"This document looks into the human rights violations committed against two specific groups who play important roles for the enjoyment of the right to peaceful assembly. The first group – public assembly monitors – performs a watchdog function by recording how rigorously the authorities observe
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their human rights obligations in the context of public assemblies. The other group – media workers – ensures that society is informed about public assemblies and concerns that have brought people to the streets, and reports on how the protests have been handled by the authorities. The report documents a pattern of unlawful obstruction of journalists’ and monitors’ work during street protests, and severe reprisals against them including arbitrary arrests, use of unlawful force, detention and heavy fines." (Back cover)
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"For months, our team has been tracking how China has exploited search engine results on Xinjiang and COVID-19, two subjects that are geopolitically salient to Beijing — Xinjiang, because the Chinese government seeks to push back on condemnation of its rights record; COVID-19, because it seeks to
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deflect criticism for its early mishandling o f the pandemic. In both cases, Beijing is quite focused on positioning itself as a responsible global leader and softening perceptions to the contrary. To evaluate these concerns, we compiled daily data over a 120-day period on 12 terms related to Xinjiang and COVID-19 from five different sources: (1) Google Search; (2) Google News; (3) Bing Search; (4) Bing News; and (5) YouTube. We found that Chinese state media are remarkably effective at influencing the content returned for the term “Xinjiang” across several search types. “Xinjiang,” which is among the most neutral terms in our data set, regularly returned state-backed content across news searches, with at least one Chinese state-backed news outlet appearing in the top 10 results in 88% of searches (106 out of 120 days searched). On YouTube, state media appeared among the top 10 results in searches for “Xinjiang” in 98% of searches (118 out of 120 days searched) [...]" (Executive summary)
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"It did not take long after the first Russian tanks rolled across the border into Ukraine for the Russian government to tighten its censorship laws. The Duma (parliament), the media supervisory authority Roskomnadzor, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Justice joined forces to com
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bat any media that might threaten the Kremlin’s control over how the ›special operation‹ in Ukraine is viewed. Rushed through, the new laws target allegedly ›false information‹ and set out both large fines and custodial sentences of up to 15 years. Numerous independent media websites were blocked, and at least 150 journalists were forced into exile by a wave of repression. Yet their voices have not been silenced – they have found new ways and formats, even in other languages and from other countries. How do independent journalists manage to provide truthful, critical reporting under conditions of wartime ensorship? Which channels do they use to ask questions that the Kremlin does not want to hear, and give answers that Roskomnadzor would not allow? Where do they find scope for free reporting? How do users get around blocks online? An insight into a media andscape divided into two worlds: before and after February 24, 2022." (Abstract)
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"Täglich gibt es Berichte darüber, wie private Betreiber sozialer Medien sich problematischen Vorgaben autoritärer Herrscher beugen. Ob in Thailand, Kasachstan oder Russland, immer wieder werden als Teil von Content Moderation (CM) gezielt Inhalte entfernt oder Konten gelöscht, weil Regierungen
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sich durch Äußerungen in den sozialen Medien kritisiert fühlen. Diesen Einzelfällen liegt ein systemisches Problem von globaler Reichweite zugrunde. Die großen Betreiber sozialer Medien aus den USA bieten ihre Dienste in einer Vielzahl autoritärer Staaten an und erreichen hier Hunderte Millionen Nutzerinnen und Nutzer. Dabei laufen sie Gefahr, zu Komplizen bei der Verletzung von Menschenrechten werden. Um das Verhalten der Unternehmen hinsichtlich dieses Problems überprüfen zu können, sollte sich die deutsche Politik international dafür einsetzen, dass öffentlich einsehbare Human Rights Impact Assessments (HRIAs) verpflichtend vorgegeben werden." (Zusammenfassung)
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"The results of this dissertation suggest that most Russians are aware, at least to some degree, of the biases of state media. Nonetheless, they still consider these sources to provide valuable information. This, in part, stems from beliefs about the access these news outlets have to information and
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some distrust in available alternative sources. It is not the case that Russians are generally active supporters of the kinds of censorship that state news outlets deploy. However, concerns about censorship must be traded off against news consumers' other priorities. In some circumstances, news audiences will even prefer a degree of censorship if information is framed as a threat to social stability. Overall, state news outlets have succeeded in producing a product that many Russian news consumers genuinely value, even if the contents are subject to bias and distortion. Russian news audiences and the content of state media to be interesting, important, and relevant. It encourages positive emotions such as pride and hope. It a rms those who are deeply attached to their Russian identity and feel positively about their leaders." (Abstract)
