"This paper explores the Taliban government's media capture strategies since retaking the country on August 15, 2021, and how journalists and media outlets have responded to these strategies. In particular, it focuses on the Taliban government's approach to the media, given the recent political tran
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sformation in Afghanistan and the religious and political ideologies of the Taliban regime [...] The study revealed that the Taliban media capture strategies have multifaceted dimensions. From the analysis of media director and journalist interviews and relevant formal documents from the Taliban regime, seven media capture strategies emerge: (1) Regulatory interference, (2) Criminal prosecution of journalists, (3) Suppression of journalists, (4) Financial pressures on media outlets, (5) Media ownership, (6) Monopoly on information and (7) Expulsion of foreign journalists. Furthermore, this study finds that the Afghan media community, including the media outlets, journalists, and media unions, employed four tolerance strategies in response to the media capture strategies of the Taliban government, such as (1) Selfimposed censorship, (2) Low resistance, (3) Stopping controversial content, and (4) Advocacy campaigns." (Abstract)
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"The study assesses the extent to which Taliban 2.0 utilised social media as a political mobilisation strategy and provides a response through discourse analysis and a literature review. The study results indicate that the tactical use of social media was more apparent in 2021 when they were promoti
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ng the notion of their impending return to power and advancing their territorial gains on social media. The Taliban 2.0's utilisation of social media underscores their strategies for comprehending public narratives to present themselves as the legitimate authorities of Afghanistan. The research reveals that the Taliban's utilisation of social media tools enabled them to regain control of Afghanistan by shaping public narratives in their favour. The study is unequivocal in its assertion that Taliban 2.0 must evolve into a political institution that is significantly more democratic and responsive. It is sufficient for it to relinquish the dynastic and undemocratic principles upon which it currently operates. Not only to enhance Afghanistan's governance in general but also to allow for a more favourable opportunity to capture the hearts and minds of the Afghan public. The Taliban 2.0 must transcend their identities to alter the ethnic narrative and eliminate inequalities. For the democratic system to progress in the appropriate direction, the nation requires a genuine and democratic opposition party or parties. The Afghan youth are the primary decision-makers in determining whether Afghanistan's democracy will continue to progress towards impactful growth or vice versa, as long as the Afghan public, particularly the youth and strong regional parties, fails to collaborate and present the electorate with viable and credible strategies against misgovernance and economic reforms that generate employment. This study suggests that young Afghans should be encouraged to develop critical thinking skills to use social media to advocate for their rights and convey dissent, as a means of communicating with the current government." (Abstract)
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"Chinese idol fans have been identified among the main forces in cyber nationalist activisms in recent years, acting as the nationalist fans protecting the state as an idol in response to external political shocks. Their skills in acknowledging, involving, and even reinventing the image of the state
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and national pride in cyber nationalist activisms do not emerge in a vacuum. This article examines how idol fans involve and reinvent the nationalist discourse in their everyday fan activities – idol promotion. We focus on the pandemic in 2020 as it provides a specific social and political context that allows us to understand better the interaction between idol fans and the state in their mundane fan activities. We construct our analysis under the computational grounded theory framework with over 6 million fan posts collected from Weibo and 11 in-depth interviews with active idol fans. Our findings show that when engaging in pandemic-related discussion, idol fans actively borrowed official discourse on nationalism and strategically responded to key political and social events in their idol promotion activities. The idol images they built are not only positive but also nationalist. Therefore, they play not only the commercial logic commonly seen in the Japanese and Korean K-pop/idol culture but also the political logic propagated by the state in China." (Abstract)
