"Since 2010, Facebook has become a battleground between competing political camps in Thailand. Facebook groups like the Social Sanction group, tellingly abbreviated as SS, and the Rubbish Collector Organization, which was founded in 2014 and has attracted more than 200,000 members, have played a cru
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cial role in the process of political radicalization. The aim of these groups is to expose political opponents by accusing them of lèse-majesté, which can result in a prison sentence of 15 years or more. The groups also serve as fora for hate speech and are increasingly used as a tool of mobilization for state-sponsored mass events by the authoritarian regime that came to power with the coup d’état of May 2014. Contrary to its popular perception as a tool for democratization, Facebook has been successfully used by political groups reminiscent of fascist vigilante groups. This paper analyses the genesis of these groups and discusses the phenomenon in a broader political and historical context." (Abstract)
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"Development practice has a critical role in providing the foundation for preventing violent extremism. UNDP’s conceptual framework proposes eleven interlinked building blocks for a theory of change explaining how development can help prevent violent extremism. These building blocks, which will in
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form global, regional and national strategies for PVE include:
1. Promoting a rule of law and human rights-based approach to PVE;
2. Enhancing the fight against corruption;
3. Enhancing participatory decision-making and increasing civic space at national and local levels;
4. Providing effective socio-economic alternatives to violence for groups at risk;
5. Strengthening the capacity of local governments for service delivery and security;
6. Supporting credible internal intermediaries to promote dialogue with alienated groups and reintegration of former extremists;
7. Promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment;
8. Engaging youth in building social cohesion;
9. Working with faith-based organizations and religious leaders to counter the abuse of religion by violent extremists;
10. Working with the media to promote human rights and tolerance;
11. Promoting respect for human rights, diversity and a culture of global citizenship in schools and universities." (Executive summary, page 5)
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"The study is divided into three parts, the first of which describes the Islamic State’s publishing house, Maktabat al-Himma, and its activities and offers a rough chronology of when the group published various works. The second part examines the group’s classroom textbooks, drawing comparisons
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with the Saudi religious curriculum and highlighting the Islamic State’s unique program of “ISization” that makes them especially lethal. The paper’s third part features a deep dive into other literature produced by the group, including book-length editions, manuals of ritual observance, and instructions to fighters, as well as shorter pamphlets. The paper closes with a series of concluding observations and policy recommendations, as well as appendices that include a list of the works surveyed, translations by the author of selections from the classroom textbooks, images of textbook covers, and a glossary of terminology IS uses in its literature." (Executive summary, page xi)
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"An app called Telegram is the new hot thing for jihadists to disseminate their propaganda. Terror organizations like the 'Islamic State' (IS) also use this app to win over German us-ers. jugendschutz.net documented a vast amount of graphic content like beheading videos – anyone can use his smartp
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hone to access such content. So far, the provider has taken only little action to protect his young users." (Introduction)
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"This Research Paper aims to analyse in depth the global propaganda strategy of the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) by looking at the methods through which this grand strategy is carried out as well as the objectives that IS wants to achieve through it. The authors first discuss IS’ growth mode
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l, explaining why global expansion and recruitment of foreign fighters are pivotal to IS success. Having in mind this critical role, the authors then explore the narratives and themes used by the group to mobilise foreign fighters and jihadists groups. Third, the paper analyses how IS deploys its narratives in those territories where it has established a foothold. Fourth, it outlines IS’ direct engagement strategy and how it is used to facilitate allegiance of other jihadist groups. The final section of the paper offers a menu of policy options that stakeholders can implement to counter IS’ global propaganda efforts." (Abstract)
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"The Council of Europe Seminar, Combating Sexist Hate Speech, brought together a group of around 60 participants, including human rights and women’s rights activists, youth leaders, journalists and policy makers to challenge sexist hate speech, its causes, forms and consequences, and to propose so