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"This volume explores the implications of digital media technologies for journalists’ professional practice, news users’ consumption and engagement with news, as well as the shifting institutional, organizational and financial structures of news media. Drawing on case studies and quantitative an
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d qualitative approaches, contributors address questions concerning: whether China is witnessing ‘disruptive’ or ‘sustainable’ journalism; if, and in what ways, digital technologies may disrupt journalism; and whether Chinese digital journalism converges with or diverges from Western experiences of digital journalism." (Publisher description)
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"Wie denken gewöhnliche Russ:innen wirklich über die Entscheidung von Präsident Putin, in die Ukraine einzumarschieren? Obwohl einiges dafürspricht, dass frühere Umfragen, die Zustimmungswerte um 60 % für den Krieg zeigen, als genuine Signale der russischen öffentlichen Meinung gewertet werde
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n können, untersucht dieser Beitrag eine Reihe von Gründen, warum diese Umfrageergebnisse mit großer Vorsicht behandelt oder gar ignoriert werden sollten. Gründe dafür sind u. a. die staatliche Zensur, die Selbstzensur der Bevölkerung und eine verzerrte Beantwortung der Fragen, das Vorhandensein von Protesten sogar in einem autoritären Umfeld in Russland, als auch die Tatsache, dass einige der früheren Umfragen nach einem hypothetischen Einmarsch fragten, über den viele Russ:innen wohl nicht ausreichend nachgedacht haben könnten. Allerdings führt der Beitrag an, dass die plausibelste Erklärung für den offensichtlichen anfänglichen Rückhalt für den Krieg in der Manipulation der öffentlichen Meinung durch staatliche Kontrolle der Kommunikationskanäle und der weitverbreitete Einsatz von Zensur, Propaganda und Desinformation im eigenen Land als auch im Ausland liegt." (Seite 6)
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"1. Global internet freedom declined for the 12th consecutive year. The sharpest downgrades were documented in Russia, Myanmar, Sudan, and Libya. Following the Russian military’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin dramatically intensified its ongoing efforts to suppress domest
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ic dissent and accelerated the closure or exile of the country’s remaining independent media outlets. In at least 53 countries, users faced legal repercussions for expressing themselves online, often leading to draconian prison terms. 2 Governments are breaking apart the global internet to create more controllable online spaces. A record number of national governments blocked websites with nonviolent political, social, or religious content, undermining the rights to free expression and access to information. A majority of these blocks targeted sources located outside of the country. New national laws posed an additional threat to the free flow of information by centralizing technical infrastructure and applying flawed regulations to social media platforms and user data. 3. China was the world’s worst environment for internet freedom for the eighth consecutive year. Censorship intensified during the 2022 Beijing Olympics and after tennis star Peng Shuai accused a high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official of sexual assault. The government continued to tighten its control over the country’s booming technology sector, including through new rules that require platforms to use their algorithmic systems to promote CCP ideology. 4. A record 26 countries experienced internet freedom improvements. Despite the overall global decline, civil society organizations in many countries have driven collaborative efforts to improve legislation, develop media resilience, and ensure accountability among technology companies. Successful collective actions against internet shutdowns offered a model for further progress on other problems like commercial spyware. 5. Internet freedom in the United States improved marginally for the first time in six years. There were fewer reported cases of targeted surveillance and online harassment during protests compared with the previous year, and the country now ranks ninth globally, tied with Australia and France. The United States still lacks a comprehensive federal privacy law, and policymakers made little progress on the passage of other legislation related to internet freedom. Ahead of the November 2022 midterm elections, the online environment was riddled with political disinformation, conspiracy theories, and online harassment aimed at election workers and officials. 6. Human rights hang in the balance amid a competition to control the web. Authoritarian states are vying to propagate their model of digital control around the world. In response, a coalition of democratic governments has increased the promotion of online human rights at multilateral forums, outlining a positive vision for the internet. However, their progress remains hampered by problematic internet freedom practices in their own countries." (Key findings)
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"The research – based on programmatic text-mining supported analyses of several millions of war-related comments scraped by Sentione and further examined with CrowdTangle - found traces of inauthentic, repetitive pro-Kremlin activity on Facebook in all countries under review, which can be consider
