"Social media allow ordinary people, civic groups, and journalists to reach a vast audience at little or no cost, but they have also provided an extremely useful and inexpensive platform for malign influence operations by foreign and domestic actors alike. Political leaders employed individuals to s
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urreptitiously shape online opinions in 38 of the 65 countries covered in this report—a new high. In many countries, the rise of populism and far-right extremism has coincided with the growth of hyperpartisan online mobs that include both authentic users and fraudulent or automated accounts. They build large audiences around similar interests, lace their political messaging with false or inflammatory content, and coordinate its dissemination across multiple platforms. Cross-border influence operations, which first drew widespread attention as a result of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential contest, are also an increasingly common problem. Authorities in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a growing list of other countries have expanded their efforts to manipulate the online environment and influence foreign political outcomes over the past year." (Page 1)
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"It is almost impossible to obtain information about who is behind Hungarian misinformation websites; financial information about them is even harder to come by; Hungarian misinformation websites fall on the spectrum from purely ideological sites to simple moneymaking machines; Facebook appears to b
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e the almost exclusive source of traffic for misinformation websites in Hungary; Misinformation websites focusing on generating income are often abandoned and then brought back to life using a different domain name; The Facebook page of misinformation websites is stable and keeps directing users to the ever-changing urls of the websites; The websites’ posts are spread via Facebook pages and groups that often bear names unrelated to the website. In a lot of cases, this can be because the websites’ names have changed. But we also found signs of an underground trade of Facebook groups and pages; The revenue generated by placing ads on a website may not be significant, but Hungarian misinformation websites appear to have at least a couple of sister-sites; At the money-making end of the spectrum, lots of misinformation websites appear to be controlled by few individuals/groups, and some individuals/groups appear to run a high number of misinformation websites; One of the groups identified as operating a number of misinformation websites can be linked to a network of political organizations that have been accused of fraud in the 2014 and 2018 general elections in Hungary." (Main findings, page 1)
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"Dominant narratives about the contemporary problem of “fake news” and cyber-propaganda have focused on how its evolution and manifestation has been closely linked with the rise of populist politics, digital capitalism, the transformation of the public sphere and structural weaknesses of liberal
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and mainstream media. These narratives often use the Western gaze as an analytical and theoretical toolkit to understand a global phenomenon, thereby missing local specificities and nuances. In this special issue we argue that any attempt to make sense of the evolution, mutation and sharing of fake news and cyber-propaganda in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be done outside the determining and constraining context of the production and consumption of news in Africa. At the core of this context of production and consumption are resource-constrained newsrooms, an ever-shifting communication ecology, realignment of the relationship between producers and consumers of content, digitization of political communication, media repression, digital literacy and competencies and competing regimes of truth and non-truth. The special issue engages with the phenomena of “fake news” and cyber-propaganda in sub-Saharan Africa. It attempts to show that there are alternative ways of thinking about the normative and epistemological challenges facing both journalism and society, more generally, in the twenty-first century. The issue carries six theoretically driven empirical studies that use a wide range of qualitative evidence to closely explore a number of themes, including the production and consumption of “fake news” and cyber-propaganda in specific contexts within the continent." (Abstract)
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"Despite the efforts of the news industry, we find only a small increase in the numbers paying for any online news – whether by subscription, membership, or donation. Growth is limited to a handful of countries mainly in the Nordic region (Norway 34%, Sweden 27%) while the number paying in the US
