"With the crackdown on radio, TV, and newspapers since 2007, the Venezuelan population is largely dependent on digital spaces: social media is generally the main source of information across the country, and digital media has taken over other types of press and completely changed the media ecosystem
...
in Venezuela. However, digital authoritarianism has rapidly advanced in the country since 2014, with Maduro’s arrival in power. Within Venezuela’s political and economic crisis, complex humanitarian emergency, and polarised context, digital authoritarianism is used to crack down on dissident voices and control freedom of expression, press, and opinion. Strategies behind digital authoritarianism in Venezuela range from internet blocking against digital media, censorship, the detention of people who use social media to express themselves against Maduro’s government, electrical outages that hinder internet access, surveillance of private communications without legal justification, electoral manipulation through technology, and misinformation and disinformation campaigns, to inorganic promotion through paid social media users. Venezuela’s opposition parties also take part in misinformation and export digital propaganda to countries like El Salvador." (Analysis and conclusion)
more
"This research indicates that the government criminalises free speech by using a vague and broad definition of fake news, and clamps down on dissent and criticism, and that journalists who criticise the government are seen as enemies of the state — as in the case of the jailing of Kingsley Fomunyu
...
y Njoka. This was evident during the conflict in the Anglophone regions in 2017. Internet throttling was also used during the 2018 elections. Online surveillance has been used to track down and arrest Cameroonians who criticise the president and state authority, citing the cybersecurity and cyber criminality law. Journalists have been arrested and jailed for social media posts. The lucky ones have been freed, some fled the country but many more are still in jail in connection with issues related to freedom of expression, information, and opinion on and offline." (Analysis and conclusion, page 19)
more
"Im Ringen um die globale Deutungshoheit setzt die russische Regierung seit Jahren auf die Verbreitung von Desinformation. Die finnische Journalistin Jessikka Aro hat nicht nur derartige Propagandataktiken aufgedeckt, sie wurde auch selbst zur Zielscheibe orchestrierter Drohungen durch vom Kreml unt
...
erstützte Internettrolle. Sie zeigt, mit welch aggressiven Strategien die russische Seite schon lange vor dem Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine versucht hat, die öffentliche Meinung in anderen Staaten in ihrem Sinne zu beeinflussen, sei es in Europa oder in den USA, im Baltikum oder auf dem Balkan. Durch vorgeblich unabhängige Nachrichtenseiten, durch massive Stimmungsmache in sozialen Medien und durch gezielte Hasskampagnen wird versucht, kritische Berichterstattung zu diskreditieren, Journalistinnen und Politiker einzuschüchtern und Zweifel an Fakten zu säen. Aro zeigt dieses Vorgehen beispielsweise anhand der Angriffe gegen sie selbst, aber auch anhand von Recherchen zur russischen Einflussnahme in Nachbarländern oder zum Abschuss des Passagierflugzeugs MH17. Die Autorin verdeutlicht einerseits die Gefahren dieses Informationskrieges für demokratische Gesellschaften und beschreibt andererseits, welchen Preis mutige Einzelpersonen zahlen, die sich der russischen Propagandamaschinerie entgegenstellen." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
more
"Authoritarian practices are not strictly limited to authoritarian states; they are employed by regimes that span the political spectrum. The research approach argues for expanding the understanding of key authoritarian strategies to include persuasion alongside coercion and cooptation, which are id
...
entified in academic literature as key approaches to consolidating power and building stability in authoritarian states. States are not only restricting access to information technologies, but are also actively investing in technologies of control, as well as shaping media ecosystems. States employ a range of strategies that often work in combination, such as: restricting information access, targeting expression, and pushing narratives. State opacity about the extent of their repressive capacities is a feature, not a bug. This allows states to make claims about their capabilities that create fear and distrust even if inaccurate or untrue. The combined use of information technologies to surveil, censor, and shape information ecosystems aid in “preventative repression,” making resistance and opposition more difficult and costly. Policy recommendations to help resist authoritarian practices face the complicated challenge of how to regulate dual-use and surveillance technologies that were developed for security and commercial applications, but that also facilitate authoritarian practices. There is an active debate about whether surveillance for commercial or consumer purposes, border controls and policing is mostly or inherently authoritarian in practice." (Summary of observations, page 6-7)
more
"Successive Iranian leaders have struggled to navigate the fraught political-cultural space of media in the Islamic Republic-skirting the line between embracing Western communications technologies and rejecting them, between condemning social networking sites as foreign treachery and promoting thems
...
