"1. Expansive reach and influence of WhatsApp groups: The study findings indicate that WhatsApp groups have a remarkably wide reach, potentially connecting with three quarters of WhatsApp users in Lebanon. These groups are part of larger networks, which enhances the dissemination of content. Moreove
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r, their cost-effectiveness for advertising, compared to platforms like Facebook, makes them a formidable tool for targeted information dissemination. 2. Dominant themes and regional variation in conversations: The analysis revealed that conversations in the 37 sampled groups revolved mainly around key themes such as livelihood, security, politics, and foreign countries’ involvement in Lebanon. Interestingly, there were regional variations in the content promoted and more specifically in fear-oriented news, reflecting the different concerns prevalent in various areas. 3. Sensationalism, speculation, and fearmongering: WhatsApp groups frequently employ sensationalized language, unverified speculations, and a focus on dramatic events. These practices contribute to an atmosphere of anxiety and uncertainty among the public, potentially influencing behaviors, including purchasing trends and political opinion-shaping. 4. Mis- and disinformation: The study highlighted the pervasive spread of false or misleading information, particularly during sensitive periods, where it can be used to exploit or manipulate public sentiment. Notable examples include unreliable earthquake predictions and the case of Sheikh Al Rifai’s murder." (Conclusion, page 38)
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"Europaweit haben 52 Prozent derjenigen, die bereits einen Account gemeldet haben, häufig oder sehr häufig Desinformation wahrgenommen. Von denen, die dies nicht getan haben, sagen das nur 36 Prozent. Hingegen geben die beiden Gruppen in etwa gleichem Umfang (58 beziehungsweise 53 Prozent) an, hä
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ufig oder sehr häufig unsicher bei Informationen im Internet zu sein. Eine größere Unsicherheit führt also nicht automatisch zu einer aktiveren Reaktion auf falsche Informationen, wie melden oder hinweisen. Jedoch überprüfen unsichere Befragte häufiger Informationen: 62 Prozent gaben an, dies bereits getan zu haben. Jüngere und Menschen mit höherer Bildung gehen aktiver mit (falschen) Internetinformationen um. Die Bereitschaft, Informationen zu melden, andere darauf hinzuweisen und Informationen nachzurecherchieren, nimmt mit dem Alter ab. Personen mit höherer Bildung recherchieren selbst aktiv Informationen, während Personen mit geringerer Bildung häufiger angeben falsche Informationen zu teilen oder zu liken." (Zentrale Ergebnisse, Seite 4)
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"Ziel dieser Studie war die Untersuchung der (langfristigen) Wirkung von Desinformation auf Social Media auf die Meinungsbildung sowie deren Einflussfaktoren. Der Fokus lag auf der Rolle von wiederholtem Kontakt mit Desinformation, auf der intervenierenden Wirkung von Aufklärungstexten und Warnhinw
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eisen in Social Media/Messenger Newsfeeds sowie auf individuellen Online-Rechercheprozessen zur Überprüfung von Desinformationen." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"Trust lies at the heart of the disinformation crisis, as citizens must decide which narratives to follow and whether to accept “alternative truths.” Therefore, trust in institutions that publish reliable information can act as a shield against disinformation. This comparative study investigates
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the role of trust in news media and political actors and general attitudes toward democracy in the willingness to spread disinformation (i.e., likes, shares, or comments). Findings of this study show that news media trust plays a subordinate role but that trust in social media news has a strong relationship with willingness to spread disinformation. In 2020, citizens in the United States and United Kingdom who had high trust in their governments were more willing to spread disinformation, whereas in France and Belgium, citizens who trusted opposition leaders were more likely to do so. Moreover, citizens who were satisfied with democracy appeared to be less vulnerable to disinformation, with the exception of those in the United States. Therefore, political actors bear great responsibility for the current (dis)information crisis because they can exploit citizens’ trust to their advantage." (Abstract)
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"Although disinformation has become a popular concept, we lack an integrative conceptualization that connects the actors, intentions and techniques underlying deceptive information. In this article, we conceptualize disinformation as a context-bound deliberate act for which actors covertly deceive r