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ed attempts to influence public opinion in the affected states and, in some cases, beyond them. Our main conclusions are: Crises help the Kremlin. Even if public opinion in the EU is currently unfavorable to the Kremlin, the onset of high, permanent inflation, soaring energy prices and the looming danger of an EU-wide recession could create a more favorable environment for the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts. Most (covertly) Kremlin-friendly forces will adopt a rhetoric blasting sanctions for harming Europe more than Russia. Importing disinformation narratives. Three out of the four narratives found in Hungary were imported into the country from abroad. One doubting Ukraine’s existence as a country started from an organization connected to Ukrainian pro-Putin oligarch Viktor Medvechuk, taken over by the so-called “news agency” of separatists. Another narrative detailing a new, dictatorial world order based on, among others, COVID-19 restrictions, and led by NATO was aimed at developing countries where Russia can hope to hold more sway. The third essentially took over a trend in the Russian media space: users tried to discredit anti-war voices by asking them “where they were in the past eight years” when Ukraine committed atrocities against minorities. Strategies in Germany: Divide and Rule. The six relevant narratives we found in Germany employed three different strategies. The first was anti-Westernism, where the US and NATO are to blame for Russia’s attack. The second aimed clearly at generating debates by spreading a Kremlin-critical narrative. Some profiles involved in this were caught disseminating both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin narratives, which indicates it is not intended to counter the Kremlin’s information operation but to be a part of it. The third strategy was about exploiting contemporary events - such as heightened discussions on sanctions and rising inflation." (Executive summary)
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"In the mid-1990s, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan for the first time. They banned photography, TV, music, and all forms of entertainment. Soon after, the Taliban banned the internet in early 2001, and then-Foreign Minister Mawlavi Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil famously stated, “We want to establ
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ish a system in Afghanistan through which we can control all those things that are wrong, obscene, immoral, and against Islam.”
After being dislodged from Afghanistan following the 2001 U.S. intervention, however, the Taliban’s approach to media changed dramatically. Over the course of the movement’s two-decade insurgency, the Taliban developed a complex media strategy that contributed significantly to its rapid military advance and takeover of Afghanistan by August 2021. Since then, their media strategy has shifted again as the movement attempts to transition from insurgency to a governing body. As such, the Taliban’s current strategy builds on the ideological foundation from the 1990s combined with a continuation of certain tactics and approaches adopted during two decades of insurgency. This article divides the Taliban’s media strategy into three phases accordingly: the movement’s first period of rule from 1996 to 2001, the 2001-2021 insurgency, and their return to power following the fall of Kabul in August 2021. It discusses each phases’ distinct characteristics, shared aspects with other phases, and what the evolution in the Taliban’s media strategy reveals about the future trajectory of the information environment in Afghanistan." (Page 1)
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"Over the past decade, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has employed unorthodox foreign policy tools with increasing frequency, intensity, and success. Perhaps the most effective of these tactics has been the use of information warfare designed to affect decision-making in countries Russia considers to be
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its adversaries. In the target countries, these measures aim to destabilize civil society, erode trust in democratic institutions, and foster uncertainty among allies. If the United States and Europe hope to defend their economies, institutions, and identities, an immediate and effective policy response is required. To date, however, the United States and many of its European partners have struggled to develop policies that combat and counter Russian information warfare. The articles gathered here examine the tools that Russia has used against Ukraine, Poland, the United States, and the European Union, as well as the strategies that these countries have employed to combat Russian information warfare. The joint article by the four authors concisely summarizes the findings and proposes policy options by means of which the democratic countries of the West can address the challenges information warfare poses. The final article looks at Russia, examining controversies around the political role of the aggregator Yandex.news in prioritizing media news." (Introduction, page 2)
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"This Policy Brief examines the different ways in which big data collection serves autocratic agendas by hiding the oppressive potential of heightened surveillance through promises of enhanced safety, convenience, and modernisation. Political actors with autocratic agendas can package their governan
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ce agenda via these promises of big data to bolster their legitimacy as leaders and avoid backlash for their invasive policies. The paper explores case studies illustrating that in some cases citizens welcome or do not object to invasive policies when autocrats frame the collection of private information as enhancing citizen safety and convenience. The paper then unpacks how the narrative push for digital solutionism and technology optimism unwittingly serves autocratic agendas. Finally, recommendations are provided for policymakers and civil society organisations seeking to resist the sinister alliance of big data and autocratic repression or what some have rightfully called, “digital dictatorships.'' Understanding the facets of big data that make them a crucial cog in autocratic governance can better aid civil society organisations and multilateral democratic institutions to combat the threat of data-driven autocracy." (Abstract)
