"[...] in recent years – particularly since the 2014 Ukraine conflict – Russia’s use of media to leverage broader influence campaigns has gained notoriety, both domestically and internationally. Russia’s state-owned media outlets are central to the Kremlin’s strategy and are drivers of its
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soft power in Africa. Services like Sputnik and RT (formerly Russia Today) find resonance among African editors. Building on anti-imperialist credentials and positioning itself as an alternative news source, state-owned media is able to provide a more balanced image of Russia in Africa, while combatting Western narratives. The Kremlin has successfully adapted to the digital age, broadening its operations to include online news sites in several languages. African news websites are, in turn, republishing content from Kremlin-sponsored media on a large scale. The narratives are amplified far beyond their original source, the main message being that Moscow is ready to engage with Africa on mutually beneficial terms. Influence-building using social media is another key aspect of Russia’s media strategy in Africa. It is used to sow doubt and build trust in alternative news sources. And, Russian networks are increasingly working with local actors in African countries to better disguise their activities. Interestingly, much of the content being shared on social media by Russian networks is not ‘fake news’, but in most cases is hyper-partisan and polarising." (Abstract)
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"The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today) has attracted much attention as a purveyor of Russian propaganda. To date, most studies of RT have focused on its broadcast, website, and social media content, with little research on its audiences. Through a data-driven
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application of network science and other computational methods, we address this gap to provide insight into the demographics and interests of RT’s Twitter followers, as well as how they engage with RT. Building upon recent studies of Russian state-sponsored media, we report three main results. First, we find that most of RT’s Twitter followers only very rarely engage with its content and tend to be exposed to RT’s content alongside other mainstream news channels. This indicates that RT is not a central part of their online news media environment. Second, using probabilistic computational methods, we show that followers of RT are slightly more likely to be older and male than average Twitter users, and they are far more likely to be bots. Third, we identify thirty-five distinct audience segments, which vary in terms of their nationality, languages, and interests. This audience segmentation reveals the considerable heterogeneity of RT’s Twitter followers. Accordingly, we conclude that generalizations about RT’s audience based on analyses of RT’s media content, or on vocal minorities among its wider audiences, are unhelpful and limit our understanding of RT and its appeal to international audiences." (Abstract)
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"This report focuses on Beijing's efforts to control domestic reporting by resident foreign journalists. It is based on interviews conducted by the IFJ in December 2021 with 19 current or recent correspondents from nine countries, who work across print and broadcast and whose experience in China ran
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ges from a couple of years to several decades. It also draws from Locked Down or Kicked Out, the Foreign Correspondents Club of China's 2021 Media Freedoms Report, and earlier FCCC annual reports based on surveys of the club's roughly 190 members. The research finds that China uses a wide range of coercive methods to control foreign journalistsf reporting. These include: outright expulsions, plus threats that make journalists feel compelled to leave; denials and delays in the granting of visas so that journalists are unable to start work on schedule or must live from one short-term visa to another, unsure if they will be there the following month; lighter scrutiny of journalists from nations viewed as 'friendly' or 'unimportant', although Beijing's attitude fluctuates according to political relations between China and the home country; lawsuits alleging breaches of reporting protocols, such as identifying oneself as a journalist, which carry the risk of being refused an exit visa until the case is resolved [...]" (Executive summary)
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"This report provides a framework for understanding China's discourse-power ambitions [...], the strategy China has developed to achieve them, and an initial assessment of the successes and limitations of these efforts to date. The report begins by tracing the evolution of China's conception of disc
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ourse power, from China's period of reform and opening in 1978 to the current era under President Xi Jinping. The next section takes a closer look at how the party-state has been restructured, in part, to help operationalize China's goals to gain "the power to speak" and "the power to be heard." The third section focuses on China's strategy for gaining discourse power by centering itself in the ecosystem of global connectivity. This strategy includes gaining the "power to speak" by using social and digital media platforms to shape local information environments in its favor. It also includes gaining the "power to be heard" by promoting the CCPapproved norm of "cyber sovereignty". Lastly, this report provides a brief assessment of both the successes and limitations of China's discourse-power operations." (Introduction, page 4)