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(16%) remains stable after a big jump in 2017. • Even in countries with higher levels of payment, the vast majority only have ONE online subscription – suggesting that ‘winner takes all’ dynamics are likely to be important. One encouraging development though is that most payments are now ‘ongoing’, rather than one-offs. In some countries, subscription fatigue may also be setting in, with the majority preferring to spend their limited budget on entertainment (Netflix/Spotify) rather than news. With many seeing news as a ‘chore’, publishers may struggle to substantially increase the market for high-priced ‘single title’ subscriptions. As more publishers launch pay models, over two-thirds (70%) of our sample in Norway and half (50%) in the United States now come across one or more barriers each week when trying to read online news. In many countries, people are spending less time with Facebook and more time with WhatsApp and Instagram than this time last year. Few users are abandoning Facebook entirely, though, and it remains by far the most important social network for news. Social communication around news is becoming more private as messaging apps continue to grow everywhere. WhatsApp has become a primary network for discussing and sharing news in non-Western countries like Brazil (53%) Malaysia (50%), and South Africa (49%). People in these countries are also far more likely than in the West to be part of large WhatsApp groups with people they don’t know – a trend that reflects how messaging applications can be used to easily share information at scale, potentially encouraging the spread of misinformation. Public and private Facebook Groups discussing news and politics have become popular in Turkey (29%) and Brazil (22%) but are much less used in Western countries such as Canada (7%) or Australia (7%). Concern about misinformation and disinformation remains high despite efforts by platforms and publishers to build public confidence. In Brazil 85% agree with a statement that they are worried about what is real and fake on the internet." (Summary, page 9)
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"In this chapter we begin by surveying the digital political landscape, which has provided a fertile breeding ground for trolling as a state tool for suppression of dissenting ideas. We observe the tactical move by states from an ideology of information scarcity to one of information abundance, whic
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h sees "speech itself as a censorial weapon" (Wu 2017). This era of information abundance has enabled states to sponsor and execute trolling attacks using ordinary internet users as well as volunteer, amateur and professional trolling institutions. Under the heading "The Anatomy of Patriotic Trolling," we outline salient patterns from more than 15 case studies across seven countries illustrating the common tools and tactics in state-sponsored trolling attacks. Drawing on campaigns across Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Ecuador, the Philippines, Turkey, Venezuela and the United States, we are able to establish the existence of a broader trend within which national variations occur. We then offer a framework for conceptualizing the responsibility of states for such attacks. We argue attribution is critical to elucidating remedies to state-sponsored trolling. As long as the role of governments in instigating or leveraging such campaigns is obscured, it will be impossible to advance effective technological or regulatory solutions. We conclude by offering some preliminary policy proposals, hoping this chapter will prompt a further debate about effective and necessary interventions." (Pages 503-504)
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"Propaganda in the Information Age is a collaborative volume which updates Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model for the twenty-first-century media landscape and makes the case for the continuing relevance of their original ideas. It includes an exclusive interview with Noam Chomsky himself. 2018
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marks 30 years since the publication of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s ground-breaking book Manufacturing Consent, which lifted the veil over how the mass media operate. The book’s model presented five filters which all potentially newsworthy events must pass through before they reach our TV screens, smartphones or newspapers. In Propaganda in the Information Age, many of the world’s leading media scholars, analysts and journalists use this model to explore the modern media world, covering some of the most pressing contemporary topics such as fake news, Cambridge Analytica, the Syrian Civil War and Russiagate. The collection also acknowledges that in an increasingly globalized world, our media is increasingly globalized as well, with chapters exploring both Indian and African media." (Publisher description)
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"1. Majorities around the globe say that social media has increased their ease of communications & access to information, but are mixed on its impact on civility. On balance, it is seen as a positive, but not without its problems. (slides 8-34). 2. Four in ten (44%) admit to being duped by fake news
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at least sometimes. Fake news is seen as most prevalent on social media & the Internet, less prevalent in mainstream media. Online trolls & social media platforms are most commonly cited as the actors responsible for spreading fake news, but governments and regular users play a part. Few can agree who should police and determine what is fake. Strong majorities support all forms of actions to resist fake news, save for government censorship. (slides 35-61; 83-147). 3. The vast majority think that fake news is made worse by the internet & that it has negatively impacted their economy, and political discourse. The United States takes the lion’s share of the blame for spreading fake news, even among its own citizens. As many as two in five now trust the media less, as a result of fake news. (slides 62-82; 148-176). 4. Fewer than half express at least some degree of confidence that algorithms used in daily life are unbiased, in any context. Citizens living in more developed economies tend to be less confident in the unbiasedness of algorithms. (slides 177-195). 5. The most common reasons for a lack of confidence in the unbiasedness of algorithms include: a lack of transparency, a perception that they are exploitative by design & the absence of a human element from decision-making. By contrast, objectivity, a lack of human emotion to cloud decision-making & the absence of human influence are most frequently mentioned by those who express confidence in the unbiasedness of algorithms. (slides 196-210)" (Five key take-aways, page 6)
