"Desinformation begleitet den russischen Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine und erreicht auch ein deutsches Publikum. Sie dient der Stärkung russischer Propaganda und ist geeignet, die deutsche und europäische Entscheidungs- und Handlungsfähigkeit in Bezug auf den Krieg zu stören und negativ zu beein
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flussen. Zwischen Frühjahr und Herbst 2022 ist die Zustimmung zu pro-russischen Propagandanarrativen in der deutschen Bevölkerung signifikant gestiegen. Seit Beginn des russischen Überfalls im Februar 2022 hat sich die Landschaft der Desinformations-Sender:innen fragmentiert. Wo zu Beginn RT DE (Russia Today Deutsch) dominierte, hat dessen Abschaltung durch die EU im März 2022 Raum für andere Akteur:innen gemacht. Dazu gehören russische Botschaften sowie die sogenannten „Alternativmedien“ und pro-russische Influencer:innen. Desinformationskampagnen richten sich auch gezielt gegen ukrainische Geflüchtete. Es kursiert wiederholt und in vielfältigen Variationen Desinformation, die geeignet ist, die Solidarität mit der Ukraine und den von dort Geflüchteten zu zersetzen. Thematisch behaupten diese Beiträge fälschlich etwa die Veruntreuung von Hilfsgütern, aggressives Verhalten von Geflüchteten oder stellen die Unterstützung des angegriffenen Landes als Bedrohung der eigenen Grundbedürfnisse dar. Falsche Behauptungen über Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine verbleiben dabei nicht im digitalen Raum, sondern werden auch in die analoge Welt übertragen. Im verschwörungsideologischen Milieu traf die Nachricht des russischen Angriffs auf die Ukraine auf eine bereits seit 2014 etablierte pro-russische und anti-amerikanische Grundhaltung. Entsprechend wurde sich zu Kriegsbeginn fast durchweg anti-ukrainisch positioniert und der Angriffskrieg Russlands verharmlost bis legitimiert." (Zentrale Erkenntnisse, Seite 1)
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"This report builds off research conducted in Czechia, Romania, and Serbia by an international team of media experts. The research aimed to identify inspiring and impactful ways that the private sector in these countries is engaging in efforts to counter disinformation and bolster independent journa
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lism. It sought to draw out what motivates the business community to meaningfully support information integrity, and what prevents greater involvement of this group." (Page 1) [...] "The research identified one promising example of a pooled fund created to support independent journalism—the Endowment Fund for Independent Journalism (NFNŽ) in Czechia. Established in 2016 by 12 businessmen who were all part of a local business club, the NFNŽ emerged as a reaction to the negative impact that oligarchization of the Czech media had begun to exert on the country’s democracy, a common concern of all its founders. The declared goal of the endowment’s founders is to maintain media pluralism and independence in Czechia, which they view as a key condition for meaningful political deliberation. The endowment has played a key role both in the philanthropic and journalistic communities in Czechia. A set of internal governance mechanisms ensures transparency of the fund’s actions and accountability of its decisions. As a result of the rigorous procedures, the NFNŽ has attracted financial contributions from around 200 small business donors. The endowment has played a central role in strengthening the health of the local journalistic culture by financing 110 journalistic initiatives to date that received a combined CZK 31 million ($1.4 million). Its projects aim to improve the work of various media outlets, such as the launch of a podcast section by Deník N. The fund also promotes independent journalism in the country. Since 2018, the endowment has organized the Journalist Forum, an annual event that has become the go-to networking venue for many of the country’s journalists." (Page 13)
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"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine dominates observed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activity. Ukraine and its representatives have been the direct target of 33 incidents. In 60 out of 100 incidents, supporting the invasion was the main motivation behind the attack. D
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iplomatic channels are an integral part of FIMI incidents. Russia's diplomatic channels regularly serve as enablers of FIMI operations. They are deployed across wide range of topics. China also uses diplomatic channels, mostly targeting the US. Impersonation techniques become more sophisticated. Impersonations of international and trusted organisations and individuals are used by Russian actors particularly to target Ukraine. Print and TV media are most often impersonated, with magazines seeing their entire style copied. FIMI actor collusion exists but is limited. Official Russian actors were involved in 88 analysed FIMI incidents. Chinese actors were involved in 17. In at least 5 cases, both actors engaged jointly. FIMI is multilingual. Incidents do not occur in just one language; content is translated and amplified in multiple languages. Incidents featured at least 30 languages, 16 of which are EU-languages. Russia used a larger variety of languages than Chinese actors but 44% of Russian content targeted a Russian-speaking populations, while 36% targeted English-speaking populations. FIMI is mostly intended to distract and distort. Russia (42%) and China (56%) mostly intend to direct attention to a different actor or narrative or to shift blame ('distract'). Russia attempts to change the framing and narrative ('distort') relatively more often (35%) than China (18%). FIMI remains mostly image and video based. The cheap and easy production and distribution of image and video material online makes these formats still the most commonly used." (Executive summary)