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ecipients by de-contextualizing, manipulating or fabricating information to maximize utility with the (targeted) outcome of misleading recipients. This conceptualization embeds fragmented accounts of disinformation in a networked and participatory information logic, and offers a comprehensive account of the conditions under which different actors may decide to deceive, how they deceive, and what they aim to achieve by deceiving recipients. Our conceptualization may inform (machine-learning) techniques to detect disinformation and interventions that aim to trigger suspicion by breaking through the truth-default state." (Abstract)
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"Das Ausmaß an Desinformation hat in den vergangenen Jahren stark zugenommen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ermöglicht dieser Leitfaden Kommunikationsverantwortlichen aus Abgeordnetenbüros, Ministerien und Behörden einen niedrigschwelligen Einstieg in den strategisch-kommunikativen Umgang mit Informati
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onsmanipulation. Im Gegensatz zur Desinformation umfasst Informationsmanipulation auch weitere manipulative Aktivitäten wie zum Beispiel die Verbreitung propagandistischer Inhalte oder die Einrichtung von Bot-Netzwerken. Der Leitfaden stützt sich dabei zum Teil auf wissenschaftliche Befunde, zum Teil auf normative Annahmen und Erfahrungswerte im Rahmen der Projektarbeit." (Zu diesem Leitfaden)
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"Visuals are expected to amplify the impact of disinformation, but it is rarely specified how, and what exactly distinguishes them from text. This article is one of the first to treat visual disinformation as its own type of falsehood, arguing that it differs from textual disinformation in its produ
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ction, processing and effects. We suggest that visual disinformation is determined by varying levels of modal richness and manipulative sophistication. Because manipulated visuals are processed differently on a psychological level, they have unique effects on citizens’ behaviours and attitudes." (Abstract)
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"The popular encrypted messaging and chat app WhatsApp played a key role in the election of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. The present study builds on this knowledge and showcases how the app continued to be used in a governmental operation spreading false and misleading information pop
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ularly known in Brazil as the Office of Hatred (OOH). By harnessing in-depth expert interviews with documentarians of the office’s daily operations—researchers, journalists, and fact-checkers (N = 10)—this study draws up a chronology of the OOH. Via this methodological approach, we trace and chronologize events, actions, and actors associated with the OOH. Specifically, findings (a) document the rise of antipetismo and disinformation campaigns associated with attacks on the Brazilian Worker’s party from 2012 until the election of Bolsonaro in 2018, (b) describe the emergence of the OOH at the heels of the election and subsequent radicalization in WhatsApp groups, (c) provide an overview of the types of disinformation that are spread on the app by the OOH, and (d) illustrate how the OOH operates by mapping key actors and places, communicative strategies, and audiences. These findings are discussed in light of ramifications that government-sponsored forms of disinformation might have in other antidemocratic polities marked by strongman populist leadership." (Abstract)
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"Alarmist narratives about online misinformation continue to gain traction despite evidence that its prevalence and impact are overstated. Drawing on research examining the use of big data in social science and reception studies, we identify six misconceptions about misinformation and highlight the
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conceptual and methodological challenges they raise. The first set of misconceptions concerns the prevalence and circulation of misinformation. First, scientists focus on social media because it is methodologically convenient, but misinformation is not just a social media problem. Second, the internet is not rife with misinformation or news, but with memes and entertaining content. Third, falsehoods do not spread faster than the truth; how we define (mis)information influences our results and their practical implications. The second set of misconceptions concerns the impact and the reception of misinformation. Fourth, people do not believe everything they see on the internet: the sheer volume of engagement should not be conflated with belief. Fifth, people are more likely to be uninformed than misinformed; surveys overestimate misperceptions and say little about the causal influence of misinformation. Sixth, the influence of misinformation on people’s behavior is overblown as misinformation often “preaches to the choir.” To appropriately understand and fight misinformation, future research needs to address these challenges." (Abstract)