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"The presented report looks at 49 major Slovak disinformation and misinformation websites and sketches out their ownership as well as financial background. The report succeeds in identifying the ownership or operational structure behind 35 websites. In terms of financial data, the report canvasses f
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our sources of income: tax designation, e-commerce, crowdfunding, and advertising. In conclusion, the Slovak misinformation and disinformation website scene appears to be run by multiple independent entities using various business models to sustain operation. Transparency and accountability remain an issue in most of the cases: Most of the websites with an unclear or concealed background are health and lifestyle related; 57% of websites were established during 2013-2016; Out of 14 health and lifestyle websites only one does not display ads or sells goods and services; Out of 49 websites, 38 either display ads or sell goods and services." (Main findings, page 1)
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"The information ecosystem in DRC is fragmented and fragile. It is characterised by a great number of media outlets, however their level of professionalism is low and their vulnerability to partisan capture is high. This fragility is replicated in the online space. The Congolese population rely heav
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ily on informal sources of information such as word of mouth, interpersonal communication with family and friends. The scarcity of reliable information open avenues for the rumours and misinformation to spread. This context presents serious challenges for the promotion of good governance and accountability that requires well informed citizens. To better address those challenges, it is necessary to understand the main sources and dynamics of information flows both offline and online, and through media and non-media channels. A consortium composed of Fondation Hirondelle (FH), Demos, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) and the Institut Congolais de Recherche en Développement et Etudes Stratégiques (ICREDES) was created in order to provide a more holistic view of the Congolese information ecosystem and to identify opportunities for entry. Due to the limited time and resources of the study, and because of the pre-existing networks and capacities of the consortium in this region, its focus is on North Kivu. To identify the voices, networks and themes that dominated this information ecosystem in this region, three levels of analysis were chosen: 1. The sources and level of information of the local populations. This analysis was provided by HHI that implemented household surveys of large samples of populations in Eastern DRC; 2. The sources of information of local journalists. This analysis was provided by FH that surveyed a network of 18 local radios in North Kivu; 3. The network and content analysis of digital and social media provided by DEMOS [...] Findings: Radio is the primary media source of information for the population of Eastern DRC (78% of the sample listens to it occasionally and 43% daily [...] The main sources of information depend on the context and the nature of the information people are seeking [...] The results highlight the lack of reliability of information sources (46% of respondents expressed a moderate to high level of confidence in local radio, and 39% for national radio) ..." (Executive summary)
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"WhatsApp und Facebook werden auch in Lateinamerika massiv genutzt, vor allem aufgrund ihres vermeintlich kostenlosen Charakters. Auch dort wird das Problem der rechten Meinungsmache und der Fake News diskutiert, denn die Tatsache, dass sich die Leute heute vor allem über Werbeplattformen informier
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en, die unzutreffend „soziale Medien“ genannt werden, hat handfeste politische Auswirkungen. In Brasilien und El Salvador wurden die jüngsten Wahlen nicht über Präsenz und Debatten in den traditionellen Medien gewonnen, sondern über gut vorbereitete und teure WhatsApp-Kampagnen. In Brasilien siegt so der Rechtsextremist Jair Bolsonaro, in El Salvador der politische Wende-hals und PR-Profi Nayib Bukele. Die brasilianischen WhatsApp-Nutzer*innen wurden während des Wahlkampfs mit gefälschtem, häufig explizit sexuellem Inhalt geflutet, wie etwa der Meldung, dass die Arbeiterpartei plane, Babyfläschchen mit Nuckel in Penisform zu verteilen, um die Homosexualisierung der Kleinkinder voranzutreiben.
Haarsträubendes postfaktisches Zeitalter – warum fallen Fake News auf fruchtbaren Boden? Klar ist: Klassische Medien haben ihre Funktion als „Gatekeeper“, als Instanzen, die sortieren und filtern, längst eingebüßt. Die Gesellschaften werden vielfältiger und unübersichtlicher: mehr Pluralität auf der einen Seite, andererseits immer tiefere Gräben, die sich durch die Gesellschaften ziehen. Die mediale Öffentlichkeit und die Zugangsbedingungen zu ihr wandeln sich. Die Menschen misstrauen „denen da oben“ durchaus zu Recht. Aber die kommerziellen Global Tech Player beherrschen die Räume für Kommunikation, Information und Meinungsbildung mit Algorithmen. Das hat Folgen. Das Geschäftsmodell basiert auf Datenschürfen, kombiniert mit persönlich zugeschnittener Werbung. Du bekommst das, was du sehen und hören willst, nicht was wahr ist und den Tatsachen entspricht. Und davon profitieren vor allem rechtspopulistische Akteure.
