"Since its ascent to power twenty years ago, the ruling AKP has tightened the screws on all forms of freedom of expression, both online and offline. It has introduced draconian laws, imposed internet restrictions, blocked content, and has arrested and intimidated critics on an unprecedented level. I
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n its toolbox are all three generations of information controls. The purges that took place in the aftermath of the failed military coup in 2016 have left the country in a state of continuous decline with thousands of civil servants jailed on bogus terrorism charges, media outlets shut, and an ongoing blocking of websites and targeting of social media platforms. The AKP continues to rely on the controversial Internet Bill, the Anti-terrorism Law, decreelaws, and an army of trolls, targeting critics and dissent online. The controversial app introduced by the National Police to snitch on social media accounts critical of the ruling party and its affiliates is yet another tool in the hands of the state to intimidate users and get in the way of freedom of speech online." (Analysis and conclusion, page 20)
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"There is a clear digital divide in Sudan as the number of internet users is a very low part of the population. Despite the high contribution of the telecommunication field to the GDP, the Sudanese authorities are not using this contribution to enhance and develop the ICT field to fill the gap of di
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gital illiteracy. Instead, they use taxpayer money to buy expensive equipment for censorship, without publishing these deals. Restricting the freedom of expression and using the state’s violence to repress fundamental rights and civil liberties are rooting the image of the authoritarian state in the minds of the citizens which may lead to a state of lack of rights awareness. Using and amending laws to protect the government interests indicates that the government will enact other laws to restrict the digital space in order to make access to information increasingly difficult. Government access to ICT infrastructure in Sudan will suppress net neutrality during political crises, affecting people economically and socially, specifically in relation to education and small businesses. Sudan has low transparency, frequently violates physical privacy, uses unlawful communication shutdowns, an idle access to information act, no freedom of expression, vague laws, and online surveillance, making it easy to say that digital authoritarianism is rooted in Sudan. Digital authoritarianism affects opportunities for foreign investment, stability of life, and social security." (Analysis and conclusion, page 21)
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"This guide is intended to provide user-friendly, practical guidance for journalists and newsrooms seeking to understand the Russian “fake news” laws, and how they’ve been applied to local and international press." (Page 1)
"The government of Zimbabwe and the ruling ZANU PF party are bent on ensuring that the status quo is preserved at all costs. As evidenced by findings in the Civic Media Observatory, the digital sphere has been identified as a threat to the country’s national security, insofar as deposing the curre
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nt political junta from power is concerned. The Arab Spring, which led to the deposing of leaders in the MENA region through social-media-organised protests certainly placed a lot of African governments on high alert about the potential transformative power of digital space. This has led to more governments, including that of Zimbabwe, enacting digitally repressive legislation aimed at curbing any form of political mobilisation on social media. Zimbabwe’s engagement with Russia, China, Iran and Israel for the acquisition of invasive spyware and biometric technology for mass surveillance purposes is premised on the ruling party’s overarching desire to control the population and retain political power. The fact that almost all deals are shrouded in a dark veil of secrecy bodes badly for civil society, human rights defenders, independent journalists, and opposition party members as the ends to which such technology will be applied are not publicised. The identification and tracking of journalists who expose corruption within government circles and their subsequent detention implies that digital technologies are being used as part of what Dragu and Lapu term preventive repression." (Analysis and conclusion, page 25)
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"This report provides a framework for understanding China's discourse-power ambitions [...], the strategy China has developed to achieve them, and an initial assessment of the successes and limitations of these efforts to date. The report begins by tracing the evolution of China's conception of disc
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ourse power, from China's period of reform and opening in 1978 to the current era under President Xi Jinping. The next section takes a closer look at how the party-state has been restructured, in part, to help operationalize China's goals to gain "the power to speak" and "the power to be heard." The third section focuses on China's strategy for gaining discourse power by centering itself in the ecosystem of global connectivity. This strategy includes gaining the "power to speak" by using social and digital media platforms to shape local information environments in its favor. It also includes gaining the "power to be heard" by promoting the CCPapproved norm of "cyber sovereignty". Lastly, this report provides a brief assessment of both the successes and limitations of China's discourse-power operations." (Introduction, page 4)
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"Disinformation and misinformation have been amplified in the digital age. In order to combat their increasing presence in our everyday lives, we have to first educate ourselves on what disinformation is. In this post, Jakub Ferencik looks at this question in some detail, primarily by analyzing Vlad
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imir Putin’s usage of disinformation in politics. He first demarcates between disinformation and misinformation, points to some examples in Putin’s early tenure as the President of Russia, and compares them with the use of disinformation during the pandemic in order to show why people lose trust in traditional media sources. Finally, Ferencik addresses the two most avid producers of Russian disinformation, RT and Sputnik, and briefly discusses why they have become so prominent." (Abstract)
