceptions in which intentional deception is a core element. This paper aims to make a contribution to the misinformation and media credibility literature by proposing a first conceptualization of perceived untruthfulness corresponding to increasing levels of cynicism and skepticism toward the factual status and honesty of information." (Abstract)
more
"We synthesize a burgeoning literature investigating why people believe and share false or highly misleading news online. Contrary to a common narrative whereby politics drives susceptibility to fake news, people are ‘better’ at discerning truth from falsehood (despite greater overall belief) wh
...
en evaluating politically concordant news. Instead, poor truth discernment is associated with lack of careful reasoning and relevant knowledge, and the use of heuristics such as familiarity. Furthermore, there is a substantial disconnect between what people believe and what they share on social media. This dissociation is largely driven by inattention, more so than by purposeful sharing of misinformation. Thus, interventions can successfully nudge social media users to focus more on accuracy. Crowdsourced veracity ratings can also be leveraged to improve social media ranking algorithms." (Abstract)
more
"Drawing from various disciplines including media studies, political science, and cognitive science, this study adopts a holistic approach to understand the dynamics that influence the impact of false information on Singaporeans. We provide empirical evidence on Singaporeans’ susceptibility to fal
...
se information and how it is influenced by their demographic (e.g., age and education) and non-demographic traits (e.g., information-seeking behaviours, and political and psychological traits). In addition, we examine different aspects of false information that Singaporeans are susceptible to, such as their exposure to and belief in false information of various topics (e.g., health and medicine, government and politics), formats (e.g., image, text, audio), and on different media platforms (e.g., social networking sites, Instant Messaging platforms). Furthermore, using an approach that is novel in the field of misinformation and disinformation studies, we evaluate how well Singaporeans performed in terms of assessing information veracity, by embedding a manipulated news article in the survey for respondents to read and judge." (Executive summary)
more
"Just because the effectiveness of disinformation may be tied to innate aspects of human psychology does not mean that democratic societies are powerless to respond. Rather, civil society, journalists, and other stakeholders invested in the freedom and openness of the global information space should
...
develop innovative adaptations to the contemporary, disinformation-rich information landscape by bearing in mind key insights from the 'demand' side of this challenge: passive and active demand for disinformation; disinformation as a global phenomenon; accounting for psychology in fact-checking initiatives; mistrust vs. media literacy; the impact of emerging technologies on the disinformation crisis." (Executive summary)
more
"In Deutschland wollen RT Deutsch, Sputnik mit SNARadio, Ruptly und die neuen Internet-Firmen Maffick Media und Redfish eine Gegenöffentlichkeit zu den aus ihrer Sicht manipulierten deutschen Medien schaffen. Dabei präsentieren sie sich als unabhängige Alternative. Dies entspricht aber nicht den
...
Tatsachen: Diese Medien werden aus dem russischen Staatshaushalt finanziert und sind organisatorisch in das vom Kreml kontrollierte Mediennetzwerk eingebunden. Diese Sprachrohre des Kremls verbreiten seine Positionen und Narrative [...] Die Bundesregierung spricht das Problem der hybriden Kriegsführung kaum öffentlich an, obwohl der Bundestag 2015 und Bundesministerien 2018 „mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit“184 Opfer von Cyberabgriffen des russischen Geheimdienstes GRU wurden. Im Mai 2020 wurde ein Haftbefehl gegen einen russischen Hacker erlassen, der im Auftrag des GRU das IT-System des Bundestags angegriffen haben soll [...] Die Nutzerzahlen von RT Deutsch und der Social Media Plattform In the Now zeigen, dass sich das Auditorium dynamisch entwickelt und einige etablierte Online-Medien überholt wurden. Auch für die „Trollfabrik“ genannte Agentur Internet Analyse ist Deutschland eines der wichtigsten Ziele. Russische Narrative werden täglich von tausenden Nutzern in Deutschland konsumiert. Die genannten Beispiele zur tendenziösen und teils falschen Berichterstattung belegen: Die russischen Medien sind eine Waffe im Informationskrieg." (Resümee, Seite 21)
more
"1. Majorities around the globe say that social media has increased their ease of communications & access to information, but are mixed on its impact on civility. On balance, it is seen as a positive, but not without its problems. (slides 8-34). 2. Four in ten (44%) admit to being duped by fake news
...
at least sometimes. Fake news is seen as most prevalent on social media & the Internet, less prevalent in mainstream media. Online trolls & social media platforms are most commonly cited as the actors responsible for spreading fake news, but governments and regular users play a part. Few can agree who should police and determine what is fake. Strong majorities support all forms of actions to resist fake news, save for government censorship. (slides 35-61; 83-147). 3. The vast majority think that fake news is made worse by the internet & that it has negatively impacted their economy, and political discourse. The United States takes the lion’s share of the blame for spreading fake news, even among its own citizens. As many as two in five now trust the media less, as a result of fake news. (slides 62-82; 148-176). 4. Fewer than half express at least some degree of confidence that algorithms used in daily life are unbiased, in any context. Citizens living in more developed economies tend to be less confident in the unbiasedness of algorithms. (slides 177-195). 5. The most common reasons for a lack of confidence in the unbiasedness of algorithms include: a lack of transparency, a perception that they are exploitative by design & the absence of a human element from decision-making. By contrast, objectivity, a lack of human emotion to cloud decision-making & the absence of human influence are most frequently mentioned by those who express confidence in the unbiasedness of algorithms. (slides 196-210)" (Five key take-aways, page 6)
more
"The guide explores the notion that fake news is not just another type of content that circulates online, but that it is precisely the character of this online circulation and reception that makes something into fake news. In this sense fake news may be considered not just in terms of the form or co
...
ntent of the message, but also in terms of the mediating infrastructures, platforms and participatory cultures which facilitate its circulation. In this sense, the significance of fake news cannot be fully understood apart from its circulation online. It is the register of this circulation that also enables us to trace how material that starts its life as niche satire can be repackaged as hyper-partisan clickbait to generate advertising money and then continue life as an illustration of dangerous political misinformation. As a consequence this field guide encourages a shift from focusing on the formal content of fabrications in isolation to understanding the contexts in which they circulate online. This shift points to the limits of a “deficit model” approach – which might imply that fabrications thrive only because of a deficit of factual information. In the guide we suggest new ways of mapping and responding to fake news beyond identifying and fact-checking suspect claims – including “thicker” accounts of circulation as a way to develop a richer understanding of how fake news moves and mobilises people, more nuanced accounts of “fakeness” and responses which are better attuned to the phenomenon." (Page 8)
more