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"This book is the result of a conference that could not take place. It is a collection of 26 texts that address and discuss the latest developments in international hate speech research from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives. This includes case studies from Brazil, Lebanon, Poland, Nigeria,
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and India, theoretical introductions to the concepts of hate speech, dangerous speech, incivility, toxicity, extreme speech, and dark participation, as well as reflections on methodological challenges such as scraping, annotation, datafication, implicity, explainability, and machine learning. As such, it provides a much-needed forum for cross-national and cross-disciplinary conversations in what is currently a very vibrant field of research." (Back cover)
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"The three countries [Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, and Kenya] provide evidence of online hate speech and disinformation affecting human rights offline. The evidence is not comprehensive yet clear enough to raise serious concerns. Online gender-based violence is also reported as critical in the
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three countries. In the three countries, national legislation to address harmful content shows some degree of inconsistency in comparison to international standards, notably in relation to the protection of freedom of expression. The reasons for such inconsistency vary among countries. The effective enforcement of legal frameworks is uneven in all three countries. Social and cultural inequalities are often reproduced in government or judicial decisions, and vagueness in legislation opens space for discretionary decisions. Platform companies have offices in Indonesia and Kenya, but not in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the three countries, there is a lack of transparency in how companies allocate the roles of moderation tasks, including the number of different language moderators and their trusted partners and sources. Companies do not process content moderation in some of the main local languages and community standards are not entirely or promptly available in local languages." (Executive summary)
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"In order to spread Russian narratives about Ukraine that create a false impression of the country among external and internal audiences, the Russian Federation uses a whole complex of information and communication channels. Their main task is to replace the target audience's existing ideas about th
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e real, factual state of affairs with ideas that are considered to be more beneficial to the aggressor country. Russia rejects democratic principles and Ukraine's desire for a European future. Depending on the tasks and results (successes/failures) of operations to influence the internal politics of Ukraine and the formation of its image among the Western audience, Russian narratives changed from a presentation of Ukrainians and Russians as “brotherly” peoples or even one people to the importance of the complete extermination of "Ukrainian nationalists and Nazis," denial of the very existence of Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic group (thereby “justifying” genocide), returning supposed "historical territories of Russia," and promoting the idea that Ukraine has never really been a proper state or is a historic mistake. The narratives of Russian propaganda intertwine, sometimes reinforcing and sometimes contradicting each other. But whatever the Russian narrative may be, its main goal is to undermine Ukraine’s democratic development and its integration into the Western world, to weaken the desire of Ukrainians to determine their future outside Russian influence, within the European family, as well as to weaken international support for Ukraine. The Kremlin's disinformation campaign led to the emergence of a number of stereotypes that influenced the decision-making of Ukraine's partners at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, which led to numerous human casualties, the destruction of Ukrainian economy and infrastructure, and a real threat to the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Fortunately, Ukraine has persevered. Unbreakable people of an unbreakable country continues its fight not only for itself but the whole democratic world." (Summary)
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"Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a
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theoretical framework based on media structure, showing how and why decentralized and centralized media offer distinct opportunities and challenges for conducting influence operations. This framework indicates a relative advantage for television in both dissemination and persuasiveness. We test this framework against the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (before the 2022 escalation), contributing new data from a national survey and a new dataset of Telegram activity. We identify fifteen disinformation narratives, and, using statistical analysis, examine correlations between media consumption, audience exposure to, and agreement with, narratives, and foreign policy preferences. To explore causal mechanisms, we follow up with content analysis. Findings strongly support our theoretical framework. While consuming some partisan social media channels is correlated with narrative exposure, there is no correlation with narrative agreement. Meanwhile, consumption of partisan television channels shows clear and consistent correlation. Finally, agreement with narratives also correlates with foreign policy preferences. However, and importantly, findings indicate the overall limitations of influence operations." (Abstract)