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"Against the background of the media commercialization reform since the 1990s in China and drawing on the case of »X-Change« (2006-2019), Wei Dong investigates the entanglements between emotion and subjectivity, ideology, identity and hegemonic power in the multimodal text of the program. The focu
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s lies on the ways in which emotions are appropriated and disciplined by regimes of power and identity, and the ways in which affect - in this case primarily kuqing (bitter emotions) communicated by the material and the body - have the potential to challenge or exceed existing relations of power in the mediascape. Wei Dong shows how Chinese reality TV provides a historical and theoretical opportunity for understanding the affective structures of contemporary China in the dynamic process of fracture and integration." (Publisher description)
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"This Media Landscape Guide was produced in January 2022. It provides a snapshot of the media at this time in Belarus. It provides an analysis of the recent shocks to the media landscape and an overview of the different types of media and information sources available for Belarusians: digital media
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platforms, social media and messaging platforms, television, radio, and print. It covers the main and most popular media outlets." (Introduction, page 4)
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"This paper is the summary of the results of a research project lasting over six months, covering domestic and foreign hidden malign influence activities pursued through the so-called "grey zone" media in three countries - the Czech Republic, Serbia and Hungary -, during a period of heightened inter
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national tensions related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Political Capital has assessed in numerous studies how the Kremlin or the Hungarian hybrid political regime has used their extensive media empire to conduct active measures or political smear-campaigns in service of political or geopolitical goals. In this study, we set out to understand the inner workings of clandestine disinformation campaigns carried out by mostly anonymous media actors to conduct or influence political campaigns, specifically in the run-up to the Czech, Serbian and Hungarian elections, and destabilise the region in general after the outbreak of the war." (Page 2)
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"Existing literature recognizes growing threats to press freedom around the world and documents changes in the tools used to stifle the independent press. However, few studies investigate how independent media respond to state pressure in an autocracy, documenting the impact of tactics that stop sho
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rt of shuttering alternatives to state media. Do independent outlets re-orient coverage to favor regime interests? Or does repression encourage more negative coverage of the regime instead? To shed light on these questions, we investigate how the abrupt removal of independent outlet TV Rain from Russian television providers influenced its coverage. We find that shortly after providers dropped TV Rain, the tone of its political coverage became more positive and its similarity with state-controlled Channel 1 increased. However, these effects were shortlived. Additional evidence suggests that subscription revenue contributed to the station’s resilience. These findings add to our understanding of media manipulation and authoritarian endurance." (Abstract)
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"Nowhere is the effort to control the flow of digital information more extensive and sustained than it is in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses a wide range of tools and strategies to achieve two related, but distinct, goals of digital information control: to shape public knowledge and to
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“guide” the public in the aftermath of sudden, unexpected events. Controlling social media is especially relevant to the second goal, and the CCP uses strategies of content removal (censorship) and content generation (propaganda) to pursue this aim. Recent studies of the Chinese internet and social media show that the CCP has adapted quickly to new digital communication technologies, though it is in sometimes unexpected ways, and CCP control of Chinese social media is integral to its efforts to shape public beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors." (Abstract)
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"The findings described in this memo strongly suggest that "softer" strategies of media cooptation are more effective than harsher, more coercive approaches to media control. In Russia, where the Kremlin has-until very recently-used a combination of commercial pressure and political influence to pus
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h media owners and editors towards cooperation, the result has been a media system in which even those Russians who prefer independent media have broad exposure to the Kremlin's messaging. Moreover, as the Vedomosti case demonstrates, softer repressions against uncooperative media outlets seem to afford the Kremlin an opportunity to capture the attention of a large portion of those outlets' audiences. By contrast, the heavier hand wielded by authorities in Minsk has helped create a highly polarized media system, in which oppositional media-despite massive repression- capture more audience attention than state-linked media, and consumers of independent media have very little exposure to state messaging. Attempts to stifle independent media outright only suffice to put oppositional audiences even further out of the reach of the state." (Conclusions, page 8)
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"This paper examines the practices, performance, and perceptions of the messaging platform Telegram as an actor in the 2020 Belarus protests, using publicly available data from Telegram’s public statements, protest-related Telegram groups, and media coverage. Developing a novel conceptualization o
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f platform actorness, we critically assess Telegram’s role in the protests and examine whether Telegram is seen as playing an active role in Belarusian contentious politics. We find that Telegram’s performance and practices drive citizens to form affective connections to the platform and to perceive Telegram as an ally in their struggle against repressions and digital censorship. Meanwhile, the Belarusian state uses Telegram’s aversion to censorship and content moderation to intervene in contentious politics by co-opting grassroots approaches and mimicking manipulative efforts of other authoritarian regimes. Our conceptual framework is applicable to post-Soviet authoritarian contexts, but can also serve as a useful heuristic for analyzing platform actorness in other regime types." (Abstract)
