"There is a pervasive fear that information technology enhances the effectiveness of destabilizing disinformation campaigns. Yet evidence from Ukraine, the paradigmatic case of “hybrid war”, indicates this threat is overstated. Rather, traditional media remain far more influential. The prevailin
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g focus on technology hampers both analysis and the development of effective counterstrategies." (Abstract)
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"This report is the culmination of an in-depth investigation aimed at better defining the causes and challenges of information disorder, and offering a viable framework for action [...] The Aspen Institute’s Commission on Information Disorder invited voices from across our society to help build up
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on our understanding of the issues and our approach to recommendations. This included numerous examples of research, original ideas, draft legislation, and critical analysis from academics, policymakers, and activists—all leveraging deep, real-world experience while striving to meet the scale of the challenge. Each recommendation that follows represents a discrete, actionable idea. Though not all of the recommendations are mutually dependent, they should be considered together—they reinforce and build off one another. For instance, recommendations calling for access and disclosure support those that impose greater accountability for bad actors and, conversely, create a check on overreach. Our recommendations cover multiple areas: technology, society, government, and media. It is also important to note that, with imperfect information, we make imperfect decisions. Due to the opacity of tech and media platforms—how they operate and how they optimize their products—we do not have sufficient understanding of all the coordinated levers that could reduce societal harms while still allowing for innovation, and both individual and community benefit." (Letter from the co-chairs, page 2)
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"Online attacks on women journalists appear to be increasing significantly, as this study demonstrates, particularly in the context of the ‘shadow pandemic’ of violence against women during COVID-19. The pandemic has changed journalists’ working conditions, making them yet more dependent on di
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gital communications services and social media channels. The emergence of the ‘disinfodemic’ has also increased the toxicity of the online communities within which journalists work, making journalists “sitting ducks” according to the UK National Union of Journalists’ Michelle Stanistreet, interviewed for this study. Our research also highlights the threefold function of disinformation in gendered online violence against women journalists: 1. Disinformation tactics are routinely deployed in targeted multiplatform online attacks against women journalists; 2. Reporting on disinformation and intertwined issues, such as digital conspiracy networks and far-right extremism, is a trigger for heightened attacks; 3. Disinformation purveyors operationalise misogynistic abuse, harassment and threats against women journalists to undercut public trust in critical journalism and facts in general." (Introduction, page 7)
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"We surveyed over 26,000 girls and young women in 26 countries. 91% of girls and young women surveyed are concerned about misinformation and/or disinformation online. 40% of those surveyed are extremely or very concerned. Misinformation and disinformation are having a negative impact on 87% of the g
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irls and young women we surveyed. 46% of girls feel sad, depressed, stressed, worried or anxious as a result of online misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation and disinformation restrict girls’ activism: 1 out of 4 girls feel less confident to share their views; 1 out of 5 girls stop engaging in politics or current affairs. 7 out of 10 girls and young women have never been taught about how to spot misinformation/disinformation at school or by family members. There was no single online source of information that the majority of girls and young women surveyed actually trusted." (Key findings, page 6)
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"The Courage Against Hate initiative has been brought together by Facebook for the purpose of sparking cross-sector, pan-European dialogue and action to combat hate speech and extremism. This collection of articles unites European academic analysis with practitioners who are actively working on coun
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tering extremism within civil society. Hate and extremism have no place on Facebook and we have been making major investments over a number of years to improve detection of this content on our platforms, so we can remove it quicker - ideally before people see it and report it to us. We’ve tripled - to more than 35,000 - the people working on safety and security at Facebook, and grown the dedicated team we have leading our efforts against terrorism and extremism to over 350 people. This group includes former academics who are experts on counterterrorism, former prosecutors and law enforcement agents, investigators and analysts, and engineers. We’ve also developed and iterated various technologies to make us faster and better at identifying this type of material automatically. This includes photo and video matching tools and text-based machine-learning classifiers. Last year, as a result of these investments, we removed more than 19 million pieces of content related to hate organisations last year, over 97% of which we proactively identified and removed before anyone reported it to us." (Introduction, page 2)
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"[...] we tried to identify the connection between anti-vax conspiracy theories and antisemitism, and the way they spread on social media. Eight media monitors from Get The Trolls Out! partner organisations in Belgium (Flanders), Belgium (Wallonia), France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and the