Gibt es dazu einen funktionierenden linken Gegenentwurf? Wir, die Macher*innen der ila und ähnlich Gesinnte, wollten eigentlich schon immer zur Bildung einer Gegenöffentlichkeit beitragen, positionierten uns gegen den „bürgerlichen Journalismus als Stellvertreterjournalismus“, wollten „Betroffenenberichterstattung“. Heute haben Rechte und Rechtsextreme den Begriff „Gegenöffentlichkeit“ für sich gekapert. Und jetzt haben wir den Salat.
Aktuell existiert eine Öffentlichkeit jenseits der Dichotomie „staatlich geregelt oder privat“. Wir haben kein Problem mehr damit, unsere eigenen Inhalte zu verbreiten und eigene Medien zu schaffen. Das stellt allerdings noch längst nicht sicher, dass wir auch gehört werden. Der springende Punkt ist nicht mehr der Zugang, sondern die Reichweite. Wir konkurrieren mit allen anderen Anbietern von welcher Information auch immer um Aufmerksamkeit. Und dabei verfügen wir, kaum anders als früher, immer noch über die schwächeren Möglichkeiten.
Wie sieht also das Überleben im „Plattformkapitalismus“ aus, wie sich darin bewegen, schützen, informieren, seine Meinung bilden und als politisch Aktive oder alternative Medienschaffende die eigenen Inhalte verbreiten? Dazu ein paar Ideen, die sich aus der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Thema und lateinamerikanischen Gesprächspartner*innen herauskristallisieren: Versteht, die Technik zu verstehen (in Lateinamerika ist die Rede von hackear la tecnología, also die Technologie für die eigenen Zwecke zu nutzen wissen), wahrt eine kritische Distanz, haltet eure Informationsquellen vielfältig (was vor allem auch Kindern und Jugendlichen vermittelt werden sollte), schafft und nutzt alternative Plattformen. Manchmal kann auch digitales Fasten das Gebot der Stunde sein. Handy aus und raus auf die Straße – oder in den Wald." (Editorial)
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"At the heart of the challenges to democracy posed by digital media are three core problems: 1. Platform monopolies: two or three corporations control not only our means of communication, but also the content which is distributed, both of which are core aspects of our democracy. Whilst the market po
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wer and global mobility of these companies make it possible for them to avoid national regulatory measures, either by moving operations elsewhere or simply ignoring them; 2. Algorithmic opacity: algorithmic engines are using huge quantities of personal data to make ever more precise predictions about what we want to see and hear, and having ever increasing influence over what we think and do, with little transparency about how they work or accountability for their impact; and 3. Attention economy: the dominant business model of digital media prioritises the amplification of whatever content is best at grabbing our attention, while avoiding responsibility for the impact that content has on our collective wellbeing and our democracy. The negative impact is brutally clear from both the literature and the world around us." (Introduction, page 14)
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"The websites creating misinformation content in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be classified into four categories based on their financial and/or political motivations and the extent to which they provide valuable journalistic contributions. The majority of misinformation websites are motivated solely
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by profit which they generate via Google AdSense. Established media outlets engage in misinformation practices either to compete for readers' attention or on behalf of their political patrons. Two relatively secretive websites have established themselves as influential leaders in misinformative propaganda, primarily preoccupied with benefiting their political patrons rather than obtaining profits. Due to secrecy and lack of regulation, it is extremely difficult to establish the financial background of these websites." (Main findings, page 1)
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"Jugendliche informieren sich heute primär digital. Umso wichtiger ist es, dass sie bei der Nutzung von digitalen Medien in der Lage sind, Nachrichten und Informationsquellen richtig einzuordnen und wahre von falschen Meldungen zu unterscheiden. Dieses Buch gibt kompetent Auskunft zum Thema. Google
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, YouTube und andere Suchmaschinen und Soziale Netzwerke gehören heute ganz selbstverständlich zu unserem Alltag. Man kann sich rund um die Uhr informieren, sich mit seinen Freunden austauschen und eigene Fotos, Erlebnisse und Ideen posten. Bei der Informationsrecherche im Netz sind seriöse Angebote aber oft schwer zu unterscheiden von Werbung, manipulierten oder falschen Beiträgen. Quelle und Herkunft sind oft nicht ausfindig zu machen. Um sich nicht in den Filterblasen von Suchmaschinen und sozialen Netzwerken zu verlieren und nicht auf Fake News, gefakte Profile oder andere Manipulationen hereinzufallen, ist es wichtig, verschiedene Informationsquellen zu nutzen und sich eine eigene, unabhängige Meinung zu bilden. Dieses Buch gibt einen umfassenden Einblick in die vielfältige Welt der Medien und vermittelt Tipps und Hilfestellungen zum richtigen Umgang mit ihnen." (Verlagsbeschreibung Loewe Verlag)