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"Disinformation and misinformation have been amplified in the digital age. In order to combat their increasing presence in our everyday lives, we have to first educate ourselves on what disinformation is. In this post, Jakub Ferencik looks at this question in some detail, primarily by analyzing Vlad
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imir Putin’s usage of disinformation in politics. He first demarcates between disinformation and misinformation, points to some examples in Putin’s early tenure as the President of Russia, and compares them with the use of disinformation during the pandemic in order to show why people lose trust in traditional media sources. Finally, Ferencik addresses the two most avid producers of Russian disinformation, RT and Sputnik, and briefly discusses why they have become so prominent." (Abstract)
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"This paper explores how Beijing and its proxies have sought to alter this state of affairs through a more localized strategy. By adapting to the local rules of Turkish media and seeking new opportunities to elevate China’s image, Beijing has sought to establish a new synergy in Turkey’s public
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sphere. Promoting a synergy with local players has begun to pay dividends as most recent Turkish opinion polls reflect a gradual increase in the number of Turkish citizens who perceive China as a potential partner." (Introduction)
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"This publication aims to analyse China’s soft power strategies in selected ASEAN countries and issue recommendations for Germany and the European Union (EU) in this field. The subject of China’s grow ing influence on a global scale is of the highest importance for decision-makers and interested
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observers across the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and beyond." (Foreword)
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"En tanto ideología presente en medios, intelectuales y élites políticas de Rusia y Latinoamérica, las narrativas iliberales -proyectadas por medios y academias afines- gozan de apreciable presencia e impacto en el panorama regional. A raíz del conflicto entre Rusia y Occidente por la invasión
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a Ucrania, el rol de los medios rusos como fuente de desinformación de la población latinoamericana ha sido objeto de atención. La presencia de estos medios masivos permite al Kremlin cuestionar el modelo democrático vigente en la mayor parte de América Latina y defender las posturas oficiales del gobierno ruso, al tiempo que se alinean con las perspectivas de las fuerzas iliberales - en especial de la izquierda radical - del espectro político regional." (Resumen)
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"During the monitoring period (February 24 – April 24) the following tendencies have been identified: Out of the 160 false information and manipulative content, mainly disseminated in Russian and Georgian sources, the largest share (49.4%) was directed against Ukraine, followed by disinformation a
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gainst the West (28.1%). Part of the false and manipulative content was aimed at justifying Russia’s actions (16.3%). In order to evade Russia’s responsibility for human casualties, the Kremlin’s propaganda has resorted to the tactic of “whataboutism” – in response to accusations, the Russian side has been arguing that the Ukrainian side was the one killing the civilian population and that the population was endangered not by Russian troops but by the actions of the Azov Battalion and other so-called ‘Nazi groups.’ The denial of Russian responsibility for the military intervention in Ukraine was also bolstered by deliberate disinformation, reinforcing the idea that Ukraine was fabricating information about the victims (Mariupol blogger story, Bucha Massacre). Visual manipulations, including those related to the pandemic, were often used for this purpose [...]" (Key findings)
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"This paper is the summary of the results of a research project lasting over six months, covering domestic and foreign hidden malign influence activities pursued through the so-called "grey zone" media in three countries - the Czech Republic, Serbia and Hungary -, during a period of heightened inter
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national tensions related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Political Capital has assessed in numerous studies how the Kremlin or the Hungarian hybrid political regime has used their extensive media empire to conduct active measures or political smear-campaigns in service of political or geopolitical goals. In this study, we set out to understand the inner workings of clandestine disinformation campaigns carried out by mostly anonymous media actors to conduct or influence political campaigns, specifically in the run-up to the Czech, Serbian and Hungarian elections, and destabilise the region in general after the outbreak of the war." (Page 2)
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"This paper examines China’s international communication strategy during the initial phase of the global COVID-19 pandemic. In the spring of 2020, Western governments and media began criticising the systematic lack of transparency and accountability in the Chinese political system in relation to t