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United Kingdom (UK) monitored Facebook and Twitter in their countries and identified hashtags, private and public groups, and prominent figures who spread misinformation related to COVID-19 and the vaccines. Through these results, they identified antisemitic narratives. The period monitored is from March 2021-August 2021, however, in some cases the period was extended in order to include recent developments. The results of the monitoring exercise are not surprising. Antisemitic narratives are present within anti-vax conspiracies in the countries where monitoring took place. In some countries antisemitism is more subtle than in others, however, it is still part of conspiracist efforts to spread misinformation and fear. One narrative that all countries have in common is an old antisemitic narrative: a group of powerful Jewish people that want to take over the world. In most countries such as Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), France, Hungary, Germany, and Poland this powerful figure takes the form of philanthropist George Soros or of the Rothschild family, who are generally central figures in antisemitic conspiracy theories. In other cases, those powerful secret figures are not named but implied." (Introduction, page 6)
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"A loosely connected, constantly learning global network of counter-disinformation responders—with the benefit of greater access to platforms and additional resources from funders—can serve as a bulwark against evolving threats to the integrity of the information space. Although these threats tr
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avel across borders rapidly, civil society organizations countering them can respond by learning from one another’s innovations, successes, and failures. New innovations in the field include media development in closed messaging platforms like WhatsApp, addressing offline sources of disinformation, empowering investigative journalism to hunt down disinformation networks, and better equipping under-threat organizations in illiberal and authoritarian settings." (Page 4)
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"Section 2 of this report provides an overview of information disorder in Asia and the Pacific and describes how it destabilizes democracy and strengthens authoritarianism. After situating information disorder in Asia and the Pacific in its historical context, Section 2 examines which actors 1) spre
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ad what narratives 2); the causes; 3) why disinformation is spread and why it does spread; 4) the tools used to manipulate and disseminate information; and 5) what impact information disorder has on democracy in Asia and the Pacific. Section 3 presents the four country case studies [Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Papua New Guinea and Thailand], which examine information disorder in depth in a specific country context along the five dimensions listed above. A brief cross-country analysis identifies similarities and differences in information disorder among the case studies and examines whether they are indicative of trends beyond a national context. Section 4 identifies mitigation strategies that contain and counter the manipulation of information for political ends and critically examines their feasibility for the context of Asia and the Pacific. The aim of this section is to identify areas of engagement for future USAID projects on information disorder." (Methodology, page 10-11)
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"The study showed a changing pattern in the misconceptions and misinformation about COVID-19. Initially myths were largely on causes and vulnerability. It was widely speculated that black people had some immunity against COVID-19. Also, the condition was perceived to cause severe disease among the e
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lderly. These misconceptions served as risk attenuators among Ghanaians, especially the younger generation. As the infection evolved in the country, another misconception emerged that the hot climate in Africa inhibited viral replication and transmission only to be followed by speculations and conjectures that COVID-19 was being used as a biological weapon to target developed economics. For the management of COVID-19, the use of local remedies such as Neem tree (Azadirachta indica) and herbal preparation also emerged. Myths about the efficacy of locally manufactured gin (akpeteshie) and hydroxychloroquine as prophylaxis led to abuse of such substances. Interview segments revealed the use of myths to propagate political agenda in the country. The study concludes that COVID-19 misconceptions and misinformation are widespread and cover the course of the condition. These myths necessitate culturally sensitive health communication strategies that take into account local perceptions of COVID-19 in order to tackle the circulation of misconceived messages about the pandemic in Ghana." (Abstract)
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"For analysing populist and dis- and minformation-driven campaigning, three sub-groupings of South African Twitter deserve particular attention. A) A community of radical populists made of black consciousness voices emphasising the struggle against 'white monopoly capital,' using this phrase as a di
