"Auf der Grundlage der identifizierten Schutzlücken erarbeitet das Gutachten mögliche Gegenmaßnahmen und beschreibt die nötigen Wirkungsvoraussetzungen. Die zentrale Frage lautet: Welche Risikopotenziale für individuelle und gesellschaftliche Interessen weist Desinformation auf und welche Gover
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nance-Maßnahmen können darauf adäquat reagieren? Die Beantwortung dieser Leitfrage erfolgt dabei in drei Schritten: Vorangestellt (Kap. 2) werden die in wissenschaftlichen und medienpolitischen Diskussionen differenzierten Erscheinungsformen von Desinformation sowie ihre jeweiligen Begriffsverständnisse zusammengefasst und auf ihre Risikopotenziale hin untersucht. Ziel ist es, die Spannweite betroffener Phänomene aufzuzeigen und sie von anderen Erscheinungsformen und Begrifflichkeiten zu differenzieren. Dabei erfolgt auch eine Bewertung der Abgrenzungsindikatoren im Hinblick auf die Nutzbarkeit für rechtliche bzw. regulatorische Anknüpfungspunkte. Zudem wird hier kurz der Stand der Forschung hinsichtlich der abträglichen Effekte von Desinformation für individuelle und gesellschaftsbezogene Schutzziele einbezogen; Kenntnisse über Wirkungen von Desinformation auf einzelne Rezipientinnen und Rezipienten liegen hier bislang nur lückenhaft vor. Dies steht in gewissem Kontrast zu den eher impliziten Unterstellungen, die den aktuellen Regulierungsforderungen zugrunde liegen. Dort, wo empirische Evidenzen vorliegen, zeigt das Gutachten jedenfalls vermutete Effekte und ihre Risikopotenziale auf. Im zweiten Schritt (Kap. 3) wird der geltende Rechtsrahmen daraufhin untersucht, welche gesetzlichen Vorkehrungen gegen eine Risikorealisierung bereits bestehen und welche untergesetzlichen Initiativen sich auf Ebene von Ko- und Selbstregulierung entwickelt haben, die als Gegenkraft wirken können. An dieser Stelle setzt die Untersuchung die Arbeit des GVK-Gutachtens von Möller, Hameleers und Ferreau fort,5 indem bestehende risikospezifische Schutzlücken mit Blick auf die identifizierten Risikopotenziale herausgearbeitet werden. Dort, wo Schutzlücken erkennbar werden, zeigt das Gutachten staatliche Handlungsmöglichkeiten und -grenzen auf. Im dritten Schritt (Kap. 4) werden regulatorische Ansatzpunkte und -instrumente, die in der Lage sind, die identifizierten Schutzlücken zu schließen, beleuchtet. Klassische Ansätze der Medienregulierung eignen sich hier meist begrenzt, da für den Bereich der öffentlichen Kommunikation der Grundsatz gilt, dass es nicht staatliche Aufgabe sein kann und darf, über die Einstufungen wahr/unwahr oder erwünschte Meinung/unerwünschte Meinung zu befinden. Hier müssen – soweit überhaupt Handeln angezeigt ist – Wege staatsferner, prozeduraler Steuerung betreten6 oder alternative Formen von inhalts- und technikbezogener Governance entwickelt werden. Alternativ oder ergänzend kommen neben Maßnahmen, die diskursermöglichend oder -unterstützend wirken, auch Gegenmaßnahmen in Betracht, die informationsintegritätssteigernde oder -integrierende Wirkungen haben können." (Seite 4-5)
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"In the present report, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression examines the threats posed by disinformation to human rights, democratic institutions and development processes. While acknowledging the complexities and challenges posed
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by disinformation in the digital age, the Special Rapporteur finds that the responses by States and companies have been problematic, inadequate and detrimental to human rights. She calls for multidimensional and multi-stakeholder responses that are well grounded in the international human rights framework and urges companies to review their business model and States to recalibrate their responses to disinformation, enhancing the role of free, independent and diverse media, investing in media and digital literacy, empowering individuals and rebuilding public trust." (Summary)
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"This article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online platform
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s to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning data-driven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media companies." (Abstract)
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"Competent institutions should react in case of spreading hate speech and introduce appropriate measures to combat the spread of disinformation, which would serve as a middle ground between arresting those who spread disinformation and a too passive approach to this problem. In addition to this, the
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Criminal Code should be amended since its lack of preciseness allows deviations from international standards of freedom of expression. In addition to the Media Strategy, which is to deal with the development of the media and creating a more enabling work environment for journalists, the Government must work on raising awareness and improving the knowledge through the development of a media literacy strategy and an accompanying action plan. In the long run, the media community should work on the establishment of a single self-regulation body, which would bring to light the examples of the spread of hate speech, disinformation, and propaganda, and work on the promotion of professional standards. Existing self-regulatory bodies should initiate the process of changing and amending the Code of Journalists of Montenegro to include the issue of preventing the emergence and the spread of disinformation. Moreover, in order to prevent the spread of hate speech, the existing self-regulatory bodies, including the RTCG’s Ombudsperson, need to make a stronger effort in promoting the professional standards set out in the Code of Journalists of Montenegro." (Recommendations)
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"The current legislation should include a direct expression of hate speech and expand the scope of hate speech in terms of person and subject as much as possible. The anti-discrimination state bodies should focus on protecting the human rights of the most vulnerable groups, broadening legal protecti