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he failed containment of the Wuhan outbreak. Facing an unprecedented reputational crisis, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilised its foreign-language media in an attempt to influence the international discourse on COVID-19. Surveying the English and Chinese editions of the People’s Daily, this study identifies CCP discourses aimed at foreign audiences and traces their evolution during the early stages of the pandemic. Overall, the study provides a comprehensive map of Chinese narratives on COVID-19 and generates fresh insights into CCP crisis communication." (Abstract)
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"Although China's official position on the war has been that of neutrality-not aligning with the West against Russia and not directly supporting Russia's war in Ukraine-its communications about the war, in particular its propaganda via state media and Foreign Ministry spokespeople have carried a mor
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e pro-Russia stance. During the past two months of the Russia-Ukraine war, Chinese official messaging has echoed and reinforced Russia's position: 1.) by promoting shared narratives about the origins and culprits of the war, namely blaming NATO and the United States; 2.) by drawing disproportionally on Russian sources and footage of the war; and 3.) by under-reporting on Ukraine's perspectives. This pro-Russia leaning during the Ukraine crisis can be understood as part of a larger propaganda trajectory vis-à-vis Russia and the United States. Domestically, China's propaganda messaging in large part appears to resonate with public opinion. Internationally, however, Chinese propaganda about the war, especially communications by Foreign Ministry spokespeople, delude China's neutrality position and antagonize the West, while more integrating China into the Global South." (Page 1)
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"Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Beiträge in russischen staatlichen Medien über Impfkampagnen im Westen haben eine negative Konnotation. Die Übertreibung der negativen Folgen einer Impfung mit Präparaten von BionTech/Pfizer und Moderna sowie die Überzeichnung der angeblich massenhaften Unzufried
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enheit sind dabei die wichtigsten Narrative der russischen regierungsfreundlichen Medien. Die russische Medienpolitik hinsichtlich der Berichterstattung über westliche Impfstoffe entspricht der allgemeinen staatlichen Linie des Kreml, Russlands herausragende Stellung in der Welt und die Unzulänglichkeiten des Westens hervorzuheben." (Schlussfolgerungen, Seite 4)
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"The media space is increasingly becoming yet another battlefield for the Islamic Republic to consolidate its hegemony throughout the Middle East. Iran’s media outreach, particularly in Arabic, is only likely to increase, especially online. Supreme Leader Khamenei is keen to see more activities do
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minating the internet, particularly by youth. For decades, Iran and its proxies worked to create a vast integrated media infrastructure to further the aim of exporting the Islamic Revolution. They have made mistakes along the way, but their persistence has allowed them to learn and correct course. Iran’s media infrastructure can now adapt to changes in the world of communications, and its officials feel confident in innovating new strategies. Only a similarly consistent media effort can counter Iran’s malign messaging machinery. This media effort should start with empirical research on the reach and impact of Iran’s media activity in the region. Based on the findings from this effort, a clear countermessaging strategy should be devised and implemented." (Conclusion)
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"[…] The studies presented here […] seek to explore two questions: how have Arab diasporic communities in Europe used Arab media in transnational political action formation since 2011? And how does the use of different media platforms stimulate or confine particular diasporic action, and what do
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es this mean for our understanding of mediatized diaspora? The project conducts a comparative study between the use and users of Syrian, Tunisian, Bahraini, and Egyptian regime-critical and politically mobilized media. The four Arab countries have been selected because they represent different patterns of immigration that are formed by colonial connections and current conflicts." (Introduction, page 2)
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"This study explores how news channels from the Global South challenge western narratives by co-producing TV programmes. It focuses on Telesur (Venezuela) and its collaborations with RT (Russia), Al-Mayadeen (Lebanon) and CCTV/CGTN (China). By combining quantitative and qualitative methods, this pap
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er examines the structure of these collaborations, the discursive construction of alternative narratives and their contribution to countering hegemonic discourses. The findings show that the efforts to construct counterhegemonic narratives are most evident in the co-productions with RT and Al-Mayadeen. Although the co-production with CGTN focusses on culture, it is nonetheless possible to identify the broadcasters’ distinct ideological agendas." (Abstract)
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"In this industry reflection I draw on my professional interest in Brazilian film production an distribution and my archival research of Brazilian films exhibited in the UK between 1995 and 2019 in order to reflect on the factors which help such productions travel and the challenges which they face.