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sinformation strategy initially run by Bell Pottinger back in 2017, which had the effect of polarising white and black South Africans. This community was the audience the EFF and RET audience appealed to. B) A community galvanised around the #PutSouthAfricansFirst hashtag and movement and its über-nationalism and xenophobia - disdain for primarily African foreign nationals. Influencers used this hashtag to demonise foreign nationals for crime, unemployment, homelessness and other disinformation. Political parties such as ATM and ActionSA used the same hashtag to campaign for votes under the guise of calling for the integrity of South Africa's borders and jobs. Their nationalist calls continued to form a crucial part of these parties' messaging, even as they benefited from the negative sentiment generated towards foreigners by the more strident anonymous accounts. C) A community of minority ideologies and groups predominantly made up of South Africa's white body politic polarised from the rest of South African Twitter influenced by overlapping harmful iterations of Libertarianism and Conservatism. Conspiracy theorists, Covid-19 denialists, anti-institution, anti-vaxxers reside within this community with imported overt MAGA-style Trumpian Alt-Right. The DA, Cape Party, ACDP appealed to this community. An analysis of tweets generated in the lead up to the election showed that one in four tweets were generated by the EFF community, underscoring the extent to which that party dominated the platform. However, it also highlights the disconnect between Twitter and the 'real world'. The EFF was only the third-largest party with roughly 10% votes." (Lessons learned and conclusion, page 99)
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"This groundbreaking collaborative case study is the most comprehensive assessment of online violence against a prominent woman journalist to date. We conducted a forensic analysis of the torrent of social media attacks on internationally celebrated digital media pioneer Maria Ressa over a five-year
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period (2016-2021). Here, we detail the intensity and ferocity of this abuse, and demonstrate how it is designed not only to vilify a journalism icon, but to discredit journalism itself, and shatter public trust in facts. These attacks also created an enabling environment for Ressa’s persecution and prosecution in the Philippines. Now, her life is at risk and she faces the prospect of decades in jail, proving that there is nothing virtual about online violence." (Page 1)
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"The present document .. first proposes a working definition of what misinformation, disinformation and hate speech” (MDH) are and how they can be framed conceptually. It then explains why MDH is of such significant concern to the ICRC and the wider humanitarian sector. Next, it outlines the key c
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hallenges and barriers faced by ICRC staff in detecting, assessing and responding to MDH. Finally, it offers recommendations and suggests possible actions for addressing these challenges." (Introduction, page 6)
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"The playbook approach consists of how to (1) identify ongoing information manipulation campaigns; (2) develop real-time and short-term responses; and (3) build long-term resilience to information manipulation. While we outline three distinct steps in this playbook, the process for combating informa
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tion manipulation is circular, with each step overlapping and reinforcing the others. Planning timelines will vary based on context, but—if at all possible—we encourage proactive rather than reactive planning to effectively counter electoral information manipulation. The playbook’s three-part strategy can help you develop rapid and real-time responses, as well as establish long-term and sustainable approaches to building resilience in order to maintain the integrity of elections and strengthen democratic processes." (Page 3)
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"The case studies analyzed here show that, in general, the mainstream media does not produce hate speech narratives on its own, but does become a vehicle for carrying them. The greatest producers of hate narratives, division, disinformation, and polarization remain the political actors, partly becau
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se of their pervasive presence in the media and their use of social media. Nonetheless, while online media do not usually start hate narratives on their own, their political alignment and interests lead them to be selective in the information they convey. As a result, it is often the case that the Albanian public receives two or more versions of the same story, contributing, to some extent, to the reinforcement of the existing political and social divisions in the country. Hate narratives towards journalists have intensified in recent years, reflecting a global trend as well as the increasingly harsh rhetoric of the political class against them on some occasions, which has certainly leaked through in the public’s trust and attitude vis-à-vis journalists and the media. On the other hand, hate narratives on migrants are rare due to Albania’s scant experience has in this regard. However, they can be found in various media outlets, with the primary sources being citizens or anonymous, showing that proper reporting on this topic is needed in order to have a more educated public in this regard and face the existing prejudices and stereotypes." (Conclusion)
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"This refreshed version of the RESIST toolkit reflects the new realities of the threat that mis- and disinformation poses today. It explores new techniques and tactics, and how organisations can effectively identify, monitor and respond. The toolkit takes a systematic, evidence-based approach for he
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lping organisations build societal and individual resilience to disinformation." (Foreword, page 3)
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"Misinformation is not solely an online problem; offline dynamics and activities also contribute to misinformation’s spread and resonance.
- Political conflict, social upheaval, economic stress, and other sociological or psychological are among the offline dynamics that contribute to misinformatio
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n’s impact and these factors must be considered to understand the intractability of global misinformation
- Misinformation affects all levels of society. It is paramount to construct responses that take all contextual variables into account; otherwise, success in countering misinformation will remain elusive, particularly in the absence of structural platform reforms.