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lutions to counter it [...] A wide range of proposals for actions by different stakeholders were made during the Seminar, highlighting the fact that sexist hate speech is an issue that should be addressed not only by the different sectors of the Council of Europe, but also by national governments, the media and civil society organisations. Specific activities were proposed, such as the creation of a logo and online stickers, the use of videos, the promotion of strategic litigation and the organisation of feminist camps for young women. Specific recommendations were also made regarding the role of the media sector, including platform providers and the need for codes of ethics to ensure more effective moderation in social media; and active gender equality policies regarding media content but also in the media sector. A set of necessary policy actions to address sexist hate speech were also identified, including clarifying concepts and definitions, eliminating gaps in legislation, especially related to combating violence against women, eliminating sexism from the language and practice of all institutions, promoting gender equality and media literacy training, and promoting the integration of a gender equality perspective in all aspects of education." (Summary, page 5-7)
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"This report presents the development, deployment, and evaluation of three counternarrative campaigns orchestrated by Against Violent Extremism (AVE) network and Jigsaw (an incubator within Alphabet that uses technology to address geopolitical issues) with additional in-kind and financial support fr
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om Facebook and Twitter. This project builds on the findings of a previous counter-narrative pilot project conducted in 2014 and attempts to find ways to achieve greater scale, authenticity, efficiency, reach, and impact. The key objectives of this project were to: Assist a wide geographic, ideological, and cultural variety of small non-profit organisations to develop and disseminate counter-narrative content to target audiences by utilising a variety of social media advertising tools; Analyse the strengths, weaknesses, and overall effectiveness of different social media platforms to facilitate reach and engagement among target audiences; and provide guidance to build the capacity of similar non-profit organisations to produce effective counter-narrative content in the future by creating ‘how-to’ videos and a counter-narrative ‘toolkit’. To achieve these objectives, AVE identified two pre-existing organisations and assisted them in the creation of counter-narrative content along with the development and execution of a target audience strategy. In the third example, AVE created a fronting organisation from scratch, building a brand through multiple accounts across multiple platforms in response to security concerns from the third party organisation [...] Our hypothesis was that a small amount of funding and guidance for counter-narrative campaigners, in terms of deploying social media advertising tools to reach ‘target audiences’, could dramatically improve the awareness, engagement and impact of counter-narratives and NGOs working in this space. The findings presented in this report support this hypothesis in a highly compelling way." (Executive summary, page 5-6)
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"This paper seeks to provide some initial guidance as to what Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is and what it means for the media development sector, its donors and other organizations that work with media developers. The paper also discusses challenges and implications of VE and CVE for media dev
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elopment and how media development work is relevant to CVE and CVE efforts." (Introduction)
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"This book presents the first systematic and historical contextualisation of the development of Hamas’s media strategy. It determines three key phases in Hamas’s development and explores the complex and important relationship at work between its politics and use of media. Assessing four elements
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of the Hamas media strategy – the media message (discourse), the media objectives, the infrastructure, and the target audience – this book tracks how Hamas grew its media infrastructure, and looks at how the idea of resistance has permeated the media discourse. Determining both tactical and strategic objectives and detailing the various layers of the target audience, it offers the first in-depth academic study of the Hamas media strategy." (Publisher description)
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"Currently, no dedicated agency or systematic effort analyzes the effect of Russian (or any other) disinformation. Who really watches Russia Today? Where? For how long? And why? Nor do we have the means to systematically track the content: How does the Kremlin’s message in Germany differ from the
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line in Sweden or Poland? Our case studies, combined with an ongoing effort at CEPA to identify and monitor Russian propaganda in parts of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) show the variety of Russia’s means and messaging. But the lack of a coherent picture constrains our ability to respond in both quantitative and qualitative terms. We recommend: Regular, targeted analysis of the reach and impact of Russian propaganda; Greater analysis of the CEE media environment to detect disinformation campaigns and understand what sources shape public awareness; and Monitoring of social media, identifying trends and personalities that are popular among polarized social groups and who could be engaged to build trust." (Page II)