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During the last twenty-five years, following the so-called renaissance of Brazilian cinema, there has been a constant increase in the number of films shown in Brazilian cinemas but, to achieve financial sustainability, filmmakers had to look abroad as well. While the search for financing and partners in other countries should allow the creation of works that possess storytelling appeal and more inviting identities to circulate internationally, the majority of Brazilian films released on UK screens rely on stereotypical depictions, well-known authors and/or powerful international distribution companies. Brazilian national institutions, such as Ancine, and international festivals, such as BFI London Film Festival (LFF), have helped increase visibility for Brazilian productions abroad but more could be done to foster new directorial voices, release strategies and coproduction partnerships." (Abstract)
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"The influence of Russian state-run foreign media (RT, Sputnik et al.) on public opinion in Western democracies is now common knowledge - regardless of its political qualification. Well-documented analyses are available, e.g., from the USA, France and Germany. The German government has also repeated
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ly pointed out the dangers of Russian state propaganda for the German media landscape. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for member states to adopt strategies against "hostile propaganda" from Moscow. The EU Commission has set up a small department to detect fake Russian news." (Introduction)
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"Während in Russland immer mehr unabhängige Medien der staatlichen Kontrolle unterworfen und als „ausländische Agenten“ gebrandmarkt werden, nutzen die russischen Staatsmedien die Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit in Deutschland, um ungehindert Desinformation zu verbreiten. Nach acht Jahren Berich
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terstattung von RT DE und Sputnik/SNA ist ein kritischer Punkt erreicht, auf den die Verantwortlichen für Medien reagieren sollten. Während der Corona-Krise ist mehr als deutlich geworden, dass RT und SNA eine politische Agenda verfolgen, die darin besteht, das „System“ und damit die Demokratie in Deutschland anzugreifen und die autoritäre Herrschaft in Russland als bessere Alternative zu propagieren. Schon im März 2020 warnte das Innenministerium, dass RT Deutsch „die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung“ durch „gezielten Falschmeldungen“ bedrohe [...] Die russischen Staatsmedien – insbesondere in Russland – schaffen ein Feindbild „Westen“, mit dem sie die Menschen nicht nur in Russland, sondern auch in den westlichen Staaten verunsichern oder zum Widerstand mobilisieren. Das Schüren von Ängsten vor einem Krieg und die überzogene Darstellung vom dekadenten, gottlosen Westen sind dabei zwei zentrale Narrative. Dieses Feindbild wird seit Frühjahr 2021 vor allem mit den Grünen in Verbindung gebracht, die angeblich kriegerische Absichten gegenüber Russland verfolgen und dem Klimaschutz als „neuer Religion“ frönen. Die Berichterstattung zu den Bundestagswahlen hat gezeigt, dass das erste Ziel war, eine Grüne im Kanzleramt zu verhindern. Gegen Annalena Baerbock wurden unbelegte Vorwürfe wie nationalsozialistisches Gedankengut erhoben, um sie zu diskreditieren." (Fazit, Seite 24)
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"The topic of the war in Ukraine dominated the media during the first three months of the war and completely marginalized all other topics. The most foreign actor reported on most in the media was Russia, while the countries of the West, the US, the EU, and NATO were far less noticeable. Although th
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e initial open support for Russia has softened since the beginning of the war, the media continue to report in favour of Russia, and against the West. Television stations with national coverage (especially their morning news programmes), as well as parts of the daily press, are at the forefront of supporting Russia. Internet portals have a more balanced approach. Among state officials, President Vucic has monopolized the discussions of the war in Ukraine, and he is the person most credited in the media for establishing Serbia's neutral stance on this issue. Disinformation in the media is placed in such a way as to present Russia in a positive light, and the West negatively. Disinformation was most prevalent on internet portals and the printed edition of Vecernje novosti, the daily Informer, and television stations Pink and Happy." (Key findings)
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