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Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis
Deep Insights

Lisa Ginsborg, Paula Gori (eds.)

Cham: Springer (2026), xvi, 654 pp.

"This volume provides a multidisciplinary analysis of disinformation and strategies for tackling it. Authored by a diverse group of scholars and experts, chapters in this volume are divided into three thematic sections. The first section delves into disinformation from various disciplinary perspecti ... more

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Reporting on Moldova’s Elections: Strategies used by independent media to reach communities targeted by disinformation campaigns

International Fund for Public Interest Media (IFPIM) (2025), 15 pp.

"This short report explores the weaponisation of disinformation during the 2024 presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova, where pro-EU candidate Maia Sandu was the target of concerted smear campaigns, voter manipulation, and interference orchestrated by Russia. According to some estimates, ... more

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Global thematic evaluation of EU actions to counter disinformation and foreign interference and manipulation of information (FIMI). Contract N° 300109186, Final Report

Per Oesterlund, Vesna Salaj, Andrei Richter, Tanja Hafner Ademi, Jawad Wariaghli, Suzanne Moll Moll

European Commission; Particip (2025), 357 pp.

"This Global Thematic Evaluation of EU Actions to Counter Disinformation and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) assessed 45 Actions funded by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) since 2021, with a combined budget of around €100 million. The portfolio covered Afri ... ca, Asia, Latin America, and the EU Neighbourhood and Enlargement regions, spanning media literacy, fact-checking, journalism support, and targeted counter-disinformation initiatives. The evaluation reviewed all Actions and analysed 12 in depth, combining desk research, surveys, interviews, and six field missions. Relevance: The Actions were broadly relevant to EU commitments on countering disinformation and FIMI, aligning with the IcSP/FPI mandate and the EEAS Stratcom agenda, and responding to the concrete needs of journalists, fact-checkers, and civil society in fragile contexts. Flexibility allowed rapid mobilisation, which was widely valued. However, strategic articulation was weak: many Actions remained stand-alone or implementer-driven, without clear embedding in a wider EU counter-FIMI strategy. The portfolio was largely reactive, drawing little on foresight capacities, and emerging themes such as gendered disinformation, climate/environmental narratives, digital security, or psychosocial support were rarely addressed systematically. Effectiveness: Most Actions were implemented as planned, despite serious disruptions, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine or weak digital infrastructure in some contexts. Outcomes, however, were uneven: ambitious objectives were often poorly matched with measurable indicators, making achievements difficult to evidence. Implementing Partners with local credibility and contextual expertise proved decisive, while those lacking local embeddedness delivered weaker or short-lived results. Innovations such as AI-driven tools demonstrated potential but struggled with uptake due to usability issues, lack of long-term financing models, and limited cooperation from social media platforms. Effectiveness was consistently higher where in-country engagement (for example through EU Delegations) and cooperation with the EEAS and other services successfully linked projects to EU policy efforts, ensuring stronger coordination. Efficiency: The IcSP/FPI instrument proved flexible and resilient, with most Actions delivered broadly on time and within budget, even in fragile and high-risk environments. A rapid budget review confirmed significant variation in cost distribution, ranging from highly cost-effective interventions to projects where management and overheads absorbed disproportionate resources. Variation is expected in a diverse portfolio, but the absence of common budgetary parameters constrained comparability and transparency. Efficiency was higher where Actions partnered with trusted local organisations, leveraged existing infrastructure, and were designed for scalability. At the same time, duplication occurred in some cases (e.g. overlapping AI initiatives), reflecting limited technical coordination. Digital security and GDPR compliance were also weakly addressed in several Actions handling sensitive data, raising risks and inefficiencies. EU Added Value: The EU’s added value was evident in its neutrality and legitimacy, enabling access in contexts where Member States faced political constraints. The rapid-response capacity of FPI was a distinct comparative advantage, with activities launched in weeks rather than months. The EU’s ability to operate at scale and across regions added weight and reach to counter-FIMI efforts. However, visibility of EU support was often low, with Delegations sometimes deliberately keeping a low profile in sensitive environments. Weak articulation of Team Europe further limited collective EU impact and visibility. Coherence: Cooperation with EEAS Stratcom and certain Commission DGs (INTPA, CONNECT, RTD) was constructive, providing continuity and complementarity. At Action level, collaboration between FPI, Delegations, and Implementing Partners generally worked well. Nonetheless, internal coherence remained a challenge: there was no common prioritisation framework, and lesson-sharing across Actions and regions was mostly informal and ad hoc. Coordination with Member States varied: in some countries, EUDs and national embassies worked closely together, while in others MS distanced themselves from sensitive projects. Team Europe approaches were therefore inconsistently applied, limiting collective visibility and strategic weight. Sustainability and impact: Sustainability was strongest where Actions were embedded in credible institutions, such as Strategic Communication Centres in Moldova and Ukraine. Stand-alone platforms and networks often collapsed once funding ended, unless informal peer-to-peer groups were deliberately nurtured. Training effects were fragile due to staff turnover and limited institutional uptake. Many platforms and dashboards lacked handover or financing models, leaving investments vulnerable. These gaps reflect the structural trade-off of a rapid-response instrument: immediacy and flexibility often take precedence over sustainability. At impact level, Actions delivered visible results at micro and meso levels (skills, peer learning, new tools), but systemic change in disinformation dynamics was neither realistic nor evidenced at current scale. Weak outcome-level monitoring further limited the ability to demonstrate incremental long-term effects." (Executive summary, page iv-v) more

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International Disinformation: A Handbook for Analysis and Response
Deep Insights

Robert Kupiecki, Filip Bryjka, Tomasz Chłoń

Leiden: Brill (2025), vii, 283 pp.