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"This article explores the use of YouTube in the increasing practice of vlogging in Zimbabwe. Vlogging counters authoritarian media policies that restrict the entry of new media players and democratic participation in existing traditional media. This dearth of public debate on traditional media has
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created a window of opportunities for social media as alternative voices through YouTube ‘televisions’. We consider this a metaphorical yearning for alternative television stations in the mainstream media-dominated context of Zimbabwe. Employing the theoretical concept of counterpublics, this article presents a thematic analysis from three selected YouTube channels: Bustop TV, Goldgator TV and TV 7. The findings reveal that although authoritarian media laws are a huge setback to freedom of expression, YouTube empowers non-professional journalists to challenge those who possess political power. The article establishes that authoritarian media laws are no longer as effective in stifling dissent. We argue new thinking towards a liberal trajectory is called upon." (Abstract)
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"[This book] addresses the long-standing puzzle of why China outlived other one-party authoritarian regimes with particular attention to how the state manages an emerging civil society. Drawing upon over 1,200 survey responses conducted in 126 villages in the Sichuan province, as well as 70 intervie
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ws conducted with Civil Society Organization (CSO) leaders and government officials, participant observation, and online research, the book proposes a new theory of interactive authoritarianism to explain how an adaptive authoritarian state manages nascent civil society. Sun argues that when new phenomena and forces are introduced into Chinese society, the Chinese state adopts a three-stage interactive approach toward societal actors: toleration, differentiation, and legalization without institutionalization. Sun looks to three disruptions-earthquakes, internet censorship, and social-media-based guerilla resistance to the ride-sharing industry-to test his theory about the three-stage interactive authoritarian approach and argues that the Chinese government evolves and consolidates its power in moments of crisis." (Publisher description)
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"Today, social networks are the most popular and widely used applications among smartphone users all around the world. Three years ago, the Telegram messaging app was the most widely used social messaging app in Iran due to its technical features and user-friendliness. Despite its popularity, Telegr
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am caused controversial debates among policymakers and public opinion. To discover the nature of these conflicts, two main discourses were identified through qualitative data analysis based on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. Proponents of Minaret discourse consider the Telegram as a threat to national security, thus they have tried to provide favorable condition to limit using it, and develop alternative domestic apps. In contrast, Cylinder discourse supports using the Telegram app to fulfill citizens’ digital rights and their rights of privacy and freedom of expression. This discursive conflict among policymakers, along with users’ resistance, resulted in some failures in the adoption of foreign apps (e.g., Telegram). Despite the extensive technical, financial, and moral supports to popularize domestic apps, users still prefer foreign apps such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and Instagram. The analysis of emergent discourses demonstrates the origins of contestations and provides insights into how to adopt social messaging apps." (Abstract)
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"Welche Rolle spielen nichtstaatliche Akteure, sogenannte "Proxys", in staatlichen Cyberkonflikten? Und wie unterscheidet sich regimetypenspezifisch das (De-)Eskalationsmanagement? Kerstin Zettl-Schabath vergleicht mithilfe eines umfassenden Datensatzes für die Jahre 2000-2019 die staatlichen Cyber
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-Proxy-Strategien von China, Russland, den USA und Israel. Dabei zeigen sich je nach politischem System deutliche Abweichungen: Autokratien nutzen Proxys als "Puffer" gegenüber Demokratien, um für ihre Taten nicht belangt zu werden. Für Demokratien dagegen können Berichte privater IT-Unternehmen "Täter-Wissen" kommunizieren sowie Handlungsdruck infolge politischer Verantwortungszuweisungen reduzieren." (Verlagbeschreibung)
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"Journalists act strategically in response to their political environments, using practices like self-censorship to avoid negative repercussions from powerful actors. But what does self-censorship look like in practice? Grounded in theories of policy response and media sociology, this study uses jou
