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Combating Disinformation in the Arab World. Case Study: The COVID-19 Pandemic

Noha Atef

Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ); Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2021), 43 pp.

"In this paper, ARIJ proposes the following recommendations which target the greater media community. This includes media institutions concerned with the press, unions, press unions and donors who support this venture. We maintain that disinformation is a product of a social and political environmen ... more

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Authoritarianism and Gendered Disinformation: A Case Study of the Philippines

Alex Kunze, Alice Schyllander, Katie Chambers, Nick Zuroski

Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs Global Capstone; #ShePersisted (2021), 39 pp.

"First, disinformation is enabled by the Philippines' history of colonialism and martial law, high social media usage and low digital literacy, compounding crises, strongman governance, and sexist and misogynist rhetoric from elected leaders. While the first three factors create conditions that gene ... more

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The Critical Risk of Disinformation for Humanitarians: The Case of the MV Aquarius

Sean Healy, Victoria Russell

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, volume 3, issue 1 (2021), pp. 28-39

"The search and rescue of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants on the Mediterranean has become a site of major political contestation in Europe, on the seas, in parliaments and government offices and in online public opinion. This article summarises one particular set of controversies, namely, fals ... more

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Cyber Capabilities as a New Resource of Power Conflicts in the Digital Sphere

Jason Chumtong, Christina Stolte

International Reports (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), issue 1 (2021), pp. 95-105

"Interestingly, traditional sources of power, such as military and economic strength, are not a prerequisite for success in cyberspace. It is true that the premier league of cyber powers also includes many traditional major powers in its ranks. But states need very few resources to build their cyber ... capabilities and exploit them to project influence, as the examples of international outsiders like Iran and Venezuela demonstrate. In some ways, cyber capabilities even seem ideally suited to allowing small and medium-sized countries to increase their influence because they represent an effective tool of asymmetric warfare. Even though they require relatively few resources and low-threshold technology, they have the potential to inflict considerable damage when deployed against other countries Attacks on poorly protected public authorities, businesses, or even infrastructure can cause serious damage to other countries. The risks for the attacker are reasonably low because attribution of the attacks is usually difficult and time-consuming. On top of this, the evidence is seldom clear, and consistent denial of any involvement is part and parcel of cyber warfare. This is also one of the key differences from previous power struggles at the international level. While the global battle for power and influence has always been accompanied by visible demonstrations of power and the accumulation of status symbols, the struggle in cyberspace takes place under the radar. This makes it especially difficult to identify shifts of power occurring today. Particularly in the field of information warfare, an area of growing importance in both national and international conflicts, states that were never previously on the radar as global players are now increasing their international influence. Yet, these countries recognised the potential of digital technologies at an early stage and are exploiting them with great success. Many of them have a wealth of experience in this respect due to having deployed the tools of information warfare against their own citizens and political opponents for many years. They can now direct this expertise towards other countries to wield global influence." (Conclusion, page 103) more

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Edelman Trust Barometer 2021: Global Report

Edelman (2021), 58 slides

"After a year of unprecedented disaster and turbulence – the Covid-19 pandemic and economic crisis, the global outcry over systemic racism and political instability – the 2021 Edelman Trust Barometer reveals an epidemic of misinformation and widespread mistrust of societal institutions and leade ... more

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The Long Tail of Influence Operations: A Case Study on News Front

Elise Thomas

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2021), 17 pp.

"This case study examines two websites and two blogging accounts which appear to be linked to News Front, a Crimean-based news organisation previously accused of being a source of pro-Kremlin disinformation and influence operations. The sites and accounts shared stories and images in many cases iden ... more

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Political messaging and information disorder during the 2020 Ghanaian elections: A multi-study analysis of verified misinformation and political social media engagement

Adedeji Adekunle

Abuja: Premium Times Centre for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) (2021), 37 pp.

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Malign Creativity: How Gender, Sex, and Lies are Weaponized Against Women Online

Nina Jankowicz, Jillian Hunchak, Alexandra Pavliuc, Celia Davies, Shannon Pierson, Zoë Kaufmann

Washington, DC: Wilson Center (2021), 61 pp.

"This report strives to build awareness of the direct and indirect impacts of gendered and sexualized disinformation on women in public life, as well as its corresponding impacts on national security and democratic participation. In an analysis of online conversations about 13 female politicians acr ... more

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Ondo and Edo Elections 2020: A Distribution Analysis of Information Disorder via Media Channels

Adedeji Adekunle, Silas Jonathan, Toluwalase Tawak

Abuja: Premium Times Centre for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) (2021), 10 pp.

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Tackling Kremlin's Media Capture in Southeast Europe: Shared Patterns, Specific Vulnerabilities and Responses to Russian Disinformation
Deep Insights

Rumena Filipova, Alexander Gerganov, Martin Vladimirov

Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) (2021), 124 pp.

"The current report illuminates the scope, means, and reach of Russia’s sharp power influence through the phenomenon of media capture. It traces the regime’s malign impact on good governance and democratic development in eight Southeast European countries (EU members: Bulgaria and Croatia, as we ... more

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Information Bedlam: Russian and Chinese Information Operations During Covid-19

Edward Lucas, Jake Morris, Corina Rebegea

Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) (2021), 20 pp.

"Based on a literature review through January 2021, evaluated at an expert seminar, this policy brief provides a baseline analysis of changing tactics, narratives, and distribution strategies in Russian and Chinese information operations (IOs) relating to the covid-19 pandemic. Key findings: China c ... more

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The Psychology of Fake News

Gordon Pennycook, David G. Rand

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, volume 25, issue 5 (2021), pp. 388-402

"We synthesize a burgeoning literature investigating why people believe and share false or highly misleading news online. Contrary to a common narrative whereby politics drives susceptibility to fake news, people are ‘better’ at discerning truth from falsehood (despite greater overall belief) wh ... more

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Motivations for Sharing Misinformation: A Comparative Study in Six Sub-Saharan African Countries

Dani Madrid-Morales, Herman Wasserman, Gregory Gondwe et al.