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on and eliminating the hierarchy between discrimination grounds. The Government should adopt codes of conduct prohibiting hate speech and the authorities should encourage political parties to do likewise. The parliament should change the procedure in the laws regarding the participation of NGO monitoring and countering the hate speech and disinformation in media in the proceedings to support the victims of hate speech and disinformation as Turkish law does not recognise the standing of NGOs to bring claims in support of victims of discrimination. In order to distinguish which institutions or individuals benefit from impunity for hate speech, a monitoring mechanism should be established to render the judiciary’s different interpretations of the boundaries between hate speech and freedom of expression visible." (Policy reommendations)
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"The legislative framework for the regulation of hate speech in BiH is fragmented and unaligned with European standards, and there are few cases of its processing. Ways to combat disinformation mainly rely on self-regulatory frameworks and fact-checking platforms, and there are no comprehensive stra
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tegies to combat disinformation. Given the large presence of hate speech and disinformation, especially in the online sphere, which can affect the democratic processes in the country, it is necessary to improve the legislative, regulatory and self-regulatory frameworks and ways of their application. Bosnia and Herzegovina is obliged to adopt appropriate solutions in accordance with international conventions, recommendations of international bodies and standards of the European Court of Human Rights." (Conclusion, page 21)
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"Although the Proclamation has good intentions of curbing hate speech in Ethiopia, it fundamentally restricts freedom of expression online and the right to information. Further, the proclamation has a chilling effect on online and offline rights, which could lead to self-censorship. For instance, jo
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urnalist Yayesew Shimelis was on April 21, 2020 arrested for allegedly attempting to incite violence by spreading false information contrary to article 5 of the Proclamation and charged by the high court Lideta branch. The government should accordingly repeal or amend the law to ensure that it promotes an online and offline environment that progressively facilitates the enjoyment of free speech and access to information in line with international and regional human rights instruments." (Page 4)
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"El análisis revela los desafíos al proceso de construcción de soluciones reguladoras que protejan derechos y sean efectivas para promover el acceso a información confiable. La desinformación está profundamente entrelazada con los procesos políticos y sociales, y no es posible pensar en soluc
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iones legales y reguladoras aisladamente del entendimiento de estos procesos y de los contextos nacionales y locales." (Resumen)
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"This report compares the impact of legislation in countries with multiparty legislatures and independent government institutions, and countries with one dominant political force and an absence of independent national institutions. It finds that in the former countries, provisions are included to sa
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feguard human rights and democratic practices, in particular freedom of expression, whilst international conventions are adhered to and aligned with human rights principles. In contrast, the latter countries place the authority of the state at the centre of dis-information laws, and their interpretation of what constitutes fake news is often vaguely-worded. To address these issues, a set of recommendations are prescribed to governments in the region to adhere to the international obligations, set up independent institutions, ensure multi-stakeholder collaboration, and seek expert advise the conditions to regard when implementing national legislation, policies and practices." (Abstract, page 61)
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"Was macht Desinformation im deutschsprachigen Internet aus? Wie wirkt Desinformation? Wie kann sie mithilfe technischer Mittel erkannt werden? Was kann und könnte mit regulatorischen und rechtlichen Maßnahmen gegen Desinformation getan werden? Aus den Erkenntnissen von Journalistik, Medienpsychol
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ogie, Informatik und Recht werden Handlungsempfehlungen an die relevanten Adressaten hergeleitet: An den Gesetzgeber, Presserat, Medienschaffende, Betreiber von Social Networks, Einrichtungen der Forschungsförderung und nicht zuletzt Mediennutzende. Dieser Band endet nicht bei der Analyse, sondern zeigt auf, wie die Verbreitung von Desinformationen über das Internet wirkungsvoll eingedämmt werden kann." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"This resource combines the collective wisdom of organizations on the front lines of combatting disinformation globally. This living project provides an outline of what’s being done to address the challenge in key areas and provides a searchable database of the organizations around the world engag
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ed in making the digital landscape safe for democracy. Effective democracies require that citizens have access to accurate and impartial electoral and political information. Disinformation campaigns spread cynicism, distort political processes and hinder citizens’ ability to make sound political decisions. Together we seek to identify what works, and expand the community engaged in this effort." (Publisher description)
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"This paper provides an overview of current responses to fake news and digital disinformation inside and outside the EU, and assesses the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. Four approaches emerge: (1) self-regulation (i.e. actions undertaken on a voluntary basis by the digital platforms)