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rnalistic narratives to examine three strategies journalists employ to publish news while safeguarding themselves in semi-authoritarian contexts with restricted media freedom. Journalists choose among these based on several factors, including the relative power available to them in a particular organizational context, story idea, or angle. The analysis shows that self-censorship is more negotiated and less one-directional than the current literature suggests. The negotiation lens also shows how power dynamics can change on a situational basis, even in contexts where one actor clearly has significantly more power than the other." (Abstract)
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"This book explores how digital authoritarianism operates in India, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and how religion can be used to legitimize digital authoritarianism within democracies. In doing so, it explains how digital authoritarianism operates at various technological levels includ
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ing sub-network level, proxy level, and user level, and elaborates on how governments seek to control cyberspace and social media. In each of these states, governments, in an effort to prolong – or even make permanent – their rule, seek to eliminate freedom of expression on the internet, punish dissidents, and spread pro-state propaganda. At the same time, they instrumentalize religion to justify and legitimize digital authoritarianism. Governments in these five countries, to varying degrees and at times using different methods, censor the internet, but also use digital technology to generate public support for their policies, key political figures, and at times their worldview or ideology. They also, and again to varying degrees, use digital technology to demonize religious and ethnic minorities, opposition parties, and political dissidents." (Publisher description)
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"In Myanmar and Pakistan, anti-democratic forces including an alliance of military and right-wing political factions are dominating political affairs despite both countries’ constitutions defining democratic processes. Consequently, the authoritarian rule has been looming in these countries. The a
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bove forces have kept tight control over traditional media (television, print) by silencing the voices of common people using force and violence. However, social media has empowered pro-civilian rule activists to raise their voices and has helped to mobilise the public in favour of political change in their societies. How are these activists using social media to bring political change in Myanmar and Pakistan? This policy brief seeks answers to this question by examining the activism of political and civil society activists on social media in Myanmar and Pakistan. The brief explains the methods, strategies, and their impact on political and social space in Pakistani and Myanmar societie." (Summary)
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"[...] Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban has imposed a new media control regime, which has three key features: restriction, gender-discrimination, and repression with impunity. First, the Taliban has passed several media policies, imposing extreme constraints on press freedom and
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media rights. Any sort of critical reporting on topics related to the government or the public is banned. The Taliban regulate the content of publications and broadcasts, imposing broad, vaguely worded prohibitions. For example, under the new regulations, media content that contradicts “Islamic values,” “Afghan values,” and “public interest” is prohibited. No operational definitions have been provided for these terms, nor an objective standard for assessing and determining breach. This has caused uncertainty and confusion about what the media can and cannot publish and broadcast, often resulting in precautionary media self-censorship. The new rules also give the Taliban sweeping powers to directly control the media and news output, barring broadcast and publication of matters and content that has not been officially sanctioned by Taliban official/s. These restrictions and interferences limit the right and ability of the Afghan media to seek, receive and impart information freely and independently.
Second, the Taliban has passed policies specifically targeting Afghan women in the media. These restrictions give the Taliban control over women’s attire and the nature and scope of their involvement in the media, restraining their freedom of expression and movement, as well as their ability to perform their tasks effectively. The general travel restrictions on women and girls make it almost impossible for women to work, in particular, limiting the ability of female journalists from gathering information or contributing to field reporting. The Taliban’s antiwomen media policies and practices are aimed towards excluding Afghan women from the media and public life.