- A constellation of programs, organizations, and initiatives that build on well-established objectives (like conflict prevention and economic aid) must all be leaned upon—along with social media platform reforms—to meet this challenge." (Key points, page 21)
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"Die Bekämpfung von Rassismus geht einher mit der Bekämpfung von Stereotypen und Vorurteilen, die oft über Verschwörungstheorien und Fake News verbreitet werden. Diese Nummer des Tangram befasst sich mit den Berührungspunkten von Verschwörungstheorien, Fake News und Rassismus. Warum halten sic
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h einige Verschwörungstheorien so hartnäckig? Warum haben sie es auf bestimmte Gruppen abgesehen? Wie soll man auf dieses im Internet allgegenwärtige Phänomen reagieren? Mit diesen Fragen setzt sich die neuste Ausgabe der Zeitschrift der Eidgenössischen Kommission gegen Rassismus auseinander." (https://www.ekr.admin.ch)
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"To arrive at a careful evaluation of impact, this report concentrates on how the tactics of China’s influence operations have evolved during the first year of the pandemic. Looking at China’s key priority of information control, the first section conceptualizes the adaptation of influence opera
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tions to align with this preference while taking advantage of the global reach of social media. Building on this understanding, section two explores the ways in which Chinese influence operations have attempted to systematically exploit carve-outs that have emerged from how social media have regulated official statements and newsworthy content. Section three analyzes in more detail the integrated messaging apparatus China has sought to develop, in particular in respect of the specific roles that China’s diplomatic network, state media, and fake social media accounts play in creating, shaping, and promoting narratives. Unpacking China’s attempts to distinguish its endeavor of narrative control from disinformation campaigns, section four examines China’s responses to accusations of disinformation and steps taken by social media companies and by targeted states to address this specific tactic. The report concludes with evaluating the potential implications of China’s influence operations in terms of their immediate objective to shape international perceptions of China’s actions during the pandemic and raises attention about the capabilities developed in this process and their potential deployment in case of a further deterioration of relations with China." (Executive summary, page 4-5)
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"This analysis examines the methods of disinformation being used to prove Russia's scientific lead, while portraying Western compet-itors in a very negative light. Sputnik V is an instrument of "soft power" through which Russia is trying to gain influence worldwide. In order to evaluate how successf
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ul the Russian infor-mation policy was, this analysis examines the perception of the benefits of Sputnik V in six different countries. In early 2021, Kazakhstan’s and Serbia’s relations to Russia were positively affected. Similar opportunities would have existed for Germany and Slovakia, since both governments were very willing to cooperate with Russia. In the case of Germany, however, this opportunity was lost due to a lack of cooperation and transparency on Russia’s part. In Slovakia, the government crisis over the use of Sputnik V has had a detrimental effect. For France and Great Britain, neither an improvement of the epidemiological situation through the Russian vaccine nor a success of the overall Sputnik V campaign are expected. This analysis is based on 130 news reports from the Russian state-owned media RT and Sputnik, the international press and the Russian independent press." (Summary)
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"China has used Covid to benefit its global image through the activation of existing media dissemination channels overseas and the use of new tactics such as disinformation and misinformation. China’s largescale medical diplomacy campaign has also provided propaganda wins in many developing countr
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ies, burnishing Beijing’s image as a reliable partner. Anecdotal reports indicate that Beijing has stepped up its content offerings, in particular by tailoring content including disinformation for specific countries and translating state-run messages into local languages. In some countries, China was also seen as the purveyor of the most accurate information about the new coronavirus, showing its growing influence over global narratives. For Beijing, Covid diplomacy clearly offers another means through which it can exert its influence. This research shows that countries that are recipients of China’s Covid vaccine clearly have more positive coverage of China, but it cannot draw conclusions as to the factors behind that. This strategy has largely been acceptable to global journalists, who — judging by the results of our focus groups in three separate countries — do not perceive China’s advances as a threat at a national level. Such views are in part due to the incremental nature of the changes, the clumsiness of China’s propaganda effort and the irrelevance of much of the material provided to local audiences. However, the survey does reveal that when viewed globally, there does appear to be more concern about China’s influence, in particular in the Asia Pacific region. The survey indicates that the overall impact of Beijing’s outreach is a redrawing of the global media landscape — one story at a time, one country at a time — shifting the China coverage in a more positive direction. China is using a multi-pronged approach to redraw the information landscape to benefit its own global image. In 2020, Beijing effectively shut down journalistic access to China, through visa denials and freezes, partly driven by international border closures. This had the effect of creating a vacuum in China coverage, creating a demand for stories from China, which could then be filled with statesponsored content already available through content-sharing agreements." (Conclusions, page 7)
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