elves on Facebook. How does a regime that originally derived its hegemony from the ability to mass communicate its ideology protect its ideological dominance in a media environment defined by hybridity, hyper-connectivity, and near constant change? More broadly, what is the role of media in the construction and maintenance of power in Iran? This book addresses these questions by examining the institutions, policies, and discourses of two political regimes over the course of nearly eight decades. Drawing from over 3,000 primary source documents and digital artifacts in Persian and English, including formerly classified material hidden deep in the archives, this book offers a history of media in Iran across political regimes and media paradigms- from the public's first encounter with mass communication in the 1940s, to the dawn of digital media in the 1990s, to internet and mobile telephony today. At the same time, the book trains a keen eye on contemporary politics." (Publisher description)
more
"This paper explores the Taliban government's media capture strategies since retaking the country on August 15, 2021, and how journalists and media outlets have responded to these strategies. In particular, it focuses on the Taliban government's approach to the media, given the recent political tran
...
sformation in Afghanistan and the religious and political ideologies of the Taliban regime [...] The study revealed that the Taliban media capture strategies have multifaceted dimensions. From the analysis of media director and journalist interviews and relevant formal documents from the Taliban regime, seven media capture strategies emerge: (1) Regulatory interference, (2) Criminal prosecution of journalists, (3) Suppression of journalists, (4) Financial pressures on media outlets, (5) Media ownership, (6) Monopoly on information and (7) Expulsion of foreign journalists. Furthermore, this study finds that the Afghan media community, including the media outlets, journalists, and media unions, employed four tolerance strategies in response to the media capture strategies of the Taliban government, such as (1) Selfimposed censorship, (2) Low resistance, (3) Stopping controversial content, and (4) Advocacy campaigns." (Abstract)
more
"This chapter explores the current wave of coronavirus-related digital crackdowns in the Arab region, which are unfolding in multiple forms, and analyzes its causes, contexts, and consequences. It explores why and how the stifling of media freedom and freedom of speech online in the Arab region has
...
been exacerbated in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, and sheds light on the various tools and mechanisms of control being used by Arab regimes to ensure that the official, state-orchestrated narrative around the pandemic dominates all communication platforms, both online and offline. In doing so, the chapter unpacks a number of methods of control that are being deployed by Arab regimes to achieve this end, ranging from closing down websites to arresting local journalists and ousting international correspondents, as well as exploiting punitive legal codes and laws to tighten their grip on all communication outlets, under the mantle of countering disinformation. It also sheds light on a closely-intertwined dimension in these new cyberwars, namely reliance on online surveillance and contact tracing tools and applications, which are justified by regimes as part of the effort to curb the spread of the deadly pandemic, but which simultaneously, and dangerously, open the door to threats to personal security, invasion of privacy, and government hacking of opposition. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the most important consequences and implications of these complex, and interconnected, phenomena, as well as the paradoxes and dilemmas they pose." (Abstract)
more
"This volume explores the implications of digital media technologies for journalists’ professional practice, news users’ consumption and engagement with news, as well as the shifting institutional, organizational and financial structures of news media. Drawing on case studies and quantitative an
...
d qualitative approaches, contributors address questions concerning: whether China is witnessing ‘disruptive’ or ‘sustainable’ journalism; if, and in what ways, digital technologies may disrupt journalism; and whether Chinese digital journalism converges with or diverges from Western experiences of digital journalism." (Publisher description)
more
"The publication analyzes the emerging trends of foreign authoritarian-state disinformation in the context of the war in Ukraine in a comparative manner focusing on 7 states of Southeast Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania). It examines
...
