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Ser periodista en Twitter: Violencia de género digital en América Latina

Sandra Chaher, Lina Cuellar (coord.)

Buenos Aires; Bogotá; Paris: Comunicación para la Igualdad Ediciones;Sentiido;UNESCO (2020), 131 pp.

"Las periodistas mujeres son atacadas, al igual que sus colegas varones, por los temas políticos o de coyuntura que publican; pero se utilizan contra ellas muchas más expresiones discriminatorias vinculadas al género y agresiones con connotaciones sexuales. En los ataques contra las periodistas h ... more

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Propaganda des „Islamischen Staats“: Formen und Formate

Bernd Zywietz (ed.)

Wiesbaden: Springer VS (2020), vi, 411 pp.

"Die Propaganda der terroristischen Miliz "Islamischer Staat" hat für Aufsehen gesorgt und die Debatte um das Internet und vor allem das "Social Web" als Risikotechnologie oder Gefahrenraum mitbestimmt. Dabei setzt der IS auf ein breites Spektrum medialer und gestalterischer Formen und Formate eine ... more

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Assessing Digital Threats to Democracy, and Workable Solutions: A Review of the Recent Literature

Kathleen Kuehn, Leon A. Salter

International Journal of Communication, volume 14 (2020), pp. 2589-2610

"Concerns surrounding the threats that digital platforms pose to the functioning of Western liberal democracies have grown since the 2016 U.S. election. Yet despite a preponderance of academic work in this area, the precise nature of these threats, empirical solutions for their redress, and their re ... more

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Hate Speech in Southeast Asia: New Forms, Old Rules

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2020), 40 pp.

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Managing Misinformation in a Humanitarian Context: Internews Rumour Tracking Methodology. Part III: How to Guide
Key Guidance

Internews (2019), 61 pp.

"You will find information and advice on everything from how to source rumours and factcheck information, to how to share actionable and practical answers to address these rumours. Internews Rumour Tracking Methodology is designed to be flexible and responsive to local context – and you should be ... more

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Silencing Hate: How to Report Migration and Counter Hate Speech Against Migrants

Danica Ilic, Natalie Konyalian

Media Diversity Institute (2019), 19 pp.

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"Fake News," Dangerous Speech and Mass Violence: Challenges for Social Media in the Developing World

Stephanie MacLellan

In: Media and Mass Atrocity: The Rwanda Genocide and Beyond

Allan Thompson (ed.)

Waterloo, Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation (2019), pp. 483-500

"The cases discussed in this chapter have demonstrated how disinformation and rhetoric that is spread through social media in the developing world often meets the Benesch criteria for dangerous speech. It comes from influential sources, which can include family and friends who share it. It plays on ... more

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Approaches to Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Program Outcomes: A Descriptive Review with Options for Future Study

Gwendolyn Bevis, Lynn Carter, Jacob Patterson-Stein, Jill Tirnauer, C. Christine Fair

USAID;Management Systems International (MSI) (2019), 66 pp.

"This review seeks to inform United States Agency for International Development (USAID) evaluation of countering violent extremism (CVE) programming in Asia and globally by exploring two research questions: 1. Under current conditions, is it possible to develop a model or methodology to test the rel ... more

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Social Media in Africa: An Emerging Force for Autocrats and Activists

Geoffrey York

In: Media and Mass Atrocity: The Rwanda Genocide and Beyond

Allan Thompson (ed.)

Waterloo, Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation (2019), pp. 415-430

"The most extreme damage inflicted by social media can be seen in South Sudan. As documented in the chapter by Theo Dolan, social media in South Sudan has contributed to hatred and conflict among ethnic groups. Many investigators, including UN investigators, have warned that South Sudan's social med ... ia are triggering violence against ethnic groups. Since the beginning of the civil war in late 2013, social media has fuelled waves of hate speech that have provoked deadly violence and ethnic conflict in South Sudan, including massacres and other atrocities. In that sense, social media has become a new variation of the "hate radio" phenomenon that flourished in Rwanda before and during the 1994 genocide … Social media is also emerging as a powerful way to harass and intimidate the opponents of a regime or a political party. In this sense, it adds another weapon to the arsenal of a powerful regime that already has multiple weapons at its disposal. A regime can mobilize its supporters to use social media in a targeted way against its foes, or it can use its financial resources to create a fake army of fictional users on social media. In either case, it is tilting the playing field against its enemies. A targeted attack through social media can be more effective than the telephone threats or messages often deployed in the past. The use of social media can be more intimidating because it belittles the targeted person in front of a much bigger audience. The presence of this audience means that the attack is more damaging, more difficult to ignore and has the potential to mobilize large numbers of people against the victim … While social media is often used for anti-democratic purposes in Africa's authoritarian states, it has also been used as a force for reform, accountability and justice. It has helped to safeguard the fairness of elections. It has allowed greater scrutiny of potential threats, such as vote-rigging or violence, allowing citizens to be alerted when there is still a chance to prevent the worst abuses. It has put a spotlight on corruption and political wrongdoing, allowing activists to mobilize pressure on governments to resolve these long-neglected problems. In some cases, as it did in the Arab Spring, social media has played a role in toppling an authoritarian state. When an election was called in the small West African state of Gambia, where the dictator Yahya Jammeh had ruled for 22 years, opposition candidates had little access to state-controlled media. So the main opposition party created more than a dozen WhatsApp groups, allowing it to communicate with voters. Other forms of social media also proliferated. A leading independent group, the Gambia Youth and Women's Forum, discussed election issues on a public Facebook group with 55,000 members. The government blocked access to WhatsApp and eventually extended the shutdown to the entire internet, but Gambians used virtual private network (VPN) technology to bypass the shutdown. The opposition won the election and Jammeh was forced to flee the country." (Pages 419-423) more

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Avoiding Discrimination & Hate Speech in Media: Guidebook

Muhammad Khamaiseh

Al Jazeera Media Institute (2019), 42 pp.

