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Language
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Countries
Authors & Publishers
Media focus
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Journals
Output Type
The Unfreedom Monitor: Cameroon Country Report
Amsterdam: Global Voices Advox (2023), 22 pp.
"This research indicates that the government criminalises free speech by using a vague and broad definition of fake news, and clamps down on dissent and criticism, and that journalists who criticise the government are seen as enemies of the state — as in the case of the jailing of Kingsley Fomunyu
...
The Unfreedom Monitor: Hungary Country Report
Amsterdam: Global Voices Advox (2023), 32 pp.
"Incidents that illustrate how digital authoritarianism works in Hungary can be grouped into three categories: gaining control over critical digital infrastructure, silencing and intimidation of dissenting voices, and the use of law to undermine people’s rights. The report demonstrates how these d
...
Politicizing for the idol: China’s idol fandom nationalism in pandemic
Information, Communication & Society, volume 26, issue 2 (2023), pp. 304-320
"Chinese idol fans have been identified among the main forces in cyber nationalist activisms in recent years, acting as the nationalist fans protecting the state as an idol in response to external political shocks. Their skills in acknowledging, involving, and even reinventing the image of the state
...
Decoding Social Media’s Role in the Resurgence of the Taliban: A Literature Review
Kabul: Kardan University, Kashmir Research Information System (2023), 22 pp.
"The study assesses the extent to which Taliban 2.0 utilised social media as a political mobilisation strategy and provides a response through discourse analysis and a literature review. The study results indicate that the tactical use of social media was more apparent in 2021 when they were promoti
...
‘Keeping news alive in Venezuela’: Using social media as tactical media
Global Media and Communication, volume 19, issue 1 (2023), pp. 101-117
"Venezuela leads Latin America with the largest number of imprisoned journalists and extreme government-led media censorship. Our in-depth interviews with 25 Venezuelan journalists reveal that assisting journalists to combat government control are social media and technology platforms like WhatsApp,
...
Media and power in modern Iran: Mass communication, ideology, and the state
London: Tauris (2023), x, 222 pp.
"Successive Iranian leaders have struggled to navigate the fraught political-cultural space of media in the Islamic Republic-skirting the line between embracing Western communications technologies and rejecting them, between condemning social networking sites as foreign treachery and promoting thems
...
Die russische Medienlandschaft: Propaganda und Exil
Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), 14. Juni (2023)
"Ein Überblick über die russische Medienlandschaft und wie sie sich seit dem Beginn des russischenAngriffskriegs auf die gesamte Ukraine verändert hat – in zehn Fragen und Antworten." (Einführung)
A Light That Cannot Be Extinguished: Exiled Journalism and Transnational Repression
Washington, DC: Freedom House (2023), 18 pp.
"1. Increasing attacks on independent media globally are forcing journalists to flee their home countries. Working from abroad, these reporters remain crucial sources of information about some of the world’s most authoritarian countries. But safety in exile is not guaranteed.
2. At least 26 govern
...
Why Does the Kremlin's Propaganda Remain Effective in Wartime?
Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2022), 10 pp.
"This paper will outline the technologies and mechanisms of Putin's information machine, how it operates during the war and the obstacles to anti-war propaganda among Russians. At the very end, we will offer some recommendations for confronting Putin's information machine at war, both of a general n
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Afghan Media under the Taliban: Restrictions and Violations
Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy Organization (AHRDO) (2022), 48 pp.
"[...] Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban has imposed a new media control regime, which has three key features: restriction, gender-discrimination, and repression with impunity. First, the Taliban has passed several media policies, imposing extreme constraints on press freedom and
...
The Unfreedom Monitor: Russia Country Report
Amsterdam: Global Voices Advox (2022), 28 pp.
"The internet gained centrality as a space of public opinion and political activity that became important for the Russian state to co-opt and control as part of the broader push for control of political elites and public perceptions as Putin and his ruling party pushed to eliminate any functioning o
...
Narrative russischer staatlicher Medien über Corona-Impfstoffe im Westen
Russland-Analysen, issue 418 (2022), pp. 2-5
"Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Beiträge in russischen staatlichen Medien über Impfkampagnen im Westen haben eine negative Konnotation. Die Übertreibung der negativen Folgen einer Impfung mit Präparaten von BionTech/Pfizer und Moderna sowie die Überzeichnung der angeblich massenhaften Unzufried
...
Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to Transnational Repression
Washington, DC: Freedom House (2022), 42 pp.
"Transnational repression is strategically employed by autocrats, enabled by underprepared host governments, and spreading rapidly around the world. This report aims to assess the strengths and weaknesses in the global understanding of and responses to transnational repression, so that governments,
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Authoritarians on a Media Offensive in the Midst of War: The Informational Influence of Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf States in Southeast Europe
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) (2022), iii, 127 pp.
"The publication analyzes the emerging trends of foreign authoritarian-state disinformation in the context of the war in Ukraine in a comparative manner focusing on 7 states of Southeast Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania). It examines
...
The Revolution Will be Televised in Arabic: Iran’s Media Infrastructure Abroad
Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2022), 19 pp.
"The media space is increasingly becoming yet another battlefield for the Islamic Republic to consolidate its hegemony throughout the Middle East. Iran’s media outreach, particularly in Arabic, is only likely to increase, especially online. Supreme Leader Khamenei is keen to see more activities do
...
Belarus Media Landscape Guide
CDAC Network (2022), 21 pp.
"This Media Landscape Guide was produced in January 2022. It provides a snapshot of the media at this time in Belarus. It provides an analysis of the recent shocks to the media landscape and an overview of the different types of media and information sources available for Belarusians: digital media
...
Steuerung der öffentlichen Meinung
Russland-Analysen, issue 418 (2022), pp. 1-14
"Wie denken gewöhnliche Russ:innen wirklich über die Entscheidung von Präsident Putin, in die Ukraine einzumarschieren? Obwohl einiges dafürspricht, dass frühere Umfragen, die Zustimmungswerte um 60 % für den Krieg zeigen, als genuine Signale der russischen öffentlichen Meinung gewertet werde
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»For a Journalist, Keeping Silent is a Crime«. Russian Independent Media: Caught Between Responsibility and Wartime Censorship
Journalistik. Zeitschrift für Journalismusforschung, volume 5, issue 2 (2022), pp. 163-171
"It did not take long after the first Russian tanks rolled across the border into Ukraine for the Russian government to tighten its censorship laws. The Duma (parliament), the media supervisory authority Roskomnadzor, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Justice joined forces to com
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