the continuities and evolution in Russia’s strategies, channels and narratives for disseminating disinformation since the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine and the extent to which other foreign authoritarian states -Turkey, the Gulf states, Iran, have amplified Russian propaganda. The research further traces the personal and institutional pathways through which China has been able to establish its media foothold in Southeast European countries. The report offers policy recommendations for safeguarding democracy and media freedom in the Balkans against the ever-increasing pressures from authoritarianism." (Publisher description)
more
"Chinas Streben nach weltweiter medialer Dominanz und Diskursmacht ist eine konkrete Gefahr für demokratische Länder. Wenn sich Demokratien dem nicht widersetzen, werden chinesische Bürgerinnen und Bürger jegliche Hoffnung auf Pressefreiheit im eigenen Land verlieren und der Journalismus, wie wi
...
r ihn kennen, wird künftig mit chinesischer Propaganda konkurrieren. Auch in Deutschland gibt es Beispiele dafür, wie China versucht, die Medienberichterstattung im eigenen Sinne zu beeinflussen, etwa durch Medienkooperationen, gemeinsame Sendungen oder China-freundliche Beilagen in Zeitungen. Auch die chinesische Botschaft in Deutschland kommentiert und kritisiert auf ihrer Webseite immer wieder deutsche Medienberichte. Im zweiten Kapitel werden vor diesen Erfahrungen verschiedene Kooperationsformen typologisiert sowie Empfehlungen an Journalistinnen, Journalisten und Medienhäuser ausgesprochen, inwieweit und unter welchen Voraussetzungen Kooperationen möglich sein könnten. Eine Gefahr - bei allen Kooperationstypen und auch allgemein in der Berichterstattung - ist die unkritische Übernahme von chinesischen Narrativen. Daher soll das dritte Kapitel für Argumente und Deutungsrahmen (sog. Frames), die für chinesische Propaganda kennzeichnend sind, sensibilisieren und alternative Darstellungen und Argumentationen anbieten. Denn ausländische Medien spielen eine wichtige Rolle dabei, Propagandainhalte zu verbreiten - eine Methode, die in Peking einen eigenen Namen hat: "ein Boot leihen, um auf den Ozean hinauszufahren". Chinas Vorhaben könnte dazu führen, dass sich teils auch subtile Narrative und ein bestimmtes, dem chinesischen Regime wohlwollendes Vokabular verbreiten und durchsetzen kann." (Seite 3-4)
more
"The internet gained centrality as a space of public opinion and political activity that became important for the Russian state to co-opt and control as part of the broader push for control of political elites and public perceptions as Putin and his ruling party pushed to eliminate any functioning o
...
pposition and cement their power. Finally, the internet gained importance as a geopolitical strategic object, given its centrality to conflicts, cyberwarfare and foreign policy operations. In the current and ongoing stage, the internet is now also an important object of critical technological infrastructure that is now also being co-opted into full state control as part of the national security and sovereignty agenda. The past decade since 2012 has seen a gradual takeover by the state of key industry players such as VK and Yandex, a crackdown on political and media elites and ordinary users, and the introduction of a swathe of new regulations, all aimed at consolidating state control over an area of importance for the national security and sovereignty agenda. Today, digital authoritarianism is an integral part of Russia’s state survival strategy and is likely to remain as such for the foreseeable future, given Russia’s current international isolation and its fraught and increasingly hostile standoff with the democratic global community." (Analysis and conclusion, page 25)
more
"Since its ascent to power twenty years ago, the ruling AKP has tightened the screws on all forms of freedom of expression, both online and offline. It has introduced draconian laws, imposed internet restrictions, blocked content, and has arrested and intimidated critics on an unprecedented level. I
...
