"This article examines the sociohistorical role of radio broadcasting in Afghanistan and analyses the interplay between the radio choices of the audience, political change and conflict. Though never explicitly trusted as a credible information source, the popularity of national radio in Afghanistan
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was critically weakened following the Communist revolution of 1978 and subsequent abuse of broadcasting under successive Afghan Communist regimes. Analysis highlights how the audience's thirst for unbiased information resulted in a substantial majority turning to the BBC World Service, this international service being perceived as a far more trustworthy and credible alternative. Discussion of the social history of Radio Afghanistan, the Taliban's Voice of Radio Shari'at and the BBC World Service serves to highlight the propagandist media machinery of the Communist era, the radical media policies of the Taliban regime and the value attributed to the BBC's current news reporting. In an example of the global becoming the local, the article concludes by examining how the BBC World Service has become the dominant radio broadcaster in Afghanistan and the extent to which this position is based on the quality of their outputs or their self-promotional discourses concerning impartiality." (Abstract)
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"Afghan journalists face threats from all sides: government officials exploiting weak legal protections to intimidate reporters and editors to compel them not to cover controversial topics; the Taliban and other insurgent groups using threats and violence to compel reporting they consider favorable;
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and police and justice officials letting threats, assaults, and even murders go uninvestigated and unprosecuted. Most of the threats come from individuals acting on behalf of powerful government officials or influential local actors, including militia leaders and so-called warlords. Violent attacks on journalists that go uninvestigated and unpunished reflect wider impunity and failure to establish the rule of law in Afghanistan. Afghan journalists often respond to the dangers with self-censorship. Many steer clear of reporting on sensitive issues—including corruption, land grabbing, violence against women, and human rights abuses—as a means to minimize safety risks. Kabul-based editors often avoid assigning stories that could put their reporters at significant risk. Editors and journalists told Human Rights Watch that self-censorship has become a survival mechanism for them. Those outside of the country’s main cities are especially vulnerable to reprisals from powerful individuals and groups because they are more exposed: they lack the protection provided by a larger Afghan media and international presence. The cultural and social conservatism of the provinces also contributes to the difficulty of reporting on controversial issues outside of the capital. The Taliban and other insurgent groups remain a potent source of intimidation and violence against journalists and media outlets. When the insurgency first emerged in 2002, journalists were among its early targets because the insurgents treated journalists as extensions of the Afghan government or Western military forces. However, in recent years, the Taliban and other insurgent groups have used the media as a propaganda platform, and actively court the press in their campaign against the government, including by pressuring reporters to cover their statements or not write articles deemed critical, sometimes with threats of violence. Female journalists in Afghanistan face particularly formidable challenges. In addition to the dangers facing all journalists, they must contend with social and cultural restrictions arising from being Afghan women in the workplace, which limit their mobility in urban as well as rural areas, and increase their vulnerability to sexual violence." (Summary, page 1-2)
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"Afghanistan once housed tourists from around the world intrigued by the Silk Road stories, the poetic and mystic culture, the majestic landscape and the hospitable people. Their experience in Afghanistan was frequently captured through journalism and photojournalism of the early 1900s. However, Afg
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hanistan’s very own media culture was born during this same time with Seraj-ul-Akhbar being the country’s first newspaper, published on 11 January 1906." (Abstract)
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"[...] Afghanistan is a fragile, fractured state and has one of the most fragile and fractured media, where almost anyone with sufficient funds and the opportunity to move quickly has been able to establish a media presence. This environment has enabled the flourishing of television, radio and other
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media established and owned by powerful political and religious leaders, or by those with allegiance to them. Some fear a future of increased ethnic, sectarian and factional strife being played out through the airwaves. Though there are some very successful commercial television channels, there is no independent and widely trusted national media capable of transcending or creating communication across the fracture points in Afghan society. Most media is either localised or seen as serving political, religious or other agendas. The future of the national broadcaster, RTA, still the only broadcaster with a truly national presence, is uncertain. While journalism as a whole has expanded greatly, investigative journalism remains limited. The sustainability of the newly established commercial media is widely questioned. With the total annual advertising market in the country estimated by some at little more than $20 million, there are real concerns that if donor support declines much of the media will wither or fall prey to factional, religious or extreme forces. There is no shortage of such forces. A number of media outlets already play upon ethnic and sectarian tensions. The Taliban, notorious when in power for shutting down media and banning video tape, have embraced the web and run one of the most effective media strategies in the country. In 2012, the mood music is one of compromise with the Taliban. Concern in the country is growing that new found media freedoms may be the price of that compromise. The role of donors in media support in Afghanistan is probably greater than in any other country at any other time. Such support is largely responsible for the development of a substantial media sector, but it faces criticism that it is poorly coordinated, short term and not informed by aid effectiveness principles; that it focuses too heavily on advancing the agendas of the donors; and that in some sectors it is distorting the media market in ways that create dependency and inhibit the development of genuinely sustainable Afghan media ventures." (Executive summary)
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"The exponential media growth in Afghanistan over the last decade is due to the enthusiasm of Afghan entrepreneurs and to support from the United States and other nations, states this report. According to the executive summary "support from the United States, the biggest donor, has waxed and waned.
