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The Vladimirror Network: Pro-Putin Power-Users on Facebook

Moustafa Ayad

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2022), 11 pp.

"Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) researchers identified key pro-Putin accounts with two or more duplicates engaged in administering, moderating, and contributing to large public Facebook groups with hundreds of thousands of members fawning over the Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russia ... more

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The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming? Russia’s Growing Presence in Africa and its Implication for European Policy

Guido Lanfranchi, Kars de Bruijne

The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' (2022), 46 pp.

"The growth of Russia’s presence across Africa over the last decade has generated significant international concern, further exacerbated after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s engagement can affect the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states (MS) in Africa ... . How should European policymakers understand these developments and respond to them? To answer this question, this report looks at Russia’s engagement in Africa, reaching three main conclusions. First, Moscow’s engagement with Africa has so far remained limited as compared to that of other global players, particularly in the economic domain. The current level of (media) attention devoted to Russia’s role in Africa is thus not supported by sufficient evidence of its actual engagement in the continent. At the same time, however, the growth of Russia’s presence is a real trend. Second, Russian actors are guided by a rather loose strategy when it comes to Africa. The Russian state has some interests that act as a broad framework. However, the actual engagement is carried out not only by state actors, but also by state-backed conglomerates and politically connected private businesses. These latter actors have their own specific interests, which are not always fully aligned with those of the Russian state. While state actors are often driven by geopolitical considerations, Russian companies are more interested in economic opportunities. Third, Russia’s engagement in African countries is significantly shaped by the different national contexts and by the interests of African governments. For instance, in a strong state like Ethiopia, Russia’s engagement takes place exclusively at the governmental level. By contrast, in Sudan and Mali (contexts with weaker state structures), other Russian actors like private military companies (PMCs) and private businesses are involved. Yet, in all three cases, Moscow’s presence tends to grow when relations between African governments and their international partners (especially in the West) deteriorate, often in the wake of authoritarian turns. This shows the opportunistic nature of Russia’s engagement, as well as the complex trade-offs faced by EU/MS governments when engaging with African governments." (Executive summary) more

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Limitations of Anti-War Messaging Oriented at Russians

Fyodor Krashennikov

Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2022), 11 pp.

"This paper offers a critical overview of anti-war propaganda in the Russian language during the first six months of the war and identifies the reasons for its limited success. After a review of the challenges to current forms of propaganda, the paper offers practical recommendations to improve the ... more

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Demystifying the Sacred: Blasphemy and Violence from the French Revolution to Today

Eveline G. Bouwers, David Nash (eds.)

Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter (2022), x, 303 pp.

"Drawing on cases from revolutionary France to the Russia of Vladimir Putin, the international authors probe the nature and agency of local blasphemy accusations, the historical and legal framework in which they were expressed and the violence, both physical and symbolic, accompanying them. In doing ... more

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Tracking the Propaganda and Disinformation About Foreign Influence in Serbia. Case Study: Serbian Media on the Ukraine War

Beograd: CRTA (2022), 15 pp.

"The topic of the war in Ukraine dominated the media during the first three months of the war and completely marginalized all other topics. The most foreign actor reported on most in the media was Russia, while the countries of the West, the US, the EU, and NATO were far less noticeable. Although th ... more

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Understanding the Infodemic of Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories

Daria B. Kazarinova

Russia in Global Affairs, volume 20, issue 2 (2022), pp. 83-104

"The article analyzes the QAnon phenomenon and the anti-vaxxer movement of COVID-19 deniers as typological manifestations of conspiratorial “alternative rationality.” A number of hypotheses have been proposed: during a pandemic and a parallel infodemic, conspiracy thinking quickly becomes transb ... more

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The Unfreedom Monitor: A Methodology for Tracking Digital Authoritarianism Around the World

Amsterdam: Global Voices Advox (2022), 71 pp.

"This briefing document provides an overview of key developments in digital authoritarianism in 11 countries and explains the theoretical framework and methodology behind The Unfreedom Monitor project. The document also provides a basis for expanding this research to other countries to deepen our un ... more

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Ukrainekrieg auf Telegram: Rechtsextremer Knotenpunkt für Desinformationen und Verschwörungserzählungen

Mainz: jugendschutz.net (2022), 9 pp.

