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Authors & Publishers
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Journals
Output Type
Russische Medien in Deutschland. Die Bundestagswahlen 2021 – Zwischen Einflussnahme und Desinformation
Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (2022), 29 pp.
"Während in Russland immer mehr unabhängige Medien der staatlichen Kontrolle unterworfen und als „ausländische Agenten“ gebrandmarkt werden, nutzen die russischen Staatsmedien die Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit in Deutschland, um ungehindert Desinformation zu verbreiten. Nach acht Jahren Berich
...
The Kremlin's Troll Network Never Sleeps: Inauthentic Pro-Kremlin Online Behavior on Facebook in Germany, Italy, Romania and Hungary
Budapest: Political Capital Institute (2022), 36 pp.
"The research – based on programmatic text-mining supported analyses of several millions of war-related comments scraped by Sentione and further examined with CrowdTangle - found traces of inauthentic, repetitive pro-Kremlin activity on Facebook in all countries under review, which can be consider
...
We Love to Hate George Soros: A Cross-Platform Analysis of the Globalism Conspiracy Theory Campaign in Brazil
Convergence, volume 28, issue 4 (2022), pp. 983–1006
"The proliferation of conspiracy theories surrounding George Soros and the ‘Globalist invasion’ had been concentrated primarily in Eastern Europe, Russia and the United States. However, since Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential victory in Brazil, Soros has become a target of the far-right in the cou
...
Content Moderation and Local Stakeholders in Indonesia
London: Article 19 (2022), 77 pp.
"This research has shown that in the midst of the complex and diverse cultural context of Indonesia, growing use and misuse of social media in the country, and the complexity of ‘grey-area’ problematic content in the country, there has been a lack of meaningful and continuous dialogue between pl
...
Talking to Trolls—How Users Respond to a Coordinated Information Operation and Why They’re so Supportive
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, volume 27, issue 1, zmab022 (2022), 19 pp.
"Through this research we gained insight into tactics employed by state-backed social media disinformation. With that goal, we explored user interactions with inauthentic Twitter accounts. We used multiple procedures to measure the ways in which users talked with and about the accounts employed by t
...
Les politiciens et les usagers des réseaux sociaux sont les plus susceptibles de diffuser des nouvelles qu'ils savents fausses, selon les Nigériens
Afrobarometer (2022), 5 pp.
"Les Nigériens sont majoritaires à penser que les politiciens et les partis politiques (63%) et les usagers des réseaux sociaux (57%) diffusent "souvent" ou "quelque fois" des informations qu'ils savent fausses. Des grandes majorites des citoyens nigeriens estiment que le gouvernement devrait pou
...
Russian Media in the Balkans. Case Study: How Moscow‘s Propaganda Influences Serbia
Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2022), 27 pp.
"The influence of Russian state-run foreign media (RT, Sputnik et al.) on public opinion in Western democracies is now common knowledge - regardless of its political qualification. Well-documented analyses are available, e.g., from the USA, France and Germany. The German government has also repeated
...
Owning the Conversation: Assessing Responses to Russian and Chinese Information Operations Around COVID-19
Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) (2022), 32 pp.
"Russia and China have created and amplified disinformation and propaganda about COVID-19 worldwide to sow distrust and confusion and to reduce social cohesion among targeted audiences. The United States government, the European Union, and multinational organizations have developed a series of inter
...
Primeiro turno: Eleições 2022. Especial mensageria: Narrativas, estratégias e fluxo de desinformação
NetLab; Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) (2022), 60 slides
"Neste relatório, o NetLab UFRJ reúne os principais resultados do monitoramento de redes de desinformação multiplataforma a partir dos aplicativos de mensageria. Analisando 115,3 mil mensagens veiculadas em grupos públicos do Whatsapp e 180,9 mil em grupos e canais públicos do Telegram, identi
...
The Terror Times: The Depth and Breadth of the Islamic State Alternative News Outlet Ecosystem Online
London et al.: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2022), 21 pp.
"This report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens
...
The Vladimirror Network: Pro-Putin Power-Users on Facebook
London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2022), 11 pp.
"Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) researchers identified key pro-Putin accounts with two or more duplicates engaged in administering, moderating, and contributing to large public Facebook groups with hundreds of thousands of members fawning over the Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russia
...
Regulation of Harmful Content Online in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Between Freedom of Expression and Harms to Democracy
Sarajevo: Mediacentar; UNESCO (2022), 108 pp.
"The study specifically focuses on five types of harmful content: a) hate speech and hate narratives; b) denials of war crimes and glorification of war criminals; c) ethno-nationally and/or politically biased media reporting; d) disinformation; and e) attacks, threats and smear campaigns against ind
...
The Unfreedom Monitor: Information
Amsterdam: Global Voices Advox (2022), 22 pp.
"To summarise, three factors define information manipulation today in the observed countries. First, there is continuous enhancement of disinformation technical abilities to overcome the measures taken by IT platforms and make disinformation look more trustworthy, especially using AI. Second, grand
...
Comunicação e ciência: Reflexões sobre a desinformação
São Paulo: Intercom – Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos Interdisciplinares da Comunicação (2022), 476 pp.
"Como indica o título do livro há em seus 21 textos diversos cenários que se apresentam em torno daquilo que conceitualmente é definido como “desinformação”, ou seja, reflexões sobre o nosso tempo concomitante de vida em que se dá crédito a teorias absurdas, se reescreve o passado a par
...
"To illustrate the dynamics of the digital information ecosystem and how disinformation is seeded within this environment, Rappler explored cascades around the following themes: war on drugs, attacks against the press, and messaging around Martial Law and authoritarian rule. The themes were selected
...
Mapping Disinformation in the Serbian Media
Beograd: CRTA (2022), 98 pp.
"Our main findings show that, numerically, disinformation overpowers the news. More precisely, this study identified 559 different types of disinformation cases in 494 news items disseminated in 14 (out of 15 analysed) Serbian news media. Our study found that false, misleading and manipulative infor
...
Populist attitudes and politicians’ disinformation accusations: Effects on perceptions of media and politicians
Journal of Communication, volume 72, issue 6 (2022), pp. 619-632
"Populist politicians increasingly accuse opposing media of spreading disinformation or “fake news.” However, empirical research on the effects of these accusations is scarce. This survey experiment (N = 1,330) shows that disinformation accusations reduce audience members’ trust in the accused
...
Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation: State-Aligned Information Operations and the Distortion of the Public Sphere
Vienna: OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (2022), 28 pp.
"In light of the role played by state-aligned actors, the private sector and lawmakers in countries with strong democratic institutions should adopt policies that mitigate the ability of state actors to manipulate AI and weaponize communication platforms. Efforts to combat disinformation must recogn
...
Parallel Public Spheres: Influence Operations in the 2022 Philippine Elections
Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy; Internews (2022), 52 pp.
"This report examines the characteristics and consequences of influence operations in the 2022 presidential election in the Philippines. The report makes three main claims: a) the term "influence operations" provides a broader frame to identify personalities, platforms, and practices that hack publi
...
Disinformation on Refugees from Ukraine: Boosting Europe’s Resilience After Russia’s Invasion
Brussels: European Policy Centre (2022), 35 pp.
"The war in Ukraine is just the latest instance where attention-grabbing events have fuelled the rapid spread of false or misleading news about refugees and migrants. This Issue Paper examines the challenges posed by disinformation about refugees from Ukraine, as well as the responses taken so far t
...