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"Thorben Prenzel stellt in seinem Buch die Triple-A-Methode vor, die eine einfache Handlungsanleitung für den Alltag bietet. Diese verständliche Schritt-für-Schritt Anleitung hilft Ihnen, gekonnt die richtigen Argumente zur richtigen Zeit anzubringen." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
"Fake news, post-truth and filter bubbles are other people’s problems, not ours…: 65% think that other people live in a bubble on the internet, mostly looking for opinions they already agree with – but only 34% say they live in their own bubble; 63% are confident they can identify fake news -
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but only 41% think average person can; 58% think they’re better than average at spotting fake news, only 28% think they’re not; 60% think other people don’t care about facts any more, they just believe what they want; 59% think they have a better understanding of social realities like crime rates than the average person, only 29% think they don’t." (Page 3)
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"Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa and occasionally drawing comparisons with other regions of the world, this book critically addresses the development of the field focusing on the current opportunities and challenges within the African context. By using a wide variety of case studies that include Moza
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mbique, Zambia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Ivory Coast and Nigeria, the collection gives space to previously understudied regions of sub-Saharan Africa and challenges the over-reliance of western scholarship on political communication on the continent." (Publisher description)
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"Seit 2015 Hunderttausende Flüchtlinge in die Bundesrepublik kamen, kursiert im Netz die Theorie vom »Großen Austausch«: Das Land solle von einer globalen »Finanzoligarchie« mittels der »Migrationswaffe« ausgeschaltet werden. Neben mangelndem Vertrauen in die Politik ist der Glaube an Versch
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wörungstheorien ein Merkmal des populistischen Brodelns. Doch was macht eine Erklärung zu einer Verschwörungstheorie? Warum sind sie für viele so attraktiv? Und was kann man dagegen unternehmen? Antworten auf solche Fragen findet man seltener als Verschwörungstheorien selbst. Michael Butter erläutert, wie solche Erzählungen funktionieren, wo sie herkommen und welche Auswirkungen sie haben können. Da sie die Eigenlogik sozialer Systeme unterschätzten, seien solche Theorien zwar immer falsch; als Symptom müsse man sie dennoch ernstnehmen. Gegenwärtig seien sie ein Indikator für die demokratiegefährdende Fragmentierung der Öffentlichkeit." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"This paper is based on a review of how previous studies have defined and operationalized the term “fake news.” An examination of 34 academic articles that used the term “fake news” between 2003 and 2017 resulted in a typology of types of fake news: news satire, news parody, fabrication, man
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ipulation, advertising, and propaganda. These definitions are based on two dimensions: levels of facticity and deception. Such a typology is offered to clarify what we mean by fake news and to guide future studies." (Abstract)
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"The study explains how strategists set campaign objectives based on input from their political clients, then delegate political marketing responsibility to a team of digital influencers and fake account operators. These operators infiltrate online communities, artificially trend hashtags to hijack
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mainstream media attention, and disseminate disinformation to silence enemies and seed revisionist history narratives. While the Philippine public’s moral panic about fake news is often directed at high-profile digital influencers and celebrities such as Mocha Uson who are seen to incite political divisiveness and harass journalists, Ong and Cabañes argue that the real chief architects of disinformation are hiding in plain sight—wearing respectable faces as leaders in their industry while sidestepping accountability." (http://newtontechfordev.com)
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"In this report, we favour the word “disinformation” over “fake news.” Disinformation, as used in the Report, includes all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit. Our main message is that the bes
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t responses to disinformation are multi-dimensional, with stakeholders collaborating in a manner that protects and promotes freedom of expression, media freedom, and media pluralism. Another key message is that effective action will require continuous research on the impact of disinformation, increased transparency, and access to relevant data, combined with evaluation of responses on a regular, ongoing basis. This is particularly important as disinformation is a multi-faceted and evolving problem that does not have one single root cause." (Foreword)
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