Third, the Taliban treats the Afghan media and media-related affairs as a security threat. The Taliban security and intelligence agencies are increasingly involved in controlling media affairs. Taliban operatives use repressive measures against members of the Afghan media in claiming to enforce the new regulations. Afghan journalists and other members of the media have been subjected to heavy surveillance, intimidation, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Cases of beatings, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings have also taken place." (Executive summary, pages 1-2)
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"Transnational repression is strategically employed by autocrats, enabled by underprepared host governments, and spreading rapidly around the world. This report aims to assess the strengths and weaknesses in the global understanding of and responses to transnational repression, so that governments,
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private companies, and civil society organizations can better equip themselves to defend human rights. Transnational repression should be recognized for what it is: a direct threat to fundamental freedoms, state sovereignty, and democracy, and a disturbing physical manifestation of global authoritarianism." (Page 2)
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"This volume explores the implications of digital media technologies for journalists’ professional practice, news users’ consumption and engagement with news, as well as the shifting institutional, organizational and financial structures of news media. Drawing on case studies and quantitative an
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d qualitative approaches, contributors address questions concerning: whether China is witnessing ‘disruptive’ or ‘sustainable’ journalism; if, and in what ways, digital technologies may disrupt journalism; and whether Chinese digital journalism converges with or diverges from Western experiences of digital journalism." (Publisher description)
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"This paper will outline the technologies and mechanisms of Putin's information machine, how it operates during the war and the obstacles to anti-war propaganda among Russians. At the very end, we will offer some recommendations for confronting Putin's information machine at war, both of a general n
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ature and relating to specific groups of Russian society." (Page 3)
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"This report explores the social media habits of Iranian netizens and how the Islamic Republic is repressing the online space." (Publisher description)
"The media situation in Belarus has never been easy. With Aliaksandr Lukashenka being elected president of the country for the first time in 1994, the necessary reforms to provide media freedom have never materialised. Instead, over the years various laws have lessened the rights of independent jour
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nalists and imposed limits on both traditional and electronic media. Following the August 2020 presidential election, which ignited a brutal crackdown against the democratic opposition, the situation has worsened. Harassment, a hijacking, and politically motivated jail terms, both short and long, intimidate Belarusians who want to exchange ideas, report wrongdoing or fight for freedom of expression and freedom for the country. In January 2022, the Belarusian Association of Journalists confirmed the presence of at least 32 journalists in Belarusian jails. On the positive side, new electronic media cannot be banned effectively and absolutely. While the regime slowly expands its presence on the internet, Belarusians trust independent media more and use it more eagerly. However, society’s distancing of itself from traditional state-controlled media is increasingly met with an angry reaction from the state apparatus, which in turn further tightens related laws. The European Union, and the European Parliament in particular, actively support independent media and civil society in Belarus, and the Council of the EU and the Parliament both address the challenges to media freedom in the country. Financial help is also provided to Belarus and was even increased at the end of 2021, with priority areas of support including ‘systematically repressed’ independent media." (Summary)
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"This report focuses on Beijing's efforts to control domestic reporting by resident foreign journalists. It is based on interviews conducted by the IFJ in December 2021 with 19 current or recent correspondents from nine countries, who work across print and broadcast and whose experience in China ran
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ges from a couple of years to several decades. It also draws from Locked Down or Kicked Out, the Foreign Correspondents Club of China's 2021 Media Freedoms Report, and earlier FCCC annual reports based on surveys of the club's roughly 190 members. The research finds that China uses a wide range of coercive methods to control foreign journalistsf reporting. These include: outright expulsions, plus threats that make journalists feel compelled to leave; denials and delays in the granting of visas so that journalists are unable to start work on schedule or must live from one short-term visa to another, unsure if they will be there the following month; lighter scrutiny of journalists from nations viewed as 'friendly' or 'unimportant', although Beijing's attitude fluctuates according to political relations between China and the home country; lawsuits alleging breaches of reporting protocols, such as identifying oneself as a journalist, which carry the risk of being refused an exit visa until the case is resolved [...]" (Executive summary)
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"The internet gained centrality as a space of public opinion and political activity that became important for the Russian state to co-opt and control as part of the broader push for control of political elites and public perceptions as Putin and his ruling party pushed to eliminate any functioning o
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pposition and cement their power. Finally, the internet gained importance as a geopolitical strategic object, given its centrality to conflicts, cyberwarfare and foreign policy operations. In the current and ongoing stage, the internet is now also an important object of critical technological infrastructure that is now also being co-opted into full state control as part of the national security and sovereignty agenda. The past decade since 2012 has seen a gradual takeover by the state of key industry players such as VK and Yandex, a crackdown on political and media elites and ordinary users, and the introduction of a swathe of new regulations, all aimed at consolidating state control over an area of importance for the national security and sovereignty agenda. Today, digital authoritarianism is an integral part of Russia’s state survival strategy and is likely to remain as such for the foreseeable future, given Russia’s current international isolation and its fraught and increasingly hostile standoff with the democratic global community." (Analysis and conclusion, page 25)
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