"Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a
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theoretical framework based on media structure, showing how and why decentralized and centralized media offer distinct opportunities and challenges for conducting influence operations. This framework indicates a relative advantage for television in both dissemination and persuasiveness. We test this framework against the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (before the 2022 escalation), contributing new data from a national survey and a new dataset of Telegram activity. We identify fifteen disinformation narratives, and, using statistical analysis, examine correlations between media consumption, audience exposure to, and agreement with, narratives, and foreign policy preferences. To explore causal mechanisms, we follow up with content analysis. Findings strongly support our theoretical framework. While consuming some partisan social media channels is correlated with narrative exposure, there is no correlation with narrative agreement. Meanwhile, consumption of partisan television channels shows clear and consistent correlation. Finally, agreement with narratives also correlates with foreign policy preferences. However, and importantly, findings indicate the overall limitations of influence operations." (Abstract)
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"The most effective propaganda resonates with audiences’ underlying worldviews and personal experiences. In order to fight it, one has to understand the mindsets that it preys on. This paper sets out to do exactly that. We first track a set of Kremlin-aligned propaganda narratives across Ukrainian
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media, then measure their overall traction through a representative national survey conducted by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, and finally use focus groups to understand their deeper appeal and impact. This gives us a uniquely holistic view of contemporary propaganda: from its sources, dissemination, and impact on society right through to how it is received and perceived from the point of view of audiences. The narratives in question include accusations that George Soros’ minions run Ukrainian politics, that the US is building secret bioweapons in Ukraine, and that shadowy “Western curators” secretly control the government. CSS survey data shows that approximately 40% of Ukrainians believe these narratives. They are in turn part of a larger message that sees Ukraine as perpetually under attack from nefarious Western forces. While individual narratives can change over time, this meta-narrative remains. Outright disinformation, conspiratorial thinking, and anti-Western messages combine in a toxic mix. The overall aim is to undermine refo rms, strengthen vested economic interests, alienate Ukraine from its Western partners, and push the country back into Russia’s orbit. While explicitly pro-Russian narratives have become a harder sell in Ukraine since the Kremlin opted to invade the country in 2014, these narratives don’t so much boost Russia as try to make the rest of the world look just as malign. They resonate outside of the usual “pro-Russian” bubble in Ukraine and spread among audiences that are often viscerally opposed to the Kremlin." (Exeuctive summary)
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"Auf der ganzen Welt nutzen unterschiedlichste Akteure die Wirkungsmechanismen der digitalen Medien aus, um durch gezielte Desinformationskampagnen die öffentliche Meinung zu beeinflussen. Dies, so lautet die zentrale These von Peter
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Pomerantsev, bedrohe Demokratien und Demokratisierungsprozesse. Wo früher Informationen durch die Zensur kontrolliert wurden, gebe es heute ein Überangebot an Informationen, deren Wahrheitsgehalt immer schwerer feststellbar ist. Dadurch ginge das Vertrauen in eine gemeinsam gelebte und objektiv überprüfbare Wirklichkeit als Voraussetzung öffentlicher Meinungs- und Willensbildung zunehmend verloren. Autokratische Regime hätten es so leichter, Narrative zu verbreiten, die das Ziel haben, politische Gegner zu schwächen, missliebige Journalistinnen und Journalisten zu diskreditieren oder zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen zu delegitimieren. Kriege wie der in der Ostukraine würden heutzutage nicht durch Schusswaffen, sondern durch Troll-Armeen, Cybermilizen und Facebook-Posts entschieden. Auf seinen Reisen taucht Pomerantsev in die grenzenlose Welt der Internetaktivistinnen und -aktivisten ein und zeigt die lokalen Folgen davon auf, wenn sie Kategorien wie Wahrheit und Lüge ins Wanken bringen." (Klappentext)
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"The audience has clear requests concerning the presentation of information and the range of themes. In our opinion the following observations are most important: There is a need to separate useful information in the media from “information noise”, as the latter can raise anxiety. Trust is felt
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towards material based on principles of neutrality, and focussed on the stories of real people. There is a need for balance in stories about interaction between the government and volunteers or civil society." (Recommendations, page 4)
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"What were Soviet influence and disinformation campaigns? What did the West do about them? This study answers these questions, explaining the Cold War strategies followed by the USSR, as well as the Western response. Eleven case studies follow, each one examining a counter-disinformation tactic in d
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epth, with comments on the relevance of that tactic today. The first seven case studies focus on defensive tactics aimed at stopping Soviet propaganda in the West, while the latter four focus on offensive tactics used to promote accurate information and democratic messages to the USSR and beyond. The conclusion features a deeper examination of the difference between modern Russian propaganda and its Soviet antecedents." (Abstract)
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"The Kremlin exploits the idea of freedom of information to inject disinformation into society. The effect is not to persuade (as in classic public diplomacy) or earn credibility but to sow confusion via conspiracy theories and proliferate falsehoods. The Kremlin is increasing its “information war
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” budget. RT, which includes multilingual rolling news, a wire service and radio channels, has an estimated budget of over $300 million, set to increase by 41% to include German- and French language channels. There is increasing use of social media to spread disinformation and trolls to attack publications and personalities. Unlike in the Cold War, when Soviets largely supported leftist groups, a fluid approach to ideology now allows the Kremlin to simultaneously back far-left and far-right movements, greens, anti-globalists and financial elites. The aim is to exacerbate divides and create an echo chamber of Kremlin support. The Kremlin exploits the openness of liberal democracies to use the Orthodox Church and expatriate NGOs to further aggressive foreign policy goals." (Executive summary)
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