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"Fruto do Ciclo de Estudos Interdisciplinares da Comunicação, atividade integrante do 45° Congresso Brasileiro de Ciências da Comunicação, a obra reúne pontos de vista convergentes, complementares e antagônicos sobre o tema desinformação. Além de uma versão textual da conferência de abe
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rtura, assinada por Eugênio Bucci, o livro é dividido em três seções, cada uma delas com quatro textos: Ciências da comunicação e da informação no combate à desinformação; Desinformação plataformizada e violações de direitos humanos; e Existe vacina para a desinformação?" (Resumo)
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"Im Ringen um die globale Deutungshoheit setzt die russische Regierung seit Jahren auf die Verbreitung von Desinformation. Die finnische Journalistin Jessikka Aro hat nicht nur derartige Propagandataktiken aufgedeckt, sie wurde auch selbst zur Zielscheibe orchestrierter Drohungen durch vom Kreml unt
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erstützte Internettrolle. Sie zeigt, mit welch aggressiven Strategien die russische Seite schon lange vor dem Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine versucht hat, die öffentliche Meinung in anderen Staaten in ihrem Sinne zu beeinflussen, sei es in Europa oder in den USA, im Baltikum oder auf dem Balkan. Durch vorgeblich unabhängige Nachrichtenseiten, durch massive Stimmungsmache in sozialen Medien und durch gezielte Hasskampagnen wird versucht, kritische Berichterstattung zu diskreditieren, Journalistinnen und Politiker einzuschüchtern und Zweifel an Fakten zu säen. Aro zeigt dieses Vorgehen beispielsweise anhand der Angriffe gegen sie selbst, aber auch anhand von Recherchen zur russischen Einflussnahme in Nachbarländern oder zum Abschuss des Passagierflugzeugs MH17. Die Autorin verdeutlicht einerseits die Gefahren dieses Informationskrieges für demokratische Gesellschaften und beschreibt andererseits, welchen Preis mutige Einzelpersonen zahlen, die sich der russischen Propagandamaschinerie entgegenstellen." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"Propaganda has been an age-old part of warmongering. It is thus no surprise that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was preceded by, and continues to be fuelled by, propaganda transmitted by state-controlled Russian media. What is more unusual about the Russian (dis)information campaigns is the sheer
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volume of distorted narratives or complete fictional accounts about the conflict. This article explores the content and technologies of Russian information manipulation of domestic audiences in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. We also examine the bases for the sustained robust public support for the war within Russia during the first 12 months of the conflict, despite being based on mostly fabricated (dis)information. Relying on political psychology and communication theory we explain how emotions and associative memories have played an important role in the Russian public's sustained approval to the war. Our findings point to that in the absence of contrasted and independently-verified information, the volume, frequency, emotional intensity of slick, plug-and-play media packages on Ukraine have acted to displace and distort the average Russian's associative social monitoring processes." (Abstract)
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"Wirtschaftliche Sorgen, Zukunfts- und Abstiegsängste sowie fehlendes Vertrauen in Politik und Wissenschaft bilden, wie Ortwin Renn erläutert, einen idealen Nährboden für Desinformation und Populismus, indem Tatbestände durch Gefühle verdrängt werden. Renn verdeutlicht, welche mentalen, sozia
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len und psychologischen Faktoren unseren Umgang mit der Flut der oft widerstreitenden Informationen bestimmen. Warum hadern Menschen mit wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen? Welche menschlichen Eigenschaften nutzen Populisten für demagogische Kampagnen? Wie wirken mediale Echokammern als Vehikel für Verschwörungserzählungen? Welche Folgen hat die wachsende Zahl derer, die Politik und Wissenschaft pauschal die Glaubwürdigkeit absprechen und sich von der Zivilgesellschaft verabschieden? Renn wirbt für eine transparente Debattenkultur in der Politik, aber auch in den Medien und den Institutionen, die Zwischentöne und Zusammenhänge nicht ausblende. Zudem müssten Zuversicht und Vertrauen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger in die eigene Gestaltungsfähigkeit gestärkt werden, nicht zuletzt durch Reformen der repräsentativen Demokratie." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"Four Forces That Lead To Polarization: 1. Economic Anxieties: Economic optimism is collapsing around the world, with 24 of 28 countries seeing all-time lows in the number of people who think their families will be better off in five years. 2. Institutional Imbalance: Business is now the sole instit