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; (2) co-regulation (i.e. cooperation framework between EU-level and national-level authorities, the internet platform companies, media organizations, researchers, and other stakeholders); (3) direct regulation (i.e. legal measures & sanctions); and (4) audience-centred solutions (i.e. factchecking and media literacy). We argue in favour of the co-regulation approach, while drawing attention to some current challenges in the response against disinformation. Furthermore, we need to go beyond the understanding of disinformation as an information/truth fraud, and draw additional measures to reflect the particular understanding of disinformation as a form of users’ engagement fraud." (Abstract)
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"Disinformation and infodemics have been central for the media policy agenda in most countries and in particular in Europe. Yet, the European Commission has had a soft law approach centralizing obligations to handling information disorder on a content level. This commentary argues that by focusing p
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rimarily on the content level we miss the bigger picture where disinformation and infodemics are only symptoms of something more important on a media infrastructure level. The commentary suggests that we need to reconsider regulation on the infrastructure level instead that supports the democratic need for better access to verified content by looking at how the current legal structure across regulatory silos is benefitting the exact opposite. Furthermore, the commentary suggests to specifically address influencers (defined by number of followers) in the context of moderation, and lastly suggests that user data is ideally stored and governed outside privately owned companies in Europe in order to benefit users and society at large." (Abstract)
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"1) Any definition of disinformation in legislation or other regulation, such as regulatory guidance, must take into account the serious implications for freedom of expression and media freedom. Particularly to the extent that provisions on disinformation have been adopted in criminal law, a precise
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definition is paramount. This is even more important following the basic principle of criminal law, which prescribes that penalties only may be imposed when the criminal behaviour and the applicable penal sanctions within the upper and lower limits are precisely formulated in the law. Scholars and fundamental rights experts have warned that disinformation is an “extraordinarily elusive concept to define in law”, and is “susceptible to providing executive authorities with excessive discretion to determine what is disinformation, what is a mistake, what is truth”. Further, measures to combat disinformation “must never prevent journalists and media actors from carrying out their work or lead to content being unduly blocked on the Internet.” Indeed, the European Commission has warned that laws on disinformation which are “too broad” raise particular concerns as regards freedom of expression, and can lead to self-censorship. Given the dangers associated with defining disinformation in legislation, great caution should be exercised in enacting a definition. 2) Current national approaches are very divergent, which from a Digital Single Market and market freedom perspective can create problems for the freedom of the media to disseminate information across borders. This clearly demonstrates a further need for considering all options of handling more unified concepts. 3) Where disinformation is sought to be defined, common elements of a more unified approach to defining disinformation should be: (a) false or misleading information, (b) disseminated with a specific intention (malicious or bad faith) (c) and has the ability to cause certain public harms." (Recommendations, page 85)
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"European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2020 on strengthening media freedom: the protection of journalists in Europe, hate speech, disinformation and the role of platforms (2020/2009(INI))." (Introduction)
"This book studies tabloid journalism newspapers within the broader context of press freedom in Africa. After defining tabloid journalism and professional practices within various political contexts, the book then proceeds to consider tabloids in Southern Africa and emerging cyberspace laws. Many fa
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ctors of press freedom are considered, including the impact of public order and national security laws on tabloids in North Africa, the impact of defamation laws on tabloids in West Africa, the impact of the fake news laws on tabloids in East Africa, and the impact of sedition and treason laws on tabloids in Central Africa. Exploring tabloid journalism and press freedom in Arabic, Portuguese, and Francophone speaking countries across Africa, this book is a unique addition to this emerging field. The book concludes by providing a synthesis of the developing patterns from the cases analysed and by looking to the future to make recommendations and map the challenges and the successes." (Publisher description)
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"Les nouvelles technologies permettent aux diverses formes de manipulation de l’information de toucher de vastes publics. Chaque citoyen-internaute devient un acteur des manoeuvres de désinformation, en particulier en les relayant sur les réseaux sociaux. Internet constitue ainsi une révolution
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de l’information, mais aussi une révolution de la désinformation. Or la mécanique démocratique est mise en danger par les fausses informations, par les « fake news ». La désinformation 2.0 est à la fois un symptôme de la crise de la démocratie et un appel à reconstruire la démocratie. Dans ce cadre, le droit et la loi doivent sans doute intervenir et poser des garde-fous. Lutter contre la désinformation 2.0, ce n’est pas faire oeuvre liberticide. C’est, au contraire, protéger les libertés civiles les plus fondamentales. Plus on lutte contre la désinformation, plus on protège les libertés d’expression et d’opinion, car celles-ci ont besoin d’être éclairées. Et le vote est une forme d’expression et d’opinion que la « post-vérité » asservit bien plutôt que de la libérer." (Dos de couverture)
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