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"1. Hyper-local factors were the most important components in both radicalisation and counter-radicalisation. Participants placed significant emphasis on the role of ‘heads’ of the neighbourhoods (who are the “only ones able to warn and convince young people against wrongdoing.” Heads of nei
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ghbourhoods have personal qualities that build trust within communities and make them effective first responders. These qualities can be summarised as follows: A credible, non-corrupt person who does not use his position to ‘swindle’ or make a profit; A person who promotes moderate stances and uses moderate speech; Local to the area, not just the region or the city, and speaks common people’s language; and Non-politically aligned and not promoting the values of one particular party or another. Another hyper-local element that helped improve communities’ resilience to radicalisation is the effective presence of security forces clamping down on radical preachers, which helps reduce the spaces of recruitment. Among the most important points highlighted by focus group participants was socio-economic deprivation that contributed to the primary method of radicalisation, which was “not out of religious conviction, but desire of money.” 2. Radicalisation happens offline and involves face-to-face recruiters making direct contact. Participants underlined the importance of hyper-local interaction as “television and social media do not have a drastic influence on young people’s minds. What impacts their thinking are their personal relationships with people they trust.” This concept works both positively and negatively as participants explained that in the incidents of radicalisation they were aware of, recruiters always knew their targets." (Major findings, page 8)
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"Contrary to dominant views within international law and institutions, it is never democratically legitimate to punish citizens solely for repulsive or dangerous viewpoints expressed within public discourse. With the controversial exception of the US, however, most states prohibit some forms of raci
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st, sexist, anti-religious, homophobic, or other intolerant speech. Hateful expression surely does afflict many of the people it targets. Most democracies therefore describe bans as—perhaps not always effective, but certainly symbolic—tools for defending the safety and equality of all citizens. Democracies must certainly promote pluralism, then, through comprehensive non-discrimination policies governing education, employment, and access to goods and services. States must promote values of equal citizenship through primary schooling and public interest campaigns, and must support models of best practice within the mass media. It is also legitimate for states to punish hate speech promulgated outside public discourse, as in situations involving harassment or so-called ‘fighting words’. Hate speech bans may even offer legitimate means of enhancing state security in unstable situations, as have at times arisen, for example, in India, Israel, Northern Ireland, or transitional democracies. Hate speech bans may genuinely enhance elements of state security, then, but they never enhance its democracy. We have overlooked that distinction through our failure to distinguish the three very distinct spheres of security, rights, and democracy. Those security or rights-based criteria which legitimate a state as a state are not the same as those which legitimate it as a democracy." (Publisher description)
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"Als Russland die Krim annektierte und den Krieg in der Ostukraine führte, setzte es gleichzeitig eine Propagandakampagne in Gang. Zur Bekämpfung von Desinformation und Falschmeldungen gründeten Dozenten und Studenten der Mohyla-Journalistenschule in Kiew im März 2014 das Informationsportal Stop
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.Fake. Über 1000 Fälle von Manipulation und Lüge aus russischen Quellen hat Stop.Fake aufgedeckt. Etwa 130 000 Leserinnen und Leser besuchen täglich das Portal, das unterdessen nicht mehr nur Fakes entlarvt, sondern für Qualitätsjournalismus steht. Es sieht seine Perspektive darin, das Spannungsfeld von Politik, Propaganda und Publizistik zu erforschen." (Abstract)
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"The book is divided into five sections: 1. Community Empowerment and Sustainable Development; 2. Hate speech and Incitement; 3. Radicalization and Extremism; 4. Human Rights and Gender Equality; 5. Inter-religious and Intercultural Discourses in the media. Articles submitted are linked to one of th
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e sub-themes above in the context of media and information literacy. Special attention has been given to the intercultural dimensions of these areas. Papers involve an effort to engage the reader to understand media and information literacy beyond their home country or professional area of competence." (Page 16)
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"Die Medienstrategen des IS wissen, was das Publikum von ihnen erwartet. Ihr hämmernder Text, der Statements, Tweets, Videos, Bilder übertönt, wie hermetisch abgeriegelt ihr Reich ist. Sie bestimmen unser Bild vom "Islamischen Staat". Dafür etikettieren sie ihre Opfer um, leihen sich Tote und l
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gen sich ein Image zurecht." (Seite 230)
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