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From 2002 to 2005 USAID spend $23 million to launch news media outlets and train journalists, and from 2006 to 2010 funding totaled $20.64 million. That included a couple of lean years, 2007 and 2008, when spending was only $3.3 million each year. But with the Obama administration’s Afghan military surge of 2009 there also came a media spending surge. USAID funded a $22 million project called the Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) for 2011, and a separate $7 million project to put news on cellphones was put to bid. Meanwhile, $183 million was allocated to the U.S. embassy in Kabul for a wide array of media projects in 2010 and 2011. And the Defense Department budgeted $180 million for information operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for 2011 alone, some portion of which went to support Afghan media. The effectiveness of all this spending is difficult to gauge, but the smaller and more focused projects–such as creating new radio stations–tend to be seen as generally successful, while the value of the larger and broader projects–such as an anti-insurgency message campaign–is harder to judge." (Executive summary, page 4-5)
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"The anti-Taliban discourse during the Swat military operation, as mediated by the Pakistani state in its propaganda campaign, was aimed at maligning the Taliban militants in order to build support and legitimacy for the military offensive. The dominant trends in the analysis of state’s propaganda
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narratives in Pakistan’s two mainstream newspapers reveal that the main ideological discourse (Islam and national security) of the state remained unchanged during the conflict. In fact, the state tried to build its anti-Taliban narrative on the same ideological discourse. Since the meta-narrative of the state did not undergo any transformation, the post-9/11 anti-terrorism narrative of the state remains a superficial discourse. The discourse analysis of Pakistani state’s anti-Taliban narratives reveals this temporality and superficiality. The state, through its propaganda campaign, portrayed the Taliban as evil, as anti-state actors, who needed to be eliminated in the interests of the country. However, the state ideology supports a pro-Taliban narrative. The only conflict is operational and temporary. Thus, the state propaganda is not directed towards all Taliban, and it is event-specific and time-specific. The state has not abandoned the Islamic ideology and its so-called strategic discourse. The Islamic ideology and the national security discourse, on the basis of which Pakistan supported the Taliban in the 90s, suit more a pro-Taliban discourse. That is why the state’s anti-Taliban propaganda kept clashing with the ideology of the state." (Conclusion, page 23)
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"This article describes and analyzes a little understood Afghan Taliban propaganda tool: chants or taranas. These melodic refrains effectively use historical narratives, symbology, and iconic portraits. The chants are engendered in emotions of sorrow, pride, desperation, hope, and complaints to mobi
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lize and convince the Afghan population of the Taliban’s worldview. The chants represent culturally relevant and simple messages that are communicated in a narrative and poetic form that is familiar to and resonates with the local people. They are virtually impossible for the United States and NATO to counter because of Western sensitivities concerning religious themes that dominate the Taliban narrative space, not to mention the lack of Western linguistic capabilities, including the understanding and mastering the poetic nature of local dialects." (Abstract)
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"[...] International donor support for Afghanistan's media has had two primary goals. The short-term goal has been to counteract the effects of insurgent communications in order to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. The long-term goal has been to create a free and independent media secto
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r that will continue to function after donor support has ended. Although millions of dollars have been invested in the development of the Afghan media sector and the growth of private media since 2001 is considered one of Afghanistan's greatest success stories, neither of these donor goals is being met. Donor support for Afghan media has led to the growth of radio and television outlets that are almost entirely dependent on foreign funding - direct and indirect. Recent strategic communications policies have neither diminished nor adequately countered the presence of extremist voices in Afghanistan. Despite some examples to the contrary, Taliban communications continue to affect the lives of ordinary Afghans, whereas many communications by and from Western sources do not. Neither short- nor mid-term analysis of the Afghan economy - ranked the third poorest in the world by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) - foresees the growth of a market able to sustain Afghanistan's domestic media sector without foreign financing. The limited impact of Western communications endeavors, in conjunction with the predicted continued weakness of the Afghan economy, reveals an urgent need for a dramatic shift in the media strategies and goals pursued by the United States and its allies. First and foremost, donors should invest primarily in the Afghan media's production and dissemination of socially constructive contents rather than in building media institutions or infrastructure that the Afghan economy cannot support. For these contents to be received as authentic and credible, they must reflect the vulnerabilities and priorities that Afghans themselves have identified as vital. Donors should make a multiyear funding commitment to the media in Afghanistan. Support should be allocated to both terrestrial and wireless media through a transparent and competitive process developed jointly by donors and Afghan media experts. Aggressively supporting the dissemination of socially constructive contents through new outlets will permit access to both geographic and demographic segments of the population not adequately served by current media outlets." (Summary, page 3)
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