"Dive into the world of disinformation with this groundbreaking book. Uncover how Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) shapes modern politics and society, and how it impacts your own life. Explore answers to key questions: What are the origins and characteristics of disinformatio ... more

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State-Sponsored Disinformation Around the Globe: How Politicians Deceive their Citizens

Martin Echeverría Victoria, Sara Garcia Santamaria, Daniel C. Hallin (eds.)

Oxford: Routledge (2025), xiii, 336 pp.

"This book explores the pervasive and globalised trajectory of domestic disinformation. It describes specific operations and general apparatuses of disinformation that are sponsored by the State institutions in several countries around the world, such as governments, political parties, and politicia ... more

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Donetsk Don’t Tell: ‘Hybrid War’ in Ukraine and the Limits of Social Media Influence Operations

Lennart Maschmeyer, Alexei Abrahams, Peter Pomerantsev, Volodymyr Yermolenko

Journal of Information Technology & Politics, volume 22, issue 1 (2025), pp. 49-64

"Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a ... more

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Russia, Disinformation, and the Liberal Order: RT as Populist Pariah

Stephen C. Hutchings, Vera Tolz, Precious N. Chatterje-Doody, Rhys Crilley, Marie Gillespie

Ithaca: Northern Illinois University Press (2024), ix, 327 pp.

"Through the prism of the first comprehensive account of RT, the Kremlin's primary tool of foreign propaganda, Russia, Disinformation and the Liberal Order sheds new light on the provenance and nature of disinformation's threat to democracy. Interrogating the communications strategies pursued by aut ... more

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Russian Media in the Balkans and their Role in the Aggression against Ukraine. Case Study: RT Balkan

Thomas Brey

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (2024), 37 pp.

"The study presented here [...] is not limited to generalised theses and descriptions of the Balkan media scene under Russian influence that only scratch the surface. Rather, the focus is on documenting the effectiveness of Russian state media in the region with a focus on Serbia, which also has an ... more

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Google Scholar (138)

WorldCat (149)

Political Technology: The Globalisation of Political Manipulation

Andrew Wilson

Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press (2024), xii, 486 pp.

"Political technology' is a Russian term for the professional engineering of politics. It has turned Russian politics into theatre and propaganda, and metastasised to take over foreign policy and weaponise history. The war against Ukraine is one outcome. In the West, spin doctors and political consu ... more

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Vilify, ridicule, disinform: Political communication and media trust in the age of generative AI

Christian Schwieter, Milan Gandhi

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation; Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2024), 23 pp.

"This report examines political communication and media trust in the age of generative artificial intelligence systems (AI). Firstly, it provides a brief explainer of generative AI tools and techniques, looking separately at systems that generate text and those that generate or manipulate images, vi ... more

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How to Detect and Analyse Identity-Based Disinformation/FIMI: A Practical Guide to Conduct Open Source Investigations

European Union; European External Action Service (EEAS) (2024), 31 pp.

"The “OSINT Toolkit to Detect and Analyse IBD-focused FIMI” serves as a comprehensive guide for conducting open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations, specifically addressing incidents and campaigns of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) that weaponise identity-based di ... more

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Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa

Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 13 (2024)

"Disinformation campaigns have targeted every region of the continent. At least 39 African countries have been the target of a specific disinformation campaign. Disinformation tends to be concentrated. Half of the countries subjected to disinformation (20 of the 39) have been targeted three or more ... times, up from just seven countries meeting that threshold in 2022. African countries experiencing conflict are subject to much greater levels of disinformation—facing a median of 5 campaigns– highlighting the connection between instability and disinformation. Countries confronting disinformation typically face multiple disinformation actors. At times, these actors amplify one another’s misleading narratives, while at others, they clash or stay in separate lanes. Nearly 60 percent of disinformation campaigns on the continent are foreign state-sponsored—with Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar as the primary sponsors. Russia continues to be the primary purveyor of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns, targeting more than 22 countries. This represents nearly 40 percent of all disinformation campaigns in Africa. These 80 campaigns have reached many millions of users through tens of thousands of coordinated fake pages and posts. Aggressively leveraging disinformation is a mainstay of Russia’s use of irregular channels to gain influence in Africa. Russia has promulgated disinformation to undermine democracy in at least 19 African countries, contributingto the continent’s backsliding on this front. African elections provide prime opportunities for disinformation. Some employ mercenary disinfo-ops teams. One private Israeli group, dubbed “Team Jorge,” has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt over 20 African elections since 2015. Domestic actors have also increasingly integrated disinformation into their political playbooks, notably during Kenya’s 2022 and Nigeria’s 2023 election. African countries that uphold presidential term limits (i.e., those with stronger checks and balances) are less exposed to foreign sponsored disinformation, with an average of 1.5 campaigns compared to an average of over 3 campaigns for countries without term limits. This underscores the common aim of foreign disinformation to prop up authoritarian actors." (Highlights) more

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The struggle against authoritarian influence in the Western Balkans: Montenegro as a test case

Vanja Calovic Makrovic

Washington, DC: International Forum for Democratic Studies; National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (2024), 24 pp.