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The Media World of ISIS

Michael Krona, Rosemary Pennington (eds.)

Bloomington: Indiana University Press (2019), viii, 277 pp.

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International Standards and Comparative National Approaches to Countering Disinformation in the Context of Freedom of the Media

Andrey Rikhter

Vienna: OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media;International Press Institute (IPI) (2019), 57 pp.

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A Typology of the Islamic State's Social Media Distribution Network

Yannick Veilleux-Lepage

In: Media and Mass Atrocity: The Rwanda Genocide and Beyond

Allan Thompson (ed.)

Waterloo, Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation (2019), pp. 453-482

"The Islamic State's media strategy allows for a message that has been crafted by a handful of IS propaganda agents to be disseminated by a few primary distributors, who in turn can reach thousands of unaffiliated sympathizers, and therefore millions of Twitter users. By means of a conclusion, this ... more

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From Preachers to Comedians: Ideal Types of Hate Speakers in Brazil

Liriam Sponholz, Rogério Christofoletti

Global Media and Communication, volume 15, issue 1 (2019), pp. 67-84

"This article attempts to develop a theoretical framework in order to understand how the media system has been enabling public figures to use hate speech to enhance their media prominence. The current scenario in Brazil, shaped by a high concentration of (private) media ownership, an economic crisis ... more

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The Psychology of State-Sponsored Disinformation Campaigns and Implications for Public Diplomacy

Erik C. Nisbet, Olga Kamenchuk

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, volume 14, issue 1/2 (2019), pp. 65-82

"Policy discourse about disinformation focuses heavily on the technological dimensions of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Unfortunately, this myopic focus on technology has led to insufficient attention being paid to the underlying human factors driving the success of state-sponsored disin ... more

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ISIS Media

Annenberg School for Communication, Center for Advanced Research in Global Communication (CARGC) (2019), 45 pp.

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Information Flows and Radicalization Leading to Violent Extremism in Central Asia

Search for Common Ground;Internews (2019), 77 pp.

"The study is comprised of three main parts: a desk study of available and accessible material – reports, documents and media material; a qualitative study comprising over 200 interviews with ordinary people, experts, and persons with direct experience with radicalization leading to violent extrem ... ism (RVE); and a quantitative component consisting of national surveys of people’s information consumption habits. For the desk study, the effort was made to gain as broad a picture as possible, that is, to cover all five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. However, predictably and unfortunately, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan proved difficult cases to study in full. For both the qualitative and quantitative field research activities, for several reasons, only the first three countries were included. As a result, this study is able to report most robustly on these three countries and propose observations regarding Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan only to a limited extent. Based on the desk study, the drivers of extremist sympathies as established in existing research have been political grievances (injustice from state structures; identity-based discrimination; oppressive political regimes, etc), economic difficulties (unemployment; indebtedness; poverty; and desire for quick and greater income) and ideological motivations (resentment of false values; striving for the singularly just and true life; for reward in a perceived afterlife). To these push and pull factors are added a range of enabling factors, such as migration, young age, gender (women), and means of communication. All these drivers of RVE need to be treated with caution, as stressed by various authors and suggested by evidence gained in field research. A general observation, gained from the desk research and supported by evidence in both qualitative and quantitative field studies, was the difference among the countries in degree of control over the information space, or the degree of hegemony over public discourse. Of the three most fully studied countries, hegemonic discourse was the strongest in Tajikistan, followed by Kazakhstan, and the least in Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan, analyzed to a limited extent, would be closer to the extreme of Tajikistan, whereas Turkmenistan was too closed to make reasonably robust observations." (Page 3) more

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Disinformation and Democracy: The Home Front in the Information War

Paul Butcher

Brussels: European Policy Centre (2019), 22 pp.

"Efforts to fight the spread of disinformation have had mixed results. Self-regulation by online platforms such as Twitter or Facebook puts a great deal of power in their hands, with potentially negative effects on independent news outlets that depend on social media for their outreach. State regula ... more

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Islamist Buzzers: Message Flodding, Offline Outreach, and Astroturfing

Ario Seto

ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, volume 12, issue 2 (2019), pp. 187-208

"Based on ethnographic research on Islamist buzzers – social media political operators tasked with making particular online conversation subjects trend – in Indonesia, this article details the process of how the proliferation of insensitive message in both the online and offline realms plays a r ... more

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Décode la h@ine! Jette la violence! Guide de prévention contre les discours de haine en ligne à l'usage des 12-18 ans
Key Guidance

Khalid Aoutail

Rabat: UNESCO (2019), 76 pp.

"Ce guide, conçu à partir d'une collecte des données sur l'expression de la haine en ligne sous toutes ses formes, et de leur analyse, propose des modules simples à comprendre afin d'accompagner celles et ceux qui le souhaitent dans la création d'un réseau virtuel d'échange pacifié. Les reco ... more

Managing Misinformation in a Humanitarian Context: Internews Rumour Tracking Methodology. Part III: How to Guide Key Guidance

Décode la h@ine! Jette la violence! Guide de prévention contre les discours de haine en ligne à l'usage des 12-18 ans Key Guidance

Managing Misinformation in a Humanitarian Context: Internews Rumour Tracking Methodology. Part III: How to Guide
Key Guidance

Décode la h@ine! Jette la violence! Guide de prévention contre les discours de haine en ligne à l'usage des 12-18 ans
Key Guidance