International Journal of Communication, volume 15 (2021), pp. 1200-1219

"In most African countries, “fake news,” politically motivated disinformation, and misinformation in the media were common occurrences before these became a preoccupation in the Global North. However, with a fast-growing population of mobile users, and the popularization of apps such as WhatsApp ... more

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The Sputnik V vaccine: An international success for Russia? An analysis of the way Russian state-owned media RT and Sputnik/SNA present information and use methods of disinformation in the examples of Germany, France, Great Britain, Serbia, Slovakia and Kazakhstan

Susanne Spahn

Berlin: The Greens-EFA in the European Parliament (2021), 41 pp.

"This analysis examines the methods of disinformation being used to prove Russia's scientific lead, while portraying Western compet-itors in a very negative light. Sputnik V is an instrument of "soft power" through which Russia is trying to gain influence worldwide. In order to evaluate how successf ... more

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The Road Ahead: Mapping Civil Society Responses to Disinformation

Samantha Bradshaw, Lisa-Maria Neudert

Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (2021), 27 pp.

"Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) bring a wide range of skill sets to the problem of digital disinformation. Some organizations focus on digital media literacy and education; others engage in advocacy and policy work. Another segment has developed expertise in fact-checking and verification. Other ... organizations have developed refined technical skills for extracting and analyzing data from social media platforms. This research yielded several clear observations about the state of CSO responses to disinformation and, in turn, suggests several recommendations for paths forward. • Prioritize Skill Diffusion and Knowledge Transfer. Civil society organizations seeking funding for counter-disinformation initiatives should emphasize the importance of skill diffusion and knowledge-transfer initiatives. The siloed nature of disinformation research points to a growing need to blend technical expertise with deep cultural and political knowledge. • CSO researchers lack sufficient access to social media data. Survey respondents identified insufficient access to data as a challenge. Sometimes data are not made available to CSOs; in other instances, data are made available in formats that are not workable for meaningful research purposes. Unequal access to the data that private companies do provide can exacerbate regional inequities, and the nature of data sharing by social media platforms can unduly shape the space for inquiry by civil society and other researchers. Funders, platforms, and other key actors should develop approaches that provide more consistent, inclusive data access to CSOs. • Duplicative programming hampers innovation. CSOs drawing on similar tools, approaches, and techniques to meet similar goals pointed to three main factors preventing more specialized, innovative initiatives: lack of coordination, lack of specific expertise, and lack of flexible funding. Community building and collaboration among relevant organizations deserve more investment, as do initiatives that partner larger, established organizations with smaller or growing ones, or pool efforts, skill sets, and expertise to encourage diverse research by design rather than by coincidence. • Relationships with tech platforms vary across regions. Surveyed CSOs often held simultaneously skeptical and positive opinions about their relationships with social media companies. Some receive preferential access to data and even funding for their work (raising concerns about independence), while others report a lack of responsiveness from company representatives. In the Global South and Eastern Europe, many CSOs expressed concern that platforms failed to meaningfully engage with them on issues of critical concern. • More flexible funding and more diverse research are both necessary. To encourage greater platform accountability across varied geographic contexts, CSOs and their funders should draw on the perspectives of specific, under-analyzed communities." (Executive summary, page 3-4) more

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Why Conspirational Propaganda Works and What We Can Do About It: Audience Vulnerability and Resistance to Anti-Western, Pro-Kremlin Disinformation in Ukraine

Peter Pomerantsev et al.

London School of Economics and Political Science; Internews Ukraine; Cardiff University, Crime and Security Research Institute (2021), 45 pp.

"The most effective propaganda resonates with audiences’ underlying worldviews and personal experiences. In order to fight it, one has to understand the mindsets that it preys on. This paper sets out to do exactly that. We first track a set of Kremlin-aligned propaganda narratives across Ukrainian ... more

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Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment

London et al.: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2021), 174 pp.

"This report sets out a new methodology for assessing cyber power, and then applies it to 15 states: Four members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance – the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia; Three cyber-capable allies of the Five Eyes states – France, Israel and Japan; F ... more

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The Routledge Companion to Media Disinformation and Populism

Howard Tumber, Silvio R. Waisbord (eds.)

London; New York: Routledge (2021), xxvi, 582 pp.

"This companion brings together various concepts used to analyse dimensions of media disinformation and populism. The companion is theoretically and methodologically comprehensive and features various historical and critical approaches providing a full and incisive understanding of media, misinforma ... more

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Democracy and Fake News: Information Manipulation and Post-Truth Politics

Serena Giusti, Elisa Piras (eds.)

London; New York: Routledge (2021), xiv, 232 pp.

"This book explores the challenges that disinformation, fake news, and post-truth politics pose to democracy from a multidisciplinary perspective. The authors analyse and interpret how the use of technology and social media as well as the emergence of new political narratives has been progressively ... more

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Finding China’s Edge: Engineering Influence Operations within the Limits of Social Media Platform Rules

Jakob Bund

Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS) (2021), 48 pp.

"To arrive at a careful evaluation of impact, this report concentrates on how the tactics of China’s influence operations have evolved during the first year of the pandemic. Looking at China’s key priority of information control, the first section conceptualizes the adaptation of influence opera ... more

Tackling Kremlin's Media Capture in Southeast Europe: Shared Patterns, Specific Vulnerabilities and Responses to Russian Disinformation Deep Insights

Tackling Kremlin's Media Capture in Southeast Europe: Shared Patterns, Specific Vulnerabilities and Responses to Russian Disinformation
Deep Insights