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ution seen as competent and ethical; government is viewed as unethical and incompetent. Business is under pressure to step into the void left by government. 3. Mass-Class Divide: People in the top quartile of income live in a different trust reality than those in the bottom quartile, with 20+ point gaps in Thailand, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. 4. The Battle for Truth: A shared media environment has given way to echo chambers, making it harder to collaboratively solve problems. Media is not trusted, with especially low trust in social media." (Page 4)
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"This is neither the first nor the last study of disinformation. Yet it differs significantly from others in many regards. Firstly, it is the first and only study summarizing the state of disinformation in Southeast Europe. While regional studies abound, none so far has looked at all countries of th
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e region between the Danube and the Mediterranean in a single comprehensive analysis. Secondly, this volume not only generates a concise overview of disinformation in the SEE region, but does so by explaining specific case studies, addressing current questions, showing the sources, potential, consequences, forms, narratives and a variety of countermeasures against disinformation in the region at large. Hence, the study not only explains and demonstrates the negative effects of disinformation, but also strives to point to approaches on how different countries deal with disinformation and thus how societies can become more resilient against the manipulative use of information [...] To unify all case studies, the editors and authors of this volume agreed upon a common structure for the articles. This structure builds upon six analytical subcategories: (1) Terminology and definitions; (2) Audience and perspective; (3) Narratives, case studies and examples; (4) Media, sources, multipliers of disinformation; (5) Political context; (6) Countermeasures and resilience." (About this book, page 4)
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"Der Begriff der "alternativen Fakten" hat in den vergangenen Jahren einen raschen Aufstieg erfahren. Mit ihm verbindet sich die Sorge, dass "alternative", den Tatsachen widersprechende Deutungen bestimmter politisch relevanter Sachverhalte zugenommen haben - und dass dies auf ein Schwinden des gete
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ilten Wissens in der Gesellschaft hinweise. Doch was sind eigentlich "alternative Fakten", und wie ist ihre Verbreitung zu verstehen? Wie der Soziologe Nils C. Kumkar darlegt, gehe es hierbei nicht lediglich um fehlgeleitete Annahmen über die Welt, die durch die "richtigen" Informationen korrigiert werden könnten. Für ein Verständnis des Phänomens relevant sei vielmehr die kommunikative Funktion, die es in Prozessen der öffentlichen Meinungsbildung einnehme. Empirisch arbeitet er anhand von drei Beispielen - der Debatte um die Zuschauerzahl bei der Amtseinführung Donald Trumps, der Verbreitung von Publikationen, die den menschengemachten Klimawandel anzweifeln, sowie der Debatte um die "Querdenker" und die Corona-Maßnahmen - heraus, dass die Nutzung "alternativer Fakten" stets in vorgängige gesellschaftliche Konflikte eingebettet ist. Innerhalb dieser Konflikte erfüllten sie weniger die Funktion, glaubhafte Deutungen zu vermitteln, als die, Verwirrung zu stiften. Der Autor plädiert dafür, diese hintergründigen Konflikte in den Blick zu nehmen, um das Phänomen "alternative Fakten" besser verstehen und ihre Verbreitung bekämpfen zu können." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
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"Fifty-four percent of EU citizens reported being “often” or “very often” unsure whether a piece of information they saw on the internet in recent months was true. Only 4 % reported never being unsure of information they saw. Thirty-nine percent of respondents reported consciously encounteri
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ng disinformation, while only ten percent said they did not encounter any disinformation at all. Respondents with a university-level degree are more likely to report being unsure and encountering disinformation than respondents with no formal education. Younger respondents tend to feel unsure less often than older respondents, but these young people also report encountering disinformation more often. Respondents in Spain and Italy show a comparatively higher frequency of uncertainty and reported encounters with disinformation, while respondents in the Netherlands show the lowest values in both cases [...] The study allows us to infer the following four recommendations for action: (1) establish an effective system for monitoring disinformation both in Germany and across Europe; (2) raise public awareness about the issue of disinformation; (3) promote media literacy among people of all age groups; (4) ensure consistent and transparent content creation on digital platforms." (Key findings, page 4-5)
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