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"Populists and the Pandemic examines the responses of populist political actors and parties in 22 countries around the globe to the Covid-19 pandemic, in terms of their attitudes, rhetoric, mobilization repertoires, and policy proposals. The responses of some populist leaders have received much publ
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ic attention, as they denied the severity of the public health crisis, denigrated experts and data, looked for scapegoats, encouraged protests, questioned the legitimacy of liberal institutions, spread false information, and fueled conspiracies. But how widespread are those particular reactions? How much variation is there? What explains the variation that does exist? This volume considers these questions through critical analysis of countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa, by leading experts with deep knowledge of their respective cases. Some chapters focus on populist parties, others on charismatic populist leaders. Some countries examined are democracies, others autocracies. Some populists are left-wing, others right-wing. Some populists are in government, others in opposition. This variation allows for a panoramic consideration of factors that systematically influence or mediate populist responses to the pandemic. The book thus makes a unique contribution to our understanding of the intersection between two of the most pressing social and political challenges of our time. The book will be of interest to all those researching populism, extremism, and political parties, and those more broadly interested in political science, public policy, sociology, communications, and economics." (Publisher description)
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"This book focuses on the politics, ethics and stereotypical pitfalls of representational practices surrounding Gender-Based Violence (GBV) from a global perspective. The originality of the volume is linked to its cross-disciplinary perspective as the topic of representing GBV is analyzed across the
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domains of philosophy/epistemology, fiction and the arts (including literature, film, television series and music) and non-fictional representations in the media (including broadcast media, online/print journalism, transmedia activism). The volume identifies contemporary representational practices and the theoretical and critical responses, examining various aspects of popular culture from around the world. In doing so, the editors put feminism in conversation with global trends to identify its cultural frontline." (Publisher description)
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"Taking a person-centered approach – we explored different constellations of social-psychological characteristics associated with (dis)information belief in order to identify distinct subgroups whose (dis)information belief stems from different social or political motives. Hungarian participants (
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N = 296) judged the accuracy of fake and real news items with a political (pro/anti-government) and nonpolitical narrative. Two profiles of ‘fake news believers’ and two of ‘fake news non-believers’ emerged, with a high conspiracy mentality being the main marker of the former two. These two ‘fake news believers’ profiles were distinguishable: one exhibited extreme trust in the media and in politicians, and the other deep distrust. Our results suggest that not only political distrust, but also excessive trust can be associated with disinformation belief in less democratic social contexts." (Abstract)
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"As Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, social media was rife with pro-Kremlin disinformation. To effectively tackle the issue of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, this study examines the underlying reasons why some individuals are susceptible to false claims
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and explores ways to reduce their susceptibility. It uses linear regression analysis on data from a national survey of 1,500 adults (18+) to examine the factors that predict belief in pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives regarding the Russia–Ukraine war. Our research finds that belief in Pro-Kremlin disinformation is politically motivated and linked to users who: (1) hold conservative views, (2) trust partisan media, and (3) frequently share political opinions on social media. Our findings also show that exposure to disinformation is positively associated with belief in disinformation. Conversely, trust in mainstream media is negatively associated with belief in disinformation, offering a potential way to mitigate its impact." (Abstract)
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"This research aims to understand the patterns, impact and modus operandi of gendered disinformation campaigns against women in politics in Brazil, Hungary, India, Italy and Tunisia. The case studies explore how gendered disinformation has been used by political movements, and at times the governmen
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t itself, to undermine women's political participation, and to weaken democratic institutions and human rights. Crucially, the research also looks at the responsibilities and responses that both state actors and digital platforms have taken - or most often, failed to take - to address this issue. Despite the regional and cultural diversity of the countries analyzed, several trends and patterns emerge related to gendered disinformation." (Executive summary)
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