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"The purpose of this research is two-fold: first, to assess the effectiveness of the restrictions placed on Russian state-affiliated media by the European Union after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine; second, to unearth potential circumvention methods and their success in enabling pro-Kr
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emlin content to reach European audiences. This report breaks down into two parts: firstly, an analysis of traffic from global and European audiences to all RT websites, as well as websites associated with Rossiya Segodnya, a media group affiliated with the Kremlin that operates various outlets, including Sputnik. For this, analysts conducted website forensics and collected website traffic data to identify all RT and Rossiya Segodnya domains and to understand who is still accessing their content and how. The second study explored how RT articles that negatively depict Ukrainians seeking refuge in Europe and elsewhere were made available through various means across the EU." (About this publication)
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"Using the coup as a vantage point, interviewees for this report were asked to reflect on three main questions: What have we learned about past media reform efforts? With hindsight, what are the legacies, best practices, and lessons learned? With a view to the future, what does the media’s respons
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e to the coup teach us about reform and resilience? One of the important lessons their collective reflections and analysis show is that over the past decade the media assistance approach in Burma should have been more strategic, nuanced, grassroots driven, flexible, and inclusive, with a greater focus on opportunities to support local initiatives, coalitions, and actors. Other important lessons learned concern risks and security, including the importance of digital security literacy and mechanisms, as well as building widespread capacity in volatile contexts with greater risk of repression." (Conclusion)
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"By the time readers arrive at the end of Jones’s astonishing examination of social media in the Middle East, they will be completely persuaded that it is now impossible to tell whether anything they read online is true. Replete with bots and sock puppets, trolls and dupes, this online world is bo
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th profoundly silly and deeply scary. Accordingly, the book is by turns funny and terrifying as it details efforts by governments, notably Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, to shape what people say, think, and do. Jones acknowledges that governments have always used public relations and propaganda to influence audiences at home and abroad. But he shows that the new information and communication technologies, which were once thought destined to free civil society and strengthen the public sphere, are also tremendously effective tools of deception and tyranny. Armies of bots and trolls motivated by money, power, and, sometimes, it seems, sheer perversity, spew out tweets and posts, fake news articles, fake news outlets, and even fake journalists; as Jones puts it, “You are being lied to by people who do not even exist.” This deception pollutes public discourse across the Middle East and, more important, inhibits the critical thinking of the citizenry." (Review by Lisa Anderson in Foreign Affairs, January/February 2023)
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"The publication analyzes the emerging trends of foreign authoritarian-state disinformation in the context of the war in Ukraine in a comparative manner focusing on 7 states of Southeast Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania). It examines
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the continuities and evolution in Russia’s strategies, channels and narratives for disseminating disinformation since the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine and the extent to which other foreign authoritarian states -Turkey, the Gulf states, Iran, have amplified Russian propaganda. The research further traces the personal and institutional pathways through which China has been able to establish its media foothold in Southeast European countries. The report offers policy recommendations for safeguarding democracy and media freedom in the Balkans against the ever-increasing pressures from authoritarianism." (Publisher description)
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"As the Russian invasion of Ukraine erupted, the country’s authorities declared a war on Western social media as well. In March, such social media giants as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram were blocked in Russia, giving their local competitor—named VK—a virtual monopoly in the country. Millio
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ns of Russian Facebook and Instagram users have flocked to this social network. Though VK may seem similar to Facebook, it is drastically different due to its proximity to the Russian government. The article examines the core peculiarities of VK and the risks its users may face, especially, in the context of war." (Abstract)
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"This paper offers a critical overview of anti-war propaganda in the Russian language during the first six months of the war and identifies the reasons for its limited success. After a review of the challenges to current forms of propaganda, the paper offers practical recommendations to improve the
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work in this area." (Page 3)
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