n its toolbox are all three generations of information controls. The purges that took place in the aftermath of the failed military coup in 2016 have left the country in a state of continuous decline with thousands of civil servants jailed on bogus terrorism charges, media outlets shut, and an ongoing blocking of websites and targeting of social media platforms. The AKP continues to rely on the controversial Internet Bill, the Anti-terrorism Law, decreelaws, and an army of trolls, targeting critics and dissent online. The controversial app introduced by the National Police to snitch on social media accounts critical of the ruling party and its affiliates is yet another tool in the hands of the state to intimidate users and get in the way of freedom of speech online." (Analysis and conclusion, page 20)
more
"There is a clear digital divide in Sudan as the number of internet users is a very low part of the population. Despite the high contribution of the telecommunication field to the GDP, the Sudanese authorities are not using this contribution to enhance and develop the ICT field to fill the gap of di
...
gital illiteracy. Instead, they use taxpayer money to buy expensive equipment for censorship, without publishing these deals. Restricting the freedom of expression and using the state’s violence to repress fundamental rights and civil liberties are rooting the image of the authoritarian state in the minds of the citizens which may lead to a state of lack of rights awareness. Using and amending laws to protect the government interests indicates that the government will enact other laws to restrict the digital space in order to make access to information increasingly difficult. Government access to ICT infrastructure in Sudan will suppress net neutrality during political crises, affecting people economically and socially, specifically in relation to education and small businesses. Sudan has low transparency, frequently violates physical privacy, uses unlawful communication shutdowns, an idle access to information act, no freedom of expression, vague laws, and online surveillance, making it easy to say that digital authoritarianism is rooted in Sudan. Digital authoritarianism affects opportunities for foreign investment, stability of life, and social security." (Analysis and conclusion, page 21)
more
"The government of Zimbabwe and the ruling ZANU PF party are bent on ensuring that the status quo is preserved at all costs. As evidenced by findings in the Civic Media Observatory, the digital sphere has been identified as a threat to the country’s national security, insofar as deposing the curre
...
nt political junta from power is concerned. The Arab Spring, which led to the deposing of leaders in the MENA region through social-media-organised protests certainly placed a lot of African governments on high alert about the potential transformative power of digital space. This has led to more governments, including that of Zimbabwe, enacting digitally repressive legislation aimed at curbing any form of political mobilisation on social media. Zimbabwe’s engagement with Russia, China, Iran and Israel for the acquisition of invasive spyware and biometric technology for mass surveillance purposes is premised on the ruling party’s overarching desire to control the population and retain political power. The fact that almost all deals are shrouded in a dark veil of secrecy bodes badly for civil society, human rights defenders, independent journalists, and opposition party members as the ends to which such technology will be applied are not publicised. The identification and tracking of journalists who expose corruption within government circles and their subsequent detention implies that digital technologies are being used as part of what Dragu and Lapu term preventive repression." (Analysis and conclusion, page 25)
more
"This paper will outline the technologies and mechanisms of Putin's information machine, how it operates during the war and the obstacles to anti-war propaganda among Russians. At the very end, we will offer some recommendations for confronting Putin's information machine at war, both of a general n
...
ature and relating to specific groups of Russian society." (Page 3)
more
"In Turkey, the AKP came to power in 2002 at a time marked by a relatively pro-European Union and pluralistic outlook in politics. The democratic backsliding in Turkey has been more obvious since 2007 and the start of the AKP’s second term in power. It deepened especially after the 2016 coup attem
...
pt and the transition to a presidential system in 2017. This democratic regression has also impacted on the media sector globally, especially through various coercive and non-coercive media capture strategies. Media concentration has been ongoing in many countries for many decades with a concomitant negative impact on media freedom, leading to a gradual decline in free and independent media. Current forms of media capture are considered more impactful than earlier methods, due to the rise of business structures that operate in tandem with state authorities to capture media outlets. In Turkey, and across those countries in which media capture is prevalent, the mainstream media is vanishing as a result of polarization; two distinct journalisms are emerging in their place, one of which is based on a propaganda model and erodes media and press freedom." (Summary)
more
"This paper examines the practices, performance, and perceptions of the messaging platform Telegram as an actor in the 2020 Belarus protests, using publicly available data from Telegram’s public statements, protest-related Telegram groups, and media coverage. Developing a novel conceptualization o
...