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Winning the Battle of Ideas: Exposing Global Authoritarian Narratives and Revitalizing Democratic Principles

Joseph Siegle

Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (2024), 23 pp.

"Rather than selling authoritarianism as such, authoritarian narratives focus on themes that have popular appeal—while attributing a wide range of visceral grievances to the shortcomings of democracy. Authoritarian narratives fall into four broad categories: 1. Noninterference, Choice, and Threats ... to Sovereignty: Narrative attempts to invoke universal themes such as sovereignty, noninterference, and choice which are presented as under threat from the spread of democracy. 2. Exploiting Grievances in the Global South: Tactics designed to attribute the numerous grievances in the Global South to exploitation by the West. 3. Democracies Failing to Deliver: A narrative that takes aim at the efficacy of democracy and, by implication, amplifies the ill-informed narratives about effectiveness of authoritarian governance. 4. Need for a New World Order: Collectively, the claims of Western interference, exploitation, and governance failures are intended to generate disillusionment with democracy and receptiveness to nondemocratic rule. Autocrats use a variety of channels to disseminate these preferred narratives at scale. The four following methods are particularly noteworthy: 1. Social Media: Authoritarians have taken advantage of the enormous—and still growing—social media sphere to promote narratives legitimizing autocracy. They exploit many users’ limited digital literacy skills through information influence campaigns and the employment of bots and online “troll farms” to peddle their preferred worldview. 2. State Broadcasters: Authoritarian actors also disseminate narratives through state media like RT, Sputnik, Xinhua, and China Global Television Network (CGTN). These outlets have the tone and imprimatur of an official news service, giving them a veneer of credibility that expands their reach. 3. Partnerships with Local Media: Authoritarian state-backed outlets aim to embed their content within national information environments. By disseminating preferred narratives through local media outlets and training foreign journalists, authoritarian actors are able to propagate norms of state control over the public information sphere. 4. Foreign Media Cooptation: Finally, authoritarian states are forging partnerships with other state broadcasters. These relationships have the indirect effect of incentivizing self-censorship and enable the intimidation of journalists and activists who criticize authoritarian leadership." (Executive summary, page 1-.2) more

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The flood, the traitors, and the protectors: Affect and white identity in the Internet Research Agency’s Islamophobic propaganda on Twitter

Bharath Ganesh, Nicolò Faggiani

Ethnic and Racial Studies, volume 47, issue 5 (2024), pp. 982-1008

"Between 2015 and 2017, the Internet Research Agency (IRA) – a Kremlin-backed “troll farm” based in St. Petersburg – executed a propaganda campaign on Twitter to target US voters. Scholarship has expended relatively little effort to study the role of Islamophobia in the IRA’s propaganda ca ... more

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Russia's Information Warfare in the Middle East

Arik Segal

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2024), 36 pp.

"This policy paper provides an overview of Russian information warfare in the Middle East. It includes a brief overview of Russian information warfare methods and Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. It then delves into Russian information warfare in the Middle East, evaluates its effectivenes ... more

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Disinformation exports: How foreign anti-vaccine narratives reached West African communities online

Carlotta Dotto, Seb Cubbon

First Draft (2023)

"Pro-Russian disinformation networks and American anti-science websites are pushing anti-vaccine content that is reaching large West African Facebook Pages and Groups. These networks are spreading social media posts and articles that contain misleading messages about Covid-19 vaccines. These message ... more

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1st EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats: Towards a Framework for Networked Defence
Deep Insights

European Union (2023), 35 pp.

"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine dominates observed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activity. Ukraine and its representatives have been the direct target of 33 incidents. In 60 out of 100 incidents, supporting the invasion was the main motivation behind the attack. D ... more

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Exploring Disinformation in Fragile States: Iraq as a Case Study of Influence of International Political Actors

Rawand Faeq

Tokyo: Toda Peace Institute (2023), 18 pp.

"This paper examines the influence of international political actors in perpetuating disinformation in fragile states, using Iraq as a case study. The advent of modern technology and social media has transformed the global information landscape, providing new avenues for the dissemination of disinfo ... more

Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis Deep Insights

International Disinformation: A Handbook for Analysis and Response Deep Insights

1st EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats: Towards a Framework for Networked Defence Deep Insights

Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis
Deep Insights

International Disinformation: A Handbook for Analysis and Response
Deep Insights

1st EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats: Towards a Framework for Networked Defence
Deep Insights