"Seit Beginn des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine im Februar 2022 nutzen Rechtsextreme die Ereignisse und Entwicklungen für ihre Propaganda. Dabei lassen sich sowohl pro-ukrainische als auch prorussische Positionierungen beobachten. Insbesondere werden gezielt Desinformationen und Versch ... more

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Why Does the Kremlin's Propaganda Remain Effective in Wartime?

Fyodor Krasheninnikov

Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2022), 10 pp.

"This paper will outline the technologies and mechanisms of Putin's information machine, how it operates during the war and the obstacles to anti-war propaganda among Russians. At the very end, we will offer some recommendations for confronting Putin's information machine at war, both of a general n ... more

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Understanding RT’s Audiences: Exposure Not Endorsement for Twitter Followers of Russian State-Sponsored Media

Rhys Crilley, Marie Gillespie, Bertie Vidgen, Alistair Willis

International Journal of Press/Politics, volume 27, issue 1 (2022), pp. 220-242

"The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today) has attracted much attention as a purveyor of Russian propaganda. To date, most studies of RT have focused on its broadcast, website, and social media content, with little research on its audiences. Through a data-driven ... more

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How Russian Television Prepared the Public for War

J. Paul Goode

PONARS Eurasia (2022), 12 pp.

"Reported here are findings from a study of the frequency and content of messaging on various themes on Russian television. The goal of this approach is not necessarily to re-create Russians' viewing habits, though one might reasonably assume that more frequently mentioned topics are more likely to ... more

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Mediensysteme in Deutschland und Russland: Handbuch

Alla G. Bespalova, Horst Pöttker (eds.)

Köln: Herbert von Halem Verlag (2022), 361 pp.

"Das Buch besteht aus zwei Teilen. Der erste enthält Stichwortartikel zu den Themenbereichen Presse, Radio, Fernsehen, Online-Medien, Agenturen und Medien im Allgemeinen. Im zweiten Teil werden Datentabellen und Grafiken präsentiert, die sich vor allem auf das Jahr 2015 beziehen. Dabei werden sowo ... more

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Owning the Conversation: Assessing Responses to Russian and Chinese Information Operations Around COVID-19

Vera Zakem, Edward Lucas, James Lamond

Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) (2022), 32 pp.

"Russia and China have created and amplified disinformation and propaganda about COVID-19 worldwide to sow distrust and confusion and to reduce social cohesion among targeted audiences. The United States government, the European Union, and multinational organizations have developed a series of inter ... ventions in response. These include exposing disinformation, providing credible and authoritative public health information, imposing sanctions, investing in democratic resilience measures, setting up COVID-19 disinformation task forces, addressing disinformation through regulatory measures, countering emerging threat narratives from Russia and China, and addressing the vulnerabilities in the information and media environment. Digital platforms, including Twitter, Meta, YouTube, and TikTok, have stepped up to counter COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation via policy procedures, takedowns of inauthentic content, addition of new product features, and partner with civil society and multinational organizations to provide credible and reliable information to global audiences. In addition, digital platforms are addressing COVID-19-related disinformation and misinformation stemming from a variety of state and non-state actors, including China and Russia. Several of these initiatives have proven to be effective, including cross-sectoral collaboration to facilitate identification of the threat; enforcement actions between civil society, governments, and digital platforms; and investment in resilience mechanisms, including media literacy and online games to address disinformation. Despite some meaningful progress, gaps in countering COVID-19 disinformation and propaganda stemming from Russia and China and unintentional misinformation spread by everyday citizens still exist. Closing these gaps will require gaining a deeper understanding of how adversaries think; aligning and refining transatlantic regulatory approaches; building coordination and whole-of- society information-sharing mechanisms; expanding the use of sanctions to counter disinformation; localizing and contextualizing programs and technological solutions; strengthening societal resilience through media, digital literacy, and by addressing digital authoritarianism; and building and rebuilding trust in democratic institutions." (Executive summary) more

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Choosing Propaganda: Media Selection and Politics in Putin's Russia

Ashley Katrine Blum

Los Angeles: University of California, Doctoral Thesis (2022), xiv, 160 pp.

"The results of this dissertation suggest that most Russians are aware, at least to some degree, of the biases of state media. Nonetheless, they still consider these sources to provide valuable information. This, in part, stems from beliefs about the access these news outlets have to information and ... more

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Russian Information Warfare 2 Months After the Invasion in Ukraine

Tamar Kintsurashvili, Sandro Gigauri

Media Development Foundation (MDF) (2022), 46 pp.