f platform actorness, we critically assess Telegram’s role in the protests and examine whether Telegram is seen as playing an active role in Belarusian contentious politics. We find that Telegram’s performance and practices drive citizens to form affective connections to the platform and to perceive Telegram as an ally in their struggle against repressions and digital censorship. Meanwhile, the Belarusian state uses Telegram’s aversion to censorship and content moderation to intervene in contentious politics by co-opting grassroots approaches and mimicking manipulative efforts of other authoritarian regimes. Our conceptual framework is applicable to post-Soviet authoritarian contexts, but can also serve as a useful heuristic for analyzing platform actorness in other regime types." (Abstract)
more
"Combating illegal parking and drinking in public is the raison d’être of Russia’s best-known law-and-order youth initiatives, StopKham and Lev Protiv. These initiatives enforce and promote neotraditional morals amongst young people by challenging alleged offenders on camera and uploading the e
...
ntertaining, humorous and often violent video clips to YouTube. I argue that their practices encapsulate flexible authoritarianism, in which the regime incentivises citizens to take initiative while expanding repressive measures against dissenters. Not only do these enterprises reflect the regime’s goals back at itself, they also popularise a new ideal of heroic masculinity that fuses patriotism with entrepreneurialism." (Abstract)
more
"Während in Russland immer mehr unabhängige Medien der staatlichen Kontrolle unterworfen und als „ausländische Agenten“ gebrandmarkt werden, nutzen die russischen Staatsmedien die Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit in Deutschland, um ungehindert Desinformation zu verbreiten. Nach acht Jahren Berich
...
terstattung von RT DE und Sputnik/SNA ist ein kritischer Punkt erreicht, auf den die Verantwortlichen für Medien reagieren sollten. Während der Corona-Krise ist mehr als deutlich geworden, dass RT und SNA eine politische Agenda verfolgen, die darin besteht, das „System“ und damit die Demokratie in Deutschland anzugreifen und die autoritäre Herrschaft in Russland als bessere Alternative zu propagieren. Schon im März 2020 warnte das Innenministerium, dass RT Deutsch „die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung“ durch „gezielten Falschmeldungen“ bedrohe [...] Die russischen Staatsmedien – insbesondere in Russland – schaffen ein Feindbild „Westen“, mit dem sie die Menschen nicht nur in Russland, sondern auch in den westlichen Staaten verunsichern oder zum Widerstand mobilisieren. Das Schüren von Ängsten vor einem Krieg und die überzogene Darstellung vom dekadenten, gottlosen Westen sind dabei zwei zentrale Narrative. Dieses Feindbild wird seit Frühjahr 2021 vor allem mit den Grünen in Verbindung gebracht, die angeblich kriegerische Absichten gegenüber Russland verfolgen und dem Klimaschutz als „neuer Religion“ frönen. Die Berichterstattung zu den Bundestagswahlen hat gezeigt, dass das erste Ziel war, eine Grüne im Kanzleramt zu verhindern. Gegen Annalena Baerbock wurden unbelegte Vorwürfe wie nationalsozialistisches Gedankengut erhoben, um sie zu diskreditieren." (Fazit, Seite 24)
more
"Der Journalist und Verleger Sergej Parkhomenko ist ein international gefeierter Menschenrechtsverteidiger, Oppositionsaktivist und unter den russischen Medienschaffenden einer der wichtigsten Partner für das Internationale Journalisten- und Mediendialogprogramm (IJMD) der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftun
...
g für die Freiheit . Als entschiedener Gegner der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine setzt er von Europa aus seine Arbeit gegen den russischen Eroberungskrieg und wider die Putin-Diktatur fort. Im Impulspapier berichtet Parkhomenko über den Überlebenskampf des unabhängigen Journalismus unter den totalitären Repressionsmaßnahmen in Russland." (https://shop.freiheit.org)
more