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"Combating illegal parking and drinking in public is the raison d’être of Russia’s best-known law-and-order youth initiatives, StopKham and Lev Protiv. These initiatives enforce and promote neotraditional morals amongst young people by challenging alleged offenders on camera and uploading the e
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ntertaining, humorous and often violent video clips to YouTube. I argue that their practices encapsulate flexible authoritarianism, in which the regime incentivises citizens to take initiative while expanding repressive measures against dissenters. Not only do these enterprises reflect the regime’s goals back at itself, they also popularise a new ideal of heroic masculinity that fuses patriotism with entrepreneurialism." (Abstract)
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"Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Beiträge in russischen staatlichen Medien über Impfkampagnen im Westen haben eine negative Konnotation. Die Übertreibung der negativen Folgen einer Impfung mit Präparaten von BionTech/Pfizer und Moderna sowie die Überzeichnung der angeblich massenhaften Unzufried
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enheit sind dabei die wichtigsten Narrative der russischen regierungsfreundlichen Medien. Die russische Medienpolitik hinsichtlich der Berichterstattung über westliche Impfstoffe entspricht der allgemeinen staatlichen Linie des Kreml, Russlands herausragende Stellung in der Welt und die Unzulänglichkeiten des Westens hervorzuheben." (Schlussfolgerungen, Seite 4)
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"The media space is increasingly becoming yet another battlefield for the Islamic Republic to consolidate its hegemony throughout the Middle East. Iran’s media outreach, particularly in Arabic, is only likely to increase, especially online. Supreme Leader Khamenei is keen to see more activities do
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minating the internet, particularly by youth. For decades, Iran and its proxies worked to create a vast integrated media infrastructure to further the aim of exporting the Islamic Revolution. They have made mistakes along the way, but their persistence has allowed them to learn and correct course. Iran’s media infrastructure can now adapt to changes in the world of communications, and its officials feel confident in innovating new strategies. Only a similarly consistent media effort can counter Iran’s malign messaging machinery. This media effort should start with empirical research on the reach and impact of Iran’s media activity in the region. Based on the findings from this effort, a clear countermessaging strategy should be devised and implemented." (Conclusion)
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"The movement that mobilized to oppose Alyaksandr Lukashenka in August 2020 was notable for its ability to bridge divisions of social class, geography, age, and identity. Almost uniquely among post-Soviet revolutionary movements, the Belarusians who rose up were not divided from those who did not al
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ong clearly discernible sociodemographic, ethnic, linguistic, or regional lines. They were, however, separated by one very stark barrier: the one separating the country’s two distinct media systems, one controlled by the state, and one independent. Drawing on an original survey conducted in September 2020, just as the protest movement was reaching its peak, this article finds that respondents’ choice of news media was the strongest and most consistent predictor of their political opinions. Media, then, appear to have served not merely as aggregators of and conduits for social processes generated elsewhere, but as the producers of social and political force in their own right." (Abstract)
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"Using the coup as a vantage point, interviewees for this report were asked to reflect on three main questions: What have we learned about past media reform efforts? With hindsight, what are the legacies, best practices, and lessons learned? With a view to the future, what does the media’s respons
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e to the coup teach us about reform and resilience? One of the important lessons their collective reflections and analysis show is that over the past decade the media assistance approach in Burma should have been more strategic, nuanced, grassroots driven, flexible, and inclusive, with a greater focus on opportunities to support local initiatives, coalitions, and actors. Other important lessons learned concern risks and security, including the importance of digital security literacy and mechanisms, as well as building widespread capacity in volatile contexts with greater risk of repression." (Conclusion)
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"This study explores how news channels from the Global South challenge western narratives by co-producing TV programmes. It focuses on Telesur (Venezuela) and its collaborations with RT (Russia), Al-Mayadeen (Lebanon) and CCTV/CGTN (China). By combining quantitative and qualitative methods, this pap
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er examines the structure of these collaborations, the discursive construction of alternative narratives and their contribution to countering hegemonic discourses. The findings show that the efforts to construct counterhegemonic narratives are most evident in the co-productions with RT and Al-Mayadeen. Although the co-production with CGTN focusses on culture, it is nonetheless possible to identify the broadcasters’ distinct ideological agendas." (Abstract)
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"On the basis of an online survey conducted among young Chinese adults, this study examines how the association between media usage and political trust can be explained by three factors: the mediating roles of the perceived credibility of traditional and social media; the moderating roles of trust i
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n sources – media and non-media sources alike; and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership. Analyses support the idea that (1) the perceived credibility of political information obtained from traditional and social media is a significant mediator, and that (2) traditional media credibility has a stronger effect than social media credibility." (Abstract)
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