"During the monitoring period (February 24 – April 24) the following tendencies have been identified: Out of the 160 false information and manipulative content, mainly disseminated in Russian and Georgian sources, the largest share (49.4%) was directed against Ukraine, followed by disinformation a ... more

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Russlands unabhängiger Journalismus: Der harte Überlebenskampf unter totalitären Repressionsmaßnahmen

Sergej Parkhomenko

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (2022), 39 pp.

"Der Journalist und Verleger Sergej Parkhomenko ist ein international gefeierter Menschenrechtsverteidiger, Oppositionsaktivist und unter den russischen Medienschaffenden einer der wichtigsten Partner für das Internationale Journalisten- und Mediendialogprogramm (IJMD) der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftun ... more

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Maidan, Krim und Russland: Eine Medien-Frame-Analyse deutscher Print-Berichterstattung im Februar und März 2014

Kinza Khan

Baden-Baden: Nomos (2022), 314 pp.

"Maidan, Krim und Russland bilden 2014 einen Fokus der Berichterstattung, als Proteste v. a. in Kiew in eine Staatskrise münden und die Halbinsel Krim von Russland annektiert wird. Diese einschneidenden Ereignisse werden von Medien eingeordnet und in Sinnzusammenhänge eingebettet. Die vorliegende ... more

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War in the Age of TikTok

Jacqueline Evans

Russia Analytical Digest, issue 280 (2022), pp. 17-19

"The rise of social media has revolutionized information-sharing and the way in which people learn about important events. As evidenced by the use of TikTok in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, social media has the ability to connect people from conflict zones to individuals around the world. ... more

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Mapping the Website and Mobile App Audiences of Russia’s Foreign Communication Outlets, RT and Sputnik, Across 21 Countries

Julia Kling, Neil Thurman, Florian Toepel, Richard Flechter

Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, volume 3, issue 6 (2022), 17 pp.

"Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, policymakers worldwide have taken measures to curb the reach of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik. Mapping the audiences of these outlets in 21 countries, we show that in the quarter before the invasion, at least via their official we ... more

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The Kremlin's Troll Network Never Sleeps: Inauthentic Pro-Kremlin Online Behavior on Facebook in Germany, Italy, Romania and Hungary

Lóránt Gyori, Csaba Molnár, Péter Krekó, Patrik Szicherle et al.

Budapest: Political Capital Institute (2022), 36 pp.

"The research – based on programmatic text-mining supported analyses of several millions of war-related comments scraped by Sentione and further examined with CrowdTangle - found traces of inauthentic, repetitive pro-Kremlin activity on Facebook in all countries under review, which can be consider ... ed attempts to influence public opinion in the affected states and, in some cases, beyond them. Our main conclusions are: Crises help the Kremlin. Even if public opinion in the EU is currently unfavorable to the Kremlin, the onset of high, permanent inflation, soaring energy prices and the looming danger of an EU-wide recession could create a more favorable environment for the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts. Most (covertly) Kremlin-friendly forces will adopt a rhetoric blasting sanctions for harming Europe more than Russia. Importing disinformation narratives. Three out of the four narratives found in Hungary were imported into the country from abroad. One doubting Ukraine’s existence as a country started from an organization connected to Ukrainian pro-Putin oligarch Viktor Medvechuk, taken over by the so-called “news agency” of separatists. Another narrative detailing a new, dictatorial world order based on, among others, COVID-19 restrictions, and led by NATO was aimed at developing countries where Russia can hope to hold more sway. The third essentially took over a trend in the Russian media space: users tried to discredit anti-war voices by asking them “where they were in the past eight years” when Ukraine committed atrocities against minorities. Strategies in Germany: Divide and Rule. The six relevant narratives we found in Germany employed three different strategies. The first was anti-Westernism, where the US and NATO are to blame for Russia’s attack. The second aimed clearly at generating debates by spreading a Kremlin-critical narrative. Some profiles involved in this were caught disseminating both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin narratives, which indicates it is not intended to counter the Kremlin’s information operation but to be a part of it. The third strategy was about exploiting contemporary events - such as heightened discussions on sanctions and rising inflation." (Executive summary) more